Fuller v. Smirga et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: Based upon the Court's review of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to re-filing of claims against defendants who are not absolutely immune and up on a showing (if applicable) that the underlying prosecution has terminated in plaintiff's favor. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants and close this case. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 3/2/2015.(Steinfeld, Sarah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

TYRIECE S. FULLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN SMIRGA, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:15-cv-00112 (JAM)

ORDER DISMISSING CASE
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Plaintiff Tyriece S. Fuller is a Connecticut state prisoner who has filed a pro se and in
forma pauperis complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and police officers. He seeks money damages of $50 million. I will dismiss the
complaint for multiple reasons. First, in the absence of any indication that the underlying
prosecution about which plaintiff complains has terminated in his favor, plaintiff has no
cognizable cause of action for money damages under § 1983. Second, all defendants are immune
under the Eleventh Amendment from plaintiff’s official-capacity claims. Third, the judges and
prosecutors are immune as well under absolute immunity principles from plaintiff’s personalcapacity claims. Finally, plaintiff’s allegations do not suffice as a matter of law to hold the
remaining defendants liable for conspiracy to engage in malicious prosecution.
BACKGROUND
Defendants are two judges of the Connecticut Superior Court (John Blawie and Robert
Devlin), three Connecticut state prosecutors (Ann Lawlor, Robert Satti, and John Smirga), two
special public defenders (Miles Gerety and Frederick Ury), and several police officers (Detective
David Edwards of the Connecticut State Police, Sergeant Jason Amato and Officer Everton

Walker of the Bridgeport Police Department, Officer Michael Paris of the Fairfield Police
Department, and Detective Therina of the Stratford Police Department). All defendants are
named in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants all
conspired on specific dates in 2012 and 2014 to violate his civil rights under the Constitution,1
and he alleges specific acts by each defendant as follows:
•

Judge Blawie allegedly covered up evidence tampering and perjured testimony and
would not permit the judicial marshals to call the police about an alleged assault and
threats against plaintiff by Special Public Defender Gerety.

•

Judge Devlin allegedly covered up fraudulent police reports, the fact that audio and video
surveillance evidence had been tampered with, and the concealment of other evidence.

•

Assistant State’s Attorney Lawlor is named as a defendant but no specific acts are alleged
to have been committed by her.

•

Assistant State’s Attorney Satti allegedly concealed evidence, knowingly used perjured
testimony at trial, knowingly used evidence at trial that had been tampered with, and
withheld evidence until plaintiff’s criminal trial began, and then presented the evidence
without notice.

•

State’s Attorney Smirga allegedly concealed evidence, covered up fraudulent police
reports, tampered with audio and video evidence, withheld evidence until plaintiff’s
criminal trial began, and then presented the evidence at trial without notice.

•

Special Public Defender Gerety allegedly assaulted plaintiff and threatened him not to
testify, did not inform the judge that prosecution witnesses gave perjured testimony and
that evidence was tampered with, concealed the fact that evidence was missing, covered
up fraudulent police reports, and tampered with audio and video evidence.
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Plaintiff alleges official misconduct in connection with an alleged drug sale on July 31, 2012, and during
multiple dates in 2012 and 2014. See Doc. #1 at 11. Records of the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch reflect that
plaintiff was convicted on July 23, 2014, on six different narcotics and weapons charges arising from incidents on
June 13 and July 31, 2012, and that he was sentenced on January 26, 2015, to multiple terms of imprisonment of
between one and five years of imprisonment on each count. Criminal/Motor Vehicle Conviction Case Detail: Fuller
Tyriece S, No. FBT-CR13-0271515-T, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, http://www.jud2.ct.gov/crdockets/
DocketNoEntry.aspx?source=Disp (search for docket number “FBT-CR13-0271515-T”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).

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•

Special Public Defender Ury allegedly removed pages from police reports, concealed the
fact that audio and video evidence existed, concealed the fact that police reports existed
for an alleged drug buy on July 31, 2012, covered up a fraudulent police report, and
tampered with audio and video evidence.

•

Connecticut State Police Detective Edwards allegedly tampered with audio and video
surveillance evidence from a confidential informant, falsified police reports and a search
warrant, and gave perjured evidence at plaintiff’s criminal trial.

•

Bridgeport Detective Amato allegedly tampered with audio and video surveillance as
well as surveillance photographs, falsified police reports, and gave perjured testimony at
plaintiff’s criminal trial.

•

Bridgeport Police Officer Walker allegedly falsified plaintiff’s arrest warrant and gave
perjured testimony at plaintiff’s criminal trial.

•

Fairfield Police Officer Paris allegedly falsified police reports, tampered with
surveillance photographs, and gave perjured testimony at plaintiff’s criminal trial.

•

Stratford Police Officer Therina allegedly tampered with audio and video surveillance
and surveillance photographs, falsified police reports, and gave perjured testimony at
plaintiff’s criminal trial.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review prisoner civil complaints and

dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. The Court must accept as true all factual matters alleged in a complaint, although a
complaint may not survive unless its factual recitations state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d
170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, it is well established that “[p]ro se complaints ‘must be
construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v.
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Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623
F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
Even in light of the liberal pleadings rules that are afforded a pro se complaint, this action
is subject to dismissal for multiple reasons. All of plaintiff’s claims against defendants relate to
criminal trial proceedings against plaintiff in the Connecticut Superior Court. It is a basic rule of
our constitutional structure that federal district courts do not have roving jurisdiction to review
matters that are pending in the state courts. See Teichmann v. New York, 769 F.3d 821, 826 (2d
Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Accordingly, it has long been clear that a federal § 1983 action may not
do service for a direct appeal or habeas corpus petition to challenge the validity of a state
criminal conviction. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that in
order for a plaintiff “to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486–87. The facts in Heck involved allegations that are similar to
the allegations plaintiff makes here—that prosecutors and an investigator had engaged in an
arbitrary investigation, had destroyed evidence, and had caused the improper admission of
evidence at trial. Id. at 479. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the complaint in Heck on
grounds that it failed to state a claim that is cognizable under § 1983.
Here, plaintiff does not allege that the prosecution against him ended in his favor or that
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his convictions have been set aside. If a prisoner wishes to challenge official misconduct that led
to his criminal conviction, the proper vehicle is by means of a direct appeal and/or petition for
writ of habeas corpus in Connecticut state court rather than an action for money damages under §
1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–82 (2005) (describing relationship between §
1983 actions and habeas corpus petitions). It follows that all of plaintiff’s claims must be
dismissed.
Even if I were to conclude that plaintiff’s claim was not barred in its entirety by Heck v.
Humphrey, I would dismiss them on other grounds. First, all of plaintiff’s official-capacity
claims for money damages are plainly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003).
Second, plaintiff’s personal-capacity claims against the judges are barred by absolute
judicial immunity. See generally Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam). No exception
to judicial immunity applies, because the allegations against the judges relate to actions taken in
their capacity as judges, rather than actions in their non-judicial capacity or actions taken in the
complete absence of jurisdiction. Id. at 11–12.
Third, plaintiff’s personal-capacity claims against the prosecutors are barred by absolute
prosecutorial immunity. See Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543, 546–47 (2d Cir. 2011) (absolute
immunity “attaches to prosecutorial functions that are intimately associated with initiating or
presenting the State’s case”); see also generally Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The complaint targets quintessentially trial-related
actions by defendant prosecutors, rather than investigative or administrative tasks that might be
subject to a lesser standard of immunity. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342; see also Teichmann,
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769 F.3d at 825–26 (absolute immunity to suit under § 1983 for judges and prosecutors alleged
to have violated plaintiff’s right to fair trial). Moreover, because the complaint contains no
allegations at all as to State’s Attorney Lawlor, plaintiff’s claim against her is also subject to
dismissal.
Finally, the remaining personal-capacity claims against special public defenders and
police officers are similarly without merit. The complaint alleges in substance a conspiracy to
engage in malicious prosecution but without a requisite allegation that the prosecution was
terminated in plaintiff’s favor. See Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). To the contrary, all indications are that the prosecution has ended unfavorably to
plaintiff by means of a conviction and sentence of imprisonment that he is now serving.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the Court’s review of plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
the complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to re-filing of claims against defendants who are
not absolutely immune and upon a showing (if applicable) that the underlying prosecution has
terminated in plaintiff’s favor.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 2nd day of March 2015.

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