Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport Board of Education et al

Filing 68

ORDER granting 54 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff shall have until February 1, 2018, to move to amend her complaint. Failure to meet this deadline will result in dismissal of the case. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 1/18/18. (Ladd-Smith, I.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CARMEN PEREZ-DICKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRIDGEPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
SANDRA KASE, and PAUL VALLAS,
Defendants.

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3:15-cv-00135-WWE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brings this employment discrimination action against
defendants Bridgeport Board of Education, Sandra Kase, and Paul Vallas. Perez-Dickson is a
Black Hispanic who alleges that defendants discriminated against her based on her race or
ethnicity. Perez-Dickson also alleges that defendants retaliated against her based on (1) her
complaints of racial discrimination and (2) her exercise of free speech pursuant to the
Connecticut Constitution.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. For the
following reasons, defendants’ motion will be granted.
Familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case is presumed.
DISCUSSION
The function of a motion to dismiss is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the
complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof."
Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.
1984). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Hishon v. King, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984). The complaint must contain the grounds upon which the claim rests through factual
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allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A plaintiff is obliged to amplify a claim with some factual
allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In a prior action between these parties (“Perez-Dickson I”), this court concluded that
plaintiff had proffered insufficient evidence of similarly situated comparators to admit an
inference of discriminatory purpose. 13-cv-198 (WWE). Plaintiff similarly failed to adduce
evidence showing that the challenged actions were pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, summary
judgment was granted in favor of defendants. On de novo review, the Second Circuit agreed:
Not only did none of the cited comparators hold the position of principal, but also,
most were accused of a single act of abuse, not the multiple acts charged to plaintiff,
each of which was preserved on videotape. Like the district court, we further
conclude that, even if plaintiff had carried her prima facie burden, she failed to
adduce evidence that would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that, in the
face of the serious (and documented) allegations of student abuse by plaintiff,
defendants' actions in placing her on paid administrative leave pending
investigation were a pretext for race discrimination.
Perez Dickson v. Bridgeport Board of Education, 2017 WL 362771, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 24,
2017).
This court previously dismissed the instant case (“Perez-Dickson II”) as duplicative of
Perez-Dickson I. The court reasoned that because plaintiff could have moved to add the
allegations contained in this case to the prior action but failed to do so within the schedule
prescribed by the magistrate judge, plaintiff should not be permitted to circumvent the unmet
deadlines by filing a duplicative action. These additional claims are of such a nature that they
could have and should have been joined in the first action. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit, in
Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., held that a “plaintiff has no continuing obligation to file amendments to
the complaint to stay abreast of subsequent events; plaintiff may simply bring a later suit on
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those later-arising claims.” 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the Second Circuit
remanded Perez-Dickson II. Defendants now move to dismiss the case in its entirety.
Perez-Dickson II adds claims that, subsequent to being placed on paid administrative
leave (the subject of Perez-Dickson I), plaintiff was given a six month suspension without pay
and was not granted the same rights and privileges as other administrators. Further, in August
2014, plaintiff was notified by the State Department of Education that her licensure as an
administrator would not be renewed. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants’ actions were not
based on serious, documented allegations of student abuse, but were instead retaliation for
plaintiff’s speech in 2012 concerning “the inability of school administrators to handle children
who are disciplinary problems.”
While cognizant of its duty to accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, for purposes of
efficiency and fairness, the court takes judicial notice of the records of Perez-Dickson I.
Dr. Kase and Mr. Vallas
Dr. Sandra Kase was Chief Administrative Officer and Paul Vallas was Superintendent of
Schools until their employment with the Bridgeport Board of Education ended in February 2014.
Defendants argue that Dr. Kase and Mr. Vallas should be dismissed from this case, as
plaintiff’s suspension without pay was decided by the Board of Education. Kase and Vallas were
not members of the Board. Moreover, Kase and Vallas had left the employ of the Board
altogether when the remaining adverse actions occurred, including the nonrenewal of plaintiff’s
administrator certificate. The State of Connecticut, not Kase and Vallas, declined to renew
plaintiff’s administrator certificate.
In response, plaintiff cites Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) for the
proposition that a supervisor who provides discriminatory reasons that are relied upon by the

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ultimate decision maker cannot escape liability. Pl.’s Resp. at 16 [ECF No. 60]. Plaintiff
contends that this is the cat’s paw theory and argues that under this theory neither Kase nor
Vallas are shielded from liability.
But, “Staub had brought a ‘cat's paw case,’ meaning that he sought to hold his employer
liable for the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment
decision.” Staub, 562 at 415 (emphasis added); see also Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance
Service, Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 271-75 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining cat’s paw liability). Plaintiff’s
argument is not persuasive because, in the Second Circuit, the cat’s paw theory of liability does
not hold employees responsible for decisions made by the employer. It does the converse.
“Within the Second Circuit, however, the cat's paw theory of liability has been recognized only
as a vehicle for holding an employer liable for the actions of a supervisor or other employee
having influence over a supervisor, rather than holding a subordinate employee liable for the
actions of a supervisor.” Cole-Hoover v. McDonald, 2015 WL 11142684, at *17 (W.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2015). Accordingly, the claims against Kase and Vallas will be dismissed.
Race Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Claims of race and ethnicity discrimination pursuant to Section 1983 are analyzed under
the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010). Under this framework, a
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving
rise to the inference of discrimination. Id.

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While understanding that the court is considering a motion to dismiss, not a motion for
summary judgment, the court is also attentive to a plaintiff’s obligation to amplify a claim with
some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim
plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In Perez-Dickson I, this court and the Second Circuit
agreed that, after discovery, plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence that defendants' actions in
placing plaintiff on paid administrative leave pending investigation were a pretext for race
discrimination. Nevertheless, the only allegation in plaintiff’s instant complaint that addresses
an inference of discrimination is at paragraph 8 of the complaint, where plaintiff again alleges
that similarly situated, unidentified employees were not placed on paid administrative leave.
Such allegation is not only implausible but also has already been decided in defendants’ favor at
summary judgment. See Perez Dickson at *2 (“On de novo review, we agree that plaintiff failed
to adduce admissible evidence showing that identified comparators were similarly situated to her
in all material respects.”). It is clear that plaintiff’s instant complaint requires amplification to
render it plausible. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims of race or ethnicity discrimination will be
dismissed.
Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 31-51Q
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are analyzed pursuant to Title VII principles. See Hicks v.
Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an
employee must demonstrate (1) participation in a protected activity; (2) defendants’ knowledge
of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,
420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, again, plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege a plausible
causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action.

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Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot rely solely on temporal proximity between her
allegedly protected speech that occurred in 2012 and adverse employment actions that occurred
15 months later, in October 2013, when she was suspended. Plaintiff responds that an
intervening pattern of antagonism between the protected speech and the adverse employment
action can be sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. But plaintiff did not allege such a
pattern here. Moreover, the “antagonistic” actions plaintiff describes in her response as “a
prolonged and extended series of investigations” are consistent with a formal inquiry into
allegations of documented child abuse by a school principal; they are not indicative of racial
animus. Plaintiff’s retaliation claims will be dismissed.
Amendment of the Complaint
Plaintiff has requested leave to amend her complaint in the event that the court finds it
deficient. The court will grant plaintiff leave to file a motion to amend. Plaintiff’s motion to
amend must explain how amendment of the complaint will not be futile in light of this ruling.
Defendants shall have 14 days to respond.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall
have until February 1, 2018, to move to amend her complaint. Failure to meet this deadline will
result in dismissal of the case.
Dated this 18th day of January, 2018, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/Warren W. Eginton
WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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