Handy v. USA
Filing
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ORDER denying 1 Motion to Vacate/Set Aside/Correct Sentence (2255). Please see attached Ruling and Order. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 6/9/16. (Samuels, J)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CHARLES HANDY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
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PRISONER
Case No. 3:15cv392 (RNC)
RULING AND ORDER
Petitioner Charles Handy, a federal inmate, brings this
action pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his convictions
and sentence on charges of drug conspiracy and distribution.
Mr.
Handy argues that his convictions were imposed in violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and
that his sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment is not valid in
light of an intervening change in the law.
For reasons that
follow, the petition is denied.
I.
Background
Mr. Handy was convicted after a jury trial on three counts
of the Superseding Indictment: conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A),
and 846 (Count 2); possession with intent to distribute five
grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) (Count 3); and possession with intent
to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 5).
The evidence at trial
showed that Mr. Handy was involved in a drug distribution
organization led by co-defendant Gavin Hammett.
Mr. Handy
regularly purchased crack cocaine from Mr. Hammett and was one of
Mr. Hammett’s largest volume customers.
The government’s
evidence at trial included recorded telephone calls, text
messages, the testimony of co-defendant Massiel Vargas (Mr.
Hammett’s girlfriend) and video surveillance, along with crack
cocaine and a digital scale that police had seized from Mr.
Handy.
A wiretap investigation conducted from April to May 2010
resulted in 35 recorded calls in which Mr. Handy spoke to Mr.
Hammett about obtaining crack cocaine.
Mr. Handy typically
purchased 28 grams at a time, but by June 2010, he was buying 40
grams per transaction.
Ms. Vargas testified that Mr. Handy
purchased crack cocaine from Mr. Hammett at least once per week.
In May 2010, after Mr. Handy and co-defendant Frank Green
were seen arriving at Ms. Vargas’s apartment then leaving in the
same car minutes later, police conducted a traffic stop and
recovered 26.9 grams of crack cocaine and 3.9 grams of powder
cocaine.
When Mr. Handy was arrested in June 2010, police seized
approximately $1,500 in cash, two cell phones, 3.7 grams of crack
cocaine, and a digital scale.
A search warrant on one of the
phones resulted in several text messages between Mr. Handy and
his narcotics customers.
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II.
Discussion
Mr. Handy claims that he is entitled to relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 because his counsel provided ineffective assistance
in failing to renew a motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29; and because the Court applied incorrect
statutory penalties at sentencing.
Neither claim provides a
basis for relief.
A.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a petitioner must establish that (1) his counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but
for his counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Bennett v. United States, 663
F.3d 71, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2011).
“rigorous” standard.
This is a “highly demanding” and
Bennett, 663 F.3d at 85.
When evaluating
claims of ineffective assistance, courts apply a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.”
United States v. Cohen, 427
F.3d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689).
Mr. Handy’s counsel filed a motion for acquittal pursuant to
Rule 29 at the close of the government’s case.
128(RNC), ECF Nos. 553, 554.
See 3:10-cr-
Counsel did not renew this motion
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after the close of all evidence or after the verdict was
returned.
On direct appeal, the Second Circuit summarily
affirmed Mr. Handy’s convictions, applying a “plain error or
manifest injustice” standard to his sufficiency challenge because
the motion for acquittal had not been renewed below.
United
States v. Hammett, 555 F. App’x 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2014).
Mr. Handy argues that his counsel’s failure to renew the
motion constituted ineffective assistance because it resulted in
the Court of Appeals applying a less demanding standard of review
on direct appeal.
This claim fails both prongs of the standard
set forth in Strickland, as counsel’s performance was not
deficient and petitioner suffered no prejudice.
A defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal is governed
by a “stern” standard that looks to whether, “viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v.
MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2005).
The abundant
evidence presented against Mr. Handy at trial, viewed most
favorably to the government, easily permitted a rational jury to
find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, a
renewal of the Rule 29 motion would have been futile.
Given the
weight of the evidence against Mr. Handy, his counsel acted
within “the wide range of reasonable professional assistance”
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when he did not renew the Rule 29 motion later in the
proceedings.
Cohen, 427 F.3d at 167; see also Aparicio v. Artuz,
269 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (failure to make “meritless
argument” does not constitute deficient performance); Baxter v.
United States, No. 3:09CV368 SRU, 2010 WL 4823241, at *2 (D.
Conn. Nov. 18, 2010) (courts are “reluctant” to require counsel
to routinely “file boilerplate motions merely to vindicate their
professional competence without regard for the grounds supporting
such motions”).
Moreover, Mr. Handy suffered no prejudice as a result of the
non-renewal of the motion.
Though the Court of Appeals stated
that Mr. Handy’s convictions were reviewed under a “plain error
or manifest injustice” standard, the summary order goes on to
hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
Hammett, 555 F. App’x at 109.
Specifically, the Court held that
“the jury could rationally infer that Handy had a stake in
promoting the illegal distribution of crack cocaine” and thereby
participated in a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846.
Id.
Similarly, the Court held that it was not “irrational
for the jury to find Handy guilty of possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Id. at 110.
In explaining its decision, the Court of Appeals
summarized and highlighted the weighty evidence presented by the
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government against Mr. Handy.1
Given the evidence in the record, Mr. Handy’s sufficiency
challenge was bound to fail regardless of the standard applied on
review.
See United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir.
2001) (“It is true that defense counsel’s failure to renew the
motion increased [petitioner]’s burden on appellate review of his
sufficiency of the evidence claim, but our decision on that issue
would have remained the same even if the usual, and less
burdensome, standard of review applied.”); Hadfield v. United
States, 979 F.2d 844, 1992 WL 340307, at *2 (1st Cir. 1992)
(counsel’s failure to renew motion for acquittal did not
prejudice petitioner because evidence “amply supported”
petitioner’s conviction”); Marte v. United States, No.
3:14-CV-560 (JCH), 2015 WL 778552, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn. Feb. 23,
2015) (no prejudice when counsel failed to renew motion for
judgment of acquittal because evidence was sufficient to support
conviction); DeGennaro v. United States, No.
2:07-CR-71-FTM-29DNF, 2011 WL 2681462, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 11,
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As the Court noted, the evidence permitted the jury to
find that “Handy and Hammett were in frequent communication and
participated in standardized weekly transactions of large
quantities of drugs,” Mr. Handy’s purchase of 28 grams of crack
“was an amount that would be used for resale and not personal
use,” and when Mr. Handy was arrested, he was “found counting a
substantial amount of cash and with a quantity of drugs
consistent with drug dealing,” along with “a digital scale and
two cell phones, which are tools that drug dealers often
possess.” Hammett, 555 F. App’x at 109-10.
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2011) (no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to renew
Rule 29 motion because motion “would have been without merit” and
“review under a de novo standard would not have changed the
result on appeal”).
Because Mr. Handy has not shown that he
suffered prejudice from defense counsel’s failure to renew the
motion for acquittal, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
cannot succeed.
B.
Statutory Penalties
As a second ground for relief under § 2255, Mr. Handy argues
that his sentence is not valid in light of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010.
Specifically, he contends that the Court should
have applied the drug quantity thresholds that went into effect
in 2010.
This claim is unavailing because it does not accurately
reflect what took place at his sentencing hearing.
At the time of Mr. Handy’s sentencing, the government urged
the Court to apply the penalties provided by the Fair Sentencing
Act, even though Mr. Handy committed his offenses prior to the
effective date of the Act.
The Court did so.
Tr., 3:10-cr-128(RNC), ECF No. 826, at 30-38.
See Sentencing
This resulted in a
statutory mandatory minimum sentence of five years, which was
doubled due to the filing of a second offender notice under 21
U.S.C. § 851.
Had the Court applied the penalty provisions
applicable to Mr. Handy’s offense at the time it was committed,
he would have been subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
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years, which could be doubled to twenty years.
Because Mr. Handy
got the benefit of the reduced penalty provided by the Fair
Sentencing Act, his claim fails.
III. Certificate of Appealability
In a proceeding under § 2255, a certificate of appealability
may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.”
2253(c)(2).
28 U.S.C. §
Under this standard, a certificate of appealability
will not issue unless reasonable jurists could debate whether the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner, or the
issues are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Mr. Handy has not
made this showing, so a certificate of appealability will not
issue.
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the petition [ECF No. 1] is hereby denied.
Clerk may enter judgment and close the case.
So ordered this 9th day of June 2016.
/s/ RNC
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge
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