Hannon v. Chief Public Defender et al

Filing 10

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 7/31/2015.(Norman, D.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

MICHAEL HANNON,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:15-cv-00418 (JAM)

v.
CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Michael Hannon is a prisoner in the custody of the Connecticut Department of
Correction. He has filed a complaint pro se and in forma pauperis seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In essence, his complaint alleges that defendants—attorneys, state and federal judges,
judicial clerk’s office staff, and others—have engaged in a massive conspiracy to deny plaintiff
effective counsel and otherwise impede plaintiff’s defense in a state criminal case and his claims
in related habeas cases. Because plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and implausible, I will dismiss
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint names the following defendants: the chief public defender, the
director of the office of assigned counsel (John Day), two attorneys (William Aosit and
Christopher Duby), six Connecticut state judges (Judges Bright, Fuger, Pellegrino, White,
Kaplan, and Clifford), a federal judge (Judge Covello) and two members of the clerk’s office in
the Connecticut Superior Court for the judicial district of Tolland (the chief clerk and an
employee named William Salvatore).
Plaintiff’s lengthy handwritten complaint is hardly a model of clarity. As best I can tell, it
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alleges the following. Plaintiff was charged with first degree manslaughter and other charges,
and a state court jury found him guilty of these offenses. Plaintiff appealed the conviction, but
did not succeed in any of his claims on direct appeal. Additionally, plaintiff has raised state and
federal habeas claims challenging his conviction. These claims, too, have failed. Throughout
these proceedings, plaintiff has been represented by numerous attorneys (both public defenders
and appointed private counsel), some of whom are named as defendants in this case, and his
various cases have been on the dockets of numerous state judges and at least one federal judge.
Plaintiff generally alleges that all these actors are engaged in a conspiracy to deny
plaintiff his right to adequate, conflict-free legal representation and to prevent him from
uncovering facts that would prove his innocence. According to plaintiff, “every lawyer and every
judge” involved in his cases has “aided the conspiracy and has prevented the development of
facts to uncover that [the victim]’s death was the result of gross medical negligence.” Doc. #1 at
17. Moreover, defendants have “intentionally denied [plaintiff] effective assistance of counsel
and justice as a result of [their] conflict[s] of interest.” Ibid. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must conduct an initial review of prisoner
civil complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. The Court must accept as true all factual matters alleged in a
complaint, although a complaint may not survive unless its factual recitations state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa
v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). Nevertheless, it is well established

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that “pro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see
also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of
solicitude for pro se litigants).
In light of this governing law, I easily conclude that plaintiff's complaint must be
dismissed. Plaintiff’s claims against the various state judges and one federal judge—for actions
undertaken concerning cases pending before them—are plainly barred by absolute judicial
immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). And it does not matter for
immunity purposes that plaintiff here is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief—rather than
money damages—because judges are immune from such claims under section 1983. See
Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2005).
The claims against members of a state court clerk’s office fail for similar reasons. Even a
defendant who is not actually a judge has judicial immunity for claims against them that stem
from their participation in judicial or judge-like functions. See, e.g., Root v. Liston, 444 F.3d 127,
131 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, plaintiff’s allegations against the clerk’s office defendants relate
entirely to their handling of plaintiff’s cases as staff members in the state court. Accordingly,
judicial immunity extends to them and bars plaintiff’s claims. See Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d
62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (clerk of court has absolute immunity from claim that clerk failed to
properly manage the court calendar and bring plaintiff’s case to fruition because “[a] court’s
inherent power to control its docket is part of its function of resolving disputes between the
parties” and “[t]his is a function for which judges and their supporting staff are afforded absolute
immunity”).

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Plaintiff’s complaints against the lawyers who have handled his cases also fail because
these individuals did not act under color of law when they represented plaintiff. A section 1983
action can only succeed where the defendant acted under the color of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well established that a public defender or any other lawyer does not act under color of law
merely by representing a client in a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against his lawyers must be dismissed.
To the extent that plaintiff asserts claims against other actors such as the chief public
defender and the director of the office of assigned counsel, those claims also fail because the
complaint is devoid of any facts plausibly indicating that these actors are responsible for any
constitutional tort.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
The Clerk of Court shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 31st day of July 2015.

/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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