Gladstone v. Health Career Academy et al

Filing 24

ORDER (see attached) GRANTING Plaintiff's 16 Motion Seeking Permission to File a First Amended Complaint, DENYING AS MOOT Plaintiff's 12 Motion for Default Judgment, and RENDERING MOOT the Clerk of Court's 11 entry of default in this action. As discussed in the attached Order, the Clerk of Court is directed to separately docket the Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiff's motion to amend, [Doc. 16 Ex. A], which is deemed filed and served as of the date of this Order, and Defendant is directed to respond to the Amended Complaint within the time specified in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on January 7, 2016. (White, B.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

BEVERLY S. GLADSTONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
3:15-cv-00517 (CSH)
HEALTH CAREER ACADEMY, and THE
WORK PLACE, INC.,
Defendants.

ORDER
HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff, Beverly S. Gladstone, brings this action against her former employer,1 Defendants,
The Health Career Academy and The Work Place, Inc., alleging violations of federal and state
workplace age discrimination statutes and of the Connecticut common law. The instant Order
resolves the pending issues that have arisen at the outset of this litigation.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint on April 8, 2015, claiming violations of the federal

Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act,
and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut common law. Doc. 1. On

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As of the date of the initial complaint (April 8, 2015) and the proposed amended
complaint (September 14, 2015), Plaintiff alleged that she was "still employed by the
Defendants." Compl. [Doc. 1], ¶ 12; Am. Compl. [Doc. 16 Ex. A], ¶ 12. However, in
subsequent briefing on the motion for default judgment she claims that she was terminated on
September 25, 2015. Doc. 22, at 1.
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August 25, following Defendants' failure to respond to the complaint by the August 21 deadline,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Entry pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Clerk of Court properly granted that motion on August 26, and default thereby
entered. Doc. 11. That same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment. Doc. 26.
Defendants thereafter made their initial appearance in the case on August 28, [Doc. 14], and
answered the complaint on September 1, [Doc. 15]. On September 14, prior to the date by which
Defendants' objection to the default judgment motion was due, Plaintiff filed a Motion Seeking
Permission to File a First Amended Complaint, aiming to add a fourth count for improper retaliation
under the ADEA. Doc. 16. The parties thereafter submitted extensive briefing on Plaintiff's Motion
for Default Judgment. Docs. 17-22. However, Defendants filed no objection to Plaintiff's motion
to amend the complaint, nor have any other submissions made any substantive reference to that
motion. This Order resolves all pending issues in the case with respect to Plaintiff's motion to amend
the complaint, the entry of default, and the motion for default judgment.2
II.

MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), a party "may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's

written consent, or the court's leave . . . [which] [t]he court should freely give [] when justice so
requires."3 Defendants did not provide written consent as to the amendment, and therefore Plaintiff

2

On January 6, 2016, the parties filed a join motion requesting this matter be referred to
a Magistrate Judge for purposes of conducting a settlement conference. Doc. 23. The Court has
yet to rule on that motion.
3

Generally, a party may amend its pleading as a matter of right if it does so within 21
days after serving it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Here, Plaintiff sought to file an amended
complaint well after 21 days after service of the initial complaint and thus Rule 15(a)(1) is
inapplicable.
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requires the Court's leave to amend her complaint.
Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to add a fourth count for improper retaliation under
the ADEA. According to Plaintiff, she was not issued a "Notice of Right to Sue" from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission—a prerequisite to bringing her ADEA retaliation
claim—until August 31, 2015, and thereby she could not have included that claim in her initial
complaint, filed nearly four months earlier. In light of this, and that Defendants do not object to the
filing of the amended complaint, the Court finds that "justice so requires" that Plaintiff be permitted
to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Permission to File a First Amended
Complaint is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed to separately docket Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint. As discussed below, the Amended Complaint is deemed filed and operative as of the
date of this Order.
III.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A default judgment is secured against a non-responsive defendant in two steps. First, the

moving party must show that the non-moving party "has failed to plead or otherwise defend" within
the time allotted by the Federal Rules. Upon such a showing, the Clerk of Court "must enter the
party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, only after the entry of default, and with an exception
not relevant here, the moving party "must apply to the court for a default judgment." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2). However, a court may elect not to enter default judgment, and can set aside an entry of
default, against a non-responsive party for "good cause." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). In other words, the
"decision whether to enter default judgment is committed to the district court's discretion."
Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2015). When applying this discretion, the
Court should consider: "(1) the willfulness of default, (2) the existence of any meritorious defenses,
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and (3) prejudice to the non-defaulting party." Guggenheim Capital, LLC v. Birnbaum, 722 F.3d
444, 455 (2d Cir. 2013).
Unsurprisingly, the parties' submissions on Plaintiff's default judgment motion focus on their
views as to the three factors identified by the Second Circuit in Guggenheim Capital. None of their
submissions, however, address Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint, and, specifically, its
impact on Plaintiff's attempt to recover a default judgment as to the causes of action in Plaintiff's
initial complaint. This is surprising because "once the amended complaint becomes the operative
complaint, a motion for default judgment made on a prior pleading should be denied," Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Yadgarov, 2014 WL 860019, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2014) (collecting ten cases), and,
generally, "once the original complaint is superseded, a clerk's entry of default on that pleading is
mooted," id. (collecting six cases). This principle controls here because an amended complaint
attached to a motion to amend becomes the operative complaint at the time when the motion to
amend is granted. See, e.g., Farina v. B&B Prop., 2000 WL 436565, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2000)
("[t]he amended complaint which was the subject of the Court's September 25, 1998 order granting
the defendant's motion to amend is deemed filed and deemed the operative complaint as of that
date"); Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 2012 WL 5471850, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2012) ("Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend . . . is GRANTED. The operative complaint in this action is now the Third
Amended Complaint. . . . The date of its filing and service is deemed to be the date of this Ruling's
entry.").
In line with the above principles, the Court's granting of Plaintiff's motion to amend her
complaint renders moot both her motion for default judgment as well as the Clerk of Court's earlier

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entry of default, both aimed at causes of action in Plaintiff's now-nullified initial complaint.4 In other
words, there can be no import to Defendants' defaulting as to the initial complaint because the
amended complaint "supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect." International Controls
Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment is denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion Seeking Permission to File a First Amended

Complaint, [Doc. 16]. The Amended Complaint attached to Plaintiff's motion is deemed filed and
deemed the operative complaint as of the date of this Order. Defendant is directed to respond to the
Amended Complaint within the time specified in Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Clerk is directed to separately docket the Amended Complaint.
The Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, [Doc. 12].
The Court RENDERS MOOT the Clerk of Court's entry of default, [Doc. 11].
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: New Haven, Connecticut
January 7, 2016
/s/ Charles S. Haight, Jr.
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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The Court notes, without deciding, that Defendants have nevertheless argued
persuasively that "good cause" likely exists to set aside the Clerk's entry of default (and deny
Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The Court is
cognizant of the fact that "default is viewed as an 'extreme sanction,' which should be treated as 'a
weapon of last, rather than first, resort.'" O'Neill v. Country Motors, II, Inc., 2015 WL 8779594,
at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2015) (quoting Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Defaults thereby "'are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions.'" Id. (quoting
Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, were the Amended
Complaint not to moot the issue of default in this action, the court likely would have resolved
any doubt "in favor of a trial on the merits," Meehan, 652 F.2d at 277, and avoided default
regardless.
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