Flowers v. Eversource Energy

Filing 70

ORDER denying 69 Motion for Relief from Judgment for the reasons given in the attached ruling and order. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/28/2020. (Dannenmaier, Katherine)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
PATRICIA A. FLOWERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONNECTICUT
LIGHT
POWER COMPANY,
Defendant.

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No. 3:15-cv-534 (VLB)

April 28, 2020

Ruling and Order Denying Motion for Relief from Judgment [Dkt. 69]
Plaintiff Patricia A. Flowers (“Flowers”) moves under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3) for relief from the Court’s September 29, 2017
judgment in favor of Defendant Connecticut Light and Power Company
(“Defendant”). Flowers claims that the judgment was procured through a
conspiracy of fraud on the Court. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES
Flowers’s motion.
I.

Procedural Background
Flowers filed this employment discrimination complaint against Defendant

on April 10, 2015. [Dkt. 1]. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on
September 26, 2016. [Dkts. 24 (Mot.), 25 (Mem. Supp), and 26 (Statement of Material
Facts)).]. On November 16, 2016, Flowers, through her then-attorney Thomas
Bucci, timely filed a Memorandum in Opposition [Dkt. 29] and Statement of Material
Facts [Dkt. 30]. In a motion filed December 30, 2016, Flowers claimed that Attorney
Bucci had omitted from discovery and the Opposition a number of pieces of
evidence and requested leave to refile. [Dkt. 45]. The Court granted Flowers’
motion, [Dkt. 48], and, on February 14, 2017, Flowers submitted a Substituted

Memorandum in Opposition. [Dkt. 52]. After considering the briefing, on September
29, 2017, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. [Dkt. 59].
Flowers appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision. [Dkts. 65,
68].
II.

Law of Fraud on the Court
The preclusive effect of a judgment advances the “dual purpose of

protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same
party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation.” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
Rule 60(b) provides narrow grounds for relief from a final judgment,
including for “any other reasons that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Relief
from a judgment obtained through fraud on the court is not constrained by the
strict one year deadline that constraints other Rule 60(b) motions. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(c)-(d). “Although both clause [Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b)](3) and the saving
provision of Rule 60(b) provide for relief from a judgment on the basis of fraud, the
type of fraud necessary to sustain an independent action attacking the finality of a
judgment is narrower in scope than that which is sufficient for relief by timely
motion.” Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 558 (2d Cir. 1988). Fraud on the court
“should embrace only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the
court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial
machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging
cases that are presented for adjudication.” Duse v. IBM Corp., 212 F.R.D. 58, 61 (D.
Conn. 2002) (quotations omitted), aff'd sub nom. Duse v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp.,

75 F. App'x 44 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Kupferman v. Consol. Research and Mfg.
Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir.1972)(Friendly, J.)). The few historic examples of
fraud on the court include: a complex, deliberate fraudulent scheme to defraud the
patent office, Hazel–Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford–Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, (1944),
and the corruption of a judge, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp., 182
F. Supp. 18 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
“Fraud on the court must be established by clear and convincing evidence.”
King v. First Am. Investigations, Inc., 287 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2002). A movant
“cannot circumvent the one year limitation by invoking the residual clause” for
fraud upon the court, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
461 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1972).
III.

Discussion
Flowers alleges a conspiracy between the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, Defendant, and her former counsel, Attorney Bucci, to defeat
Flowers’s retaliation lawsuit against Eversource. [Dkt. 69 at 5]. She bases this
conclusion on the following evidence:
•

Defendant’s legal counsel emailed EEOC twice informing the EEOC that
Defendant’s copy of Flowers’ EEOC complaint appeared to be incomplete
and requesting that the EEOC provide Defendant with the remainder of
Ms. Flowers’ complaint. [Dkt. 69 at 2-3]. Ultimately, however, Defendant
“addressed in detail” Flowers’ allegations at the EEOC level. Id. at 3-4.

•

The EEOC’s determination letter included the sentence: “you allege that
the Respondent failed to promote you in retaliation for filing a racial
discrimination complaint,” as opposed to a more generic phrase. Id. at 45.

•

Attorney Bucci omitted Flowers’ claim that Defendant’s “retaliation
against [Flowers] by failing to conduct a thorough investigation into
Flowers’ internal racial discrimination complaint” in the Amended
Complaint. Id. at 6. Attorney Bucci explained to Flowers that, “since the
EEOC explained that the theory was that the investigation was not done
properly so as to keep you from being promoted, that evidence would
come in under our first cause of action: failure to promote. We don’t have
to separately allege it.” Id. at 6-8.

•

Attorney Bucci omitted multiple material facts and evidence from the first
version of the Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 7
(citing [Dkts. 29, 30]).

•

In its reply to the Substituted Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, Defendant (a) argued that Ms. Flowers’ evidence was
insufficient because it was based on the “transcript of her deposition,
with no support other than self-serving documents of her own creation”
and (b) failed to specifically address each of the paragraphs of Ms.
Flowers’ 56(a)2 statement. Id. at 9-11.

Ultimately, Flowers alleges that the fraud was achieved by convincing the
Court to improperly determine the motion for summary judgment on disputed facts.
The Court finds that Flowers has not shown fraud on the court by clear and
convincing evidence. First, Flowers does not show that the alleged participants in
the fraud took any steps to intentionally deceive the Court. Flowers also does not
show or even claim that the allegedly participants took any steps to improperly
influence each other or the Court by ex parte communications or other means.
Second, the Court remedied any harm that Attorney Bucci might have
caused to Flowers’s case through the omissions in the first version of the
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment when the Court provided Flowers
with an opportunity to substitute another opposition to summary judgment. See
[Dkt. 48] and [Dkt. 52].

Third, Flowers has not shown that any fraud was achieved -- that is, that the
Court’s decision was based on fraudulently presented facts or on improper
influences. Indeed, Flowers’ main allegation of fraud – that the Court’s decision
was improperly reasoned – is not a question to be decided under Rule 60(d)(3), but
instead one to be decided by appeal. Flowers has in fact pursued that route, and
the Second Circuit has affirmed the Court’s judgment. See [Dkt. 68]. The Court
refuses to allow Flowers to attempt to circumvent that decision here.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Flowers’ motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____/s/________________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
District of Connecticut
Dated this day in Hartford, Connecticut: April 28, 2020