Dempsey v. Housing Operations Management, Inc.

Filing 42

ORDER denying 36 Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 6/1/2016. (Pollack, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ROBERT DEMPSEY,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:15-cv-615 (SRU)

v.
HOUSING OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT, INC., as agent for,
CEDAR HILL APARTMENTS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant.
RULING AND ORDER
Robert Dempsey brought this action against the management of the apartment building
where he lives, alleging that it violated the Fair Housing Act and its Connecticut analog by
evicting him for nonpayment of rent. He alleges that he failed to pay rent in the first instance,
and later failed to comply with the terms of a stipulated judgment, because of his disability—that
disability being alcoholism. He therefore argues that the defendant’s refusal to forbear from
evicting him, and to allow him to pay arrears on an installment plan, constitutes refusal to make a
reasonable accommodation to his disability. I heard argument on a motion to dismiss in
November 2015, and I took the motion under advisement while the parties attempted to resolve
the case. They later informed me that their efforts to resolve it were futile, and, in February 2016,
I issued a ruling (doc. # 34) granting the motion to dismiss. I expressed my regret that this case
was being litigated rather than resolved by the parties but held that the “accommodation”
Dempsey sought was extraordinary, “because the payment of rent as consideration for the right
to possess and use a property is the very basis and nature of the transaction between a lessor and
lessee” (doc. # 34 at 5). Dempsey has now filed a motion, in effect, to challenge that proposition.
Formally, he moves under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate my

earlier dismissal and under Rule 15(a) for leave to amend his complaint. In substance, he
reargues the motion to dismiss and seeks reconsideration of my decision granting it.
Rule 15(a)(2) provides for parties to amend their pleadings with the leave of the court,
and it directs that courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” But the liberal spirit
of that rule does not extend, of course, to amendments that would be futile. And Dempsey’s
proposed amended complaint does not state a more plausible claim under the Fair Housing Act
than his original complaint did. He alters his original in order to make more abundantly clear that
the defendant is not an ordinary landlord, but rather a non-profit provider of supportive housing
for formerly homeless residents with disabilities. But that was already clear. The defendant is,
however, still a landlord, which leases apartments to tenants in exchange for rent. It may be
reasonable to expect a non-profit provider of supportive housing to be in many ways more
flexible than other landlords, but I cannot agree with Dempsey that requiring “forbearance of
eviction for nonpayment of rent is not a fundamental alteration of the relationship between the
parties in this case,” (doc. # 41 at 2–3) much less that “it is the essence of their relationship” (id.
at 3). The parties in this case are landlord and tenant, and “the payment of rent as consideration
for the right to possess and use a property” (doc. # 34 at 5) defines that relationship, whether the
landlord has altruistic motives or seeks only profit. The Fair Housing Act does not prohibit
evicting tenants for failure to pay rent.
Dempsey’s motion to vacate and for leave to file an amended complaint (doc. # 36) is
denied.
It is so ordered. Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 1st day of June 2016.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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