Charles v. Gridley et al

Filing 5

ORDER. As set forth herein, all federal law claims are DISMISSED, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 5/26/15.(Bradley, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LEO FELIX CHARLES,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN GRIDLEY, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CASE NO. 3:15-cv-732 (MPS)

MAY 26, 2015

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, Leo Felix Charles, currently incarcerated at the Corrigan-Radgowski
Correctional Center in Uncasville, Connecticut, has filed a complaint pro se under section 1983
of title 42 of the United States Code. The complaint was received by the court on May 14, 2015,
and the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted on May 19, 2015. The
plaintiff names six defendants, Connecticut State Trooper Kevin Gridley, Connecticut State
Police Sergeant Stephen J. Samson, Deputy Warden Dennis Roche, Warden Walter Ford,
Correctional Lieutenant Dawn Hicks and Correctional Lieutenant Ernest Green. All defendants
are named in their individual capacities only. In his preliminary statement, the plaintiff identifies
his claims as false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful arrest, conspiracy to arrest, malicious
arrest, malicious prosecution, denial of equal protection, denial of due process, wrongful
initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution, malicious use of legal process, libel, slander,
defamation, conspiracy and cover-up in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as
well as state tort claims for malfeasance, nuisance, harassment, conspiracy, negligence and gross
negligence. See Doc. #1 at 2.
Under section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code, the court must review prisoner

civil complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. Id. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must assume the
truth of the allegations, and interpret them liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they]
suggest[].” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). “‘A document filed pro se is to
be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d
202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Although detailed
allegations are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants
fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a right to
relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not
sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
I.

Allegations
On October 8, 2012, the plaintiff was in pretrial detention at the Hartford Correctional

Institution. While working at his prison job, he was assaulted by inmate Parsons. Following the
assault, defendant Hicks ordered the plaintiff taken to the medical unit where he received first aid
treatment before being transported to the University of Connecticut Health Center emergency
room. Defendant Hicks interviewed the plaintiff regarding the assault prior to transport.
Upon his return, defendant Hicks asked the plaintiff to sign a form stating that he would
not press charges against inmate Parsons. The plaintiff refused to sign the form and asked
defendant Hicks to call the state police. She refused. When the plaintiff began arguing with
2

defendant Hicks, he was escorted to segregation where he was assaulted by several correctional
officers during the strip search. As a result of this assault, the plaintiff injured his right shoulder
and underwent a total shoulder replacement. Defendant Hicks issued the plaintiff a disciplinary
charge for fighting.
On October 10, 2012, defendant Green asked the plaintiff to plead guilty to the
disciplinary charge. The plaintiff insisted that he had been assaulted by inmate Parsons and
refused to plead guilty. He demanded that defendant Green call the state police. Defendant
Green refused and told the plaintiff that he would have the plaintiff arrested. Defendant Green
told the plaintiff that inmate Parsons had pled guilty to his disciplinary charge.
On October 12 and 16, 2012, the plaintiff wrote letters to then Commissioner of
Correction Arnone and Warden Ford informing them that he had been assaulted by inmate
Parsons and by correctional staff.
Acting Shift Commander Sharon Garrett conducted an investigation and determined that
the plaintiff was assaulted by inmate Parsons and that no weapon was involved. She reported her
findings to defendants Roche, Ford, Green, and Hicks. Despite the investigation results,
defendants Roche and Ford stated that the wounds on inmate Parsons’ back were consistent with
a penetrating-type of weapon and accused the plaintiff of using a make-shift weapon against
inmate Parsons. The medical incident report, however, noted only scratches to inmate Parsons’
upper left torso and back and swollen knuckles. Defendants Roche and Ford insisted that the
plaintiff had been involved in a fight with inmate Parsons.
On October 15, 2012, defendant State Trooper Gridley came to the Hartford Correctional
Center and spoke with the plaintiff in the presence of defendant Green. The plaintiff signed a
3

waiver of rights form and began telling defendant Gridley about the assault by inmate Parsons.
When the plaintiff began to ask to press charges against inmate Parsons, defendant Green
interrupted and stated that he would have the plaintiff arrested. Defendant Gridley told the
plaintiff he would see him at a later date and left the facility without taking the plaintiff’s
statement regarding the assault by inmate Parsons.
The plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the assaults by inmate Parsons and correctional
staff. Defendant Ford denied the grievance, informing the plaintiff that an investigation would
be conducted if evidence of misconduct were found, but that the plaintiff would not be privy to
the results of any such investigation. The plaintiff filed a second grievance seeking disciplinary
action against defendants Hicks and Green, and the staff involved in the assault of the plaintiff in
segregation.
On November 15, 2012, defendant Gridley returned to interview the plaintiff. The
plaintiff waived his rights and began describing the incident. Defendant Gridley, in reliance on
the statements of defendants Roche and Ford, stated that the plaintiff was involved in a fight and
had used a weapon against inmate Parsons. The plaintiff denied these statements and refused to
confess to fighting with inmate Parsons or using a weapon against him. Defendant Gridley
denied the plaintiff’s request that inmate Parsons be arrested.
Based on the evidence that inmate Parsons’ injuries were caused by a weapon, defendant
Gridley obtained a warrant for the plaintiff’s arrest. Defendant Samson condoned the actions of
defendant Gridley. On February 3, 2013, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault in
the third degree and disorderly conduct. On April 26, 2013, at a hearing during which the
plaintiff was not present, the State nolled the charges.
4

II.

Analysis
The plaintiff’s main claims are for false arrest and malicious prosecution. He asserts no

claims in the section of the complaint entitled “Claims for Relief” against defendants Hicks or
Green. Nor does he assert claims based on the assault by correctional staff, or the responses to
his grievances.
Case law within this circuit is clear that “[a] plaintiff does not have a claim for false
arrest or malicious prosecution under section 1983 if, at the time of his arrest and prosecution, he
already is in custody on other charges, because there is no deprivation of liberty interests.”
Arnold v. Geary, No. 09 Civ. 7299(GWG), 2013 WL 4269388, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing cases). The plaintiff alleges that he was in
pretrial detention at the time of both the assault and the arrest and prosecution. Indeed, the
Department of Correction website confirms that the plaintiff has been incarcerated since June 5,
2011. See www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us (last visited May 20, 2015). Thus, the plaintiff’s
federal claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution necessarily fail. This encompasses the
claims the plaintiff describes as false arrest, false imprisonment, unlawful arrest, malicious
arrest, malicious prosecution, wrongful initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecution and
malicious use of legal process.
The plaintiff also includes several conspiracy claims. He contends that defendants Roche
and Ford conspired to have him arrested by including in the incident report package their
assessment that a weapon was used to cause the injuries to inmate Parsons and that defendants
Gridley and Samson conspired to effect his arrest by focusing on that report rather than other
documents suggesting that no weapon was involved. All of the conspiracy claims relate to the
5

claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. To state a claim for conspiracy, the plaintiff
must state causes of action for the claims underlying the alleged conspiracy. See Caro v. Fidelity
Brokerage Servs., No. 3:13-cv-1028(CSH), 2015 WL 1975463, at *35 (D. Conn. Apr. 30, 2015);
see also Joyce v. Hanney, No. 3:05-cv-1477(WWE), 2009 WL 563633, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 4,
2009) (“if the underlying claim is dismissed, a conspiracy claim cannot stand”). As the plaintiff
has not stated a cognizable claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution, his federal conspiracy
claims also fail.
The plaintiff’s final federal claims are for denial of due process and equal protection.
The plaintiff bases his due process claims on the failure of defendants Gridley and Samson to
credit the evidence in the incident report package suggesting that no weapon was involved rather
than the evidence that the inmate Parsons’ injuries were caused by a weapon. However, the
plaintiff has “no due process right to a full and complete police investigation.” Gleis v. Buehler,
No. 3:04CV2217(DFM), 2007 WL 926907, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2007) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). If the police have probable cause for an arrest, they have no duty to
further investigate possibly exculpatory evidence. See Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 398
(2d Cir. 2006). The incident report package contained contrary evidence regarding involvement
of a weapon. The police were not required to determine which version of events was correct
before obtaining an arrest warrant.
To state an equal protection claim, the Second Circuit requires the plaintiff to
“demonstrate that he was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2005).
An equal protection claim also may be brought “by a ‘class of one’ where a plaintiff alleges that
6

[]he has been ‘intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” African Trade &Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Abromaitis,
294 F.3d 335, 362-63 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564 (2000)). Although the plaintiff references the Equal Protection Clause, he alleges no facts
showing that he was treated differently from other similarly situated inmates. Thus, his equal
protection claim also fails.
Supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of discretion, not of right. See United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 715-16 (1966). Where all federal claims have been dismissed
before trial, state law claims arising from the same case or controversy should be dismissed
without prejudice and left for resolution by the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). As the Court
has dismissed all of the plaintiff’s federal claims, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims.
ORDERS
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the court enters the following orders:
(1)

All federal law claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims.
(2)

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED this 26th day of May 2015 at Hartford, Connecticut.

/s/
Michael P. Shea
United States District Judge
7