Marosz v. Spaulding

Filing 13

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. See attached order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a separate judgment and close this file. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 11/17/2015. (Thomas, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
EDWARD MAROSZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CAPTAIN S. SPAULDING,
Respondent.

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CIVIL CASE NUMBER:
3:15-cv-891 (VLB)
November 17, 2015

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DISMISSING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
Edward Marosz, pro se and incarcerated at the Allenwood Medium Federal
Correctional Institution in White Deer, Pennsylvania, challenges a detainer lodged
against him by the State of Connecticut. ECF No. 1. Marosz invokes 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.

Id.

The Court thereafter informed him that his petition would be

construed as filed pursuant to Section 2254 and directed him to explain why the
so-construed petition should not be dismissed as barred by AEDPA’s one-year
limitations period or for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

ECF No. 8

(Order). Marosz now argues that he properly filed his petition pursuant to Section
2241 because he is serving a federal sentence. ECF No. 11 (Response). That
argument lacks merit.
Section 2241 may be used to challenge the execution of a federal sentence.
Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A
writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 is available to a federal prisoner who does not
challenge the legality of his sentence, but challenges instead its execution
subsequent to his conviction.”). A prisoner challenging the execution of his state
sentence is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which expressly

addresses “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Cook
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a
prisoner must use § 2254 to challenge the execution of state sentence).

A

challenge to a state detainer constitutes a challenge to the execution of a state
sentence and is therefore properly raised pursuant to Section 2254. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Deboo, 2012 WL 2396367, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. June 25, 2012) (“Where the
petitioner challenges the validity of another jurisdiction’s detainer, rather than its
impact on his present confinement, the proper vehicle for such a claim is 28
U.S.C. § 2254.”); Manns v. Martinez, 2008 WL 5104809, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 1,
2008) (same); Roberts v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 2009 WL 1351674, at
*2 (D.N.J. May 12, 2009) (same). Accordingly, the Court construes the challenge
as being asserted pursuant to Section 2254.1
Marosz also argues that he properly exhausted his claims because he filed
a motion in Connecticut Superior Court seeking “to revok[e] or modify[ ]
probation or supervised release” and attaches a copy of an undated state court
motion. ECF No. 11 (Response) at 10–13. Marosz subsequently submitted copies
of a sentence modification application dated July 2015 and a letter from the Office

1

A federal court ordinarily must employ special procedures before
engaging in such a construction, but Adams notice is not required here because
the Court dismisses the so-construed petition without prejudice. See Jiminian v.
Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting courts to construe, without
notice, § 2241 petitions as made pursuant to § 2255 when successive rules
inapplicable).
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of the State’s Attorney indicating its opposition to the sentence motion
application. ECF No. 12 (Letter) at 5, 9.
Section 2254 petitioners must first exhaust their state remedies before
seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(1)(A). A constitutional claim is
not exhausted until it has been Afairly presented@ in state court. Bierenbaum v.
Graham, 607 F.3d 36, 47 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29
(2004)). A claim is fairly presented if the highest state court was appraised of
both the factual and legal bases for the claim, such that Athe nature of the claim@
was likely to Aalert the court to the claim=s federal nature.@ Carvajal v. Artus, 633
F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

A claim remains

unexhausted, rather than procedurally defaulted, if the petitioner can still raise
his claim in state court. See Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 1025 (2005).
Marosz’s so-construed Section 2254 petition is unexhausted because his
filings indicate that he remains in the process of challenging the detainer in state
court.

Dismissal without prejudice is required here because Marosz has not

demonstrated that “there is an absence of available State corrective process” or
that “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Accordingly, the Court
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the so-construed Section 2254 petition as
unexhausted. The Court also DENIES a certificate of appealability because jurists
of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).

The Court further certifies under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the Court’s judgment would not be taken in
good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/_________________
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: November 17, 2015

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