Williams v. Hartford Police Dept. et al

Filing 176

RULING granting 160 Motion for Reconsideration, and adhering, in part, to the Court's prior 159 Rulings on Motions to Compel. See attached Ruling for details. Signed by Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam on 6/2/2016. (Katz, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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:
CHARLES C. WILLIAMS
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF HARTFORD, et al.
:
:
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Civil No. 3:15CV00933(AWT)

June 2, 2016

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [Doc. #160]
Pending before the Court is a motion by plaintiff Charles
C. Williams (―plaintiff‖) seeking partial reconsideration of the
Court‘s May 2, 2016, Ruling on Motions to Compel. [Doc. #160].
Defendants have not responded to plaintiff‘s motion. For the
reasons articulated below, the Court GRANTS plaintiff‘s Motion
for Reconsideration, and adheres, in part, to its prior ruling.
A.

Background
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background

of this matter, which is recited in the Court‘s Ruling on
Motions to Compel. See Doc. #159. For purposes of this Ruling,
however, the Court will briefly address the background leading
to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Pertinent to the below discussion, on January 4, 2016,
plaintiff moved for an order compelling defendants to respond to
numerous production requests. [Doc. #108]. As relevant here,
plaintiff sought an order compelling defendants Emory Hightower

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(―Hightower‖) and Terry Waller (―Waller‖) to respond to certain
requests for production1 relating to their respective
suspensions, reprimands, disciplinary histories, and any
allegations of misconduct and corruption (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the ―Misconduct Requests‖), for the
past six (6) years. See Doc. #108 at 17, 19, 25; Doc. #143-1 at
1-3.2 Defendants Hightower and Waller posed extensive objections
to the Misconduct Requests.
The Court granted, in part, plaintiff‘s Motion to Compel
with respect to the Misconduct Requests. See Doc. #159 at 31-36,
40-42. Specifically, with respect to defendant Hightower, the
Court ordered that he ―produce to plaintiff any records of
disciplinary charges, internal investigations, and complaints
directly related to allegations, if any, of abuse of power by
defendant Hightower in his position as police chief, for the
time period of January 1, 2011, through April 30, 2013.‖ [Doc.
Specifically: requests 2, 3, and 4 of plaintiff‘s September 7
and 30, 2015, Requests for Production directed to defendant
Hightower; request 5 of the September 30, 2015, Requests for
Production directed to defendant Hightower; and request 3 of the
November 11, 2015, Requests for Production directed to defendant
Waller.
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Although plaintiff did not file a motion as to defendant
Waller‘s responses, during the February 17, 2016, case
management and discovery status conference, plaintiff indicated
that he took issue with defendant Waller‘s responses to
plaintiff‘s requests for production. Accordingly, the Court
ordered defendant Waller to file his objections to plaintiff‘s
requests so that the Court could issue a ruling on defendant
Waller‘s objections. [Doc. #132 at 2].
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#159 at 35]. As to defendant Waller, the Court similarly ordered
that he ―produce to plaintiff any records of disciplinary
charges, internal investigations, and complaints directly
related to allegations, if any, of abuse of power by defendant
Waller in his position as Fire Chief, for the time period of
January 1, 2011, through April 30, 2013.‖ Id. at 41-42.
Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of that portion of the
Ruling on Motions to Compel pertaining to the Misconduct
Requests. [Doc. #160]. Specifically, plaintiff objects to the
limited timeframe placed on the documents to be produced by
defendants Waller and Hightower. Id.
B.

Legal Standard
―The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration]

is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless
the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.‖ Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995). Three grounds can justify reconsideration: ―an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.‖ Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat‘l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
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§4478 at 90). ―A motion for reconsideration may not be used to
plug gaps in an original argument or to argue in the alternative
once a decision has been made. Furthermore, a motion to
reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks
solely to relitigate an issue already decided.‖ Lopez v. Smiley,
375 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21–22 (D. Conn. 2005) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
C.

Discussion
Plaintiff‘s Motion for Reconsideration seeks a broader time

frame of documents than that ordered by the Court with respect
to the Misconduct Requests.
―A district court has broad latitude to determine the scope
of discovery and to manage the discovery process.‖ EM Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted), aff‘d sub nom. Republic of Argentina v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 189 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2014). ―Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) does not allow a party to roam in shadow
zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not
presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably
become so.‖ Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Konover, No. 3:05CV1924
(CFD)(WIG), 2009 WL 585430, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2009)
(quoting Evans v. Calise, No. 92CV8430(PKL), 1994 WL 185696, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1994)). Therefore, ―[t]he party seeking
discovery must make a prima facie showing that the discovery
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sought is more than merely a fishing expedition.‖ Id. (quoting
Evans, 1994 WL 185696, at *1).
As noted in the Court‘s Rulings on Motions to Compel, as a
general matter, in a section 1983 case such as this,
―[d]isciplinary records involving complaints of a similar
nature, whether substantiated or unsubstantiated, could lead to
evidence that would be admissible at trial and thus, are
discoverable.‖ Frails v. City of New York, 236 F.R.D. 116, 11718 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (compiling cases). Indeed, ―plaintiffs in
federal civil rights actions are presumptively entitled to
recollections as well as documents on prior complaints and
police history.‖ King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 198 (E.D.N.Y.
1988); accord Malsh v. New York City Police Dep‘t, No.
92CV2973(KTD)(AJP), 1995 WL 217507, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
1995) (―[C]ourts in this circuit frequently have ordered the
police to produce pre-complaint documentation of alleged police
misconduct[.]‖); Gibbs v. City of New York, 243 F.R.D. 95, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (―Plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to
discovery of documents on prior complaints and police histories
of individual defendants because it could yield relevant
information.‖ (citing King, 121 F.R.D. at 198)); Nicaj v. City
of New York, No. 07CV2382(LBS), 2008 WL 542606, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 25, 2008) (same). It was on this basis that the Court
granted plaintiff‘s motion, in part, as to the Misconduct
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Requests and permitted discovery as to any complaints pre-dating
the misconduct alleged to have occurred on the part of
defendants Waller and Hightower, as set forth in the Amended
Complaint. See Doc. #159 at 33-35.
Plaintiff now renews his request for documents responsive
to the Misconduct Requests subsequent to the time ordered by the
Court. In support of this position, plaintiff argues that
Hightower ―was accused for corruption also in 2014 which
resulted in his retirement in 2014. Further, defendant ‗Terry
Waller‘ retirement was forced in 2015 because of complaints
filed against him in 2014 and 2015.‖ [Doc. #160 at 1-2 (sic)].
Plaintiff also contends, in conclusory fashion, that defendants
Waller and Hightower were forced to retire early due to their
―ill behavior and actions dated from 2012 to 2014 concerning
‗Emory Hightower,‘ 2012 to 2015 concerning ‗Terry Waller.‘‖ Id.
at 2. This argument directly conflicts with plaintiff‘s prior
statement that defendant Waller was forced to retire in 2015
because of complaints filed against him in 2014 and 2015. Id.
Upon reconsideration, the Court finds that plaintiff should
be permitted to obtain documents spanning a broader time frame
with respect to the Misconduct Requests. First, the Court will
allow plaintiff to discover responsive documents, as set forth
in the Rulings on the Motions to Compel, up to and including the
date of plaintiff‘s arrest that forms the basis of this action,
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July 29, 2014. [Doc. #42 at 4].3 See, e.g., Chillemi v. Town of
Southampton, No. 12CV3370(ADS)(AKT), 2015 WL 1781496, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2015); Phillips v. City of New York, 277
F.R.D. 82, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Pacheco v. City of New York, 234
F.R.D. 53, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Accordingly, on or before June
23, 2016, defendants Hightower and Waller shall produce to
plaintiff any records of disciplinary charges, internal
investigations, and complaints directly related to allegations,
if any, of abuse of power by defendants Hightower and Waller in
his position as police chief and fire chief, respectively, for
the period of April 30, 2013, through and including July 29,
2014. Again, any privacy concerns may be alleviated by redacting
any personal information.
Second, some additional discovery in response to the
Misconduct Requests that post-dates plaintiff‘s July 29, 2014,
arrest is warranted. However, the Court will not permit the
wholesale disclosure of documents for the years 2014 and 2015
that plaintiff seeks, as plaintiff has not met his burden of
showing how such documents are relevant. For example, in the
motion for reconsideration, plaintiff baldly asserts that

Based on a review of public records, the Court erroneously
believed that the plaintiff had been arrested in April 2013, and
therefore ordered the production of documents prior to April 30,
2013. In fact, although the offense for which plaintiff was
arrested was allegedly committed on February 14, 2013, plaintiff
was not arrested until July 29, 2014.
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―defendants‘ were made to retire early in 2014 and 2015 as a
result of their ill behavior and actions dated from 2012 to 2014
concerning ‗Emory Hightower‘ and 2012 to 2015 concerning ‗Terry
Waller.‘‖ [Doc. #160 at 2 (sic)]. Plaintiff has not demonstrated
how information concerning defendants Waller and Hightower‘s
general disciplinary charges, internal investigations and
complaints relating to their alleged abuse of power after his
arrest are probative of the City‘s policies and practices that
were in place at the time of his arrest. See Chillemi, 2015 WL
1781496, at *6-7 (directing defendants to produce disciplinaryrelated documents for time frame following plaintiff‘s arrests
so long as the conduct underlying such disciplinary-related
documents were related to those arrests). Accordingly, the Court
hereby orders that defendants Hightower and Waller to produce
records of disciplinary charges, internal investigations, and
complaints, which occurred after plaintiff‘s July 29, 2014,
arrest and which are directly related to that arrest.
D.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS

plaintiff‘s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. #160], and adheres,
in part, to its prior ruling. The defendants shall produce the
additional materials ordered herein on or before June 23, 2016.
This is not a Recommended Ruling. This is an order
regarding discovery and case management which is reviewable
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pursuant to the ―clearly erroneous‖ statutory standard of
review. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); and
D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2. As such, it is an order of the Court
unless reversed or modified by the District Judge upon motion
timely made.
SO ORDERED at New Haven, Connecticut, this 2nd day of June,
2016.
/s/
HON. SARAH A. L. MERRIAM
United States Magistrate Judge

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