Kelley v. Hamden et al

Filing 86

ORDER: The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 77 ) is hereby GRANTED for the reasons set forth in the attached document. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims in the plaintiff's complaint and close this case. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 8/30/17. (Mata, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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:
TYRONE KELLEY,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CITY OF HAMDEN, et al.,
:
Defendants.
:
:
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Civil No. 3:15CV00977(AWT)

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 77) is hereby GRANTED.

The Clerk

shall enter judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims
in the plaintiff’s complaint.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the court
determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be
tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant
judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” Cronin v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995)(citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The burden of showing that no genuine factual dispute exists rests
on the party seeking summary judgment. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

“[M]ere conjecture or speculation by the party resisting
summary judgment does not provide a basis upon which to deny the
motion.” Quarles v. General Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d
Cir. 1985). “[T]he plaintiff must offer concrete evidence raising
genuine disputes of material fact tending to show that his version
of events is more than fanciful,” and “may not rely on conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Jeffreys v. City of
New York, 426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005). “The mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
OFFICER JASON, OFFICER McCUE, DETECTIVE INGLESE, INVESTIGATOR RYAN,
DETECTIVE DOLAN, OFFICER D’ANGELO AND SERGEANT RAGOZZINO
These defendants are named in the caption of the complaint and
the complaint contains conclusory allegations, but no specific

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allegations, about them.

As detailed in the Memorandum in Support

of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 77-1)
(“Defendants’ Memorandum”), there is no evidence that these
defendants were present when the plaintiffs spoke with police
officers on May 29, 2013 or when he was arrested on June 30, 2013.
“[W]here a complaint names a defendant in the caption but
contains no allegations indicating exactly how the defendant
violated the law or injured the plaintiff, a motion to dismiss the
complaint in regard to that defendant should be granted.” Zavatsky
v. Aronson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 349, 358 (D. Conn. 2001) (quoting

Dove v. Fordham Univ., 56 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)). The same principle applies now, at the summary judgment
stage.
Therefore these defendants are entitled to summary
judgment.
WILLIAM ONOFRIO AND PATROL OFFICER VENDITTO
False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution

The plaintiff brings claims for false arrest and malicious
prosecution.

He contends that his arrest on June 30, 2013 was

the result of an inadequate investigation and false evidence
provided by these defendants, and points to the fact that he was
acquitted after a jury trial in Connecticut Superior Court.
However, “the existence of probable cause is a complete defense
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to a . . . claim alleging false arrest or malicious
prosecution.” Garcia v. Gasparri, 193 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (D.
Conn. 2002) (citing Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65,
69–70 (2d Cir. 2001)).
The probable cause inquiry:
is an objective one that focuses on the facts available to
the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. Probable
cause exists when, based on the totality of circumstances,
the officer has knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy
information as to, facts and circumstances that are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed by
the person to be arrested.
Finigan v. Marshall, 574 F.3d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here there is no genuine issue as to the fact that the
arrest of the plaintiff on June 30, 2013 was supported by
probable cause.

The victim positively identified the plaintiff

as the individual who shot him in two sworn witness statements
and in a photo lineup.

Moreover, the arrest was made pursuant

to a duly issued warrant.

The fact that the criminal charges

against the plaintiff were dismissed does not bear on whether
there was probable cause for the arrest.

See Krause v. Bennett,

887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[P]robable cause does not
require an officer to be certain that subsequent prosecution of
the arrestee will be successful.”)
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The plaintiff contended during the telephonic status
conference on August 15, 2017 that transcripts from his criminal
trial would serve to create a genuine issue of a material fact
as to the existence of probable cause.

He asserted that the

officers lied when they stated that the victim told them that
the plaintiff had shot him.

However, the only evidence the

plaintiff pointed to in support of that contention was that the
victim’s description of the plaintiff was wrong with respect to
the clothing the plaintiff was wearing.

This would not be

sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
probable cause.
Therefore, these defendants are entitled to summary
judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for false arrest
and malicious prosecution.
Defamation
To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant published a
defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified
the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement
was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff’s
reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement.”

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Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620, 627–28
(2009).
The plaintiff’s defamation claim arises out of information
contained in police reports and the arrest warrant application.
Such reports are protected by the qualified privilege afforded
statements made during an ongoing police investigation.
Hopkins v. O’Connor, 282 Conn. 821 (2007).

See

“[T]he malice

required to overcome a qualified privilege in defamation cases
is malice in fact or actual malice.” Id. at 845 (citations
omitted).

However, the plaintiff has failed to present evidence

that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
defendants harbored malice towards him.
Therefore, these defendants are entitled to summary
judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s defamation claims.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the actor
intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should
have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3)
that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s
distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the
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plaintiff was severe.” Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn.
205, 210 (2000).

Extreme and outrageous conduct is defined as

conduct that “exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent
society.” Crocco v. Advance Stores Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 485, 504
(D. Conn. 2006) (quoting Carrol v. Allstate Insurance Co., 262
Conn. 433, 443 (2003)).

“Whether a defendant’s conduct is

sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and
outrageous is initially for the court to determine.” Appleton,
254 Conn. at 210.
Here, based on the information available to them, the
defendants were justified in questioning the plaintiff on the
evening of the shooting and ultimately arresting him once he was
positively identified by the victim in sworn statements and a
photo line-up.

Such reasonable and prudent conduct on the part

of the defendants falls well short of meeting the standard for
extreme and outrageous conduct.
Therefore, these defendants are entitled to summary
judgment with respect to these plaintiffs’ claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Municipalities and their employees are generally immune
from liability for discretionary governmental conduct.
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See

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) (“[A] political subdivision
of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or
property caused by . . . negligent acts or omissions which
require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official
function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by
law.”). “[T]he operation of a police department is a
discretionary governmental function.”

Gordon v. Bridgeport

Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 179 (1988). “Police officers
are protected by discretionary act immunity when they perform
the typical functions of a police officer.” Soderlund v.
Merrigan, 110 Conn. App. 389, 400 (2008).

While there are three

recognized exceptions to discretionary act immunity, as set
forth in the Defendants’ Memorandum, the plaintiff has failed to
produce evidence that would create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether any of the alleged acts and or omissions of
either of these defendants falls within one of these exceptions.
Therefore, these defendants are entitled to summary
judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s claims for negligence
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
CITY OF HAMDEN
Under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978), a municipality is liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
only for its own acts.

The defendant discusses the four ways in
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which a plaintiff can demonstrate that a municipality has acted.
See Defendants’ Memorandum at pages 15-16.

The plaintiff has

failed to produce evidence of a formal policy officially adopted
by the municipality that was unconstitutional on its face.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

See

The plaintiff makes no allegation that

any single, unconstitutional act or decision was taken by an
authorized decision-maker.

See Bd. Of County Comm’rs of Bryan

County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1997); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-84 (1986).

The plaintiff has not

produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to
whether the defendants were part of “a widespread practice that,

although not authorized by written law or express municipal
policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)(citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff has not produced evidence
that could create a genuine issue as to whether some failure on the
part of the municipality to provide adequate training or
supervision of the defendants rises to the level of deliberate
indifference.

See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 407-08; City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).

Therefore this defendant is entitled to summary judgment
with respect to the plaintiff’s Monell claim.
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CONCLUSION
The Clerk shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 30th day of August 2017, at Hartford,
Connecticut.
/s/AWT
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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