Burke v. Apogee Corporation et al

Filing 123

ORDER denying 118 Motion for Reconsideration. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Defendants and close this case. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 9/25/2017. (Williams, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JEFFREY BURKE,
Plaintiff,
v.
APOGEE CORPORATION, d/b/a IMPACT
PLASTICS, and SUPERIOR PLASTICS
EXTRUSION COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:15-CV-01012 (VAB)

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On August 4, 2017, the Court issued a ruling setting forth its findings of fact and
conclusions of law in connection with a bench trial held in this matter from February 13, 2017
through February 16, 2017. Order, ECF No. 117.
During the bench trial, Mr. Burke (“Plaintiff”) asserted that his employment contract with
Apogee Corporation, d/b/a Impact Plastics (“Apogee”) and Superior Plastics Extrusion
Company, Inc. (“Superior Plastics”) (together “Defendants”) provided him with the opportunity
to purchase a five per cent (5%) “shadow share” interest in the company. He argued that he
actually purchased this five per cent (5%) interest during the course of his employment, thus
entitling him to certain payments upon his termination, and that Defendants breached the
employment contract as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to
repurchase his shadow share interest upon his termination. Defendants, on the other hand,
asserted that Mr. Burke never finalized this purchase, therefore he was not entitled to any related
payments. The Court found for Defendants on all claims. Id.
Mr. Burke has now moved for reconsideration, arguing that he has a meritorious claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and requesting an evidentiary

hearing to determine the appropriate relief. Pl. Mot. for Reconsid., ECF No. 118. For the
reasons outlined below, Mr. Burke’s motion is DENIED.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration

will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995);
see also Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice”
(internal citations omitted)). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted where the
moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
II.

DISCUSSION
In his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Burke does not introduce any “decisions or data”

that would reasonably alter the Court’s conclusions. See id. Instead, he introduces a new legal
theory that contradicts the theory he raised in the context of trial. At trial, Mr. Burke
unequivocally asserted that he completed his purchase of a five per cent (5%) shadow share
interest in Apogee and Superior Plastics during the course of his employment. In his motion for
reconsideration, Mr. Burke now posits that Defendants’ “misrepresentations deprived [him] of
his continued opportunity to purchase shadow shares before his termination,” thereby breaching
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Pl. Mot. for Reconsid. at 4, ECF No. 118.
“[A] party may not use a motion for reconsideration to ‘relitigate an issue already
decided’ by advancing novel arguments that could have been raised previously.” Hadid v. City

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of New York, 182 F. Supp. 3d 4, 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257); see also
Palmer v. Sena, 474 F. Supp. 2d 353, 355 (D. Conn. 2007) (“A motion for reconsideration
cannot be employed as a vehicle for asserting new arguments or for introducing new evidence
that could have been adduced during the pendency of the underlying motion.”) (internal
quotations and marks omitted). Through this motion for reconsideration, Mr. Burke asserts a
theory that he chose not to raise at trial: namely, that he was denied the opportunity to purchase
shadow shares, a theory not only new, but wholly incompatible with the sworn testimony
presented at trial.1
“It is ... ‘well-settled’ that a motion for reconsideration is ‘not a vehicle for relitigating
old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.’” Diaz v. Bellnier, 914 F. Supp. 2d 136, 139
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P. 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d
Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and marks omitted). This is precisely what Mr. Burke seeks to do
here. Accordingly, Mr. Burke’s motion for reconsideration is appropriately denied.
III.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Burke’s [118] Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is

directed to enter judgment for Defendants and close this case.
SO ORDERED in Bridgeport, Connecticut this 25th day of September, 2017.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In his Reply Brief, Mr. Burke seeks to characterize the Court’s findings of fact as “newly discovered evidence”
establishing a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Reply Br. at 1, ECF No. 120. The
Court’s findings of fact, however, are based entirely on the parties’ presentations at trial, including Mr. Burke’s
sworn testimony that he did purchase a five per cent shadow share interest in Defendants. See Tr. I, 122:10-25. The
Court’s ruling thus properly considered the evidence presented at trial in finding Defendants not liable and neither
created nor discovered evidence. See United States v. Cuti, No. 08 CR. 972 DAB, 2011 WL 4000993, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (rejecting argument that court order following a Fatico hearing is “newly discovered
evidence,” stating that “[t]he Court's ruling is not newly discovered evidence; it is law”).
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