Russ McCullough et al v. World Wrestling Entertainment Inc

Filing 383

ORDER granting Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 205 and Motions to Dismiss 266 and 269 and granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion for Sanctions 262 . Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 9/17/2018. (Lindberg, Christina)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
RUSS MCCULLOUGH, et al.
Plaintiffs,

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
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3:15-CV-1074 (VLB)
v.
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LEAD CASE
WORLD WRESTLING
:
ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
:
Defendant.
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______________________________________________________________________
WORLD WRESTLING
ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT WINDHAM, THOMAS
BILLINGTON, JAMES WARE, and
OREAL PERRAS,
Defendants.

JOSEPH M. LAURINAITIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WORLD WRESTLING
ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and
VINCENT K. MCMAHON
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:15-CV-994 (VLB)
CONSOLIDATED CASE

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:16-CV-1209 (VLB)
CONSOLIDATED CASE
September 17, 2018

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
[DKT. NO. 205] AND TO DISMISS [DKT. NOS. 266, 269] AND GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SANCTIONS [DKT, NO. 262]
I.

Introduction
On September 29, 2017, this Court issued an order (the “Order”) regarding

a motion for judgment on the pleadings and motions to dismiss and for sanctions
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filed by World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (“WWE”) and Vincent McMahon
(collectively, Defendants). The Order directed counsel for the Plaintiffs in the
Laurinaitis action (“Laurinaitis Plaintiffs”) and declaratory judgment Defendants
in the Windham action (“DJ Defendants” or “Windham Defendants”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs” or the “Wrestlers”) to “file amended pleadings which comply with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9 and which set forth the factual basis of
their claims or defenses clearly and concisely in separately numbered
paragraphs.” [Dkt. No. 362 at 20]. In order to assist Plaintiffs’ counsel to meet
their theretofore unsatisfied pleading obligation—as noted in the Court's prior
rulings—and to mitigate any potential further prejudice to the Defendants, the
Court also required the Wrestlers’ counsel to demonstrate that they had
conducted factual due diligence in preparation for filing an amended complaint
by:
submitting for in camera review affidavits signed and sworn under penalty
of perjury, setting forth facts within each plaintiff’s or [declaratory
judgment] defendant’s personal knowledge that form the factual basis of
their claim and defense, including without limitation:
1. the date or dates on which they wrestled for WWE or any or its
agents or affiliates (including the first and last date);
2. if they wrestled for more than one person and or entity, for whom
they wrestled, and for what period of time;
3. whether they ever signed any agreement or other document in
connection with their engagement to wrestle by or for WWE or any of
its agents or affiliates;
4. whether they were ever or are now in possession of any document
relating to their engagement to wrestle by or for WWE or any of its
agents or affiliates, including without limitation W-4s, W-2s or 1099s;
and
5. what specific WWE employees or agents said or did that forms the
basis of each and every one of the claims or defenses in the
wrestler’s pleading, including:
a. a reference to the specific paragraph of the complaint;

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b. when and where such act occurred or such statement was
made;
c. the identities of any and all the persons present at the time of
the act or statement; and
d. any and all other facts personally known to the affiant that
form the basis of their belief that WWE or any or its agents or
affiliates knew or should have known that wrestling caused
any traumatic brain injuries, including CTE.
Id. at 20-21. The Court reserved its judgment on pending motions to dismiss, for
judgment on the pleadings, and for sanctions, to give the Wrestlers a final
opportunity to file pleadings that complied with both the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Order.
The Wrestlers filed a Second Answer in the Windham action [Dkt. No. 364]
and a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) in the Laurinaitis action [Dkt. No. 363]
on November 3, 2017. The Wrestlers’ counsel also submitted for in camera
review affidavits from each Wrestler. After reviewing each of these submissions,
and for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Wrestlers’ counsel did not
comply with the Order and that declaratory judgment, dismissal, and sanctions
are warranted.
II.

Background
On January 16, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel, Konstantine Kyros filed the first of

six lawsuits on behalf of former WWE wrestlers, alleging they are either suffering
from symptoms of permanent degenerative neurological conditions resulting
from traumatic brain injuries sustained during their employment, or are at
increased risk of developing such conditions. As set forth below, this case has
been characterized by Attorney Kyros’ repeated failures to comply with the clear,
and unambiguous provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this

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Court’s repeated instructions and admonitions, which has resulted in a
considerable waste of the Court’s and the Defendants’ time and resources.
A. Attorney Kyros’ Attempts to Evade the Court’s Jurisdiction
The first of the consolidated cases, with lead plaintiffs Evan Singleton and
Vito LoGrasso, purported to be a class action and was transferred to this Court
from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to a forum selection clause in
contracts signed by each of the plaintiffs. [Dkt. No. 6]. Thereafter, Attorney
Kyros filed several purported class actions in districts other than Connecticut,
each seeking the same or similar redress for the same alleged conduct as the
purported class action pending before this Court. Each of these cases was
subsequently transferred to this Court, with the District of Oregon noting that
counsel’s choice of forum showed evidence of forum shopping. Attorney Kyros
them filed the Laurinitis action in this district but which was randomly assigned
to Judge Eginton, thereupon Attorney Kyros attempted to prevent the case from
being transferred to this Court, despite the clear and unambiguous language of
this district's related case rule.
WWE sought sanctions against Kyros due to his persistence in filing suit in
courts outside of this district. In the exercise of utmost restraint the Court denied
this motion, but noted that Kyros’ actions appeared to be “part of a vexatious and
transparent attempt to circumvent two prior decisions by district courts in
Oregon and California either enforcing the forum-selection clauses or
nonetheless transferring WWE concussion litigation to this district.” [Dkt. No.
253 at 25]. The Court also noted that “Plaintiffs’ forum-shopping has forced

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multiple district courts to exert needless effort to corral these cases to the proper
forum.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court denied WWE’s motion for sanctions because
Kyros had filed the most recent of the consolidated cases in the correct district.
Id. at 25-26. The Court noted, however, that it was “open to reconsidering this
finding at a later date should Kyros revert to bad habits.” Id. at 26.
B. Attorney Kyros Repeatedly Files Complaints Rife with Irrelevant,
Inflammatory, and Inaccurate Information
The complaints in the initial actions consolidated before this Court were
nearly identical. They were exceedingly long and consisted of paragraphs
asserting generalities, legal conclusions and facts unrelated to the plaintiffs’
claims. The Court repeatedly instructed Attorney Kyros on his professional
obligations under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9, and 11. For example, in a
June 8, 2015 scheduling conference, the Court admonished Plaintiffs that “[t]he
defendant shouldn’t have to write a motion to dismiss, nor should the Court have
to read, research, and write a decision on a motion to dismiss when it’s patently
clear to the parties prior to the filing of the motion, that the claim should be
dismissed.” [Case No. 15-cv-425, Dkt. No. 73 at 49]. The Court went on to explain
that:
“[A] complaint should be a compilation of facts – facts. I’d really, really like
you to read the Federal rule, give it some close consideration, perhaps read
some cases on the pleadings standards, and then file this complaint again
in a week without any scrivener errors, without a lot of superfluous,
hyperbolic, inflammatory opinions and references to things that don’t have
any relevance.”
Id. at 60. The Court specifically noted that the Singleton complaint referenced a
report that became public in 2014, claimed that the plaintiffs were deceased when

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they were not, and referenced events that transpired in the lives of wrestlers who
were not parties to the lawsuit. Id. at 60-64. The Court asked,
“What does that have to do with either of your clients? They had both
stopped wrestling before 2014. I see no reason to include that in the
complaint, other than to inflame. It’s argumentative. A complaint should
be a clear and concise statement of the facts that form the basis of your
claim. So you need to identify what claim you’re asserting, do the research
to find out what facts have to be proven in order to establish that claim and
allege the facts that are necessary to prove each claim. Because the rest of
that is just window dressing. And that’s where you get into the trouble that
you’re in where you’re asserting that someone’s dead who’s not because
the complaint is full of hyperbolic stuff . . . . [I]t may be clear, but . . . it’s
not concise and it’s not accurate.
Id. at 61. The Court then granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint,
which they did.
Despite deficiencies in the amended complaints filed in the Singleton case
and others, the Court considered WWE’s motions to dismiss the complaints on
their merits, and dismissed claims (1) for negligence for failure to state a claim
under Connecticut law; (2) for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent deceit,
for failure to identify with any specificity any false representation by WWE upon
which the plaintiffs relied; (3) and for fraudulent concealment and medical
monitoring, because neither stated a separate and independent cause of action
under Connecticut law. [Dkt. No. 116 at 70]. The ruling also stated that the
complaints were “excessively lengthy, including large numbers of paragraphs
that offer content unrelated to the Plaintiffs’ causes of action and appear aimed at
an audience other than this Court.” [Dkt. No. 116 at 4].
A fraudulent omission claim as to plaintiffs Singleton and LoGrasso
survived the summary judgment stage, on the ground that these plaintiffs had
adequately alleged that WWE knew of the risk that repeated concussions or
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subconcussive blows could cause permanent degenerative neurological
conditions like CTE as early as 2005 and fraudulently failed to disclose this risk.
C. Attorney Kyros’ Conduct During the Discovery and Summary
Judgment Phases of Singleton
The parties conducted discovery into Singleton’s and LoGrasso’s claims,
during which WWE attempted to uncover, among other things, the basis for
plaintiffs’ allegations that (1) Singleton experienced symptoms associated with a
traumatic brain injury from which he suffered while wrestling for WWE; (2) WWE
made “deceptive public statements” which “downplayed known long-term health
risks of concussions”; (3) WWE attempted to criticize or discredit studies relating
to brain trauma or CTE; (4) individuals associated with WWE stated “wrestlers
diagnosed with brain trauma did not receive these injuries as a result of wrestling
for WWE.” [See Dkt. No. 198 at 22-35]. WWE also sought information regarding
the specific fraudulent omissions or misrepresentations that formed the basis of
the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 36. Plaintiffs were unable or failed to do so. When the
plaintiffs served deficient interrogatory responses relating to these issues, WWE
filed a motion to compel, which the Court granted in part. With respect to
interrogatories asking Plaintiff to identify a person or statement, the Court noted
that “[w]here Plaintiff is unable to identify a statement or speaker in response to
an interrogatory, Plaintiff must state that fact.” [Dkt. No. 144].
Plaintiffs supplemented their responses. However, WWE judged these
responses insufficient, and filed a motion for Rule 37 sanctions, arguing that
plaintiffs failed to comply with the Court’s ruling on WWE’s motion to compel.
[See Dkt. No. 198]. WWE specifically asked the Court to dismiss the case with
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prejudice and to award attorney’s fees. On February 22, 2018, Magistrate Judge
Robert A. Richardson issued a ruling recommending that the Court order further
supplementation of these six interrogatories, and that the Court order Attorney
Kyros and his law offices to pay WWE all of the legal fees that it incurred in
connection with its motion for sanctions. [Dkt. No. 371 at 17]. While Judge
Richardson recommended deniying WWE’s motion to the extent it sought
dismissal with prejudice, he noted that “plaintiffs and their counsel are now on
notice that any further noncompliance during the remainder of this litigation may
result in dismissal of the case.” Id. at 18. The Court adopted this recommended
ruling on July 22, 2018. [See Dkt. No. 376].
Shortly after Judge Richardson issued his recommended ruling, on March
28, 2018, the Court granted summary judgment as to Singleton’s and LoGrasso’s
claims on the grounds that (1) Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that WWE
knew of the risk that concussions could cause permanent degenerative
neurological conditions prior to 2007, which was after LoGrasso’s retirement
from wrestling; and (2) WWE offered undisputed evidence that it warned
Singleton of the risk before he sustained his career-ending injury in 2012. [Dkt.
No. 374 at 18-19]. The Court also noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel had once again
“asserted facts and advanced legal theories for which there is no reasonable
evidentiary and legal basis” and again “caution[ed] that such conduct subjects
counsel to Rule 11 sanctions.” [Dkt. No. 374 at 21]. The Court then advised
Plaintiffs' attorneys to discharge their ethical duty to the court by “read[ing] the

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record in its entirety before filing anything with the Court to assure their
reasonable belief in any and all future assertions of fact and law.” Id.
D. Windham Procedural History
WWE filed a complaint for declaratory judgment (“DJ”) against the
Windham Defendants, arguing that the potential claims raised in demand letters
sent by these Defendants were barred by Connecticut’s statutes of limitation and
repose. The Windham Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the DJ action. In
their motion, the Windham Defendants argued that the Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment, because the anticipated
lawsuits that WWE identified were too remote and speculative to create a
justiciable case or controversy. The Court granted the Windham Defendants’
motion to dismiss on the grounds that it had denied WWE’s motion to dismiss
LoGrasso’s complaint.
WWE filed a motion for reconsideration of this dismissal, arguing in part
that the Court erred when it presumed that the tolling doctrines which permitted
LoGrasso’s suit to move forward also applied to the declaratory judgment action.
In particular, WWE argued:
“The Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff LoGrasso plausibly alleged a basis
for tolling under the continuing course of conduct and fraudulent
concealment exceptions was based on his allegations that WWE knew of
information concerning a link between repeated head trauma and
permanent neurological conditions in 2005 or later. By 2005, all of the tort
claims threatened by the named Defendants in the Windham action would
have been foreclosed for years because none of them had performed for
WWE since at least 1999.”
[Dkt. No. 119-1 at 15 (citations omitted)]. The Court granted WWE’s motion for
reconsideration in part, holding that a case or controversy existed with respect to
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the named DJ Defendants, and holding that the application of Connecticut
procedural law was appropriate given that several related cases were already
pending in Connecticut, and that even if the Windham Defendants filed their
cases in different districts, they would likely be transferred to Connecticut. [Dkt.
No. 185 at 39-42]. The Court did not decide whether tolling the statutes of
limitation or repose would be appropriate as to the Windham Defendants.
In the Order, the Court stated:
[T]he DJ answer does not articulate any facts suggesting that discovery
will uncover of facts which would support the defenses asserted. The
Court cannot consider WWE’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a
vacuum; the Court must consider the motion in the context of the
sufficiency of the allegations of the complaints in all of the consolidated
cases. In that regard, counsel for the Windham Defendants has been
involved in the filing of six separate actions, some of which named plaintiff
wrestlers who had ceased performing for WWE well before 2005. Despite
being hundreds of pages long, in none of the complaints filed before
Defendants filed the DJ action did the wrestlers’ counsel plausibly allege
that before 2005, WWE knew of a link between repeated head trauma and
permanent degenerative neurological conditions and fraudulently failed to
disclose this link to its performers. Nor do the Windham Defendants.
....
Because (1) the Court has already thoroughly evaluated the issues
presented in the consolidated cases, determining that the claims of
wrestlers who had stopped performing for WWE prior to 2005 are barred;
(2) the Windham Defendants have not offered any indication in their answer
to WWE’s declaratory judgment complaint that their anticipated claims
would deviate from the claims asserted by the plaintiffs in the earlier
consolidated cases; and (3) because additional discovery would be
wasteful and unnecessary, the Court is inclined to grant WWE’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings.
[Dkt. No. 362 at 17-19]. Nevertheless, the Court deferred judgment on WWE’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, to give the DJ Defendants the opportunity
to amend their answer to specifically allege known facts or “facts likely to be
discovered on further investigation” that would show that their claims were not
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time-barred and to submit affidavits from each of the DJ Defendants consistent
with the Order.
E. Laurinaitis Procedural History
On July 18, 2016, Attorney Brenden Leydon filed the Laurinaitis complaint,
which was also signed by Attorney Kyros, Anthony M. Norris, Erica C. Mirabella
and Sylvester J. Boumil. This complaint named 53 plaintiffs, was 213 pages long,
featured 667 separate paragraphs, and was accompanied by twelve exhibits
totaling 208 pages. [Case No. 3:16-cv-1209, Dkt. No. 1]. The case was initially
assigned to U.S. District Judge Warren W. Eginton, who ordered the case
transferred to this Court under the District’s related case policy on September 27,
2016, following motion practice. [Case No. 3:16-cv-1209, Dkt. Nos. 28, 35, 39]. On
October 3, 2016, this Court consolidated the case with the other WWE concussion
cases pending before this Court. [Case No. 3:16-cv-1209, Dkt. No. 45].
Defendants WWE and Vincent McMahon filed motions for sanctions and to
dismiss on October 17 and October 19, respectively. [Dkt. Nos. 228-236]. The
Court referred the sanctions motion to Judge Richardson on November 4, 2016.
[Dkt. No. 249].
In the first sanctions motion, the Defendants stated that, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2), they served motions for sanctions on
Plaintiffs on August 5, 2016 and August 19, 2016, “advising them that the
Complaint made patently false allegations, asserted time-barred and frivolous
legal claims . . . [and that] at least 19 of the Plaintiffs executed releases covering
the claims in the Complaint.” [Dkt. No. 229 at 21]. Specifically, the motion alerted

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Plaintiffs that their complaints contained “patently false and nonsensical
allegations” resulting from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s decision to “plagiarize extensive
portions” of the complaint filed in the National Football League (“NFL”)
concussion litigation. [Dkt. No. 229 at 23-24]. These allegations included, for
example, the name NFL rather than WWE, the assertion that “wrestler” Mike
Webster “sustained repeated and disabling head impacts while a player for the
Steelers,” despite the facts that Mr. Webster was a football player, not a wrestler,
and that the Steelers are an NFL team unaffiliated with the WWE. [Dkt. No. 229 at
24 (citing Compl. ¶ 249)]. Although Defendants identified several other obviously
false allegations, Plaintiffs’ counsel did not withdraw or amend their complaint
within 21 days of service of the sanctions motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)
(permitting a party on whom a sanctions motion is served 21 days to withdraw or
amend their submission before the party seeking sanctions can file the sanctions
motion before the Court). Nearly three months after the sanctions motion was
filed, Plaintiffs’ counsel had not withdrawn or amended any allegations. Not until
November 9, 2016—and only after the Court referred the sanctions motion to
Judge Richardson—did Plaintiffs withdraw or amend their allegations by filing
their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). [Dkt. No. 252].
While the FAC removed or edited some of the most egregiously false
allegations, it still fell well short of the requirements set forth in Rules 8, 9, and
11. Defendants filed motions to dismiss the FAC and for sanctions on December
23, 2016, which the Court addressed in the Order. [Dkt. Nos. 262-270, 362]. The
Court noted that the FAC had ballooned to 335 pages and 805 paragraphs. [Dkt.

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No. 362 at 7]. The Court also cited several examples of “inaccurate, irrelevant, or
frivolous” allegations,1 and noted:
“Despite repeatedly requesting that plaintiffs’ counsel exclude irrelevant
allegations and ensure that each claim in each consolidated case have a
reasonable factual and legal basis, this Court has, in an abundance of
deference to the wrestler plaintiffs and to the detriment of WWE, applied a
liberal pleading standard more suited to a pro se plaintiff than to a licensed
attorney asserting claims on behalf of an entire class.”
Id. at 19. Nevertheless, the Court granted Plaintiffs one final opportunity to file a
complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, giving notice
that failure to do so would result in dismissal with prejudice and the imposition of
sanctions.
The Laurinaitis Plaintiffs filed the SAC on November 3, 2017. The SAC is
225 pages long and contains 669 paragraphs. The Court indicated in the Order
that the parties need not file any briefs or motions relating to the SAC, in an

The Court’s opinion cited the following paragraphs of the FAC: ¶¶ 51
(referencing a study published in October 2015 despite the fact that none of the
Laurinaitis Plaintiffs were still performing at that time), 108 (noting that WWE
instructed a female wrestler not to report a sexual assault she endured while on a
WWE tour despite the fact that this has no relevance to her claims about
neurological injuries or the enforceability of her booking contract), 130 (noting
that WWE is a monopoly that earns $500 million annually), 157 (quoting general
observations from the book of a wrestler who is not a party to this lawsuit), 159161 (noting that the WWE does not provide wrestlers with health insurance), 28993 (describing a fictional storyline in which a doctor claimed on television that a
wrestler who is not a Laurinaitis Plaintiff suffered a serious concussion, when in
fact he “did not have post concussion syndrome” and the storyline was intended
only to “create dramatic impact for the fans”), and 302 (stating that “100% of the
four wrestlers studied to date” showed signs of chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (“CTE”) when a publicly available study published by Bennet
Omalu, a neuropatholgist mentioned elsewhere in the complaint, stated that he
examined the brains of four wrestlers and founds signs of CTE in only two of
them and therefore Plaintiffs knew that only 50% of a statistically insignificant
number of former wrestlers were found to have had CTE).
1

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attempt to minimize the costs to the parties and the Court, and because the Court
had reserved judgment on Defendants’ fully briefed motions to dismiss, for
judgment on the pleadings, and for sanctions. Nevertheless, Defendants filed an
informal response with a list of allegations that they asserted were still irrelevant
or frivolous. [See Dkt. No. 365]. Plaintiff filed a responsive brief, which primarily
criticized Defendants’ brief for failing to conform to the requirements for a formal
motion to dismiss, and which did not attempt to explain why the allegations that
the Defendants identified were relevant or non-frivolous, and did not attempt to
explain why sanctions should not be imposed. [See Dkt. No. 366].
I.

Legal Standard
A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
“After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party

may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion
for judgment on the pleadings is decided on the same standard as a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Barnett v. CT Light & Power Co., 900 F.
Supp. 2d 224, 235 (D. Conn. 2012) (citing Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 159
(2d Cir. 2010)).
B. Motion to Dismiss
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Sarmiento v. U.S., 678 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusion’ or ‘formulaic

14

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). “Where a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In general, the Court’s review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) “is limited to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the
complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any
documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” McCarthy v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider
documents of which the Plaintiffs had knowledge and relied upon in bringing suit,
Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993), so
long as these documents are “integral” to the complaint and the record is clear
that no dispute exists regarding the documents’ authenticity or accuracy,
Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 133-35 (2d Cir. 2006).
Defendants also moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), on the grounds that all of the Plaintiffs’ claims are timebarred. “A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action
only when it ‘has authority to adjudicate the cause’ pressed in the complaint.”

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Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 168 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 585
F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010) (quoting Sinochem Int’l
Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007)). “Determining the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry and a claim is
properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate
it.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “When jurisdiction is
challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and the district court may
examine evidence outside of the pleadings to make this determination.” Id.
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he court must take all facts
alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
plaintiff, but jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that showing is not
made by drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting
it.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
C. Motion for Sanctions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states that “an attorney who presents ‘a
pleading, written motion, or other paper’ to the court thereby ‘certifies’ that to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry,
the filing is (1) not presented for any improper purpose, ‘such as to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation’; (2) ‘warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing

16

existing law or for establishing new law’; and (3) supported in facts known or
likely to be discovered on further investigation.” Lawrence v. Richman Grp. of CT
LLC, 620 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)). “If . . . the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court
may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
“[D]istrict courts generally have wide discretion in deciding when sanctions are
appropriate.” Morley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 66 F.3d 21, 24 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Sanko Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1987)). However,
“Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed with caution,” Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d
72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994), and “district courts [must] resolve all doubts in favor of the
signer,” Rodick v. City of Schenectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1350 (2d Cir. 1993).
“[N]ot all unsuccessful arguments are frivolous or warrant sanction,” and
“to constitute a frivolous legal position for purposes of Rule 11 sanction, it must
be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance of success and no
reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.” See
Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990). With regard to factual
contentions, “sanctions may not be imposed unless a particular allegation is
utterly lacking in support.” Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 388 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quoting O’Brien v. Alexander, 101 F.3d 1479, 1489 (2d Cir. 1996)).
“[T]he standard for triggering the award of fees under Rule 11 is objective
unreasonableness and is not based on the subjective beliefs of the person
making the statement.” Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy &

17

Sauce Factory, Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Storey, 347 F.3d at
388). This objective standard is “intended to eliminate any ‘empty-head pureheart’ justification” for patently unsupported factual assertions or frivolous
arguments. See Hochstadt v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 547 F. App’x 9, 11 (2d
Cir. 2013) (quoting Gurary v. Winehouse, 235 F.3d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Dismissal of a complaint with prejudice and monetary penalties “are
among the permissible sanctions allowed under Rule 11.” Miller v. Bridgeport
Bd. of Educ., No. 3:12-CV-01287 JAM, 2014 WL 3738057, at *10 (D. Conn. July 30,
2014). “Rule 11 also allows for the Court to refer the misconduct of an attorney
for consideration by disciplinary authorities.” Id. at *11. However, “[a] sanction
imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(4).
II.

Windham Action
The Court first addresses whether the Windham Defendants’ amended

answer sets forth sufficient facts to toll the Connecticut statutes of limitation and
repose.2 The DJ Defendants’ Second Affirmative Defense addresses WWE’s
claim that the statutes of limitation and repose bar the DJ Defendants’ claims.
Specifically, it asserts that WWE fraudulently concealed the cause of action from
the DJ Defendants until 2015. However, the Second Affirmative Defense does not
allege that WWE knew of a link between concussive or subconcussive blows and

The Court refers to pages 12-18 of the Order for a description of the law
governing the statutes of limitation and repose and the ways in which the prior
answer was deficient.
2

18

permanent degenerative neurological conditions like chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (“CTE”). Rather, it provides a summary of the injuries and
claimed injustices DJ Defendants suffered during their tenures as wrestlers,
many of which, such as James Ware’s “snapped” collarbone and Thomas
Billington’s inability to buy health insurance, have nothing to do with WWE’s
claims or the DJ Defendants’ defenses. [Dkt. No. 364 at 25-26]. The Court also
reviewed Mr. Ware’s and Mr. Billington’s affidavits. Neither sets forth any facts
suggesting that WWE knew of the risks of CTE or any other permanent
degenerative neurological condition before either wrestler retired and failed to
disclose this risk, either fraudulently or despite a continuing duty to either
wrestler to warn him of these risks. Nor do the Wrestlers point to anything in the
record to support this claim in opposition to the Defendants’ motion. The
Wrestlers therefore have not set forth any facts that would justify tolling
Connecticut’s statutes of limitation and repose—either in their original or
amended answers. The Court therefore enters judgment on the pleadings in
favor of WWE as to DJ Defendants Ware and Billington.
Counsel for the two remaining DJ Defendants has represented that they
are deceased. WWE has not sought to substitute executors or administrators of
their estates. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a),
“If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order
substitution of the proper party. A motion for substitution may be made by
any party or by the decedent’s successor or representative. If a motion is
not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the
action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.”

19

The DJ Defendants have failed to file a formal suggestion of death with this Court,
nor have they offered any indication that they have served such suggestion of
death on the executors or representatives of the estates of DJ Defendants
Windham and Perras, in accordance with Rule 25(a). See Gothberg v. Town of
Plainville, 305 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (D. Conn. 2015) (holding that service of a
suggestion of death on counsel for the parties, and not on the executors or
administrators of the decedents estates was insufficient to trigger the 90-day
period within which a motion for substitution may be filed); George v. United
States, 208 F.R.D. 29, 31 (D. Conn. 2001) (stating that death must be
“formally” suggested “upon the record.”).
If Windham or Perrasis is deceased, the Court cannot enter judgment
against him unless an opportunity to file a suggestion of death is afforded. The
Court therefore dismisses these two Defendants. If either party wishes to
substitute the executor or administrator of either estates, it must file a a formal
suggestion of death filed and served on all interested parties within 30 days, and
a proper motion for substitution must be filed within 90 days of service of the
suggestion of death. If no party seeks to substitute a duly authorized
representative for Windham or Perras within the time period allotted, all claims
against them shall be dismissed with prejudice without further order of the Court.
III.

The Laurinaitis Action
The Court next addresses Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 263,

266, and 269]. Defendants sought dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and as a Rule 11(c) sanction. The Court finds

20

that dismissal with prejudice is warranted because the Laurinaitis claims are
either barred by this Court’s prior rulings, time-barred, or frivolous, and that
amendment would be futile.
A. Plaintiffs’ Fraudulent Concealment and Medical Monitoring Claims
are Barred by the Court’s Prior Rulings
Plaintiffs assert separate counts of “fraudulent concealment” and “medical
monitoring” despite this Court’s clear holding, in the very first of the WWE
concussion cases that Attorney Kyros filed, that neither constitute causes of
action under Connecticut law. [See Dkt. No. 116 at 54 (stating that “fraudulent
concealment is not a separate cause of action”); Dkt. No. 116 at 69 (stating that
“[a] particular type or measure of damages and a cause of action entitling a
person to a particular type or measure of damages are separate and distinct legal
principles” and dismissing the medical monitoring claim because “plaintiffs have
failed to articulate any authority supporting the proposition that plaintiffs can
bring a cause of action of ‘medical monitoring’ separate and apart from their
cause of action for fraudulent omission under Connecticut law”)]. Nor has he
filed or prevailed on an appeal of the Court’s rulings or filed a motion for
reconsideration pointing out any error in the Court rulings. Attorney Kyros
simply ignores the Court’s rulings in violation of the law-of-the-case doctrine.
See United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]hen a court has
ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in
subsequent stages in the same case . . . . [T]he law-of-the-case doctrine [is]
driven by considerations of fairness to the parties, judicial economy, and the

21

societal interest in finality.”). These claims must therefore be DISMISSED once
again.
B. Plaintiffs Have Asserted Numerous Patently Time-Barred Claims
The first complaint in this action was filed on July 18, 2016. The SAC does
not allege that any Plaintiff wrestled for WWE and suffered a head injury while
wrestling later than 2011. Similarly, with limited exceptions, the Complaint does
not state when each Plaintiff first entered into a contract classifying him or her as
an independent contractor. However, the wrestler who retired most recently,
Salvador Guerrero, signed a booking contract in which he was classified as an
independent contractor in 2001, when he first started wrestling for WWE. [SAC,
Exh. A.]. It is therefore reasonable to assume that booking contracts were signed
when each wrestler began wrestling for WWE. Terry Brunk began wrestling for
WWE most recently—in 2006. [SAC ¶ 63].
1. Tort Claims
It is not subject to challenge that the statute of limitations for tort claims
set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577 applies to Plaintiff’s claims for fraud,
fraudulent nondisclosure, and civil conspiracy to commit fraudulent
concealment. Section 52-577 provides that “[n]o action founded upon a tort shall
be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained
of.” “The three year limitation period of § 52-577 begins with the date of the act
or omission complained of, not the date when the plaintiff first discovers an
injury.” Collum v. Chapin, 40 Conn. App. 449, 451-52 (1996) (citing Fichera v.
Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212-13 (1988)). “The relevant date of the act or

22

omission complained of, as that phrase is used in § 52-577, is the date when the
negligent conduct of the defendant occurs and not the date when the plaintiffs
first sustain damage . . . . Ignorance of his rights on the part of the person
against whom the statute has begun to run, will not suspend its operation.”
Kidder v. Read, 150 Conn. App. 720, 726-27 (2014).
Plaintiffs’ tort claims arise out of their allegation that WWE concealed the
risk that concussions or subconcussive blows could cause permanent
degenerative neurological conditions in order to induce Plaintiffs to continue to
continue wrestling. This omission must have occurred at a time when the
Plaintiffs were still wrestling and could still suffer head injuries while wrestling.
With the possible exception of Plaintiff James Snuka, discussed in the next
section, no Plaintiff has alleged that he or she wrestled for WWE later than 2011.
2. Wrongful Death and Survival Actions
The estates of five wrestlers—James Snuka, John Matthew Rechner, Brian
David Knighton, Timothy Alan Smith, Ronald Heard, and Harry Masayoshi
Fujiwara—also assert wrongful death and survival claims. Wrongful death claims
must be brought “within two years from the date of death” except that “no such
action may be brought more than five years from the date of the act or omission
complained of.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-555(a). “Section 52-555 may “serve as a
bar to a wrongful death claim” even if “an injured victim could not have known
that he or she had a claim against the alleged tortfeasor until after the limitation
period had expired.” Greco v. United Techs. Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 353 (2006).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-594 provides that if the time for bringing an action has not

23

elapsed at the time of a person’s death, the executor of that person’s estate may
bring an action within a year of the death.
Fujiwara last wrestled in 1996, [SAC ¶ 55], Rechner last wrestled in 2008,
[SAC ¶ 85], Knighton last wrestled in 2005 [SAC ¶ 86], and Heard last wrestled in
1989 [SAC ¶ 109]. The Complaint alleges that Snuka appeared in WWE
performances between 2005 and 2015. [SAC ¶ 52]. However, the affidavit of the
executor of Mr. Snuka’s estate, submitted for in camera review, stated that 1996
was “[t]oward the end of his career,” that “most of Jimmy’s full-time wrestling
was at the height of the 1980s,” and that he was “inactive” or “largely semiretired” between 1996 and 2015. The complaint does not allege, and the affidavit
does not support any allegations, that Mr. Snuka suffered any head injuries or
risked incurring such injuries later than 1996. All these wrestlers, with the
possible exception of Mr. Snuka, retired more than five years before this lawsuit
was filed. And Mr. Snuka has not alleged that any of his alleged injuries were
incurred during WWE appearances post-dating 1996. Wrongful death actions are
therefore barred by Section 52-555. Survival actions are barred because the
statutes of limitation or repose for each of the deceased Plaintiffs’ other claims
have elapsed.
3. Misclassification Claims
Plaintiffs assert misjoined claims that they were misclassified as
independent contractors and thereby denied the benefits and protections of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.

24

Because Plaintiffs assert that the misclassification was part of a “scheme to
defraud the Plaintiffs” and “achieved by the presentation to the Plaintiffs of
boilerplate Booking Contracts,” the misclassification claims are governed either
by the three-year statute of repose for tort actions, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577, or
the six-year statute of limitations for contract actions, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-576.
The District of Connecticut has previously considered the statute of
limitations for misclassification claims relating to WWE booking contracts. In
Levy v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., No. CIV.A.308-01289(PCD), 2009 WL
455258, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2009), Judge Dorsey held that misclassification
claims arose “at the inception” of the booking contracts. Plaintiff has not offered
this Court any compelling justification for disregarding Judge Dorsey’s holding.
As noted above, it appears that booking contracts were entered into when each
wrestler joined WWE. To the extent any of the Plaintiffs did not sign a booking
contract, but instead made “handshake deals” or worked as “jobbers,” these
wrestlers must have known of their classification as independent contractors
either when these deals were first made, or when each of these wrestlers received
tax paperwork within the year of making that deal. Plaintiffs also would have
been aware throughout their employment that they were not being awarded the
same benefits as individuals classified as employees of WWE. Indeed, Plaintiffs
expressly state in their complaint that they were not given retirement or health
benefits.
The Plaintiff who most recently joined WWE did so in 2006—approximately
ten years before this case was filed. Therefore, none of the Plaintiffs can

25

establish that they were first misclassified as independent contractors within six
years of the date they filed the complaint in this action. Plaintiffs’ ERISA and
OSHA reporting claims are predicated on this misclassification claim, and
Plaintiff has not offered the Court any authority to suggest that these claims may
survive after the misclassification claim is dismissed.
4. RICO Claims
Plaintiffs’ claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) are also time-barred. Civil RICO actions have a fouryear limitations period. In re Trilegiant Corp., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 3d 82, 104 (D.
Conn. 2014), aff’d sub nom., Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.
2018) (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
156-57 (1987)). This limitations period “begins to run when the plaintiff discovers
or should have discovered the RICO injury.” Id. (quoting In re Merrill Lynch
P’ship Litig.,154 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1998)). “The four-year limitation period
begins anew [for a civil RICO claim] each time a plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered a new and independent injury.” Id. However, “actual knowledge of
the fraudulent scheme is not necessary; an objective standard is used to impute
knowledge to the victim when sufficient ‘storm clouds’ are raised to create a duty
to inquire.” Id. at 106. Plaintiffs acknowledge that CTE was only diagnosable by
an autopsy performed after death.
Because Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are predicated on Plaintiffs’ alleged
misclassification as independent contractors, and such misclassification must
have taken place when each Plaintiff was first hired, the limitations period runs

26

from when each Plaintiff signed a booking contract, began working for WWE, first
received a tax statement classifying him or her as an independent contractors, or
noticed he or she was not receiving the benefits to which WWE employees were
entitled. No Plaintiff has alleged that he or she did so less than ten years before
this action was filed. Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are therefore time-barred.
5. FMLA Claims
The Family and Medical Leave Act provides that “an action may be brought
under this section not later than 2 years after the date of the last event
constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. §
2617(c)(1). For a willful violation, the limitations period is three years. 29 U.S.C. §
2617(c). With the exception of Mr. Snuka, each Plaintiff stopped working for WWE
more than three years before this case was filed. They therefore cannot establish
that their FMLA claims arose within the limitations period. Plaintiff Snuka has not
alleged that he even asked for family or medical leave between 2013 and 2016. He
also has not alleged that he was improperly denied such leave or punished for
taking such leave within the limitations period. The Plaintiffs’ FMLA claims are
therefore time-barred.
6. Successor Liability
Because all of the substantive claims against WWE are time-barred, and all
the claims that arise out of Plaintiffs’ work for ECW or WCW predate their WWE
claims, these ECW and WCW claims are also time-barred. The Court therefore
need not specifically address whether WWE should be liable for claims arising
out of its relationship with ECW or WCW.

27

C. Plaintiffs’ “Unconsionable Contracts” Claims are Frivolous
Plaintiffs claim that their booking contracts were void as unconscionable,
but they attach the contracts of only two wrestlers to their complaint, and identify
no particular unconscionable terms. Rather, Plaintiffs allege generally that they
were coerced into signing unfavorable “boilerplate” contracts without the
assistance of their own attorney or under threat that they would be fired or not
hired if they refused to sign, and that these contracts misclassified the wrestlers
as independent contractors. The Court has already established that
misclassification claims are time-barred. The remaining allegations regarding the
condition under which these contracts were signed are not claims that the
contracts were unconscionable.
Even if the Court were to liberally construe these claims as undue influence
claims, they would not be actionable and are therefore frivolous. The
Connecticut Supreme Court has held that “ratification results, as a matter of law,
‘if the party who executed the contract under duress accepts the benefits flowing
from it or remains silent or acquiesces in the contract for any considerable length
of time after opportunity is afforded to annul or avoid it.’” Young v. Data Switch
Corp., 231 Conn. 95, 103 (1994) (quoting Gallon v. Lloyd-Thomas Co., 264 F.2d
821, 826 (8th Cir. 1959)). This reasoning also applies when a contract is voidable
for undue influence. See Gengaro v. City of New Haven, 118 Conn. App. 642, 653
(2009) (holding that “the reasoning set forth in Young can be applied” to actions
to void a contract because of undue influence). And the Connecticut Supreme
Court has held that a delay of 17 months constitutes a “considerable length of
time.” See Young, 231 Conn. at 103. Each Plaintiff who signed a booking
28

contract with WWE enjoyed the benefits of those contracts without seeking legal
intervention for years following the execution of the contracts, and indeed, years
following the termination of each Plaintiff’s employment with WWE. Binding
Connecticut precedent bars these claims, and Plaintiff’s counsel has set forth no
non-frivolous argument for modifying or reversing this law.
D. The Statutes of Limitation Should Not Be Tolled Under the
Continuing Course of Conduct Doctrine
Under appropriate circumstances, the Connecticut statutes of repose may
be tolled under the continuing course of conduct doctrine. The plaintiff must
show the defendant: “(1) committed an initial wrong upon the plaintiff; (2) owed a
continuing duty to the plaintiff that was related to the original wrong; and (3)
continually breached that duty.” Witt v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 252 Conn. 363,
370 (2000).
Where Connecticut courts have found a duty “continued to exist after the
act or omission relied upon: there has been evidence of either a special
relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some
later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.” Macellaio v.
Newington Police Dep’t, 145 Conn. App. 426, 435 (2013). The existence of a
special relationship “will depend on the circumstances that exist between the
parties and the nature of the claim at issue.” Saint Bernard Sch. of Montville, Inc.
v. Bank of Am., 312 Conn. 811, 835 (2014). Connecticut courts examine each
unique situation “in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a
resulting superiority and influence on the other.” Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36,
41 (1982). Specifically, a “‘special relationship’ is one that is built upon a

29

fiduciary or otherwise confidential foundation characterized by a unique degree
of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior
knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the
other.” Saint Bernard Sch., 312 Conn. at 835.
However, “a mere contractual relationship does not create a fiduciary or
confidential relationship,” id. at 835-36, and employers do necessarily not owe a
fiduciary duty to their employees, Grappo v. Atitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A.,
56 F.3d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 1995); Bill v. Emhart Corp., No. CV 940538151, 1996 WL
636451, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1996). The law will imply [fiduciary
responsibilities] only where one party to a relationship is unable to fully protect
its interests [or where one party has a high degree of control over the property or
subject matter of another] and the unprotected party has placed its trust and
confidence in the other.” Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 41
(2000).
Plaintiffs have not established that WWE had any continuing duty with
respect to their health or their employment status after they left WWE. For
example, Plaintiffs allege that WWE “sends substance dependency letters
annually to its former performers offering free treatment, as well as community
updates and quarterly royalty payments” and maintains a “Talent helpline.” [SAC
¶¶ 270, 271]. It is reasonable to infer, based on WWE’s offer to provide substance
abuse treatment, that the hotline is related to substance abuse prevention or
treatment. It is not reasonable to conclude from the allegations in the complaint
that WWE has a continuing duty to keep itself apprised of former wrestlers’ health

30

or to provide comprehensive health care to these wrestlers. It is similarly
unreasonable to infer that retired wrestlers would not seek medical treatment
from sources outside of WWE after their retirement. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not
allege that WWE purported to be their primary health care provider, or that WWE
diagnosed, treated, monitored, or advised the Plaintiffs regarding their health,
including their mental health, after they retired. Similarly, the Court is at a loss to
imagine how continuing royalty payments give rise to any duty to the Plaintiffs
regarding their alleged misclassification as independent contractors decades
earlier.
E. The Statutes of Limitation and Repose Should Not Be Tolled Under
the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine
Connecticut has codified the doctrine of fraudulent concealment in Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-595, which provides: “[i]f any person, liable to an action by
another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of such
action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such person so
liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon first discovers
its existence.” In order to rely on Section 52-595 to toll the statutes of limitations
and repose, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the defendant: (1) had actual
awareness, rather than imputed knowledge, of the facts necessary to establish
the cause of action, (2) intentionally concealed those facts from the plaintiff and
(3) concealed those facts for the purpose of obtaining delay on the part of the
plaintiff in filing a cause of action against the defendant.” Falls Church Grp., Ltd.
v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 281 Conn. 84, 105 (2007).

31

Fraudulent concealment under Section 52-595 must be pled with sufficient
particularity to satisfy the requirements Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) with regard to fraud
claims, because a claim that the statute of limitations should be tolled because of
fraud, is “obviously, a claim for fraud.” In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., No.
304MD1631SRU, 2005 WL 2175139, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2005). In addition, a
plaintiff must show that due diligence “did not lead, and could not have led, to
discovery” of the cause of action. Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic
Dioceses, 196 F.3d 409, 427 (2nd Cir. 1999). “Typically, a plaintiff will prove
reasonable diligence either by showing that: (a) the circumstances were such
that a reasonable person would not have thought to investigate, or (b) the
plaintiff’s attempted investigation was thwarted.” OBG Tech. Servs., Inc. v.
Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Sys. Corp., 503 F. Supp. 2d 490, 509 (D.
Conn. 2007). Affirmative acts of concealment are not always necessary to satisfy
the requirements of Section 52-595. McCullough v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc.,
172 F. Supp. 3d 528, 555 (D. Conn.), reconsideration denied, No. 3:15-CV-001074
(VLB), 2016 WL 3962779 (D. Conn. July 21, 2016), and appeal dismissed, 838 F.3d
210 (2d Cir. 2016). “[M]ere nondisclosure may be sufficient when the defendant
has a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts.” Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel has now had the opportunity to conduct extensive
discovery on this issue in prior consolidated cases. He was unable to uncover
any evidence showing that WWE has or had actual knowledge that concussions
or subconcussive blows incurred during professional wrestling matches cause
CTE. The earliest evidence they were able to uncover is the fact that WWE

32

learned from public news reports that one wrestler, Christopher Benoit, was
diagnosed with CTE in 2007. Plaintiffs’ counsel therefore lacks any good faith
basis for asserting that WWE was aware of any association between professional
wrestling and CTE prior to 2007, which was after most of the Plaintiffs retired.
The Court is also unwilling to find that the diagnosis of one wrestler with
CTE is sufficient to imbue WWE with actual awareness of a probable link between
wrestling and CTE. Further, counsel lacks a good faith basis for asserting that
Plaintiffs who retired after 2007 could not on their own, in the exercise of due
diligence, uncover information timely about CTE or the risks that concussions or
subconcussive blows could cause CTE. For example, the circumstances
surrounding Mr. Benoit’s death were so tragic and so horrifying that it would
have been reasonable for his fellow wrestlers to follow news developments about
him and about CTE, through which they could have deduced that they were at
risk of developing CTE and sought medical opinions about risks to their own
health. This information was widely available in public news sources, such that
WWE did not have superior access to it, and could not have thwarted any
attempted investigation. Tolling on the basis of fraudulent concealment is
therefore baseless.
F. Amendment Would Be Futile
As noted above, Plaintiffs have asserted numerous patently time-barred
claims that have nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ alleged head trauma, any long-term
consequences of such trauma, or WWE’s concealment of the risk that such
trauma could cause permanent degenerative neurological conditions. The Court

33

has also repeatedly admonished the Wrestlers’ counsel, Attorney Kyros and his
appearing co-counsel regarding his inclusion of irrelevant and inflammatory facts
in its pleadings. [See, e.g., Dkt. No. 362 at 7, 20 (stating that the Laurinaitis
complaint included “numerous allegations that a reasonable attorney would know
are inaccurate, irrelevant, or frivolous”); Dkt. No. 263-2 at 60 (noting that prior
complaint included “superfluous, hyperbolic, inflammatory opinions and
references to things that don’t have any relevance”); Dkt. No. 116 at 13 (criticizing
counsel for including in pleadings “content unrelated to the Plaintiffs’ causes of
action”)].
In addition, the Court has repeatedly criticized Attorney Kyros for filing
“excessively lengthy” complaints, [Dkt. No. 116 at 13], including the FAC in the
Laurinaitis action, which the Order noted was 335 pages long, and included 805
paragraphs. The Court clearly instructed Attorney Kyros that if he failed to file an
amended complaint that complied with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9, and
11, the case would be dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court reminded
Attorney Kyros and his appearing co-counsel of the due diligence required to be
undertaken to assure compliance with the rules, and ordered them to file
evidence that the process of reaching a good faith belief in the facts asserted had
been conducted. They have persistently ignored this Court's orders and
persisted in filing complaints, including filing a mark-up of a previously critiqued
deficient complaint, which fail to remotely satisfy the pleading standards.
Rule 8(a)(2) states that a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 9

34

requires the Wrestlers to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake,” which is of particular relevance to claims that WWE
fraudulently failed to disclose the risks that concussions and subconcussive
blows could cause permanent degenerative neurological conditions like CTE, or
fraudulently concealed any causes of action.
The SAC remains unreasonably long, asserts claims that this Court has
previously dismissed, and continues to assert facts which Plaintiffs’ counsel has
no reason to believe are true. While the SAC has now been reduced to 225 pages
and 669 paragraphs, counsel accomplished this by single spacing roughly 54
pages, and through the liberal use of subparagraphs. While it is clear that
Attorney Kyros made some revisions to the prior complaint, he made no effort to
present a short and plain statement of the Plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief, as
required by Rule 8. Nor have Attorney Kyros and his appearing co-counsel
demonstrated that they have conducted due diligence sufficient to have a good
faith belief in the facts asserted in the SAC. Moreover, the SAC is rife with
allegations: (1) that this Court has previously considered and dismissed; (2) that
are patently irrelevant to the issues present in this lawsuit (including those the
Court previously identified as being irrelevant); and (3) that any reasonable
attorney would know are frivolous.
For example, its order regarding WWE’s motions to dismiss the first two of
the Laurinaitis Plaintiffs’ complaints, the Court specifically noted that a reference
to a study published in October 2015 was irrelevant because none of the Plaintiffs
were still wrestling in 2015. [Dkt. No. 362 at 7]. Nevertheless, in the SAC,

35

Plaintiffs cite several news reports and studies published between 2013 and 2017
in support of its claim that “it is not plausible that the WWE is unaware of the
risks of CTE in its performers.” [SAC ¶¶ 284-94]. What is really at issue in this
case is whether WWE knew of the risk that repeated head trauma could cause
permanent degenerative neurological conditions, fraudulently failed to disclose
these risks to wrestlers, and then fraudulently concealed facts which it had a
legal duty to disclose that would have given rise to legal claims between each
Plaintiff’s retirement and the date that this action was filed. Whether WWE
currently is or could be in possession of evidence that concussions can cause
CTE is immaterial.
The Court also previously identified as irrelevant the assertion that “WWE
is a monopoly that earns $500 million annually,” “general observations from . . . a
wrestler who is not a party to this lawsuit,” and the fact that “WWE does not
provide wrestlers with health insurance.” [Dkt. No. 362 at 7-8]. This nonexhaustive list of irrelevant allegations seems to have had little to no effect on
Attorney Kyros’ decision-making, because the SAC still lists WWE’s revenues,
observations that former wrestler and non-party Jesse Ventura made on a
television show, and the fact that WWE did not provide wrestlers with health
insurance. [SAC ¶¶ 11, 114, 263, 387-88, 328, 379, 462]. In addition to these
irrelevant allegations are numerous others, including a list of physical injuries
that have nothing to do with concussions or head trauma, incurred by several
Plaintiffs in the ring. [See SAC ¶ 37 (alleging that “Plaintiff Jon Heidenreich

36

sustained serious shoulder injuries requiring multiple surgeries” and that
“Plaintiff Marty Jannetty sustained a severe broken ankle”].
Attorney Kyros’ decision to assert frivolous claims has required the Court
to waste considerable judicial resources sifting through three unreasonably long
complaints filed in the Laurinaitis action, with the vague hope that some claim,
buried within a mountain of extraneous information, might have merit. “The
function of the pleadings is to give opposing parties notice of the facts on which
the pleader will rely.” Van Alstyne v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 8 Fed. App’x 147, 154 (2d
Cir. 2001). Counsel’s inclusion of numerous allegations which are unrelated to
any non-frivolous claim, and do nothing more than paint WWE as a villain, does
not provide Defendants with such notice. Instead, it needlessly increases the
cost of litigation by, for example, burdening Defendants with the task of drafting
and prosecuting multiple motions to dismiss and for sanctions, none of which
prompted Attorney Kyros to withdraw factually unsupportable allegations or
frivolous claims during the safe harbor period set forth in Rule 11(c)(2).
Furthermore, if the Court required the Defendants to engage with a complaint
comprised primarily of irrelevant and inflammatory factual allegations, it would be
shirking its responsibility to employ the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
“secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive” disposition of this action. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 1.
The Court has been extremely forgiving of Attorney Kyros’ and his
appearing co-counsels’ highly questionable practices throughout this case, in an
effort to give each wrestler a fair hearing. However, despite second, third, and

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fourth chances to submit pleadings that comply with Rules 8, 9, and 11, Attorney
Kyros has persisted in asserting pages and pages of frivolous claims and
allegations for which he lacked any factual basis. He was warned that if he
continued to do so this case would be dismissed, and he ignored this warning.
Attorney Kyros has offered the Court no reason to believe that if given a fifth,
sixth, or seventh chance, he would prosecute this case in a manner consistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the Court finds that further amendment would be futile and
that only the award of attorney’s fees and costs would deter Attorney Kyros from
committing future violations of Rule 11. Attorney Kyros and his Law Offices shall
pay all of the legal fees that the Defendants reasonably incurred in connection
with both of their Motions for Sanctions [Dkt. Nos. 262 and 228]. All fees paid
pursuant to this order are to be paid by the law firm and not by the client.
Further, in order to protect the public, Attorney Kyros is ordered to send by a
receipted mail delivery service a copy of this ruling to his appearing co-counsel
and to each of the Laurinaitis Plaintiffs and any other future, current, or former
WWE wrestler who has retained or in the future does retain his legal services to
file suit against WWE alleging an injury sustained during their wrestling contract
with WWE.

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IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons:
1. WWE’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Dkt. No. 205] is
GRANTED and declaratory judgment will enter as to DJ Defendants
Ware and Billington.
2. The action against DJ Defendants Windham and Perras is
DISMISSED without prejudice to reopening upon the filing and
service within 28 days of a formal suggestion of death and the filing
within 90 days thereafter of a motion to substitute the administrators
or executors of Windham’s and Perras’ estates.
3. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 266,
269].
4. The Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions [Dkt.
No. 262] to the extent it sought the award of attorney’s fees and
costs.
5. Nothing in this decision shall preclude Attorney Kyros from seeking
contribution from other appearing co-counsel.
6. The Court does not retain jurisdiction for purpose of resolving
sanction-sharing disputes among the attorneys.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the Defendants, close this case

and to terminate all pending motions in this consolidated case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________/s/______________
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Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: September 17, 2018

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