Ramos v. Correction et al
Filing
98
ORDER denying 96 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 96 Motion to Compel. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 3/16/2018. (Giammatteo, J.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JOSE ERIC RAMOS,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:15-cv-1444-VAB
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ET AL.
Defendants.
RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
Jose Eric Ramos (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit on October 2, 2015, asserting claims
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, (“RLUIPA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. See generally
Compl., ECF No. 1. Following a settlement conference, the parties voluntarily dismissed the
case, with prejudice and without costs or fees. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 93.
The Court subsequently dismissed the case. See Order Dismissing Case, ECF No. 94.
Mr. Ramos now moves for a judgment on the pleadings “and/or” a motion to compel
because he claims that Defendants breached the settlement agreement by requiring him to sign a
W-9 form. Pl. Mot. at 1, ECF No. 96. He seeks compliance with the settlement agreement, and
an additional $30,000.
For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Ramos is currently confined at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in
Suffield, Connecticut (“MacDougall-Walker”). See Amend. Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 76. Defendants
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include the current and former Commissioners of the State of Connecticut Department of
Corrections (“DOC”), as well as the director of religious services for the department. Id. ¶¶ 4-7.
Each defendant is sued in their individual and official capacity. Id. ¶ 8.
A.
Factual Allegations1
Mr. Ramos alleges that he requested religious tarot cards from prison officials. Id. ¶ 9. He
claims that the cards were shipped from a bookseller, but he was informed three months later that
the cards were sent back to the bookseller because he had not filed out the proper forms. Id. ¶¶
10, 14-15. Several months later, he ordered a second set of cards from Avanti Enterprises, Inc.
Id. ¶ 17. He alleges that the Department of Corrections took money out of his inmate trust
account, but he had not received the cards by the time he initiated the lawsuit. Id. ¶¶ 18-20
B.
Procedural History
Mr. Ramos filed the initial Complaint in this lawsuit on October 2, 2015. He asserted
claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as well as under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, (“RLUIPA”) 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. against the Department of
Correction, Reverend Bruno, Counselor Arcouette and John Doe Commissioner of the
Department of Correction. See generally Compl.
The Court dismissed all claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their
official capacities under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) and all other claims against the Department of
Correction and Counselor Arcouette under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). See Initial Review Order at
7, ECF No. 9. The Court concluded, however, that the First Amendment free exercise claim, the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim and RLUIPA claim would proceed against the
Commissioner of Correction and Reverend Bruno in their individual and official capacities. Id.
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The factual allegations addressed here are drawn from the Amended Complaint.
2
The Court also noted that the U.S. Marshal could not serve the Commissioner, unless he was
identified by name, id. at 8. Mr. Ramos subsequently identified the Commissioner as Leo C.
Arnone, and the Clerk added Mr. Arnone as a defendant. See Notice, ECF No. 13; Order, ECF
No. 16.
Mr. Ramos then moved to amend the Complaint and filed two proposed supplemental
complaints. See Mot. Leave Amend., ECF No. 22; Proposed Suppl. Compl., ECF No. 44; Second
Proposed Suppl. Compl., ECF No. 48. He also filed two motions for summary judgment. ECF
Nos. 44, 48. Defendants moved to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 29.
The Court granted leave to amend, but ordered that the supplemental complaints be
removed from the docket because they added allegations unrelated to those raised in the initial
Complaint. See Ruling on Motions to Amend, to Dismiss, for Summ. J. and Proposed Suppl.
Compl. at 4, 12, ECF No. 71. The Court also denied both motions for summary judgment and the
motion to dismiss, without prejudice to renewal after the filing of the Amended Complaint. Id. at
12-15.
The Court also “warn[ed] Mr. Ramos that he has not been granted leave to add any of the
new claims from his proposed supplemental complaint.” Id. at 15. The Court directed Mr. Ramos
to file an amended complaint identifying himself as the plaintiff, Commissioner Arnone,
Commissioner Dzurenda, Deputy Commissioner Scott Semple, and Reverend Bruno as
defendants. It also instructed Mr. Ramos to “include the First Amendment free exercise and
RLUIPA claims, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim as asserted in the
complaint against Reverend Bruno and Commissioner Arnone and the deprivation of property
claim and the free exercise of religion claim as asserted in the proposed amended complaint
against Commissioner Dzurenda and Deputy Commissioner Semple.” Id. Additionally, the Court
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referred the case to Magistrate Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons for a settlement conference. See
Order, ECF No. 72.
The Court partially granted Mr. Ramos’s motion for appointment of counsel. See Ruling
on Pending Mot. at 9, ECF No. 73. While Mr Ramos had “not demonstrated a need for the
appointment of pro bono counsel for the purposes of trial, the Court recognized that Mr. Ramos
may benefit from representation at the recently scheduled settlement conference in this matter.”
Id.
Mr. Ramos filed an Amended Complaint. He alleged several different violations:
the deprivation of property; deprivation of free exercise; deprivation
of free exercise of religion; deprivation of equal protection rights;
deliberate indifference to plaintiffs property, due process right(s)
and religious needs; denial of property/theft of property . . . violated
Plaintiff Jose Ramos’ rights and constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, a due process violation, a free exercise violation, a free
exercise of religion violation, deprivation of property, a violation of
equal protection under the First Amendment, 9th and Fourteenth
Amendment, and RLUIPA, to the United States Constitution.
Amend. Compl. ¶ 27. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, $500,000 in compensatory
damages and an additional $500,000 in punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 29-32. Defendants again moved
to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 83.
On April 13, 2017, Paul L. Brozdowski was appointed pro bono counsel under Local
Rule 83.10. See Order, ECF No. 81. He filed an appearance on April 18, 2017. Notice, ECF No.
82.
Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons held a settlement conference with the parties on May 31,
2017. The parties then filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on June 16, 2017. Notice, ECF No.
93. In light of the notice of voluntary dismissal, the Court directed the Clerk to administratively
close the file “without prejudice to re-opening on or before 8/19/2017.” See Order Dismissing
Case, ECF No. 94.
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Mr. Ramos now moves for a judgment on the pleadings “and/or” a motion to compel. Pl.
Mot., ECF no. 96. He argues that Defendants delayed payment of $1,000, a term of the
settlement, and conditioned payment on the filing of a W-9 tax form, even though the Settlement
Agreement did not contemplate the filing of the form. Id. at 2-3. As a result, Mr. Ramos
concludes that “Defendants have breached Contract and waisted [sic] enough of everyons [sic]
time.” Id. at 5. He seeks an additional $30,000 in damages.
Defendants object to the motion. Defs. Obj., ECF No. 97. They argue that this Court
lacks jurisdiction because it ordered the case dismissed and "[n]o motion to reopen was filed
within 30 days of the dismissal.” Id. at 1. Additionally, they argue that the motion is moot
because they deposited $1,000 into Mr. Ramos’s inmate trust account on July 26, 2017. Id.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A district court has the power to enforce summarily, on motion, a settlement agreement
reached in a case that was pending before it.” Comm'n Express Nat., Inc. v. Rikhy, No. CV-034050 (CPS), 2006 WL 385323, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2006) (quoting Meetings & Expositions
Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir.1974)).
Settlement agreements are contracts and therefore interpreted according to general
principals of contract law. See Powell v. Omnicom, 497 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (“A
settlement agreement is a contract that is interpreted according to general principles of contract
law.”); Goldman v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 39 F.3d 402, 405 (2d Cir .1994) (“As the
settlement agreement constituted a contract, general principles of contract law must govern its
interpretation.”).
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III.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Ramos argues that Defendants have breached the settlement agreement and he
therefore is entitled to an additional $30,000 in damages. The Court disagrees.
First, the motion is procedurally improper because Mr. Ramos is represented, and
therefore could have moved through his attorney, appointed for settlement purposes only. See
Order Appointing Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 81; D. Conn. L. R. 83.10(c)(2) (“The presiding
judge may appoint counsel for a specific limited purpose, such as for settlement purposes only . .
. .”). Mr. Ramos’ counsel has not yet withdrawn from his representation of Mr. Ramos. See D.
Conn. L. R. 83.10(c)(2) (“A limited-purpose appointment will be limited to the purpose
identified in the order of appointment and will not extend to any other part of the litigation
process. Only in the case of a limited purpose appointment, counsel may withdraw from the case
by filing a notice of withdrawal upon fulfillment of the purpose for which appointed.”).
Mr. Ramos appears to argue that his motion to compel should be granted because
Defendants required routine tax information but failed to include that requirement in the
settlement agreement. See Pl. Mot. at 4-5 ( “No were in the settlement Agreement, written or
verbal, did it state anything about a W-9 Form. . . . Defendants have breached Contract and
waisted enough of everyones time.”). The request therefore arguably is related to the execution
of the settlement, and could be within the scope of his counsel’s appointment. As a result, Mr.
Ramos could be required to move through his counsel. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (“Every pleading,
written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
name--or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”).
Nevertheless, since Mr. Ramos’ counsel was appointed for a limited purpose, the
negotiation of the settlement agreement, but not necessarily litigation regarding the settlement
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agreement, the Court will construe the appointment of Mr. Ramos’ counsel as having been
terminated at the time of the execution of the settlement agreement and Mr. Ramos therefore is
free to represent himself. See D. Conn. L. R. 83.10(c)(2) (“A limited-purpose appointment . . .
will not extend to any other part of the litigation process.”).
In any event, this motion should be denied as moot. Mr. Ramos seeks to enforce his
settlement agreement, which he claims required payment of $1,000, a deck of tarot cards, and
one telephone call to Avanti, Inc. See Pl. Mot. at 3.2 Mr. Ramos does not dispute that he has
already received the tarot cards or has been allowed to make the call; he only claims delay in the
payment of the $1,000. Defendants have provided documentation to show that the $1,000 was
transferred to the Plaintiff’s inmate trust account on July 26, 2017. See Defs. Obj. at 1, ECF No.
97; see also Trust Account Statement, Defs. Obj., Ex. A. As a result, the terms of the settlement
agreement have been satisfied and there is nothing for the Court to decide with respect to it.
Finally, in the absence of any express language in the settlement agreement to the
contrary, it is hard to construe Mr. Ramos’ claims as constituting a material breach of a
settlement agreement. A settlement agreement is a contract, and a district court can apply general
principles of contract law and enforce a settlement agreement reached in a case pending before it.
See Cerilli v. Rell, No. 3:08-cv-242 (SRU), 2013 WL 1092895, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 15,
2013) (collecting cases and failing to find material breach where “it is undisputed that the
defendants fulfilled their affirmative obligations under the settlement agreement”).
Mr. Ramos signed the settlement agreement on “on or about” June 23, 2017. Pl. Mot. at
2.3 Defendants transferred the money owed under the agreement on July 26, 2017, three days
2
Neither party has placed the Settlement Agreement before the Court.
He also notes he sent a signed copy to his attorney a signed copy “on or about” June 13, 2018.
Id. at 2.
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after the Settlement Agreement required. There is no basis for claiming a breach of the
Settlement Agreement. Under the settlement agreement, Defendants were required to pay Mr.
Ramos a specific sum of money and deliver tarot cards. Pl. Mot. at 3; Defs. Obj. at 1. As noted
above, both of these obligations have been satisfied. There is no basis for claiming that the threeday delay in payment would be a material breach of the agreement. Cf. Wifiland, LLP v. Sands of
Time Campground, No. FSTCV106010550S, 2013 WL 1494371, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
22, 2013) (“The court finds, however, that the defendant's 23–day delay in making the final
installment of the settlement amount does not constitute a ‘material breach’ of the agreement
entitling the plaintiff to terminate the agreement.”); Fitzpatrick v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 10
CIV. 142 MHD, 2013 WL 709048, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2013), reconsidered in part, No.
10 CIV. 142 MHD, 2013 WL 5427883 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (noting under New York law
“courts routinely hold that delays of days or even weeks in making required periodic payments
may constitute non-material breaches . . . .”).
There also is no basis for claiming that requiring Mr. Ramos to complete tax forms
required under federal law constitutes a material breach of the agreement either. Cf. Gonzalez v.
Jurella, No. 3:14-cv-01250 (AWT), 2015 WL 9943596, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2015) (“The
fact that certain ministerial tasks remained to be completed also does not undermine the Court's
finding that the agreement was concluded.”); Trostle v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, No. 1:13-CV-709, 2017 WL 4863254, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2017) (instructing
plaintiff, over objection, to fill out W-9 and other forms that state agency defendant requested
“prior to the issuance of any check in satisfaction of the Judgment . . . .”); Duse v. Int'l Bus.
Machines Corp., 252 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no breach of settlement agreement,
despite non-disclosure agreement, because filing a Form 1099 constituted business necessity).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Mr. Ramos’ motion, ECF No. 96, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 16th day of March, 2018.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
Victor A. Bolden
United States District Judge
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