Kallfelz v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

ORDER denying 22 plaintiff's motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner; and granting 23 defendant's motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner. See attached ruling. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/31/17. (Brierley, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ELIZABETH ENRIGHT KALLFELZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 3:15CV1494(DFM)

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff, Elizabeth Enright Kallfelz, seeks judicial
review of the denial of her applications for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income
(“SSI”).1

Currently pending are plaintiff’s motion to reverse

1Plaintiff

filed applications for DIB and SSI on March 28,
2012, alleging a disability onset date of December 30, 2004.
Plaintiff later amended her onset date to January 1, 2011. Her
applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R.
20.) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Edward Sweeney held a
hearing on January 17, 2014.
The ALJ found at step 1 that plaintiff engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the following periods: March
2011 through August 2011, and October 1, 2012 through December
2013. (R. 23.) He noted, however, that there may be a
continuous 12 month period during which plaintiff did not engage
in substantial gainful activity and thus, he proceeded through
step 5 of the sequential evaluation process. (R. 24.) At step
2, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the following severe
impairments: affective disorder and attention deficit disorder.
(R. 24.) He found at step 3 that plaintiff’s conditions do not
meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (R. 24-25.) He
determined that plaintiff retained the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional
limitations: she is limited to simple, routine and repetitive
tasks in a work environment free of fixed-pace production
requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions, with

the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) (doc. #22) and defendant’s motion to affirm the
decision of the Commissioner.

(Doc. #23.)

Counsel filed a

statement of facts and medical chronology, which I incorporate
by reference.2

(Doc. #22-2, 23-2.)

For the following reasons,

plaintiff’s motion is DENIED and defendant’s motion is GRANTED.3
I.

Legal Standard
The standards for determining an individual’s entitlement

to DIB and SSI, the Commissioner’s five-step framework for
evaluating claims, and the district court’s review of the final
decision of the Commissioner are well-settled.

I am following

those standards, but do not repeat them here.

few, if any, workplace changes. She also should not have
contact with the public or more than occasional contact with
supervisors and coworkers. (R. 26.) At step 4, the ALJ
determined that plaintiff has no past relevant work. (R. 29.)
At step 5, considering plaintiff’s age, education, and RFC, the
ALJ found that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that plaintiff could perform. (R. 29.) He thus
concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act. (R. 30.) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s
decision to the Appeals Council, which denied her request for
review on August 18, 2015. (R. 1-6.) Plaintiff timely appealed
to this court.
2Plaintiff filed a medical chronology and summary of facts
with her motion to reverse. (Doc. #22-2.) Defendant adopts the
facts as presented by plaintiff, but provides a more detailed
summary of the facts, written in narrative format. (R. 23-2.)
3This is not a recommended ruling; the parties consented to
the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. (Doc. #16); see 28
U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(b).
2

II.

Discussion

Plaintiff makes two arguments: (a) that the ALJ erred at
step 3 by finding that plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment; and (b) that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

I

consider each argument in turn.
A. Step Three Determination
At step 3, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s impairments do
not meet or medically equal “one of the listed impairments” in
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.

(R. 24.)

Specifically, he

analyzed whether plaintiff’s impairments meet or medically equal
the severity of Listing 12.04 (affective disorders).

Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether her
schizoaffective disorder satisfies the paragraph “C” criteria of
Listing 12.03 (schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic
disorders).
First, although the ALJ did not explicitly discuss Listing
12.03 in his decision, the court infers from his step 3 finding
that he considered whether plaintiff’s impairments meet any “one
of the listed impairments,” not just Listing 12.04.

In any

event, the paragraph “C” criteria for Listings 12.03 and 12.04
are the same.

To meet the paragraph C criteria under either

listing, plaintiff must show a medically documented history of a
chronic affective disorder/psychotic disorder of at least two
3

years’ duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation
of ability to do basic work activities, plus one of the
following:
1. Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration; or
2. A residual disease process that has resulted in such
marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in
mental demands or change in the environment would be
predicted to cause the individual to decompensate; or
3. Current history of one or more years’ inability to
function
outside
a
highly
supportive
living
arrangement, with an indication of continued need for
such an arrangement.
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, ¶¶ 12.03(C), 12.04(C).
While the ALJ found that plaintiff “has experienced one to
two episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration” (R.
26), her mental impairments have not caused more than a minimal
limitation of her ability to do basic work activities.

In this

regard, plaintiff is able to go to school, work part-time, live
independently, perform household chores, and socialize with
friends.

(R. 25.)

She reported having no difficulty completing

tasks or following written instructions.

(R. 25.)

The ALJ

found that plaintiff has only mild restrictions in activities of
daily living and moderate difficulties in social functioning and
concentration, persistence or pace.

(R. 25.)

limitations in any area of functioning.

4

She has no marked

“[T]he burden is on the claimant to present medical
findings that show his or her impairments match a listing or are
equal in severity to a listed impairment.”
200 F. Supp. 3d 349, 358 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).
to meet her burden.

Stephens v. Colvin,
Plaintiff has failed

The ALJ properly assessed the evidence and

determined that none of plaintiff’s impairments meet or
medically equal a listed impairment.
B. RFC Determination
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is
not supported by substantial evidence.4
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving her RFC.

See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(c); 416.912(c); Staggers v. Colvin, No. 3:14CV-717 (JCH), 2015 WL 4751123, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2015)
(“[T]he claimant bears the

burden of proving her RFC”); Hogan

v. Astrue, 491 F. Supp. 2d 347, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he only
burden shift that occurs at step 5 is that we are required to
prove that there is other work that you can do, given your RFC,

4Plaintiff

concedes that “the record establishes that she
can engage in some level of work activity periodically, because
she does.” (Pl. Br., Doc. #22-2, p. 6.) She contends, however,
that the ALJ did not adequately assess the periods of time when
she suffers from increased stress, which reduces her level of
functioning. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, a review of the
ALJ’s decision reveals that he took into consideration
plaintiff’s periods of exacerbation, but found them to be
“sporadic and short lived, with the exception of the August 2013
exacerbation, which was precipitated by multiple stressors.”
(R. 28.)
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age, education, and work experience.

That shift does not place

on us the burden of proving RFC.”).
“[T]he court must decide whether the [RFC] determination is
supported by substantial evidence . . . .

Substantial evidence

is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion; it is more than a ‘mere scintilla.’ . . .
The substantial evidence rule also applies to inferences and
conclusions that are drawn from findings of fact . . . .

The

court may not decide facts, reweigh evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner.”

Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23

F. Supp. 2d 179, 189 (D. Conn. 1998) (citations omitted).

The

court will not second-guess the ALJ’s decision where he
identified the reasons for his RFC determination and supported
his decision with substantial evidence.

Falcon v. Colvin, No.

5:12-CV-1164 (FJS), 2014 WL 1312362, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2014) (“So long as the ALJ properly exercises his discretion,
the court must limit its review to whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision; the court may not second-guess the
ALJ’s balancing of the evidence.”).
When reaching his RFC determination, the ALJ discussed the
evidence of record, including plaintiff’s own statements and the
medical opinion evidence, over three single-spaced pages. (R.
27-29.)

He assigned great weight to the opinion of plaintiff’s

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Steven Katz; substantial weight to
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plaintiff’s therapist, Dr. Deborah Applefield; and generally
adopted the opinions of the state agency medical consultants,
Dr. Hedy Augenbaum and Dr. Robert Sutton.

The ALJ found that

plaintiff retained the RFC to perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional
limitations: she is limited to simple, routine and repetitive
tasks in a work environment free of fixed-pace production
requirements, involving only simple work-related decisions, with
few, if any, workplace changes.

She also should not have

contact with the public or more than occasional contact with
supervisors and coworkers. (R. 26.)
Plaintiff does not disagree that Dr. Katz’s opinion should
be afforded significant weight, but she argues that his opinion
does not support the ALJ’s RFC determination.
reveals the contrary.

The record

In June 2012, Dr. Katz opined that

plaintiff had no problem performing work on a sustained basis,
and only had a slight problem interacting appropriately with
others in a work environment and handling frustration
appropriately.

(R. 358-59.)

In October 2012, Dr. Katz once

again stated that plaintiff had no problem performing work on a
sustained basis.

(R. 353.)

Most recently, in his December 2013

report, Dr. Katz noted that while plaintiff was significantly
impaired from April to August 2013, rendering her unable to
work, she had recovered by August 28, 2013, and had no
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limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out
simple instructions; interacting with others; or responding
appropriately to usual work situations or changes in routine.
(R. 438.)

Dr. Katz stated that as of August 28, 2013, there was

“no indication of cognitive impairments such as psychological
slowing, impaired verbal memory, impaired concentration or
attention . . . .
tasks.”

(R. 437.)

[S]he may have difficulty (mild) with complex
The ALJ relied on Dr. Katz’s opinion “due to

his area of expertise, the consistency of his opinion with his
treatment notes and those of other treating sources, the
longitudinal treatment history and the frequency of his contact
with the claimant.”

(R. 28.)

The ALJ properly assigned great

weight to Dr. Katz’s opinion, which supports his RFC
determination.
The ALJ also relied on the observations of plaintiff’s
therapist Dr. Applefield, when making his RFC determination.
Although Dr. Applefield indicated that plaintiff had some
exacerbations, they were short-lived and usually improved by her
next therapy session.

For example, at a session on September 9,

2011, Dr. Applefield wrote that plaintiff was “feeling
(appropriately) sad” because her boyfriend was going to Israel
until January.

(R. 369.)

By the next session on September 16,

2011, plaintiff reported a “stable mood” and that she was
enjoying her math and science classes.
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(R. 370.)

Overall, Dr.

Applefield’s notes reflect that plaintiff had an adequate mood
level, appropriate affect, and no acute distress.

From this

opinion evidence, the ALJ reasonably determined that plaintiff’s
exacerbations are sporadic and short-lived.
The ALJ also relied upon the assessments of the nonexamining state agency medical consultants, who opined that
plaintiff could perform short, simple work tasks in an
environment without strict time or production quotas and may
have superficial, brief contact with others.

(R. 29.)

Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s reliance on these
opinions.
Lastly, when making his RFC determination, the ALJ relied
upon plaintiff’s own statements of her activities of daily
living.

As discussed above, the ALJ noted that plaintiff is

able to go to school, work part-time, live independently,
perform household chores, and socialize with friends.

(R. 25.)

She traveled to Israel to visit her boyfriend and enjoyed trying
new foods and seeing a different geography and culture.
381.)

(R.

She also expressed interest in studying pharmacy, writing

poetry, baking chocolate chip cookies, participating in
competitive swimming, and cliff-jumping in Vermont.

(R. 367.)

The ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s daily activities “are not as
limited to the extent one would expect given the complaints of
disabling symptoms and limitation.”
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(R. 27.)

The ALJ identified the reasons for his RFC determination
and supported his decision with substantial evidence.

There is

no error.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, plaintiff’s motion to reverse the
decision of the Commissioner (doc. #22) is DENIED and
defendant’s motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner
(doc. #23) is GRANTED.
This is not a recommended ruling.

The consent of the

parties allows this magistrate judge to direct the entry of a
judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appeals can be made directly to the

appropriate United States Court of Appeals from this judgment.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(c).
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 31st day of March,
2017.
_________/s/___________________
Donna F. Martinez
United States Magistrate Judge

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