Torres v. McGrath et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 29 Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Osden. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim shall proceed against Defendant Osden; Plaintiff's First Amendment claim and claims for injunctive relief are dismissed as to Defendant Osden for the reasons set forth in the Ruling attached. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 7/31/2017. (Hudson, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

CANDIDO TORRES,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT MCGRATH, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:15-cv-1558 (VLB)

July 31, 2017

RULING ON DEFENDANT JACLYN OSDEN’S MOTION TO DISMISS [No. 29]
On October 26, 2015, the plaintiff, Candido Torres, commenced a civil
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the New
Hampshire and Connecticut Departments of Correction in their individual and
official capacities, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under the First,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment [No. 1]. He also raised claims of
negligence against all defendants, and requested declaratory, injunctive and
compensatory relief. Thereafter, this Court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims
except those alleging violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights by
defendant Jaclyn Osden (“Osden”), a Counselor Supervisor for the Connecticut
Department of Correction, in her individual and official capacities [Nos. 9, 30].
Osden now moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s remaining claims pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on grounds of qualified immunity and failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted [No. 29]. The plaintiff has not responded to Osden’s

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motion.1 For the reasons that follow, Osden’s motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
I.

Standard of Review
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.”
Although Rule 8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)). A complaint that offers mere conclusory statements without factual
support will not suffice to withstand dismissal. Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The plausibility standard is not a
probability requirement; the complaint must show, not merely allege, that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

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The deadline for the plaintiff to respond to Osden’s motion to dismiss was
January 18, 2017. See ECF No. 29.
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When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of
the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114
(2d Cir. 2012). This principle does not, however, apply to the legal conclusions
that the plaintiff draws in his complaint. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atlantic
Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft,
556 U.S. at 679.
“Where . . . the complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally
with ‘special solicitude’ and interpreted to raise the strongest claims that it
suggests.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hill v.
Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff’s
complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Id.
II.

Facts
This Court articulated the following facts in its Initial Review Order [No. 9]

on May 3, 2016:
The plaintiff asserts that Connecticut Department of Correction
officials transferred him to the New Hampshire Department of
Corrections to serve his sentence. The Plaintiff claims that during his
confinement in Connecticut, he had renounced his membership in the
Latin Kings gang. Upon being transferred to New Hampshire, the
Plaintiff became inducted into the Neta prison gang.
In December 2014, the Plaintiff was incarcerated in the New Hampshire
State Prison for Men in Concord, New Hampshire (“NH Concord”). In
late December 2014, the Plaintiff became upset about not being
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permitted to speak Spanish freely, and engaged in an argument with
correctional staff. Shortly after the argument, the warden transferred
the Plaintiff to the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility in
Berlin, New Hampshire (“NNH Berlin”). The Plaintiff claims that his
girlfriend learned from New Hampshire Population Management and
Classification Director Lacasse that Plaintiff had been transferred in
retaliation for his complaints about staff refusing to permit him to
freely speak Spanish. The Plaintiff later learned that Unit Manager
McGrath was also responsible for the decision to transfer him to
Berlin.
The Plaintiff married his girlfriend on January 15, 2015. His wife made
him choose between her and his membership in a prison gang.
Between February and May 2015, the Plaintiff and his wife wrote many
letters to [Osden], who works in the Sentence Calculation and
Interstate Management Office of the Connecticut Department of
Correction. The Plaintiff informed [Osden] that he sought to renounce
his membership in the Neta prison gang and that he and his wife were
very concerned about potential reprisals by members of the prison
gang after he renounced his membership in the gang. He made it clear
that he feared for his safety.
On March 13, 2015, the Plaintiff was cut in the back of the head by an
inmate who was part of a gang. Prison officials placed him in
protective custody. Despite the Plaintiff’s concerns about his safety,
[Osden] informed him that due to the fact that the cut was superficial,
he would not be transferred back to Connecticut.
On March 19, 2015, shortly after being transferred to general
population, an inmate assaulted the Plaintiff in the bathroom. The
Plaintiff immediately contacted prison staff, including Lieutenant
McFarland. Prison staff did not report the incident. Prison officials,
including Lieutenant McFarland, did not investigate the incident.
In April 2015, the Plaintiff pled guilty to a disciplinary ticket charging
him with intoxication. He received multiple sanctions. [Osden]
informed the Plaintiff that he would not be able to return to
Connecticut due to a disciplinary infraction that he had received in
August 2014. To be eligible to transfer back to Connecticut, prison
officials required the Plaintiff to be disciplinary report-free for one
year.
On April 18, 2015, the plaintiff contacted Lieutenant McFarland and
asked to be placed on in-cell meals because he feared for his safety.
He claimed that the Neta gang had placed a hit on him. That same day,
the Plaintiff contacted Director Lacasse and sought to be separated
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from certain inmates who were members of the Neta gang. Director
Lacasse responded that she would investigate the information
provided by the plaintiff to determine whether separation orders were
warranted. Three days later, on April 21, 2015, Lieutenant McFarland
denied the Plaintiff’s in-cell meal request.
On May 5, 2015, due to threats against his safety and the theft of his
electronic game console, prison officials placed the Plaintiff in
protective custody. The Plaintiff wrote to Lieutenant McFarland and
Director Lacasse and informed them that he feared for his safety and
was emotionally distraught because he could not visit his mother who
was chronically ill.
On May 11, 2015, he complained about having suicidal thoughts and
feeling depressed. Mental health staff offered the Plaintiff an antidepressant. On May 12, 2015, the Plaintiff informed [Osden] that he
would be going on a hunger strike in an effort to remain in protective
custody.
On May 14, 2015, the Plaintiff tried to commit suicide by cutting his
right wrist. Mental health staff placed the Plaintiff on suicide watch in
an observation cell and checked him every fifteen minutes. Prison
staff also transported him to a hospital to have his wrist checked. The
Plaintiff remained on suicide watch until May 27, 2015.
On May 28, 2015, prison officials at NNH Berlin transferred the plaintiff
back to NH Concord. On May 29, 2015, prison officials at NH Concord
transferred the Plaintiff back to a prison facility in Connecticut. The
Plaintiff subsequently received medical and mental health treatment
at Garner.
After reviewing the factual allegations raised in the complaint, this Court
rendered the following conclusions regarding the plaintiff’s First and Eighth
Amendment claims:
[T]he Court construes the Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants
Lacasse and McGrath punished him for voicing his concerns about
the prohibition on freely speaking Spanish by transferring him to
another prison facility as a claim of retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment right to redress grievances. The Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim will proceed against defendants Lacasse
and McGrath in their individual capacities.

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In addition, the court concludes that the Plaintiff has stated plausible
claims of deliberate indifference to safety and/or failure to protect
against defendants Lacasse, McGrath, Osden and McFarland. Thus,
the Eighth Amendment claims will proceed against defendants
Lacasse, McGrath, Osden and McFarland in their individual capacities.
*

*

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The plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief pertaining to the conditions of
confinement in Connecticut against defendant Osden. Thus, the First
and Eighth Amendment claims will proceed as to defendant Osden in
her official capacity as well.
On January 9, 2017, this Court dismissed all claims against all defendants
except for Osden [No. 30]. The Court ordered that the plaintiff’s First and Eighth
Amendment claims will proceed against Osden in her individual and official
capacities.
III.

Discussion
Osden argues that the plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims

should be dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity and failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. First, with respect to both
constitutional claims, Osden argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity.
[Dkt. 29 (Osden’s Motion to Dismiss) (“MTD”) at 6.] Alternatively, Osden argues
that the First Amendment allegations raised in the complaint were directed at
other defendants in the case, particularly New Hampshire Correctional staff, but
not Osden. Id. at 7. With respect to the Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate
indifference to safety and/or failure to protect, Osden argues that the plaintiff
failed to sufficiently allege actual knowledge on the part of Osden that the plaintiff
faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 13-14. Finally, Osden argues that
the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief, specifically that he be transferred to a
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Connecticut correctional facility, are now moot because the plaintiff asserts in his
complaint that he was so transferred on May 29, 2015. Id. at 14-15. The Court will
address each of these arguments in turn.
A. Qualified Immunity
“The qualified immunity doctrine protects government officials from suits
seeking to impose personal liability for money damages based on unsettled
rights or on conduct that was not objectively unreasonable, and reduces the
general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial . . . .” Connell v.
Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Michell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L. Ed.2d 411 (1985)). “A public official, when sued in
his individual capacity, is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim for damages
(1) if the conduct attributed to him was not prohibited by federal law . . . or (2)
where that official action was so prohibited, if the plaintiff’s right not to be
subjected to such action was not ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken . . .
.” Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed.2d 523 (1987)). “A right is
‘clearly established’ when the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what [s]he is doing violates that right.”
Id. (quoting Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)). Although there
need not be case law directly on point in order for a right to be considered
“clearly established,” “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed.2d 1149 (2011); see also McGowan v. United States, 825

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F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2016) (court may grant qualified immunity on ground that
purported right was not clearly established by prior case law without resolving
more difficult question of whether purported right exists at all).
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which more often than not is
asserted in a defendant’s answer to a complaint and does not support a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 435 (2d Cir.
2004). However, the Second Circuit has permitted the qualified immunity defense
to be successfully asserted in a 12(b)(6) motion if it is based on facts which
appear on the face of the complaint and “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief.” Id. (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir.
1992)). In order for a defendant to prevail on a qualified immunity defense in a
12(b)(6) motion as a opposed to one raised in a motion for summary judgment,
she must satisfy this more stringent standard. Id.
Osden’s motion to dismiss does not explain why she is entitled to qualified
immunity on the plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims. She simply
quotes Connell for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity “if the allegations of the complaint fail to state a claim of violation of
clearly established law.” MTD at 6 (quoting Connell, 153 F.3d at 80). Moreover,
the facts alleged in the complaint do not suffice to satisfy the more stringent
standard in order for Osden to prevail on a qualified immunity defense in a
12(b)(6) motion. This Court in its Initial Review Order ruled that the plaintiff
stated a plausible retaliation claim that the defendants punished him for voicing

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his concerns about not being able to communicate in Spanish by transferring him
to another facility. Initial Revew Order [No. 9] (“IRO”) at 12. The Second Circuit
has rejected qualified immunity defenses raised in motions to dismiss in
opposition to First Amendment retaliation claims because such claims require an
improper retaliatory motive on the part of the defendant, and “where a more
specific intent is actually an element of the plaintiff’s claim as defined by clearly
established law, it can never be objectively reasonable for a government official
to act with the intent that is prohibited by law.” Washington v. Gonyea, 538 Fed.
Appx. 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir.
2001)).
With respect to the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, it does not appear
from the face of the complaint, alone, that Osden is entitled to qualified immunity.
Based on its interpretation of the allegations as stated in the Initial Review Order,
this Court cannot conclude that the plaintiff “can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” McKenna, 386 F.3d at 435. For the
foregoing reasons, Osden’s qualified immunity defense is premature and must be
dismissed at this stage of the proceeding.
B. First Amendment Claim
Osden alternatively argues that the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim
should be dismissed because the plaintiff has not alleged any connection
between Osden and the retaliatory action that was taken against the plaintiff for
voicing his concerns about being able to speak Spanish. MTD at 7. Although the
Court in its Initial Review Order ruled that the plaintiff had stated a plausible First

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Amendment retaliation claim against Osden and the New Hampshire correctional
staff for punishing him in response to voicing his concerns about the prohibition
on freely speaking Spanish, upon further review, this Court agrees with Osden
that this claim was only directed at the New Hampshire correctional staff and not
at Osden, an employee of the Connecticut Department of Correction.
The facts that gave rise to the First Amendment retaliation claim took place
in December of 2014 while the plaintiff was incarcerated at the New Hampshire
State Prison for Men in Concord, New Hampshire. Plaintiff’s Complaint [No. 1]
(“Pl.’s Cmp.) ¶¶ 17-18. According to the plaintiff, an individual identified only as
“Ms. Toth,” who was presumably an employee of the New Hampshire correctional
staff, “reprimanded the plaintiff for speaking Spanish outside of a group
meeting,” which led to an argument between Ms. Toth and the plaintiff. Id. at ¶
17. When the plaintiff wrote a request to Ms. Toth regarding the incident, the
plaintiff was transferred to the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Institution
in Berlin, New Hampshire. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. The plaintiff does not explain in his
complaint how, if at all, Osden, a counselor at the Connecticut Department of
Correction, was involved in the December 2014 incident or the decision to
transfer the plaintiff to another facility in New Hampshire. While the complaint
does allege that Osden conveyed policies to Plaintiff, it does not allege that she
had any personal involvement in the decision making process applying such
policies. “It is well settled . . . that ‘personal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under §
1983.’” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of

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Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (prisoner’s § 1983 claim against warden not cognizable
absent allegation that warden was personally involved in or had direct
responsibility for prisoner’s injuries). It appears from the factual allegations that
only members of the New Hampshire correctional staff were involved in the
decision to transfer the plaintiff after he had voiced his concerns about being
able to speak Spanish. Construing the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the
First Amendment claim against Osden has no facial plausibility. This Court
cannot reasonably infer from the facts of the complaint that Osden personally
played any role in, and therefore could conceivably be liable for, the retaliatory
action alleged. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678-679. Therefore, the plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim against Osden is hereby dismissed.2
C. Eighth Amendment Claim
“The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of inmates in their custody.” Hayes v. New
York City Dept. of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996). Prison officials are
liable for harm incurred by the inmate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the officials acted
with “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s safety. Id. To establish a claim of
“deliberate indifference,” the inmate must demonstrate that (1) “he is

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The fact that this Court previously ruled that the plaintiff stated a plausible First
Amendment claim against Osden has no bearing on its current decision to
dismiss the claim. See Garewal v. Sliz, 611 F. App’x 926, 931 (10th Cir. 2015) (fact
that district court does not dismiss complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A does not
mean that complaint will withstand Rule 12(b)(6) challenge); Buchheit v. Green,
705 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing complaint without adversarial
presentation often difficult and time-consuming task).
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incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2)
“the defendant prison official[] possessed sufficient culpable intent.” Id. “[A]
prison official has sufficient culpable intent if [s]he as knowledge that an inmate
faces a substantial risk of serious harm and [s]he disregards that risk by failing to
take reasonable measures to abate the harm.” Id. The official must have actual
knowledge of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and she must also draw that inference.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed.2d 811 (1994).
In its Initial Review Order, this Court concluded that the plaintiff had stated
a plausible deliberate indifference claim against Osden. IRO at 12. Osden now
challenges that conclusion, arguing that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
show that she had any prior knowledge of information from which a reasonable
inference could be drawn that the plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of
serious harm. MTD at 13-14. Specifically, Osden argues that, prior to the alleged
head injury or bathroom assault, she had no knowledge that the plaintiff was
threatened or was somehow exposed to imminent harm, and the complaint failed
to allege such knowledge. Id. Moreover, Osden asserts that the plaintiff never
reported the alleged bathroom assault, that Osden does not have control over
inmate safety protocol in any Connecticut or New Hampshire correctional
facilities, and that the plaintiff did not allege any facts showing a pervasive or
well-documented history of inmate assaults in the facilities in which he was
housed. Id. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. This Court disagrees.

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The plaintiff’s complaint alleges a plausible claim that Osden acted with
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. The plaintiff alleged
that between February and May of 2015, he wrote numerous letters to Osden
voicing concerns he had over his safety after having recently renounced his
membership in the Neta prison gang and that he wished to be returned to a
facility in Connecticut. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 20-23. He also alleged that he informed
Osden about the first attack during which he incurred a cut to the back of his
head, again requesting a transfer back to Connecticut, and that such request was
denied. Id. at ¶ 25. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff was allegedly assaulted in the
bathroom of his unit. Id. at ¶ 26. Contrary to Osden’s argument, the plaintiff did
in fact allege that he reported the bathroom assault to correctional staff but that
no investigation was performed. Id. at ¶ 27. Despite informing Osden of both
incidents, Osden denied the plaintiff’s requests to be transferred back to a
Connecticut facility, explaining that the cut to the back of his head “was deemed
superficial” and no investigation was conducted into the alleged bathroom
assault. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of
a substantial risk [of serious harm] is a question of fact subject to demonstration
in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence . . . .”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Thus, the plaintiff plausibly alleges that Osden knew
prior to the assaults that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and
failed to protect him from the ensuing attack.
Osden’s argument that she had no control over inmate safety measures in
Connecticut or New Hampshire correctional facilities does not suffice to dismiss

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the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim at this juncture. Although Osden
correctly asserts that the plaintiff has not alleged how, if at all, Osden was
responsible for, or involved in, the decisions of the New Hampshire correctional
staff with respect to protective custody placement, the plaintiff sufficiently
alleged that Osden repeatedly denied requests to transfer the plaintiff back to
Connecticut, despite the plaintiff’s expressed concerns that his safety was in
jeopardy. Construing the complaint liberally and accepting all facts as true, the
pro se plaintiff has stated a plausible claim of deliberate indifference to harm
under the Eighth Amendment.
D. Claims for Injunctive Relief
Osden argues that the plaintiff’s claims against Osden for injunctive relief
are moot because he has since been transferred back to a correctional facility in
Connecticut and, therefore, removed from the conditions of confinement of which
he bases his Eighth Amendment claim. This Court agrees and hereby dismisses
the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
The events upon which the plaintiff bases his Eighth Amendment claim
occurred while the plaintiff was in the custody of the New Hampshire Department
of Corrections. The plaintiff alleges that, following those events but before the
commencement of this proceeding, he was returned to Connecticut, specifically
Garner Correctional Institution in Newtown, Connecticut. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 55. In his
prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks an order from this Court that he be transferred
to either Brooklyn Correctional Institution or Enfield Correctional Institution, both

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of which are located in Connecticut. Id. at p.9. The plaintiff has not cited any
authority or provided any reasons why he is entitled to be transferred to the
facility of his choosing.
Nevertheless, the removal of a prisoner from the facility where the harm
allegedly occurred sufficiently renders moot a claims for injunctive relief. See
Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (transfer from prison facility
moots action for injunctive relief against transferring facility). The Court
recognizes that an exception exists where the plaintiff’s claim is “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 417 n.2 (1988).
However, in this case, the plaintiff has not explained how, if at all, his current
facility exposes him to unconstitutional harm and that a transfer to Brooklyn
Correctional Institution or Enfield Correctional Institution is necessary to avoid
future harm. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Osden
are hereby dismissed.
IV.

ORDERS
The plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Osden is hereby DISMISSED.

The plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim shall proceed against Osden, as it is factdependent and may only be addressed on a motion for summary judgment. The
plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 31st day of July, 2017.

______/s/________________________
VANESSA L. BRYANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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