Conquistador v. Hartford Police Department et al

Filing 39

ORDER. For the reasons stated herein, the 34 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's 27 Motion to Compel Answer, 28 Motion for Extension of Time, and 36 Motion to Appoint Counsel are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 3/13/2017. (Connelly, L.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JEAN K. CONQUISTADOR,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:15-cv-1617 (MPS)

HARTFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff Jean Conquistador has brought this lawsuit against the City of Hartford, Hartford

Police Department, Hartford Police Officer John Doe 1, and Hartford Police Officer John Doe 2,
alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In an initial review order,
the Court accepted Plaintiff’s amended complaint only as to the City of Hartford. The City of
Hartford has moved to dismiss the complaint because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
II.

Background
A. Allegations
The plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff is Latino. (Amended Complaint,

ECF No. 10 at ¶ 1.) On July 31, 2015, at approximately 7:15am, the plaintiff was “inspecting a
BMW and a Mercedes-Benz parked on the corner of Greenfield Street and Enfield Street. (Id. at
¶ 2.) At that time, Defendant John Doe 1 approached the plaintiff in a police cruiser and “began
interrogating the plaintiff,” aking questions like “what are you doing? Why are you here? Are
you selling drugs?” (Id. at ¶ 3.) The plaintiff responded that “he was only inspecting the
vehicles in the parking lot for a possible purchase,” and John Doe 1 replied “yeah right,”
demanding that the plaintiff produce identification. (Id. at ¶ 4-5.) As John Doe 1 got out of his

vehicle, another white officer approached the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff asked John Doe 1
why he was being asked to produce identification, and John Doe 1 replied that the Hartford
Police Department “received a call from a Hartford resident complaining of people ‘walking in
the area’ too much.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) Police Officer John Doe 2 began asking the plaintiff questions
and stated “a Puerto Rican checking out a BMW and a Mercedes Benz. You must be selling
drugs.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) John Doe 1 then stated, “maybe he’s trying to steal one of the cars.” (Id.)
Plaintiff denied both allegations. (Id.) John Doe 2 then wrote down the plaintiff’s information
and ordered him to leave the area, informing him that “they would arrest him if they saw him
again.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) The plaintiff asked “for what?” and John Doe 1 replied “we’ll think of
something, now get the fuck out of here!” (Id. at ¶ 10.)
The plaintiff later called the Hartford Police Department and asked if they had received
any complaints on July 31, 2015 by Hartford residents complaining of people “walking in that
area too much.” (Id. at ¶ 11.) The officer he spoke with “checked the call logs for that day” and
told him that “there were no such calls.” (Id.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on November 9, 2015, along with a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On November 30, 2015, Magistrate Judge Sarah Merriam filed a
Recommended Ruling, dismissing the complaint without prejudice and denying the motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 8.) On December 7, 2015, plaintiff filed an amended
complaint. (ECF No. 10.) On July 28, 2015, District Judge Charles Haight approved Magistrate
Judge Merriam’s Recommended Ruling, but accepted the amended complaint only as to the
Defendant City of Hartford. (ECF No. 20.) Judge Haight noted that the plaintiff had not altered
his complaint as to the Hartford Police Department or the John Doe defendants, and thus

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dismissed the complaint as to those defendants.1 (Id.) This case was transferred to this Court on
October 5, 2016.
III.

Standard
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff has

alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570. Under Twombly, the Court accepts as true all of the complaint’s
factual allegations when evaluating a motion to dismiss. Id. at 572. The Court must “draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent
Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2008). “When a complaint is based solely
on wholly conclusory allegations and provides no factual support for such claims, it is
appropriate to grant defendants[’] motion to dismiss.” Scott v. Town of Monroe, 306 F. Supp. 2d
191, 198 (D. Conn. 2004). For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, “[a]fter the court
strips away conclusory allegations, there must remain sufficient well-pleaded factual allegations
to nudge plaintiff’s claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” In re Fosamax
Products Liab. Litig., 2010 WL 1654156, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010). In other words “a
plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801
F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV.

Discussion
The plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging “discrimination, racial profiling and

harassment” in violation of his equal protections rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF
No. 10 at 5.) To state a claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that a person acting

1 The Order dismissed the claims against the Hartford Police Department with prejudice and the claims

against the John Doe defendants without prejudice.

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under color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The only claim remaining is against the City of Hartford.
“A municipality may be liable under Section 1983 for any ‘policy or custom’ that causes
a ‘deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.’” Canzoneri v. Inc. Village of Rockville
Centre, 986 F. Supp. 2d 194, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
New York, 439 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). To state such a claim, the plaintiff must allege that “(1) an
official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right.” Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotations and
citations omitted). “The failure to train or supervise city employees may constitute an official
policy or custom if the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of those with
whom the city employees interact.” Id. at 195 (quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any official policy or custom, or any claim that the City of
Hartford failed to train or supervise its employees. Thus, the claim against the City of Hartford
is dismissed.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the claims against the City of Hartford are DISMISSED

with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Answer (ECF No. 27), Motion for Extension of
Time (ECF No. 28), and Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 36) are DENIED as moot. The
Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.

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Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
March 13, 2017

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