Markel Insurance Company v. Ebner Camps, Inc. et al

Filing 54

ORDER granting 39 Motion for Summary Judgment by Markel Insurance Company and denying 47 Motion for Summary Judgment by Ebner Camps, Inc. for the reasons set forth in the attached decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 08/04/2017. (Lee, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
EBNER CAMPS, INC.,
JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:15-cv-01663-VLB

August 4, 2017

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[DKTS. 39 & 47]
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Markel Insurance Co.
(“Markel Insurance” or “Plaintiff”) seeking a declaration that its general liability
insurance policy affords no coverage to Ebner Camps, Inc. (“Ebner Camps” or
“Defendant”) for liability it may have to a plaintiff in a civil action pending in state
court brought by a former camper alleging that in 1987 he was sexually assaulted
by a counselor at Camp Awosting owned by Ebner Camps. For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Markel Insurance.
I.

Background
A. The State Case
In early 2015, an individual proceeding under the pseudonym John Doe

initiated a civil action against Ebner Camps. See [Dkt. 47-1 ¶ 7 (Defs.’ D. Conn. L.
R. 56(a)(1) Stmt.)1; Dkt. 50-1 (Pl.’s D. Conn. L. R. 56(a)(2) Stmt.) ¶ 7; Dkt. 48-4 (Opp’n

Defendant John Doe avers that he is an interested party to this action and
accordingly joins Defendant Ebner Camps, Inc.’s Objection to Motion for Summary
Judgment and memorandum in support thereof, see [Dkts. 47, 48], and “fully
incorporates the arguments and exhibits set forth therein, including defendant
Ebner Camps, Inc.’s Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement of Material Facts.” See [Dkt. 49
(Def. John Doe’s Obj’n on Mot. Summ. J.) at 1].
1

1 

Pl.’s Summ. J. Ex. D, Marshal’s Return) (stating Ebner Camps was served with John
Doe’s complaint on Feb. 17, 2015); Dkt. 41-4 (D. Conn. L. R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. Ex. C,
State Court Docket) at 3 of PDF (indicating complaint was filed on Jan. 26, 2015)].2
The state court complaint alleges that in 1987 John Doe attended summer camp at
Camp Awosting, which is owned and controlled by Ebner Camps. See [Dkt. 47-1
¶¶ 9-10; Dkt. 50-1 ¶¶ 9-10]. Ebner Camps allegedly employed John Murphy as a
camp counselor, and over the course of the 1987 summer he sexually assaulted
and battered John Doe on numerous occasions. [Dkt. 47-1 ¶¶ 11-12; Dkt. 50-1 ¶¶
11-12]. The state court complaint raises allegations of negligence, negligent hiring
and retention, negligent supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress against Ebner Camps, all which pertain to the
alleged sexual assault and battery. See [Dkt. 47-1 ¶¶ 14-18; Dkt. 50-1 ¶¶ 14-18].
B. The Policy
Markel Insurance issued an insurance policy to Ebner Properties, LLC with
an effective date of March 1, 2014. See [Dkt. 47-1 ¶¶ 1-2; Dkt. 50-1 ¶¶ 1-2].

The

policy period expired March 1, 2015. See [Dkt. 47-1 ¶ 2; Dkt. 50-1 ¶ 2]. Defendant
Ebner Camps, Inc. is a named insured under the policy. [Dkt. 47-1 ¶ 6; Dkt. 50-1 ¶
6].

The policy contained Commercial General Liability Coverage and certain

endorsements

including

Abuse

or

Molestation

Coverage,

Miscellaneous

Professional Liability Coverage Endorsement, and Punitive Damages Exclusion.
[Dkt. 47-1 ¶¶ 3-5; Dkt. 50-1 ¶¶ 3-5; Dkt. 48-2 (Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B (Markel

2
The original complaint contained allegations against Kevin Ebner, Kristin Martin,
and Kurt Ebner, but John Doe subsequently withdrew his complaint against these
individuals on or about June 1, 2015. See Dkt. 47-1 ¶¶ 7-8; Dkt. 50-1 ¶¶ 7-8].
2 

Policy) at EBNER000200, -0218]. The Commercial General Liability Extension of
Declarations lists Camp Awosting at a premises owned, rented, or occupied by the
named insured and designates the Abuse and Molestation Coverage to apply to
Camp Awosting. [Dkt. 47-1 ¶ 19; Dkt. 50-1 ¶ 19; Dkt. 48-2 at -0154].
The policy contains several provisions relevant to the case at hand. First,
the CGL Coverage states that Markel Insurance “will pay those sums that the
insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ . .
. to which the insurance applies” but has “no duty to defend the insured against
any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘bodily injury’ . . . to which this insurance does not
apply.” [Dkt. 48-2 at -0157]. “Bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury, sickness
or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at
any time.” Id. at -0167. Markel Insurance reserves a right to “at [its] discretion, [to]
investigate any ‘occurrence’ and settle any claim or ‘suit’ that may result.” Id. at 0157.
“Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Id. at -0169. The
CGL Coverage limits the application of insurance coverage to “bodily injury” if
three conditions are satisfied. Those conditions are if “(1) [t]he ‘bodily injury’ . . .
is caused by an ‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘covered territory,’; (2) [t]he
bodily injury’ . . . occurs during the policy period; and (3) [p]rior to the policy period,
no insured listed under Paragraph 1 of Section II – Who is an Insured and no
‘employee’ authorized by you to give or receive notice of an ‘occurrence’ or claim,
knew that the ‘bodily injury’ . . . had occurred, in whole or in part.” Id. at -0157

3 

(emphasis added). This section explicitly states that “[v]arious provisions in this
policy restrict coverage” and directs the insured to “[r]ead the entire policy
carefully to determine rights, duties and what is and is not covered.” Id.
Second, Markel Insurance added an endorsement provision titled Abuse or
Molestation Coverage, which “modifies insurance provided under the [CGL
Coverage].” See id. at -0190. This endorsement states that “the provisions of the
CGL Coverage Form apply unless modified by this endorsement.” Id. (emphasis
added). Under the Abuse or Molestation Coverage endorsement, Markel Insurance
will
pay those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages that result in ‘bodily injury’ . . . because of abuse,
molestation or exploitation arising from negligent employment,
training, investigation, reporting to the proper authorities, or failure to
so report, or retention and supervision of a person for whom any
insured is or ever was legally responsible. Coverage includes the
actual, alleged, or threatened abuse, molestation, or exploitation by
anyone of any person while in the care, custody or control of any
insured.
Id. (emphasis added). The Abuse or Molestation Coverage endorsement also
includes “mental anguish or emotional distress” as types of “bodily injury.” Id.
The endorsement, however, includes Limits of Insurance such that “[n]o coverage
in this policy is provided for abuse, molestation or exploitation except as provided
herein, under this endorsement.”

Id. at -0191.

“Multiple incidents of abuse,

molestation or exploitation involving a person which takes place over multiple
policy periods for which this coverage is provided by us shall be deemed as one
‘occurrence’ and shall be subject to the coverage and limits in effect at the time of

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the first incident.”

Id.

Monetary limitations are $1,000,000 per person, per

occurrence or $2,000,000 aggregate per policy period. Id. at -0190.
There also exists a Miscellaneous Professional Liability Coverage
Endorsement that modifies certain provisions of the CGL Coverage. See id. at 0199. This endorsement covers damages “arising out of a covered ‘wrongful act’
to which this insurance applies or ‘wrongful act(s)’ of others for which you are
liable.” Id. The endorsement expressly states, “This insurance does not apply to:
. . . (3) [l]iability resulting from any actual, threatened, or alleged abuse, molestation
or sexual conduct.” Id.
Lastly, the policy includes a Punitive Damages Exclusion endorsement,
which modifies insurance provided, in relevant part, under the CGL Coverage Part.
See id. at -0218.

This endorsement states, “It is understood and agreed that

coverage under this policy does not apply to punitive or exemplary damages, nor
to fines, penalties or sanctions imposed by law, nor to defense costs related to any
of the above.” Id.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of proving
that no genuine factual disputes exist. See Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d
98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010). “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court
is required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id. (citing

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “If there is any evidence in the
record that could reasonably support a jury’s verdict for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd
Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
A party who opposes summary judgment “cannot defeat the motion by
relying on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere
assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. Cnty
of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1996). “At the summary judgment stage of the
proceeding, [the moving party is] required to present admissible evidence in
support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to back them up,
are not sufficient.” Welch–Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No. 3:03-cv-00481, 2004 WL
2472280, at *4 (D. Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (citing Gottlieb, 84 F.3d at 518); see Martinez
v. Conn. State Library, 817 F.Supp.2d 28, 37 (D. Conn. 2011). Where there is no
evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party
producing it and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the
evidence offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the
record, summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.,
604 F.3d 712, 726–27 (2d Cir. 2010).
III.

Analysis
The parties dispute whether the policy at issue imposes upon Markel

Insurance a duty to defend and to indemnify Ebner Camps for the allegations set

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forth in the state case. In essence, Markel Insurance contends the insurance policy
is an occurrence-based policy excluding conduct that happened before the policy
period, such as the alleged sexual assault and battery of 1987. Ebner Camps does
not dispute that the policy is occurrence-based, see [Dkt. 53 (Defs.’ Am. Reply) at
1], but it instead posits that language from the Abuse and Molestation Coverage
endorsement modified the insurance policy “to provide comprehensive and
virtually timeless coverage for claims arising out of sexual abuse and molestation,”
[Dkt. 48 at 4]. Specifically, Ebner Camps argues that the endorsement language
covering “a person for whom any insured is or ever was legally responsible”
extends coverage to people no longer employed “who may have exploited or
molested a person while in the care, custody or control of Ebner” and directly
conflicts with the other provisions of the policy “limit[ing] coverage to occurrences
within the policy period.” Id. at 7. This disagreement boils down to one question:
to what extent does the Abuse and Molestation Coverage endorsement modify the
CGL Coverage?
The parties agree that Connecticut law applies to the interpretation of this
insurance policy contract. See [Dkt. 40 (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.) at 5 of PDF; Dkt. 48 at
8]. The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law for the Court,
see Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 274 Conn. 457, 462-63
(2005), that “is to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the
construction of any written contract,” Zulick v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co., 287 Conn.
367, 372-73 (2008). A court must construe the insurance contract to effectuate “the
intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the . . . [insured] expected to receive

7 

and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy
. . . .” Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 795 (2009)
(quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 406 (2004)). Overall, policy
language must be construed “as laymen would understand it and not according to
the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters . . . ; the policyholder’s
expectations should be protected as long as they are objectively reasonable from
the layman’s point of view.” R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 273 Conn.
448, 462 (2005) (quoting O’Brien v. United States Fidelity Guar. Co., 235 Conn. 837,
843 (1996)).
Clear and unambiguous policy terms must be given their “natural and
ordinary meaning,” and a court “cannot indulge in a forced construction ignoring
provisions or so distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently
intended by the parties.” Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 213 Conn. 696, 702-03
(1990); Liberty Mutual, 290 Conn. at 795-96 (requiring language “from which the
intention of the parties is to be deduced” to be given the natural and ordinary
meaning where the terms are unambiguous). Put another way, a court may not
“torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for
ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or
laymen contend for different meanings.” Schultz, 213 Conn. at 703 (quoting Downs
v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 146 Conn. 490, 494-95 (1959)); see Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Meyers,
No. CV030519406S, 2003 WL 23177491, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (“[A]mbiguity
does not result from a term having multiple dictionary definitions nor because the
parties differ on its meaning.”). Where a term in an insurance policy is ambiguous,

8 

however, such ambiguity “must be resolved in favor of the insured.” Liberty
Mutual, 290 Conn. at 796. Ambiguous terms in an insurance policy are those that
are “reasonably susceptible to more than one reading.” Connecticut Med. Ins. Co.
v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 7 (2008). This ambiguity must exist in the policy
language itself and cannot derive from a party’s “subjective perception of the
terms.” Id.; Liberty Mutual, 290 Conn. at 808 (same).
The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that an “endorsement” has been
defined as both (a) “a provision added to an insurance contract altering its scope
or application that takes precedence over printed portions in conflict therewith,”
and (b) “[a] written or printed form attached to the policy which alters provisions
of the contract.” Schultz, 213 Conn. at 703 (citing, respectively, (a) Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary and (b) T. Green, Glossary of Ins. Terms (1980)); see Lexington
Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Grp., Inc., 311 Conn. 29, 55 (2014) (defining
“endorsement” or “rider” as “a writing added or attached to a policy or certificate
of insurance which expands or restricts its benefits or excludes certain conditions
from coverage”) (quoting 2 L. Russ & T. Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3d Ed. 2005)
§ 18:17, p. 18–24). “When properly incorporated into the policy, the policy and the
rider or endorsement together constitute the contract of insurance, and are to be
read together to determine the contract actually intended by the parties.”
Lexington, 311 Conn. at 55.

It logically follows then that “[i]n construing an

insurance policy, the court must not ignore or disregard any provision that can be
reconciled with other parts of the policy nor should a court interpret a single
provision or sentence in a policy and attach to it a great significance than is

9 

intended by the whole terms of a policy.” Schultz, 213 Conn. at 704. A court should
also interpret the policy to give every provision operative effect where possible, as
“[a] construction of an insurance policy which entirely neutralizes one provision
should not be adopted if the contract is susceptible of another construction which
gives effect to all of its provisions and is consistent with the general intent.”
Lexington, 311 Conn. at 57 (quoting R.T. Vanderbilt, 273 Conn. at 469). By like
measure, “[t]o the extent that an interpretation makes another term or provision
meaningless, that interpretation should be rejected in favor of an interpretation that
preserves meaning.” Id. (quoting 1 J. Thomas & F. Mootz, New Appleman on Ins.
Law (Library Ed. 2011) § 5.03[1], p. 5-31). That being said, where there exists an
“irreconcilable conflict” between language from the policy and the endorsement,
then the latter controls. Schultz, 213 Conn. at 705.
As aforementioned, the CGL Coverage provides Markel Insurance “the right
and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking . . . damages [for ‘bodily
injury’].”

See [Dkt. 48-2 at -0157].

The Abuse and Molestation Coverage

endorsement covers damages for “bodily injury” resulting specifically from abuse,
molestation and exploitation. Id. at -0190. The endorsement “modifies insurance
provided under the [CGL Coverage] but explicitly acknowledges that the CGL
Coverage provisions “apply unless modified by this endorsement.”

Id.

A

“modification” is defined as “[a] change to something; an alteration” or “[a]
qualification or limitation of something.” Modification, Black’s Law Dictionary,
(10th ed. 2014). These definitions indicate that language from the endorsement is
inextricably linked to the associated language of the insurance policy. There also

10 

exists language directly preceding the content of the endorsement, which states
as follows: “In consideration of the premium charged, the following is added to
Section I, Coverage A.” [Dkt. 48-2 at -0190 (thereafter listing the content)]. The
content of the endorsement then appears within an outline matching the sections
and subsections of the CGL Coverage. In considering the endorsement’s format,
the “modification” definition, and the overarching contract construction principles
in mind, the Court finds that any provision from the CGL Coverage that does not
“irreconcilably conflict” with the Abuse and Molestation Coverage endorsement
provisions applies coextensively to the legal obligations to pay damages for abuse,
molestation or exploitation.

See Schultz, 213 Conn. at 705 (stating that

endorsement language controls over policy language where there is an
“irreconcilable conflict” between the provisions).
Some Abuse and Molestation Coverage language clearly modifies the
associated CGL Coverage provisions. For instance, the endorsement clearly and
unambiguously modifies the definition of “bodily injury” to “include[ ] mental
anguish or emotional distress.” Id. The relevant definition of “include” is “to take
in or have as part of a whole,” see Include, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/include?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_sou
rce=jsonld (last visited Aug. 2, 2017), and accordingly the Court construes the
endorsement to expand the definition of “bodily injury” as defined under the CGL
Coverage: “bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including
death resulting from any of these at any time,” id. at -0167. The endorsement also

11 

explicitly limits coverage in that “[n]o coverage in this policy is provided for abuse,
molestation or exploitation except as provided herein, under this endorsement.”
Id. at -0191.3
Notably, the Abuse and Molestation Coverage endorsement covers any legal
obligation to pay damages “because of abuse, molestation or exploitation arising
from negligent employment, training, investigation, reporting to the proper
authorities, or failure to so report, or retention and supervision of a person for
whom any insured is or ever was legally responsible.” Id. at -0190. This language
marks the center of the parties’ dispute. Although Ebner Camps argues that this
phrase “conflicts directly with the commercial general liability coverage provisions
that limit coverage to occurrences within the policy period,” see [Dkt. 48 at 7],
Markel Insurance posits that such language does not conflict and must still
comport with the requirements for CGL Coverage to apply: “(1) [t]he ‘bodily injury’
. . . is caused by an ‘occurrence’ that takes place in the ‘covered territory,’; (2) [t]he
bodily injury’ . . . occurs during the policy period; and (3) [p]rior to the policy period,
no insured listed under Paragraph 1 of Section II – Who is an Insured and no
‘employee’ authorized by you to give or receive notice of an ‘occurrence’ or claim,
knew that the ‘bodily injury’ . . . had occurred, in whole or in part.” [Dkt. 48-2 at 0157].

3
Markel Insurance presents an alternative argument that the Miscellaneous
Professional Liability Coverage endorsement excludes coverage for sexual acts as
the endorsement explicitly excludes coverage for “[l]iability resulting from any
actual, threatened, or alleged abuse, molestation or sexual conduct.” See [Dkt. 40
at 15-16 of PDF]. Ebner Camps does not dispute this contention, and the above
presented language further indicates that where abuse or molestation is at issue
then the Abuse and Molestation Coverage endorsement controls.
12 

The Court finds that a natural and ordinary reading of this language is that
coverage of “a person for whom any insured is or ever was legally responsible”
defines who is insured but nothing more. As aforementioned, a court is to interpret
the policy and endorsement together, Lexington, 311 Conn. at 55, but should not
give certain provisions, sentences, or even phrases a “greater significance than is
intended by the whole terms of the policy,” Schultz, 213 Conn. at 704. Ebner Camps
argues that “[t]his language specifically extends coverage for present employees
and past employees for an unlimited amount of time.”

[Dkt. 48 at 7].

This

interpretation does not conflict with the fact that the “bodily injury” must still occur
during the policy period. In other words, so long as the conduct occurred in the
covered territory during the policy period and specified individuals did not know
of the occurrence prior to the policy period, it is irrelevant that the individual
allegedly inflicting the bodily injury is currently or formerly employed because both
are covered under this endorsement. To interpret the phrase as Ebner Camps
advocates would require the Court to override the CGL Coverage that is limited to
occurrences within the policy period, and this construction would “entirely
neutralize one provision” where there is otherwise the “susceptib[ility] of another
construction which gives effect to all of its provisions and is consistent with the
general intent.” See Lexington, 311 Conn. at 57. Indeed, the Court would have to
expand the phrase from who is insured to also include when the insurance can be

13 

invoked. This is in clear contravention of Connecticut’s principles of contract
interpretation. 4
A reading of the contract as a whole supports a conclusion that it is the
“general intent” for the occurrence-based limitations to remain intact. The CGL
Coverage Part Declarations includes a Retroactive Date section, which states,
“Coverage A of this Insurance does not apply to ‘bodily injury’ . . . which occurs
before the Retroactive Date, if any, shown here: ____none___.” [Dkt. 48-2 at -0153].
This language supports the conclusion that coverage under this policy is not
intended to extend beyond the policy period.

The parties could have made

coverage retroactive but chose not to do so. Neither the parties nor the Court have
identified any other evidence in the policy indicating the parties wanted coverage
for abuse and molestation to reach beyond the policy period that otherwise applies
to all other types of occurrences.

To the extent Ebner Camps believes the

4
The Court also notes that the phrase, “is or ever was legally responsible,” appears
to be boilerplate language in many abuse and molestation endorsements. After
conducting a broad search of the instant phrase and the endorsement subject
matter, the Court identified nearly 60 state and federal cases nationwide and found
that very few discussed the meaning of the phrase; where the phrase was
discussed, it typically involved the scope of who was covered under the language.
See, e.g., Logan Bus Co., Inc. v. Discover Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 24525/09, 2012
WL 4477286, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 28, 2012) (determining that “’legally responsible’
refers only to its employee or worker,” and not to a student); QBE Ins. Corp. v.
Walters, 148 A. 3d 785, 791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (holding that where “the exclusion
explicitly encompasses the negligent employment, investigation, supervision,
training, and retention of ‘a person for whom any insured is or ever was legally
responsible and whose conduct is described’ as ‘actual or threatened assault or
battery whether caused by or at the instigation of any insured, his employees,
patrons or any other persons,’” negligent conduct of an insured or its employees
is excluded) (emphasis added). It is notable that in not a single case did any party
interpret the phrase to mean coverage should be afforded beyond the policy
period.
14 

occurrence-based language is knocked out by the endorsement, the Court
acknowledges that where there exists a conflict between the policy and the
endorsement, the latter prevails, see Schultz, 213 Conn. at 705, but finds that no
conflict exists to warrant the application of this rule. Moreover, the endorsement
itself contains the following limit of insurance: “Multiple incidents of abuse,
molestation or exploitation involving a person which takes place over multiple
policy periods for which this coverage is provided by us shall be deemed as one
‘occurrence’ and shall be subject to the coverage and limits in effect at the time of
the first incident.” Id. at -0191 (emphasis added).

Indeed, were the Court to

disregard the existence of the italicized language that exists in the endorsement
itself, it would be doing so in contravention of clear legal principles. See Lexington,
311 Conn. at 56-57 (“To the extent that an interpretation makes another term or
provision meaningless, that interpretation should be rejected in favor of an
interpretation that preserves meaning.”).
Markel Insurance has also identified several Connecticut state regulations
establishing standards for claims-made policies. See [Dkt. 40-4 (Def.’s Mot. Summ.
J. Ex. 4, Applicable Regulations)]. Under Regs. Conn. State Agencies § 38a-327-3,
a claims-made policy must comply with a long list of minimum standards. See id.
at 4 of PDF. Ebner Camps agrees that this policy is an occurrence-based policy,
not a claims-made policy, but nonetheless argues that the Abuse and Molestation
Coverage endorsement modifies the CGL Coverage. See [Dkt. 53 at 1]. Ebner
Camps also posits that an insured is not required to evaluate the policy’s
compliance with state regulations. See [Dkt. 48 at 11]. Notwithstanding Ebner

15 

Camps’s contentions, the Court agrees with Markel Insurance that the modification
would effectively turn this endorsement into a claims-made provision.

That

Connecticut regulations severely restrict the use of claims-made policies is
additional evidence against Ebner Camps’ construction and, if nothing else,
suggests the construction may not be feasible for practical regulatory reasons.
Certainly in this circumstance “the policyholder’s expectations should be
protected” because a reasonable layperson would construe a policy in a way that
would facilitate regulatory compliance should it be applicable. R.T. Vanderbilt Co.,
Inc., 273 Conn. at 463.
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS summary judgment in favor of

Plaintiff Markel Insurance. The Court enters a declaratory judgment that Markel
Insurance has no duty under the policy to defend or indemnify Ebner Camps as to
the allegations set forth in John Doe’s state court complaint in Litchfield Superior
Court, Doe v. Ebner Camps, Inc., et al., docket number CV 15-5007564-S.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/_______________
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: August 4, 2017

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