Altayeb v. Chapdelaine et al
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER (see attached). Signed by Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on December 16, 2016. (Kahl, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CAROL CHAPDELAINE, CTO PERRY,
C/O JOHN DOE 1, C/O JOHN DOE 2, C/O
JOHN DOE 3, C/O JOHN DOE 4, C/O JANE
DOE 1, C/O JANE DOE 2, C/O JANE DOE
3, C/O JANE DOE 4, NURSE JOHN DOE 1,
NURSE JOHN DOE 2, NURSE JOHN DOE
3, NURSE JOHN DOE 4, NURSE JOHN
DOE 5, NURSE JANE DOE 1, NURSE
JANE DOE 2, NURSE JANE DOE 3,
NURSE JANE DOE 4, NURSE JANE
DECEMBER 16, 2016
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff Becker Altayeb (“Altayeb”), incarcerated and pro se, has filed a Complaint
[Doc. 1] asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and certain state-law claims. The Defendants are
Warden Carol Chapdelaine, Correctional Treatment Officer Perry, Correctional Officers John
Doe 1-4, Correctional Officers Jane Doe 1-4, and Nurses John/Jane Doe 1-5. All Defendants are
named in their individual capacities only.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review prisoner civil complaints against
governmental actors and dismiss any portion of the complaint that “is frivolous, malicious, or
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or that “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune to such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Second Circuit precedent, a pro se
complaint is adequately pled, and thus passes a § 1915A review, if its allegations, liberally
construed, could “conceivably give rise to a viable claim.” Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124,
130 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court must accept as true all factual matters alleged in a complaint,
although a complaint may not survive dismissal unless its factual recitations "'state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.'" See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp.,
770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). Nevertheless, it is well-established that “[p]ro se
complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d
90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
The Second Circuit reviews a district court's dismissal of a prisoner's complaint under
§ 1915A de novo and will "reverse a district court's dismissal pursuant to § 1915A whenever a
liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Larkin
v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Wynn v. Southward, 257 F.3d 588, 591-92
(7th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, reiterating this point, in the § 1915A context, the Second Circuit in
Larkin cited and quoted approvingly from Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d
198, 202 (2d Cir. 1999) that it "will not affirm the dismissal of a complaint unless it appears
beyond doubt, even when the complaint is liberally construed, that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts that would entitle him to relief." Larkin, 318 F.3d at 139.
Altayeb was transferred to the MacDougall Correctional Institution on April 3, 2014.
During the intake interview, Altayeb told correctional staff he was concerned for his personal
safety because he was a Muslim/Arab. He repeated these concerns to Warden Chapdelaine when
she toured his housing unit. Warden Chapdelaine told Altayeb that he was over-reacting.
During July and August 2014, Altayeb told Correctional Officers John Doe 1-4 and Jane
Doe 1-4 that several inmates had threatened him. They called him a terrorist and said that they
were going to “get him for what Arabs are doing to our country.” Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 15. Defendants
Correctional Officers Doe told Altayeb that he would get what was coming to him. Altayeb
relayed these comments and his concerns to Defendant Perry, who told him not to pay attention
to the comments and characterized the comments as childishness.
On August 14, 2014, over Altayeb’s objection, Defendant Perry moved inmate Williams
into Altayeb’s cell. Inmate Williams made a derogatory remark toward Altayeb based on his
faith, which Defendant Perry heard. Altayeb asked to be removed and Defendant Perry laughed
it off. Inmate Williams was a former soldier who had served in Afghanistan, which Defendant
Perry also knew. That afternoon, while Altayeb was sleeping, inmate Williams attacked Altayeb
and called him a terrorist. Inmate Williams stabbed Altayeb in the chest, broke a fan over his
head and hit him in the chest and ribs. Altayeb tried to bang on the cell door for help but
Correctional Officers Doe did nothing. After another inmate called Correctional Officers Doe,
they eventually came to the cell and deployed a chemical agent. Both inmates were handcuffed.
Altayeb was taken to the medical unit to have his eyes washed and brought to the
segregation unit. At the medical unit, Defendants Nurses John/Jane Doe 1-5 refused to treat
Altayeb’s stab wounds and other injuries. He received no medical care from August 14, 2014,
through August 21, 2014, on which day Altayeb was transferred to Corrigan-Radgowski
Correctional Facility. Medical staff there ordered him taken to the hospital for treatment of
several broken ribs, a concussion, and infected stab wounds.
Between August 14 and 21, 2014, Altayeb repeatedly requested that Defendants
Correctional Officers Doe call the state police so he could file a complaint for a hate crime and
assault against inmate Williams. They denied his requests. Correctional Officers Doe also
denied Altayeb a legal call to contact his attorney. Warden Chapdelaine also denied him
permission to call his lawyer, the state police and "the councilor at the embassy in New York."
Doc. 1 at 9, ¶ 35.
Altayeb asserts several § 1983 claims based on the following violations: (1) Defendants
Chapdelaine, Perry and Correctional Officers Doe were deliberately indifferent to his safety and
failed to protect him from harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) Defendants Nurses
Doe were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; and (3) Defendants Chapdelaine and Correctional Officers Doe violated Altayeb’s
right to due process and equal protection as well as his First Amendment rights by failing to call
the state police and failing to permit him to make legal calls. Alatayeb also asserts state-law
claims against Defendants Chapdelaine, Perry and Correctional Officers Doe for negligence in
failing to protect him from harm. Altayeb seeks declaratory relief, monetary damages, punitive
damages and injunctive relief, but asserts claims against all Defendants only in their individual
Altayeb seeks injunctive relief only in the form of an order that the Department of
Correction place him on single cell status, remove all disciplinary reports from his file and
reinstate his social contact visits. This relief must be denied. First, Altayeb asks the Court to
order the Department of Correction to afford him the requested relief. The Department of
Correction, a state agency, is not a defendant in this case and, indeed, cannot be sued under
section 1983 for injunctive relief. See Bhatia v. Conn. Dep't of Children & Families (DCF), 317
F. App'x 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[A] state agency . . . is not susceptible to liability under section
1983 . . . both because such an agency is not a 'person' within the meaning of that statute . . . and
because state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." (citations omitted))
(summary order); see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (holding that
states and its officials are not a person within the meaning of the statute); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (recognizing that state agencies are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity). Thus, Altayeb cannot save this claim by simply adding the
Department of Corrections as a Defendant.
Moreover, Defendants sued by Altayeb are named in their individual capacities only.
“[Injunctive relief against a state official may be recovered only in an official capacity suit, . . .
because [a] victory in a personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual defendant
rather than against the entity that employs him.” Marsh v. Kirschner, 31 F. Supp. 2d 79, 80 (D.
Conn. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Altayeb cannot seek
injunctive relief against the state officials in their individual capacities. Section 1983 does,
however, permit individuals to seek injunctive relief against state actors in their official
capacities. Id. However, even if Defendants had been named in their official capacities,
Defendants all work at MacDougall Correctional Institution and have no control over Altayeb’s
confinement at Garner Correctional Institution, his place of confinement when he filed this
action. See Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) ("It is settled in this Circuit that a
transfer from a prison facility moots an action for injunctive relief against the transferring
facility." (citing Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 568 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989) and Beyah v. Coughlin,
789 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986))).
In summary, all requests for injunctive relief are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
State-law Negligence Claim
Altayeb asserts a state-law negligence claim against Defendants Chapdelaine, Perry and
Corrections Officers Doe. Altayeb challenges actions (and inaction) taken by Defendants as a
breach of a duty of reasonable cared owed to him, resulting in physical and emotional injury to
Altayeb. However, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-165(a) provides that "[n]o state officer or employee
shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the
discharge of his duties or within the scope of his or her employment." Therefore, state
employees are not "personally liable for their negligent actions performed within the scope of
their employment." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 319 (2003). As such, Defendants have
statutory immunity from Altayeb's negligence claim. See Ziemba v. Lynch, No. 11-974, 2013
WL 5232543, at *8 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2013). Altayeb's state-law negligence claim is dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).1
C. Altayeb's § 1983 Claims
Altayeb alleges a number of § 1983 claims related to the alleged assault, his injuries and
the subsequent treatment he received by Defendants. The Court will address each claim in turn.
Eighth Amendment Claims
Altayeb alleges that Defendants Chapdelaine, Perry and Correctional Officers Doe were
deliberately indifferent to his safety and failed to protect him from harm in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. To state such a claim, Altayeb must "allege facts showing that he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and that the defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to that risk and [his] safety." See Medina v. Black, No. 151371, 2016 WL 386030, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2016) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
836 (1994)). Defendants must have known of and disregarded "an excessive risk of harm to the
plaintiff's health and safety," been aware of the facts from which the inference can be drawn that
such a substantial risk of harm existed, and actually drawn that inference. Id. (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837).
In assessing whether Altayeb faced an excessive risk of serious harm, this Court must
"look at the 'facts and circumstances of which the official was aware at the time he acted or
failed to act.'" Hartry v. City of Suffolk, 755 F. Supp. 2d 422, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting
Although Altayeb mentions at the beginning of his Complaint state-law assault and
battery claims against Defendants, throughout the rest of the Complaint he fails to assert any
facts supporting such claims against these Defendants and does not attempt to state such a claim.
The only assault or battery referenced in the complaint is that committed by inmate Williams,
who is not named as a Defendant. To the extent he is asserting such claims, they are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Heisler v. Kralik, 981 F. Supp. 830, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). The focus is "on the existence of a
substantial risk of serious harm, rather than the actual injuries suffered in an attack." Medina,
2016 WL 386030, at *5 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In fact, an inmate need not await
injury to seek to remedy the unsafe conditions. Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845). "[W]hen a
prisoner is subjected to specific threats from another inmate, and there are indication[s] that the
threat will be carried out, the failure of prison officials to act may give rise to a deliberate
indifference claim." Hartry, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (quoting Walker v. Shaw, No. 08-10043,
2010 WL 2541711, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Altayeb alleges that he informed Defendants, including the supervisory
Defendants, several times that he was worried about his safety as a Muslim/Arab person, that
inmates were calling him a terrorist and stated an intention to attack him, and that he should not
be housed with a soldier that had fought in Afghanistan. Defendants brushed aside and
minimized Altayeb's concerns and certain Defendants are alleged to have predicted that Altayeb
would get was coming to him, thereby seeming to approve the inmates' threats. He was then
brutally attacked by his cellmate and certain Defendants ignored Altayeb's pleas allowing the
attack to continue longer. These allegations are enough to plead that Defendants were aware of,
and disregarded, an excessive risk of serious harm to Altayeb's health and safety. Thus, he has
stated cognizable claims for failure to protect and deliberate indifference to his safety by these
Altayeb also alleges that Defendants Nurses Doe were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Deliberate indifference by prison
officials or medical staff to a prisoner's serious medical needs also constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F. Supp. 2d 261, 264 (D. Conn. 2008); see also Salahuddin v. Goord,
467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment imposes a duty upon prison officials to ensure that inmates receive adequate
medical care." (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 844)). To prevail on such a claim, Altayeb must
demonstrate that the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care was "sufficiently serious" and
that the Nurse Defendants acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind" by acting with
"deliberate indifference to inmate health." Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279-80.
To determine whether the alleged deprivation is "sufficiently serious," courts must
consider (1) whether the prisoner was actually deprived of adequate medical care when
providing reasonable care is all that is required, and (2) how the medical care was inadequate,
which requires also examining what harm will likely be caused or has been caused. Id. at 280.
Only deprivations that deny "the minimal civilized measure of life necessities" are "sufficiently
serious." Id. at 279 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Regarding the Nurse
Defendants' state of mind, "[d]eliberate indifference is a mental state equivalent to subjective
recklessness, as the term is used in criminal law," requiring officials to "act or fail to act while
actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result." Id. at 280 (citing
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-37, 839-40).
Here, Altayeb alleges that the Nurse Defendants, aware of the brutal attack on Altayeb,
ignored his substantial injuries from the attack, failing altogether to treat him for any injury other
than that to his eyes from the deploying of the chemical agent. The Nurse Defendants, as
alleged, were aware of a serious medical need, and consciously and intentionally disregarded
that need. As a result, Altayeb was not treated for his injuries until he was transferred to another
correctional institution at which point he was sent directly to a hospital. At the hospital, he was
finally treated for his injuries related to the brutal attack, which included wounds that had
become infected due to his lack of prior treatment. Thus, Altayeb has stated cognizable claims
for deliberate indifference to his medical needs by these Nurse Defendants.
Claims Related to Altayeb's Inability to Call Certain Persons
Altayeb alleges that certain Defendants, including Defendant Chapdelaine, refused to
allow him access to a telephone to call his lawyer, the Connecticut State Police, and the
councilor at the embassy in New York, which denied him due process and equal protection.
Regarding his claim that he was not allowed to contact his lawyer, "[p]risoners . . . 'have a
constitutional right of access to the courts.'" Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.
2004) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977)). Such a right has been grounded, at
least as relevant to prisoners, in the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process. Id.; see also Pino v. Dalsheim, 558 F. Supp. 673, 674-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that as a corollary to the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process of law, prisoners must be afforded reasonable access to the courts in
order to . . . seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights." (citing Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled in part on other grounds by Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989))).
Any regulations or practices by a state that "unjustifiably obstruct" this "right of access to
the courts are invalid." Pino, 558 F. Supp. at 674-75 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 419)
(internal quoatation marks omitted). However, "[t]o establish a constitutional violation based on
denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was deliberate
and malicious, and that the defendant's actions resulted in an actual injury to the plaintiff."
Banks v. Cnty. of Westchester, 168 F. Supp. 3d 682, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Bellezza v.
Holland, 730 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such an
injury requires that "the defendant's conduct did, in fact, hinder the efforts of the plaintiff to
pursue a legal claim." Id. (citing Bellezza, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 314-15) (emphasis in original).
Here, Altayeb alleges that for, at most, a period of one week certain Defendants
prevented him from contacting his lawyer. He does not allege how that hindered him from
ultimately filing the instant action or how it resulted in injury to him. Moreover, courts have
consistently found that "[m]ere delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate
with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Banks, 168 F. Supp. 3d at
693 (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, absent any allegation that the conduct of certain Defendants in this seven-day
period caused harm, Altayeb's Complaint cannot sustain an action under § 1983 on that ground.
Regarding Altayeb's inability to contact the state police, "a victim of allegedly criminal
conduct is not entitled to a criminal investigation or the prosecution of the alleged perpetrator of
the crime." Johnson v. Ruiz, No. 11-542, 2012 WL 90159, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2012)
(collecting cases). The ability to have a criminal complaint filed and have a prosecution result as
a victim of the alleged crime is not a constitutionally protected activity. Moreover, a victim has
"no constitutionally protected right to a proper investigation" of any claims filed. Id. (citing
Lewis v. Gallivan, 315 F. Supp. 3d 313, 316-17 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) and Santossio v. City of
Bridgeport, No. 01-1460, 2004 WL 2381559, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2004)).
Altayeb's allegation that certain Defendants did not allow him to contact the state police
to press charges against inmate Williams does not state a constitutional claim. See id. at *5.
Altayeb had no constitutional right to an investigation or to have inmate Williams prosecuted,
thus, his allegations regarding the failure to permit him to press charges fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Finally, regarding Altayeb's claim that he was prevented from contacting the "councilor
at the embassy in New York," it is unclear from his Complaint what embassy Altayeb was trying
to contact, why Altayeb would need to contact an embassy or what purpose Altayeb had in
contacting the embassy. Although this district has recognized that communications with foreign
embassies directly concern a prisoner's incarceration and that a foreign national "surely has a
right to communicate with his government in order to persuade it to take some official action on
his behalf," Stover v. Carlson, 413 F. Supp. 719, 723 (D. Conn. 1976), Altayeb does not allege
that he is a foreign national entitled to so communicate with his government or even which
embassy he was seeking to speak with about the assault. In addition, Altayeb does not allege
any harm or injury resulting from the seven day period in which he could not so communicate
with the embassy. Given the lack of details and allegations concerning this cursory claim,
Altayeb has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted on this basis.
To the extent Altayeb is asserting any First Amendment claims on the denial of his
requests to call his lawyer, the Connecticut State Police or the embassy, he also fails to state any
claims upon which relief can be granted. Prisoners have no constitutional right to unlimited
telephone use. See Pitsley v. Ricks, No. 96-0372, 2000 WL 362023, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. March 31,
2000) ("Courts considering prison telephone restrictions have agreed that an inmate has no right
to unlimited telephone use." (collecting cases)). Restrictions on such use are generally upheld if
the affected inmate has an alternate means of communicating with the outside world. Id. at *5.
Altayeb does not allege (and it does not appear from his Complaint) that he was without
any other means of contacting his lawyer, the Connecticut State Police, or the embassy such as
by letter. Thus, although Altayeb may have been limited in his ability to use the telephone, he
has not alleged facts from which this Court can infer that he was entirely deprived of his right to
communicate with the outside world in violation of the First Amendment. In addition, to state a
violation of his First Amendment speech rights, Altayeb is required to show that he suffered
prejudice or actual injury. Clay v. Schwebler, No. 13-1314, 2015 WL 6438919, at *4-5
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015) (citing Pitsley, 2000 WL 362023, at *3). As explained above, Altayeb
has failed to do so with the allegations in his Complaint.
Altayeb's claims related to the denial of his requests to contact his lawyer, the
Connecticut State Police, and an unspecified embassy are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Leave to Amend
Where a pro se complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court generally "should not
dismiss without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, where "[t]he problem with [the plaintiff's] causes
of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it." Id. The Court may deny a plaintiff
leave to amend such claims as "[r]epleading would thus be futile" and "[s]uch a futile request to
replead should be denied" as instructed by the Second Circuit. Id. (citing Hunt v. Alliance N.
Am. Gov't Income Trust, 159 F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Here, the problems with Altayeb's claims for injunctive relief, Altayeb's state-law claims
and his § 1983 claims based on violations of his constitutional rights related to his inability to
call the Connecticut State Police are substantive. As such, repleading them would be futile.
These claims are dismissed and Altayeb may not replead them.
However, the Court will grant Altayeb leave to amend his § 1983 claims based on
violations of his constitutional rights related to his inability to call his lawyer and the embassy in
an amended complaint based on the guidance provided in this Initial Review. Altayeb could
reasonably assert such claims if he can cure the deficiencies noted in this Ruling.
Altayeb is advised that, if filed, the amended complaint is intended to completely replace
the complaint in this action, and thus it "renders [any prior complaint] of no legal effect." See
Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore, Altayeb's amended
complaint must include all of the allegations against each of the Defendants against whom the
case is going forward so that the amended complaint may stand alone as the sole complaint that
defendants must answer.
All requests for injunctive relief, Altayeb's state-law claims, and Altayeb's
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to his ability to make phone calls to his lawyer, the Connecticut
State Police, and an embassy are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Altayeb will
have thirty (30) days to file an Amended Complaint asserting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related
to his ability to make phone calls to his lawyer and an embassy in accordance with this Initial
Review. Otherwise, the case will proceed on the remaining 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based upon
Eighth Amendment violations against Defendants in their individual capacities.
The Clerk shall verify the current work address of Defendants Chapdelaine and
Perry with the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs, mail a waiver of service of
process request packet to each Defendant at the confirmed address within twenty-one (21) days
of this Order, and report to the Court on the status of the waiver request on the thirty-fifth (35)
day after mailing. If any Defendant fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make
arrangements for in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service on him in his or her individual
capacity and the defendant shall be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
The Clerk shall send written notice to Plaintiff of the status of this action, along
with a copy of this Order.
The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint and this Ruling and Order
to the Connecticut Attorney General and the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs.
The Defendants shall file their response to the Complaint, either an answer or
motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date the waiver form is sent. If they choose to
file an answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations and respond to the cognizable claim
recited above. They also may include any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal
Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, shall be
completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this order. Discovery requests need
not be filed with the court.
All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months (240 days)
from the date of this order.
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to a
dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date the motion was filed. If no response
is filed, or the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can be granted absent objection.
If Plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local
Court Rule 83.1(c)(2) provides that the plaintiff MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can
result in the dismissal of the case. Plaintiff must give notice of a new address even if he is
incarcerated. Plaintiff should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is
not enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If
Plaintiff has more than one pending case, he should indicate all of the case numbers in the
notification of change of address. Plaintiff should also notify Defendant or the attorney for
Defendant of his new address.
Plaintiff is hereby notified that the U.S. Marshal cannot serve the Complaint on
John Doe 1-4, Jane Doe 1-4, and Nurse John/Jane Doe 1-5 until he identifies these Defendants
by name. Plaintiff will have ninety (90) days from the date of this order to conduct discovery
and file a notice identifying these Defendants by name. If Plaintiff fails to file a notice within
the time specified, the claims against all Doe Defendants will be dismissed without further notice
from the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and the action will proceed only on the claims
against Defendants Chapdelaine and Perry.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: New Haven, Connecticut
December 16, 2016
/s/ Charles S. Haight, Jr.
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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