Kelly et al v. Honeywell International Inc.
Filing
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ORDER granting 70 Motion for Reconsideration for the reasons set forth in the attached decision. The parties are ordered to file a status report within 21 days of the date of this Order stating whether there is presently a need for the Court to address the preliminary injunction previously found moot. The Clerk is directed to reopen this case. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 05/25/2017. (Lee, E.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DAVID KELLY, RICHARD NORKO,
ANNETTE DOBBS, PETER DELLOLIO,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Defendant.
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Civil Case Number
3:16-cv-00543 (VLB)
May 25, 2017
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [DKT. 70]
Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for reconsideration upon the Court entering
judgment in favor of Defendant with respect to “Subclass B,” retirees who retired
after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement and its incorporated
documents (“Agreements”) as well as their surviving spouses.
The Court
previously granted summary judgment in favor of Subclass A, retirees who retired
before the Agreements’ expiration as well as their surviving spouses. The Court
assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts. For the following reasons, the
Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.
I.
Background
On August 12, 2016, the parties submitted to the Court for certification the
following proposed class:
all former Stratford plant production and maintenance and office and
clerical employees (those represented by UAW Locals 376 and 1010)
who retired from Honeywell or AlliedSignal since October 28, 1994 (the
date the retiree obligations moved to Textron to AlliedSignal) and
surviving spouses who are receiving retirement health insurance
benefits from Honeywell or are otherwise eligible to receive coverage.
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[Dkt. 37 (Joint Proposed Class), ¶ 1 (jointly modifying Plaintiffs’ Mot. Certify Class)].
During a telephonic conference on November 7, 2016, the Court inquired as to
whether the class should be divided into two subclasses: retirees who retired
before the Agreements’ expiration and their surviving spouses, and retirees who
retired after the Agreements’ expiration and their surviving spouses. [Dkt. 81 (Tel.
Conf. Tr.), at 9:4-16]. Defense counsel averred that “it [did] not matter whether they
retired during that period,” id. at 10:8-23, and accordingly and upon consent of both
parties the Court granted the proposed class, [Dkt. 51 (Vacated Order)].
After reviewing the parties’ summary judgment briefing and evidence, the
Court concluded that despite the parties’ contention about the irrelevance of the
date of retirement, lifetime medical coverage benefits vested only for retirees who
retired prior to the expiration of the Agreements. [Dkt. 58 (Decision), at 33-34]. The
Court determined the language in the Agreements to be ambiguous with respect to
retirees who retired after the expiration of the Agreements, and thereafter held a
hearing on February 27, 2017, to address the limited issue of whether these
particular Plaintiffs also enjoyed vested lifetime medical coverage benefits. The
Court reviewed evidence and considered the hearing testimony, making the
determination that such rights were not vested and vacating the certification of the
initial class.
[Dkt. 64 (Ruling and Order), at 6-7].
Presently there exist two
subclasses: (A) retirees who retired before the expiration of the Agreements and
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their surviving spouses; and (B) retirees who retired after the expiration of the
Agreements and their surviving spouses.1
Relevant to this issue is the Local 1010 UAW Decision & Effects Agreement
(“Summary”), a document summarizing the results from the 1994 negotiation
process between Textron and the Union for the union members to review prior to
ratification. [See Dkt. 24-11 (Summ. for Ratification)]. Former Union President and
current President of the Local 1010 Retiree Chapter, David Kelly, testified during
the hearing that he created the Summary for the union members, circulated it to
Textron’s Vice President of Labor Relations and Vice President of Human
Resources, and watched these individuals read the Summary in front of him. [See
Dkt. 72 (Evid. Hr’g Tr.), at 68:22-70:11]. Importantly, he also “asked [the Vice
Presidents] to verify its accuracy, that it was okay with – that it accurately reflected
what was negotiated.”
Id. at 69:22-70:3 (emphasis added).
The Summary’s
introductory paragraph states, “The following benefits will be provided to all Local
1010 employees and retirees who are laid-off or retire during this agreement.” [Dkt.
24-11, at 1]. The Court relied upon this clear language and Mr. Kelly’s testimony in
concluding there was no triable issue of fact regarding the parties’ intentions at the
time the contract took effect and accordingly concluded that section 2(b) of the
Effects Bargaining Agreement (“EBA”) did not confer vested lifetime medical
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As the Court recognized in the Memorandum of Decision on the Cross-Motions
for Summary Judgment, the central issue as to whether and on what date
employees’ medical coverage benefits vested applies both to retirees and their
surviving spouses. [See Dkt. 58, at 17, 25]. Previous and subsequent references
to retirees’ contractual rights include surviving spouses.
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coverage benefits to Subclass B because they retired or were laid off after and not
during the Agreements. [Dkt. 64 (Ruling and Order)].
Both parties have since appealed. Defendant challenges the entirety of the
final judgment, [Dkt. 68 (Def.’s Notice Appeal)], and Plaintiffs challenge the final
judgment only with respect to Subclass B, [Dkt. 75 (Pls.’ Notice Appeal)]. Plaintiffs
also filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration. [Dkt. 70-1 (Mot. Recons.)]. The
Second Circuit has stayed the appeal pending resolution of this motion pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). See Kelly v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., appeals docketed, 16675 (2d Cir. Mar. 7, 2017), 17-803 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2017).
Plaintiffs principally argue in the Motion for Reconsideration that Kelly
carelessly drafted the Summary “in haste,” he intended to write “under” instead of
“during,” and that such a mistake was not authorized by anyone on the UAW side
of the bargaining table. [Dkt. 70-1, at 2]. As supporting evidence, Plaintiffs filed
Kelly’s declaration in which he states after the Agreements expired, “in the summer
and fall of 1997, HR Director Brian McMenamin told the Local 1010 bargaining
committee, me included, that employees would not lose their lifetime retiree
medical benefits if they worked beyond the expiration date. He also asked me on
at least two occasions to help persuade senior employees to defer retirement
beyond contract expiration.” [Dkt. 70-2 (Pls.’ Ex. 1, Kelly Decl.), ¶ 7]. Plaintiffs also
filed a document titled “Hot News Local 1010: Voluntary Layoffs,” dated May 30,
1995. [See Dkt. 70-3 (Pls.’ Ex. 2, Hot News)]. The article explains that since
November 1994, a total of 136 Local 1010 employees elected to take voluntary
layoffs and 117 took immediate early retirement following layoffs. Id. Laid off
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employees who retired received a severance bonus of $27,700 “in addition to the
employee’s pension and medical benefits which are guaranteed for life by the
AlliedSignal Corporation under the terms of our Agreement.” Id. (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs aver that this article is an example demonstrating Kelly “never made this
misstatement again.” [Dkt. 70-1, at 2].
II.
Legal Standard
The District Court of Connecticut Local Rule 7(c) permits a Motion for
Reconsideration to be filed within seven days of the filing of a decision. A motion
for reconsideration filed under Local Rule 7(c) is equivalent as a practical matter to
a motion for amendment of judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See City of
Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1991). Rule 59(e) motions filed within
28 days of the judgment suspend the finality of judgment. See Weyant v. Okst, 198
F.3d 311, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The timely filing of a postjudgment motion
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. . . 59 automatically ‘affect[s] the finality of the judgment,’
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 Advisory Committee Note (1995), because such a motion seeks
to alter the judgment or reverse decisions embodied in it.”); Moore’s Federal
Practice ¶ 59.52[1] (3d ed. 2016).
In the Second Circuit, the standard for granting a motion for reconsideration
“is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other
words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); see D. Conn.
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L. R. 7(c) (requiring the movant to file along with the motion for reconsideration “a
memorandum setting forth concisely the controlling decisions or data the movant
believes the Court overlooked”). There are three grounds for granting a motion for
reconsideration: (1) “intervening change of controlling law”; (2) “the availability of
new evidence”; or (3) a “need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d
Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Fed. Practice & Procedure,
§ 4478 at 790). If the Court “overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters
that were put before it on the underlying motion,” reconsideration is appropriate.
Eisemann v. Greene, 204 F.3d 393, 395 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curium). However, a
motion for reconsideration should be denied when the movant “seeks solely to
relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257; Patterson v. Bannish,
No. 3:10-cv-1481 (AWT), 2011 WL 2518749, at *1 (D. Conn. June 23, 2011) (same).
III.
Analysis
In moving for reconsideration as to Subclass B, Plaintiffs contend “there was
arguably controlling data related to the [EBA] summary (Dkt. 24-11) on which the
Court relied that it overlooked.” [Dkt. 70-1, at 1]. Plaintiffs address this issue as a
general matter and do not articulate precisely how they are entitled to
reconsideration under any of the factors. The Court has nonetheless assessed
each factor because the Court granted summary judgment on a basis not proposed
by either party, which neither party had an opportunity to address. The Court holds
that reconsideration should be GRANTED.
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Viewing the record in its entirety, the Court finds that there exists a triable
issue of material fact for a jury to consider. Textron and the Union negotiated new
Agreements effective May 30, 1994. [See Dkt. 45-2, ¶ 9; Dkt. 54, ¶ 9; Dkt. 45-5 (Def.’s
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3, Local 376/Textron CBA), at 4]. Kelly testified that he was
present at the bargaining table during the negotiation process as the “unofficial
benefit representative.” [See Dkt. 72, at 71:10-16]. His testimony that the “specific
language that said this benefit is for all past, meaning Textron, and all future,
meaning AlliedSignal, retirees,” id. at 75:6-9, is different than the Court’s
conclusion upon analyzing the Summary. The record is replete with examples
supporting his articulation that the Agreements afforded lifetime benefits to all
retirees, which include the Defendant’s repeated statements and conduct after the
Agreements expired. [See, e.g., Dkt. 24-12 (Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. 12, Pension
Board Letters); Dkt. 24-14 (Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. 14, AlliedSignal Plant Closure
Letter); Dkt. 24-21 (Opp’n Mot. Dismiss Ex. 21, Honeywell Letter)].
The Summary was drafted by Kelly and its accuracy was confirmed by
Textron on the spur of the moment and does not have the indicia of reliability of a
summary plan description (“SPD”), which Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (“ERISA”) requires an employer to provide to its employees. [See Dkt. 24-11,
at 1; 29 U.S.C.A. § 1022.] Section 1022(a) of ERISA specifically requires an SPD to
“be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan
participant.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 1022(a). In addition, an SPD must “be sufficiently
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.” Id. Subsection (b)
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lists the content required in an SPD, which includes “a description of the relevant
provisions of any applicable collective bargaining agreement” and “the plan’s
requirements respecting eligibility for participation and benefits.” 29 U.S.C.A. §
1022(b). This Summary does not comply with the requirements under § 1022(b).
Furthermore, the employer did not write the Summary as is required. Therefore,
the Summary cannot be considered an SPD and is not dispositive of the
contracting parties’ intent.
The conduct of both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant is inconsistent with the
language in the Summary, which is sufficient to raise a question about the parties’
mutual understanding at the time the Summary was written. A triable issue of fact
therefore exists as to whether the Company intended to provide benefits to
Plaintiffs who retired after expiration of the Agreements and their surviving
spouses. Should the Court deny the motion for reconsideration, there would be a
risk of manifest injustice.
IV.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED.
Should the case be remanded for further proceedings
subsequent to the appeal, the parties are directed to meet and confer and propose
a schedule to the Court within 21 days of the date of the Second Circuit mandate.
The Court also orders the parties to file a status report within 21 days of the date
of this Order stating whether there is presently a need for the Court to address the
preliminary injunction previously found moot.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
_ ______ /s/ ______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: May 25, 2017
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