Machnicz v. Colvin
Filing
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ORDER. As set forth herein, Ms. Machnicz's motion 18 for an order reversing the Commissioner's decision is DENIED, and the Commissioner's motion 22 to affirm that decision is GRANTED. The case is dismissed. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 5/25/17. (Tegeler, D.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LAURA LEE MACHNICZ,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:16-CV-741 (MPS)
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Defendant.
RULING ON THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REVERSE AND THE DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER
This is an administrative appeal following the denial of Laura Lee Machnicz’s application
for disability insurance benefits. Ms. Machnicz argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
erred in concluding that her impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment,
specifically Listing 11.13, “Muscular dystrophy with disorganization of motor function.”
Although I find that the ALJ failed to specifically explain why Ms. Machnicz’s impairment did
not meet or medically equal Listing 11.13, I nevertheless conclude that the decision was supported
by substantial evidence. I therefore AFFIRM.
I.
Background
Ms. Machnicz filed an application for disability benefits on January 7, 2013. (Pl.’s Memo,
ECF No. 19 at 1; Def.’s Memo, ECF No. 22-1 at 2.) On June 24, 2013, the Social Security
Administration denied her initial request for disability benefits and thereafter denied her request
for reconsideration. (Id.) Ms. Machnicz appeared with counsel for a hearing before ALJ Sharda
Singh on December 19, 2014. (Id.) On March 13, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying
benefits. (Id.)
The ALJ found that Ms. Machnicz was a 40-year-old woman at the time of the alleged
disability onset date, with severe impairments of back injury, muscular dystrophy, and depression.
(ALJ Decision, Tr. 15.) She determined that Ms. Machnicz did not have a listed impairment, noting
that she had considered all physical listings, including Listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint)
and 1.04 (disorders of the spine), as well as a mental impairment listing, Listing 12.04 (affective
disorders). (Id. at 15-17.) Next, the ALJ determined that Ms. Machnicz had the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform ‘light work’ as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except she can only stand and
walk for 4 hours in an 8-hour workday. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
She can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She
must avoid hazards. She is limited to understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple,
routing, and repetitive noncomplex tasks.
(Id. at 17-21.) Finally, the ALJ found that although Ms. Machnicz could not perform past relevant
work, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she could
perform based on her age, RFC, work experience, and education, and therefore she was not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 21-23.) Specific facts and portions
of the ALJ’s decision will be discussed below as necessary.
On March 17, 2016, the appeals council denied Ms. Machnicz’s request for review, thereby
making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”). (Pl.’s Memo at 1; Def.’s Memo at 2.) This appeal followed.
Ms. Machnicz has filed a motion for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner, and the
Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order affirming the decision.
II.
Standard
The Social Security Act establishes that benefits are payable to individuals who have a
disability, “[an] inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
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determinable physical or mental impairment....” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1), (d)(1). The Commissioner
delegates her authority to make fact findings and disability benefits decisions to ALJs, who must
follow a five-step evaluation process.1
“A district court reviewing a final ... decision pursuant to … 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is
performing an appellate function.” Zambrana v. Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, a district court may not make a
de novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled in reviewing a denial of disability benefits.
Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the court’s
function is to ascertain whether the correct legal principles were applied in reaching the decision,
and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983,
985 (2d Cir. 1987). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, that
decision will be sustained, even where there may also be substantial evidence to support the
plaintiff’s contrary position. Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982). The Second
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The five steps are as follows: (1) The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities; (3) if the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner must ask whether,
based solely on the medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). If the claimant has one of these enumerated impairments,
the Commissioner will automatically consider that claimant disabled, without considering
vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience. Id. (4) If the impairment is not
“listed” in the regulations, the Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, he or she has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past work; and (5)
if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines
whether there is other work the claimant could perform. Id. To be considered disabled, an
individual’s impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot... engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The Commissioner bears the burden of proof on the fifth
step, while the claimant has the burden on the first four steps. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).
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Circuit has defined substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla
or a touch of proof here and there in the record.” Id.
III.
Discussion
Ms. Machnicz argues that the ALJ erred in determining that her condition did not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, because she failed to consider Listing 11.13, “muscular
dystrophy with disorganization of motor function.”2 Ms. Machnicz does not dispute the ALJ’s
determinations at other steps of the process, or her factual findings.
Ms. Machnicz is correct that the ALJ did not mention or discuss Listing 11.13 in her
decision. While the ALJ stated that she had considered “all physical listings” and made a general
finding that “no acceptable medical source has mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the
criteria of any listed impairments, individually or in combination,” she only explicitly walked
through the criteria of Listings 1.02, 1.04, and 12.04. (ALJ Decision, Tr. 15-16.) The failure to
mention Listing 11.13 does not require a remand, however, if other portions of the ALJ’s decision
show that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that “[t]he claimant does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” (Id. at 15.)
Specifically, I may uphold the ALJ’s determination if it is supported by substantial
evidence elsewhere in her opinion. “The absence of an express rationale for an ALJ’s conclusions
does not prevent us from upholding them so long as we are ‘able to look to other portions of the
ALJ’s decision and to clearly credible evidence in finding that his determination was supported by
2
This is step three of the five-step evaluation process described supra, note 1.
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substantial evidence.’” Salmini v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 371 F. App'x 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir.1982)). See also Otts v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 249 F. App'x 887, 889 (2d Cir. 2007) (“While the ALJ might have been more specific in
detailing the reasons for concluding that Otts’s condition did not satisfy a listed impairment, the
referenced medical evidence, together with the lack of compelling contradictory evidence from the
plaintiff, permits us to affirm this part of the challenged judgment.”); Rockwood v. Astrue, 614 F.
Supp. 2d 252, 274 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Where the ALJ did not specifically refer to Listing 1.04A,
“the ALJ’s failure to provide a specific rationale for finding Plaintiff's spinal impairment did not
meet Listing 1.04A does not prevent this Court from upholding his determination because
substantial evidence… supports the ALJ’s determination.”)
I must therefore consider whether substantial evidence supported the finding that Ms.
Machnicz’s impairments did not meet or medically equal Listing 11.13, based on the “regulations
as they existed at the time” of the decision. Henry v. Colvin, 561 F. App'x 55, 57–58 (2d Cir.
2014).3 At the relevant time, Listing 11.13 covered “muscular dystrophy with disorganization of
motor function as described in 11.04B.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Listing 11.04B, in
turn, described “significant and persistent disorganization of motor function in two extremities,
resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station.” Id.
The ALJ found that Ms. Machnicz suffered from the severe impairment of muscular
dystrophy. However, “mere diagnosis… without a finding as to the severity of symptoms and
limitations does not mandate a finding of disability.” Prince v. Astrue, 514 F. App'x 18, 20 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). To meet Listing 11.13, the ALJ also
Listing 11.13 was substantially revised after the Commissioner’s decision became final in this
case. See Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Neurological Disorders, 81 FR 43048-01 (July
1, 2016) (effective as of September 29, 2016).
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needed to find “significant and persistent disorganization of motor function in two extremities,
resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station.” 20
C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 11.04B (emphasis added).
Substantial evidence supports a finding that there was no “sustained disturbance of gross
and dexterous movements.” Id. The ALJ found that “the evidence does not support a finding that
the claimant… is unable to perform fine and gross movements effectively,” explaining that “[t]here
is no indication from the treatment notes of any significant deficits in her hands or upper
extremities.” (ALJ Decision, Tr. 15.) The ALJ noted that Ms. Machnicz performed household
chores, and “admit[ted] that she can cook dinner, do ‘light house work,’ as well as feed her cats
and change their litter.” (Id. at18.) The evidence cited by the ALJ supports these findings. (See,
e.g., Tr. 67-68, 405-07, 410-34.)
Substantial evidence also supports a finding that there was no “sustained disturbance of…
gait and station.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 11.04B. The ALJ concluded that Ms.
Machnicz could stand and walk for 4 hours in an 8 hour work day and that “the evidence does not
support a finding that the claimant is unable to ambulate effectively.” (ALJ Decision, Tr. 15, 17.)
She explained that “[t]reatment notes indicate no significant defects in gait… although in July
2014, she was given a cane for help in ambulation.” (Id. at 15; see also Tr. 67-68, 405-07, 41034.) The ALJ further noted Ms. Machnicz’s “lack of gait difficulty for most of the period, and her
ability to work as a CNA full time for a significant part of the period [following the alleged onset
of disability]” and the fact that Ms. Machnicz “admit[ted] also that she can travel by walking.”
(ALJ Decision, Tr. 18, 21.) The ALJ also pointed out that it was not until mid-2014—three and a
half years after the alleged disability onset date—that Ms. Machnicz needed “any sort of assistive
device”—a prescription for a cane—“due to the muscular dystrophy.” (Id. at 18, 19.)
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Ms. Machnicz does not dispute these factual findings or conclusions, nor does she point to
any specific evidence to contradict them. Though Ms. Machnicz testified to difficulty using her
arms and hands, as well as standing and walking (see, e.g., Tr. 39, 50, 57), “[w]here there is
substantial evidence to support either position, the determination is one to be made by the
factfinder,” i.e., the ALJ. Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990).
In sum, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Machnicz did not suffer from
“sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station” and therefore her
impairments did not meet or medically equal Listing 11.13. This is not a case “in which we would
be unable to fathom the ALJ’s rationale in relation to evidence in the record,” Salmini, 371 at 113
(citation and quotation marks omitted), and thus there is no need to remand for clarification.
IV.
Conclusion
As set forth above, Ms. Machnicz’s motion for an order reversing the Commissioner’s
decision (ECF No. 18) is DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion to affirm that decision (ECF
No. 22) is GRANTED. The case is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
Hartford, Connecticut
May 25, 2017
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