Gray v. Jackson et al

Filing 8

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER dismissing case. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 10/24/2016. (Jamieson, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

GARY GRAY,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:16-cv-00874 (SRU)

v.
UNIT MANAGER JACKSON, et al.,
Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, Gary Gray, incarcerated and pro se, has filed a complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Unit Manager Jackson and the University of Connecticut Medical
Hospital/Health Care Center. For the reasons set forth below, I dismiss Gray’s complaint.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), I must review prisoner civil complaints against
governmental actors and “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that
includes only “‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action’ or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” does not meet the facial

plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).
Although courts have an obligation to interpret “a pro se complaint liberally,” the complaint
must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility. See Harris
v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Gray alleges that in January 2014, he was a pretrial detainee and was confined at
MacDougall Correctional Institution. He states that he had been diagnosed with cancer prior to
his incarceration, but the condition was in remission. He asserts that once a week, Unit Manager
Jackson gave him a watered-down cleaning fluid to clean his cell as well as cleaning supplies
that had been used previously by other inmates. He contends that the supplies were not sanitized
between uses and were hazardous.
On or about January 20, 2014, Gray cut himself shaving. At the time, he was using a
razor provided to him by a correctional officer. Within a day or two, the cut became irritated and
he began to feel feverish and weak. Gray claims correctional staff did not monitor him
sufficiently and his condition became worse over the next four days.
On January 27, 2014, prison staff escorted him to the medical department and admitted to
the infirmary. On January 28, 2014, a nurse diagnosed Gray as suffering from pneumonia and a
physician directed medical staff to call an ambulance to transfer Gray to John Dempsey Hospital
for treatment. At the hospital, physicians diagnosed Gray as suffering from pneumonia and
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (“MRSA”).
Gray remained in the hospital until February 12, 2014. When he arrived back at
MacDougall, a physician ordered Gray to be confined in the infirmary for a short stay and to be

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isolated from other inmates and staff because he still suffered from MRSA and was recovering
from a thoracotomy that had been performed in the hospital.
Gray seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief. For the reasons set forth below,
I dismiss Gray’s complaint with leave to amend.
I.

Official Capacity Claims
To the extent that Gray seeks damages against the defendants in their official capacities,

the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342
(1979); see generally Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985). I dismiss all such claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
II.

University of Connecticut Medical Hospital/Health Care Center
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the

defendant, a person acting under color of state, law deprived him of a federally protected right.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982). A state agency is not a person
within the meaning of section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, (1989)
(state and state agencies not persons within meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The University of Connecticut Health Center is a state agency, of which the University of
Connecticut John Dempsey Hospital constitutes an integral part. See Walker v. State of
Connecticut, No. 06-cv-00165, 2006 WL 1981783, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2006) (“Like other
state agencies, the University of Connecticut Health Center is not a person within the meaning of
section 1983.” (citations omitted)); Stewart v. John Dempsey Hospital, No. 03-cv-1703, 2004
WL 78145, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2004) (Eginton, J.); see also Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp.
361, 364 (D. Conn. 1978). Because the University of Connecticut Health Center is a state

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agency, it is not a person subject to suit under section 1983. See Walker, 2006 WL 1981783, at
*2; Stewart, 2004 WL 78145, at *2 (holding that John Dempsey Hospital, as part of the
University of Connecticut Health Center, “is not a person within the meaning of section 1983”).
Accordingly, I dismiss the claims against the University of Connecticut Medical Hospital/Health
Care Center for lacking an arguable legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
III.

Unit Manager Jackson
Gray asserts claims related to Unit Manager Jackson’s deliberate indifference to his safety

and health. He alleges that Jackson’s conduct violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. With regard to the former, Gray was a pretrial detainee at the time the alleged conduct
occurred. Because Gray was a pretrial detainee in a state correctional facility, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Eighth Amendment—is the source of his
constitutional protections for conditions of confinement claims. See Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581
F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Gray’s allegations that Jackson violated his Eighth
Amendment rights are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
As for the Fourteenth Amendment, because “[a] person lawfully committed to pretrial
detention has not been adjudged guilty of any crime,” the Due Process Clause dictates that he or
she may not be punished in any manner—neither cruelly and unusually, nor otherwise. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979). “Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention,”
however, “amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense.” Id. at 537. In the absence of an
allegation that the defendant verbally expressed his intent to punish, a court may infer punitive
intent if the actions of the defendant either are “not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive
governmental purpose,” or else “appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id. at 561. If the

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actions of the defendant or the conditions of confinement do not constitute punishment, the
detainee’s allegations regarding the conditions of confinement are analyzed under the standard of
deliberate indifference set forth for Eighth Amendment claims in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825 (1994). See Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 72 (adopting Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to
health or safety standard set forth in Farmer to Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
asserted by pretrial detainee); Moran v. Livingston, 155 F. Supp. 3d 278, 291 (W.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“If the conditions do not amount to punishment, allegations that defendants have denied plaintiff
access to basic human needs are evaluated under a standard of deliberate indifference. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
To state a conditions of confinement claim under the deliberate indifference standard, an
inmate must first establish that a prison official denied him “the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Then, the inmate must show that the official acted with subjective “deliberate indifference to
[his] health or safety” in that the official knew the inmate “face[d] a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 834,
847 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Gray claims that Unit Manager Jackson gave him a watered-down cleaning solution
each week to clean his cell, as well as supplies that had been used for cleaning by another inmate
moments before Gray received them. Gray contends that Jackson should have been aware of the
“hazards associated with unclean cleaning products and equipment.” Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 3.
As an initial matter, Gray has put forth no facts to suggest that Jackson’s conduct caused
him to contract MRSA or pneumonia. Furthermore, the facts Gray has alleged do not state a

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plausible claim that Jackson, by providing Gray with a diluted cleaning solution and supplies that
did not meet his standard of cleanliness, imposed punitive conditions of confinement.
Moreover, even were I to assume that Unit Manager Jackson created an environment in
which Gray’s health might be endangered (because he would be more likely to contract MRSA
or pneumonia), Gray has not alleged that Jackson deliberately or intentionally disregarded a risk
to his health or safety. Rather, at most, the conduct constituted a lack of due care or negligence.
Inadvertent or negligent conduct which causes injury does not support a section 1983 action. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“deliberate indifference requires more than mere negligence”); Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (“conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must
involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”); Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–36 (1986) (due process protections not triggered by lack of due care
by state officials); Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Negligence does not,
however, satisfy the scienter requirement necessary to support a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Furthermore, Gray has made no allegation that Jackson was aware of Gray’s medical
symptoms subsequently found to indicate pneumonia, or that Jackson failed to take action to
ensure that Gray received medical treatment in a timely manner. Thus, Gray has not stated a
plausible claim that Jackson was deliberately indifferent to his health or safety. I dismiss all
claims against Unit Manager Jackson because they lack an arguable legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1).
IV.

Section 1985 and 1986 Claims
In addition to his section 1983 claims, Gray states that he brings this action under 42

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U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. Section 1986 provides no substantive rights, however. “A valid
[section] 1986 claim must be predicated upon a valid [section] 1985 claim.” Mian v. Donaldson,
Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
The first two subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 clearly are irrelevant to this action. Section
1985(1) prohibits conspiracies to prevent federal officials from performing their duties, while
section 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies intending to deter witnesses from participating in state or
federal judicial proceedings. Gray is not a federal official and his claims are not related to
participation of witnesses in judicial proceedings.
In order to state a claim under section 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendants
were part of a conspiracy; (2) the purpose of the conspiracy was to deprive a person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
(3) there was an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) there was an injury to
the plaintiff or his property, or a deprivation of the plaintiff’s right or privilege. See Mian, 7 F.3d
at 1087–88. In particular, the plaintiff must show that the conspiracy was motivated by a “racial
or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Id. at 1088 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Section 1985(3) may not be construed as a “general
federal tort law” and does not provide a cause of action based on the denial of due process or
other constitutional rights. See Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1971).
Gray asserts no facts to support a claim of any conspiracy on the part of the defendants.
Nor does he allege that the actions of any defendant were taken because of Gray’s race or other
class-based discriminatory animus. Thus, Gray fails to state a claim cognizable under section
1985(3). Because Gray has not stated a section 1985 claim, his section 1986 is not actionable.

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Both the sections 1985 and section 1986 claims are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
IV.

Section 1988 Claims
Gray further asserts that he brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988(a)

provides that the district courts shall exercise their jurisdiction over civil rights cases (where
appropriate) in conformity with federal or state law. This section does not, however, provide an
independent cause of action. See Moor v. Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693, 702–06, reh’g denied,
412 U.S. 963 (1973). If Gray is seeking attorney fees pursuant to section 1988(b), his claim also
fails. A pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney fees under section 1988. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499
U.S. 432, 435 (1991). I dismiss Gray’s section 1988 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
V.

Conclusion
It is hereby ordered that:
(1) The claims against all defendants in their official capacities for money damages are

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) and all other claims are DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state law claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (holding that, where
all federal claims have been dismissed before trial, pendent state claims should be dismissed
without prejudice and left for resolution by the state courts). The Motion for Appointment of
Counsel [Doc. No. 7] is DENIED as moot.
Because Gray suggests that correctional staff and/or medical staff ignored his symptoms
and complaints of weakness and fever for five days before he was admitted to the medical
infirmary, I will permit Gray leave to file an amended complaint to name those staff members
who allegedly ignored his symptoms for five days. The amended complaint must include the

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names of each defendant involved, the dates that Gray sought treatment or made his symptoms
known to each defendant, and each defendant’s response to his requests. If Gray chooses to file
an amended complaint, it must be filed together with a motion to reopen the judgment, within
thirty days of the date of this order.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the defendants and close this case.

So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 24th day of October 2016.

/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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