Owens v. Connecticut et al
Filing
178
ORDER granting 162 Motion for Permission to Serve Excess Interrogatories; denying 165 Motion to Amend/Correct. See attached Ruling and Order for details. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 3/30/2021. (Taylor, L.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MARVIN E. OWENS,
Plaintiff,
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v.
MICHAEL NOVIA,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 3:16-cv-0898 (RNC)
RULING AND ORDER
Pending are plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his
complaint to allege an additional cause of action, ECF No. 165,
and his motion for leave to file a single additional
interrogatory relating to the proposed claim, ECF No. 162.
In
essence, plaintiff seeks to add a claim that the defendant
officer “targeted” him by labeling him as an “and one,” and he
seeks leave to file an interrogatory to find out what that label
means.
As discussed below, the proposed amendment is untimely
and futile.
denied.
Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend is
However, the motion for leave to serve the additional
interrogatory is granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff originally sought to bring fourteen claims against
several defendants.
After a series of dismissals and summary
judgments, see ECF Nos. 13, 16, 83, 141, 152, two claims remain
against a single defendant.
The claims are brought against the
defendant police officer under Title 42, United States Code,
Section 1983, alleging excessive force and false arrest.
The
claims arise from plaintiff’s encounter with the officer on May
21, 2015.
In brief, plaintiff alleges that the defendant was
dispatched to plaintiff’s residence in response to a 911 hang-up
call.
After the officer arrived at the residence, the events
giving rise to the false arrest and excessive force claims took
place.
Plaintiff’s new claim, and his requested interrogatory,
center on the defendant’s interaction with the 911 dispatcher.
Plaintiff alleges that the audio of the conversation between
the dispatcher and the defendant reveals the dispatcher stating
that the defendant “placed an ‘and-one’ on plaintiff.”
162.
ECF No.
Plaintiff requests an additional interrogatory to learn
what that means, ECF No. 162, and seeks to add a new claim
alleging that
defendant targeted plaintiff by [m]arking, [l]abeling to
[B]ridgeport [P]olice [D]epartment, moreso surrounding
law enforcement, [that plaintiff was] to be considered an
‘and one’ party, in whom all law enforcement should refer
upon approach of plaintiff.
ECF No. 165.
II. Discussion
Leave to amend is to be freely granted “when justice so
requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), but a court “has discretion to
deny leave for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue
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delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
McCarthy v.
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 1184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
Plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend was filed long after the deadline for
seeking leave to amend had expired.
In view of plaintiff’s
failure to seek leave to amend in a timely manner, the motion
may be denied based on undue delay unless the interests of
justice require that leave be granted.
I conclude that the interests-of-justice standard is not
met because the proposed amendment would be futile.
It is “well
settled that an amendment is considered futile if the amended
pleading fails to state a claim or would be subject to a motion
to dismiss on some other basis.”
United States v. Garrity, 187
F. Supp. 3d 350, 352 (D. Conn. 2016) (quoting Gilbert, Segall &
Young v. Bank of Montreal, 785 F. Supp. 453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(internal citations omitted)). Accepting plaintiff’s allegations
as true, and construing them liberally in his favor, I do not
think they support a claim on which relief can be granted.
To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff must allege facts
showing that he has a plausible claim, in other words, facts
permitting a reasonable conclusion that the defendant has
engaged in wrongdoing causing injury to the plaintiff for which
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relief may be granted under applicable law.
Plaintiff’s
allegations do not support such a conclusion.
Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that defendant’s
labeling him as an “and one” was illegal or otherwise wrongful.
Nor does he allege facts showing that as a result of this
labeling he was injured or damaged in any way.
As his request
to serve an additional interrogatory makes clear, he does not
know what it means to be labeled an “and one.”
Assuming he is
attempting to add a new § 1983 claim, he does not identify a
constitutional right that the labeling violated, nor does he use
a phrase like “excessive force” that would allow the court and
the defendant to identify the right at issue. See Cox v. Vill.
of Pleasantville, 271 F. Supp. 3d 591, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff failed to state a
claim when plaintiff invoked the Fourteenth Amendment and used
the phrase “excessive force”).
Plaintiff may believe that the word “targeting” is similar
to the phrase “excessive force” in that it suggests action on
the part of a police officer that is inherently wrong.
But the
word “targeting,” at least in the particular context of this
case, is insufficient to give notice of the circumstances
supporting the proposed claim.
Plaintiff does not allege that
he was “targeted” because of a constitutionally protected
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characteristic.
Indeed, “targeting” is a misnomer for the facts
plaintiff alleges: he does not allege that he was “targeted” in
any way, only that defendant “mark[ed]” or “label[ed]” him as an
“and one.”
Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is
insufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the
defendant officer engaged in wrongdoing in violation of
plaintiff’s rights under federal law.
Moreover, plaintiff alleges no facts permitting a
reasonable conclusion that he suffered harm as a result of the
alleged labeling.
Plaintiff complains of harm caused by the
defendant’s use of excessive force and his conduct in making a
false arrest.
There is no allegation that the labeling had
anything to do with the alleged use of excessive force or the
alleged false arrest, much less that it proximately caused harm
for which relief can be granted by way of an independent cause
of action.
When as here, “it appears that granting leave to amend is
unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of
discretion to deny leave to amend.”
Hylton v. J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A., 338 F. Supp. 3d 263, 284 (2018) (quoting Lucente v.
Int’l Bus Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff’s untimely request for leave to amend is therefore
denied.
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Plaintiff’s motion for leave to serve an additional
interrogatory may be granted, even though the discovery deadline
has expired, if the information sought is relevant to the
existing claims and responding to the interrogatory would not be
unduly burdensome.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Plaintiff has
not explained how the meaning of the term “and one” is relevant
to the claims for excessive force and false arrest.
However,
the term must have had some significance for the dispatcher, and
presumably it had some significance for the defendant officer as
well.
The meaning of the phrase may therefore be of some
assistance to the plaintiff and the trier of fact in better
understanding the sequence of events leading to the events at
plaintiff’s residence.
On this basis, I find that the
interrogatory is relevant for purposes of discovery.
There is
no reason to think that requiring the defendant to disclose the
meaning of the phrase “and one” in advance of trial would be
unduly burdensome.
I conclude, therefore, that the
interrogatory should be permitted.
III.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the motion for leave to amend the complaint
is denied and the motion to serve the additional interrogatory
is granted.
A pretrial conference will be scheduled.
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So ordered this 30th day of March 2020.
/s/ RNC
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge
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