Martin v. Simsbury et al
RULING granting 25 Motion to Dismiss. The court has no jurisdiction to proceed to consider the merits of Martins federal claims because they are not yet ripe. Therefore, Counts 1, 2, and 3, are dismissed. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7, the remaining state law claims. The Complaint is therefore dismissed in its entirety. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 5/2/2017. (Pipech, L.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
TIMOTHY G. MARTIN,
TOWN OF SIMSBURY, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
MAY 2, 2017
RULING RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 25)
The plaintiff, Timothy Martin, brings this action against the defendants, the Town
of Simsbury, Hiram Peck, Howard Beach, Michael Glidden, Margery C.B. Winters,
Darren Cunningham, Jason Levy, Craig MacCormac, Jim Morrison, Donna Beinstein,
and Donald Reiger (“defendants”), alleging federal constitutional claims of a regulatory
taking and violations of substantive and procedural due process and equal protection
under sections 1983, 1985, and 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code, as well as
state law claims of intentional infliction of emotion distress, negligence, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and inverse condemnation. Am. Compl. This action
arises from Martin’s interactions with the Simsbury Zoning Board regarding his desire to
build a single-family home on a parcel of land.
The defendants bring this Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25) under Rules 12(b)(1),
12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint, insufficient service of process as to defendant
Beach, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.’s Mem. of
Law in Support of Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 1 (Doc. No. 25-1). They argue,
inter alia, that Martin’s claim is not yet ripe for review because he has failed to obtain a
final decision from the relevant zoning authority. Id. at 1-2.
Because the court concludes that it has no subject matter jurisdiction over
Martin’s claims because he has not sought and received a final decision from the
relevant authorities, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
When considering a motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), the court “must accept as true all material factual allegations in the
complaint, but [the Court is] not to draw inferences from the complaint favorable” to the
party asserting jurisdiction. J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107, 110
(2d Cir. 2004).
The following facts are alleged in the Amended Complaint and, as such, the court
accepts them as true for the purposes of deciding the Motion to Dismiss. Id. Martin
owns a parcel of land (“the Property”) in Simsbury, Connecticut, which was designated
by the Simsbury Assessor’s Map D03, Block 208, Lot 003A. Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 12)
at ¶ 2. The lot was created under the “Free/First Cut” section of the Simsbury Zoning
Regulations. Id. at ¶ 4. Former Simsbury Compliance Officer and defendant, Howard
Beach (“Beach”) helped design the map for the land split, and subsequently approved
and signed the map before it was filed in the Town Clerk’s office as Town of Simsbury
map #3976 (“map”). Id. The Property was then appraised by the Town Assessor at a
value of $118,000, and subsequently taxed at approximately $3,200 per year. Id. at ¶ 7.
On some unspecified date, Martin applied to the Farmington Valley Health
District (“FVHD”) for a septic permit on the Property. Id. at ¶ 10. The FVHD and the
defendants then demanded that Martin “unnecessarily” redesign the proposed system
several times, which he did. Id. at ¶ 11. The FVHD and the defendants still rejected his
septic permit application because they claimed that his soil test results were erroneous.
Id. The FVHD and the defendants rejected Martin’s offer to retest the soil on the
condition that the FVHD would issue the septic permit if the second test had a
consistent result. Id. at ¶ 12. Martin appealed to the State of Connecticut Health
Department, with the result that Martin retested the soil in the presence of an indifferent
sanitarian, the Town of Simsbury attorney, and the engineer who did the original tests.
Id. at ¶ 13. The test results were consistent with his original tests, and the septic permit
was issued. Id. Martin alleges that no other applicant was ever forced to go to such
lengths or expense to verify the accuracy of soil tests performed by licensed engineers.
Next, Martin alleges that the Town and Beach informed Martin by letter on
January 30, 2015, that, although the official approved inland wetlands map for the Town
of Simsbury did not place the Property on wetlands, they would not issue a building
permit until Martin had conducted a full wetlands investigation of the Property. Id. at ¶
14. Martin alleges that there are no inland wetlands on or near the Property according
to the official inland wetlands map. Id. at ¶ 16. The Town of Simsbury, Michael Glidden
(“Glidden”), the Zoning Enforcement Officer, Hiram Peck, the Town Planner, and Beach
were aware of an unofficial and unapproved map of the wetlands for years, but Martin
alleges that he was the only person that they ever imposed it on. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 18, 20.
Martin spent several months pleading with them that it was unfair and unconstitutional
to make him test for wetlands when no one else in the area had to do so. Id. at ¶ 19.
Beach retired, and his successor, Glidden, also required Martin to conduct a full
wetlands investigation of the Property. Id. at ¶ 20. Martin alleges that at least dozens, if
not hundreds, of lots in the town were developed with the approval of Beach, Glidden,
and Peck as their supervisor, and despite their location on the unofficial wetland map.
Id. at ¶ 21. These other individuals were not required to do a wetlands investigation
because their property was not located on the official inland wetlands map. Id.
Instead of performing a wetlands investigation, Martin chose to apply for a
building permit. Id. at ¶ 22. Glidden responded to the application March 4, 2015,
insisting that Martin do the wetlands testing before a building permit could issue, but
also informing Martin that the Property was not, in fact, a building lot. Id. Glidden
determined that the Property had never been approved as a building lot because it
lacked the required 200 feet of street frontage. Id. at ¶ 36. Glidden’s letter also
threatened criminal action against Martin for advertising to sell the Property because it
was an unapproved lot. Id. Martin filed an appeal of Glidden’s rejection, first with the
Inland Wetlands Agency for the Town of Simsbury, and then with the Connecticut State
Superior Court, but both denied the appeal. Id. at ¶ 24-25. The Superior Court
dismissed Martin’s case because he had not exhausted all available administrative
remedies. Id. at ¶ 25; see, also, Martin v. Town of Simsbury, No. CV 155039449, 2016
WL 673417 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016) (holding that Martin did not take
advantage of the process to determine whether or not his activity was regulated such
that he required a wetland permit and so he had not exhausted his administrative
On April 11, 2016, Martin requested that the Town of Simsbury Conservation
Commission (“the Commission”) give him a definitive answer as to whether his
application would be considered under the unofficial inland wetlands map. Id. at ¶ 32.
Martin alleges that the Conservation Commission, and defendants Winters,
Cunningham, Levy, MacCormac, Morrison, Beinstein, and Reiger voted to evaluate the
Property under the unofficial inlands wetland map, and admitted that the
official/approved map was erroneous and they were acting contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 33.
Martin was unaware of any appeal process from this decision, and letters to the Town of
Simsbury Attorney and the Conservation Committee received no response. Id. at ¶ 35.
Importantly, the Amended Complaint does not allege that Martin requested that the
Commission determine whether or not his activity would have a significant impact such
that he need not apply for a permit, or what the consequence of evaluating the Property
using the unofficial map were. See Town of Simsbury Inland Wetlands Regulations,
Section 7.1, 7.4.1 (2013) (describing the wetlands permit application process).
Finally, Martin filed an appeal of Glidden’s decision that the lot was not a legal
building lot with the Town of Simsbury Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”). Id. at ¶ 39.
The ZBA affirmed Glidden’s decision. Id. at ¶ 44. The defendants suggested that
Martin merge the Property with a neighboring property, or apply for a rear lot
subdivision, which might allow him to develop the Property. Id. at 45.
Martin then applied to the ZBA for a variance of the required road frontage for the
Property, but this too was rejected. Id. at ¶ 47. Based upon the foregoing, Martin
alleges that there has been an unconstitutional taking of his property, and he has
served the Town of Simsbury with a demand for compensation. Id. at ¶ 48.
Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must
dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks
constitutional authority to adjudicate the suit. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,
113 (2d Cir.2000). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court must
accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint, and draw all inferences in
the plaintiff’s favor. Id. The court may rely on evidence outside of the complaint in
determining whether it has jurisdiction. Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. v. Hellas
Telecommunications, S.á.r.l., 790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015). In considering a Rule
12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426
F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005).
Before the court can consider the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court
must ensure that the controversy is ripe. See Nutritional Health All. v. Shalala, 144 F.3d
220, 225 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Ripeness is a constitutional prerequisite to exercise of
jurisdiction by federal courts.”). To fulfill this constitutional requirement, the controversy
must have crystallized such that the claims do not depend upon “contingent future
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Nat’l Org. for
Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 687 (2013) (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)). “The Ripeness doctrine is drawn both
from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to
exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the takings context, the court considers whether a claim is ripe through a twopronged test announced in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). The first prong requires that the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has made a “final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue.” Id. at 186. The second prong
requires the plaintiff to have sought and failed to receive just compensation through an
adequate process provided by law. Id. at 194.
The first prong of Williamson County captures the Constitutional requirement that
there be injury in fact. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2061-62
(2013) (holding that the final agency decision imposing fines was a “sufficient ‘injury’ for
federal jurisdiction). The Second Circuit, however, has clarified that the final decision
requirement is a prudential rule, not a jurisdictional one, thereby allowing a court to
determine that Williamson’s final decision requirement be waived because the zoning
authority had otherwise inflicted constitutional injuries sufficient for the plaintiff to assert
standing. See Sherman v. Town of Chester, 752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014) (allowing a
takings claim to proceed on a theory that seeking a final decision would be futile when
over a decade of consistent procedural changes had already allowed the town to avoid
making a final decision). The proper inquiry is whether the court can accurately
determine how far the regulation goes—i.e., what behavior does it deny and what
behavior does it permit—such that the court can determine whether or not a taking has
occurred. This can be shown either through the agency’s final determination, or through
a set of facts that demonstrate that the glimmer of hope that the agency has left is not
truly achievable such that the court may view the agency as having made a final
decision in all but fact. See id.
Similarly, the second prong—that the Government not only take property, but
also deny just compensation—has been described as prudential ripeness, and as such
“is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional. See Horne, 133 S. Ct, at 2062, 2062 n.6 (“A
‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ exists once the government has taken private property without
paying for it. Accordingly, whether an alternative remedy exists does not affect the
jurisdiction of the federal court.”); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept. of Environ. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010) (deeming that the plaintiff
waived the argument that they had not received just compensation because that
argument was not jurisdictional). Still, the Fifth Amendment only prohibits the taking of
private property for public use “without just compensation,” and so the court cannot
determine whether a taking violated the Fifth Amendment without some evidence that
the plaintiff was denied just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V; see Macdonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cty., 477 U.S. 340, 360 (1986) (“For similar reasons, a court
cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide ‘just compensation’ until it
knows what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative body intends to
This prudential ripeness assessment of Williamson County has been extended to
apply to other claims that stem from alleged takings. “[A] substantive due process claim
premised on the theory that a regulation has gone too far is subject to both prongs of
the Williamson ripeness test.” Southview Associates, Ltd. V. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96
(1992). Similarly, “the ripeness requirement of Williamson, although announced in a
takings context, has been extended to equal protection and due process claims
asserted in the context of land use challenges.” Dougherty v. Town of North
Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2002). Substantive due
process claims of arbitrary and capricious conduct only require satisfaction of the first
prong of Williamson, namely that there be a showing of finality. Kurtz v. Verizon New
York, Inc., 758 F.3d 506, 514 (2014).
Thus, before the court can consider the merits of Martin’s constitutional claims,
the court must first determine that both prongs of Williamson County have been met as
to his equal protection claims and his due process claim that a regulation has gone too
far, and that the final decision prong has been met as to his arbitrary and capricious
conduct claims. If the court determines that the prongs of Williamson County have not
been met, the court should then determine whether or not the plaintiff has shown that
despite failing to meet requirements of Williamson County, the matter is still properly
before the court. See Sherman, 752 F.3d at 563 (allowing a claim to proceed despite
the lack of a final decision because the court found that the government’s actions had
been “so unreasonable, duplicative, or unjust as to make the conduct farcical,” and
therefore further pursuit a final decision would be futile.).
There has been no final decision by the Zoning Board
The first prong of the Williamson County test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the relevant agency has made a final decision
on how the plaintiff can develop his or her property. See 473 U.S. at 190-91. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the inquiry of what precisely constitutes a “taking”
for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment is a difficult one, and one that cannot be
accomplished when the precise contours of the regulatory decision are yet unknown
because the government has not issued a final decision. Id. at 191. In Williamson
County, the plaintiff had been denied approval of a building permit, but had not sought a
variance, and so the court could “not conclusively determine whether respondent will be
denied all reasonable beneficial use.” Id. at 194. Absent such a final decision, further
review by the court was deemed premature.
Later opinions have clarified that the final decision prong of the Williamson
County test is a factual determination which must take into account all relevant statutes,
ordinances, and regulations, in order to determine whether or not there has been a final
determination of how the property owner can use his property. Murphy v. New Milford
Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 2005). The question before the court is
“whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definite position on the issue that
inflicts an actual, concrete injury.” Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193.
The Second Circuit has explained that the “final decision” prong serves four
goals: (1) a final decision from the land use authority provides the court with a complete
record to review; (2) the court can only know the precise way that a regulation will be
applied to a parcel after the owner of that parcel has pursued all of the remedies
available to him; (3) an appeal may provide the property owner with relief without
entangling the district court in a constitutional dispute; and (4) federalism concerns
counsel allowing local matters to be handled locally before involving federal courts.
Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348.
Applying these principles to the matter at hand, it is clear to the court that Martin
has not received a final determination from the zoning authority on how he may use the
Property. The Amended Complaint first discusses the decision of the Commission
regarding the inland wetlands regulations. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 9-35. However,
Martin does not allege what the consequences of the determination of the Commission
were, and the Complaint moves on to describe only the consequences of the denial of
his variance. Id. at ¶ 36. Martin does allege that he appealed the decision of the
Commission to the State of Connecticut Superior Court, but that court ruled that Martin
had not exhausted all of his administrative remedies, specifically because he did not
apply to the Commission for a permit to allow him to pursue his desired development.
Id. at ¶ 25; Martin v. Town of Simsbury, No. CV 155039449, 2016 WL 673417 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016). Martin has not alleged that he applied to the Commission for
a finding that his activity would not be a regulated activity; rather, he states that because
he is under the belief his activity is not regulated, he does not need to apply to the
Commission. Id. at ¶ 26. Martin’s own legal conclusion, without any interpretation from
the governing administrative body, cannot satisfy the final decision requirement of
Williamson County. See Conyer v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2009) (“on a
motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.”) (internal citations omitted).
Indeed, Martin does not allege that he did more than ask the Commission
whether or not it would hold him to an unofficial map or the official map. Id. at 32-35.
Although the Amended Complaint alleges that the Property has—erroneously,
according to Martin—been determined to be on wetlands, the Amended Complaint does
not allege that the Commission considered what Martin could or could not do on the
wetlands. Martin does not allege that he ever applied for an inland wetland permit, and
the court cannot rely on his legal conclusion that he was not asking to conduct regulated
activity. Am. Compl. at ¶ 26; see Town of Simsbury Inland Wetlands Regulations,
Section 2.1 (2013) (defining regulated activity as any activity “involving, but not limited
to the removal or deposition of material, or any obstruction, alteration or pollution of
such Regulated Area and any earth moving, filling, construction . . . with the Regulated
Area . . . .”). The Amended Complaint alleges no facts that would allow this court to
determine that the disposition of the Property has changed since the Connecticut
Superior Court reviewed the matter and determined that Martin had not exhausted his
administrative remedies because he had not applied to the Commission for a permit.
Martin v. Simsbury, No. HHDCV155039449, 2016 WL 673417 at * 2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Jan. 26, 2016). Because Martin has not alleged that he requested a final decision from
the Commission regarding what would be permitted on the Property, the court cannot
determine whether or not a taking has taken place.
The Amended Complaint next describes how Martin applied for a building permit
on the Property, which was ultimately denied because the land was not a building lot.
Am. Compl. at ¶ 22. The primary issue was that the Property only has 50 feet of the
required 200 feet of street frontage. Id. at 36. Martin attempted to solve this issue by
applying for a variance of the 200 foot requirement, but this application was ultimately
denied. Id. at 47.
Defendants supplement the information provided in the Complaint with an
affidavit from Glidden, the Assistant Town Planner for the Town of Simsbury. Aff. of
Michael Glidden (Doc. No. 25-2). Glidden describes the comments he made to the ZBA
in connection with Martin’s application for a variance. Id. at ¶ 6. Specifically, Glidden
informed the ZBA that Martin had been informed that, although his building did not
conform to the requirements for a building permit, it might conform to the requirements
for a rear lot. Id. at Ex. C. Glidden explained that development under the rear lot
regulations does not require the frontage otherwise required, but that Martin would need
to apply for a special exception from the Simsbury Planning and Zoning Commission in
order to proceed under those regulations. Id. at ¶ 7. The court is entitled to consider
this evidence, even though it comes from beyond the four corners of the Amended
Complaint, in connection with determining whether it has jurisdiction to hear the merits
of Martin’s Amended Complaint. See Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp. v. Hellas
Telecomms, S.á.r.l., 790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015).
Martin responds to these representations with a conclusory statement that it
would be “impossible for this lot to qualify for any such division as a rear lot subdivision
. . . .” Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. and Request for Oral Arg. (“Pl.’s
Resp.”) (Doc. No. 30) at 4-5. Without some factual basis to substantiate this, Martin’s
own interpretation of the regulation is not sufficient to plausibly ripen his claims. The
relevant decision-maker, Glidden, has indicated that an application for a rear lot
exception would be a worthwhile pursuit for Martin. Aff. of Glidden at ¶ 7.
These facts demonstrate that Martin has not yet received a final decision as to
what the permitted uses of the Property are. Martin has only applied for, and the ZBA
has only denied, a single variance. The communications from Glidden indicate that he
is open to exploring the possibility of a rear lot exception, if Martin would submit the
application for it. See Aff. of Michael Glidden at ¶ 7. Indeed the Zoning Regulations of
the Town of Simsbury expressly allow for rear lot development with no street frontage at
all. Zoning Regulations of the Town of Simsbury, C.8 (Dec. 30, 2016). The claim is
therefore not ripe because of the possibility that “some development will be permitted,”
despite the fact that a single variance has been applied for and denied. See
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Cty. of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1986) (rejecting a
claim as unripe because the decisions that had been rendered by the local governing
body did not foreclose the possibility that some development of the land would be
permitted). Because Martin has not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the ZBA would deny approval for all uses such that there no longer existed the
possibility that some development would be permitted, Martin’s federal claims—Counts
One, Two, and Three—are not ripe for review. See Southview Assocs., Ltd. v.
Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 98 (2d Cir. 1992) (collecting Supreme Court decisions clarifying
the final decision requirement).
Martin has also not shown that any further application would be futile. “[I]t is well
established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and
interpreted to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). By reference to Sherman v. Town of
Chester, 752 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2014), Martin appears to advance the argument that,
based on his prior interactions with the town zoning authorities, further applications
would be futile. Pl.’s Resp. at 6. Based on the record before the court, the court does
As described above, the assistant town planner explicitly told Martin that a
possible solution to his zoning problems existed in the rear lot regulations. Aff. of
Glidden at ¶ 7. Indeed, Glidden explained this precise idea to Martin in a letter dated
March 4, 2015. Ex. D to Aff. of Glidden. Although it is by no means assured that Martin
will be successful in his pursuit of a special exception for a rear lot division, Glidden’s
letter certainly does not suggest that an application for such an exception would be
futile. Sherman, which Martin cites for the proposition that the court should consider the
merits of his case because the zoning board has effected a non-categorical taking, is
readily distinguishable. In Sherman, the plaintiff was subjected to decades of regulatory
changes and inquests by the town zoning authority, including a moratorium on
subdivision approvals which was admittedly implemented to specifically stop the
plaintiff’s development, numerous changes to the zoning requirement during the
application process, and monthly lists of demands for new studies. Sherman, 752 F.3d
Here, Martin has made a single application to the town planner for a building
permit, and a single application for a variance, both of which were denied. See Am.
Compl. at ¶¶ 36, 47. He was also informed that the zoning authorities believed there
existed a workable solution within the existing zoning regulations. Aff. of Glidden at ¶ 7.
This is markedly different from the extreme circumstances of Sherman, such that the
court concludes that further pursuit of a zoning decision by the local authorities would
not be futile. There is no indication that any of the defendants have been moving the
finish line such that Martin will never be able to obtain a final decision. Cf. Sherman, 752
F.3d at 563 (describing the Town’s tactic of avoiding a final decision by moving the
finish line, driving Sherman to the point of financial exhaustion over the course of ten
Indeed, finding that Martin’s claims are unripe comports with the policies
underlying the ripeness test of Williamson County. First, once the zoning authorities
determine whether or not it is possible to build on the Property as a rear lot, the court
will have a complete record from which to analyze Martin’s taking claims. Murphy v.
New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2005). Second, only by
pursuing all available regulatory remedies can the court assess whether there truly has
been a taking. Id. Third, it is also possible that the alternative avenues available to
Martin would result in a use of the Property that leaves him content, such that Martin will
be afforded relief without “entangling the district court in a constitutional dispute.” Id.
Finally, pursuing further local accommodations respects the federal system by not
inserting the federal judiciary in a pending local matter. Id.
The court concludes that there has been no “final decision” regarding Martin’s
use of the Property, and therefore the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over his constitutional claims regarding the same. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985); Southview Associates, Ltd. V.
Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96 (1992) (extending Williamson County to Due Process claims
stemming from a regulatory decision regarding land use); Kurtz v. Verizon New York,
Inc., 758 F.3d 506, 514 (2014) (holding that substantive due process claims of arbitrary
and capricious conduct in the takings context require the first prong of Williamson
County to be met). Thus, prong one of Williamson County cannot be met based on the
plausible allegations of facts in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Counts One,
Two, and Three are therefore dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Supplemental Jurisdiction over Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7
Having dismissed all of the federal claims in the Complaint because they are not
yet ripe, the court must next consider whether it should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and inverse
condemnation. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 61-84. Section 1367(c)(3) of title 28 of the
United States Code provides that the court may “decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a [state law] claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” The Second Circuit has instructed the district courts that, “if a
plaintiff’s federal claims are dismissed before trial, ‘the state law claims should be
dismissed as well.’” Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 250 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Having determined that the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the federal claims asserted
in the complaint, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 25) is GRANTED. The court has no
jurisdiction to proceed to consider the merits of Martin’s federal claims because they are
not yet ripe. Therefore, Counts 1, 2, and 3, are dismissed. The court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7, the remaining state law
claims. The Complaint is therefore dismissed in its entirety.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 2nd day of May, 2017.
/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge
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