Brown v. Semple et al

Filing 98

RULING AND ORDER granting 30 MOTION to Amend Complaint, and 34 MOTION to Supplement Cover Page; denying as moot 35 Second MOTION to Supplement Cover Page, 78 MOTION for Order, and 82 MOTION for Order; denying without prejudice 85 MOTION for Leave to File Extra Interrogatories, 91 MOTION for Protective Order, and 95 MOTION for Extension of Time. The Clerk shall docket the proposed amended complaint attached to 30 MOTION to Amend Complaint, pages 2 through 59, as the ame nded complaint. The Clerk also shall docket pages 60 through 80 of Doc. No. 30 as exhibits A to J of the amended complaint, and docket Doc. No. 31 as exhibits K to UU of the amended complaint. In addition, the Clerk shall docket the supplemental first page of the amended complaint attached to 34 MOTION to Supplement Cover Page, at page 5, as a supplemental first page of the amended complaint.The Clerk shall docket a copy of 91 MOTION for Protective Order in Brown v. Semple , No. 3:17-cv-01328 (SRU).All claims against defendants Nurse Pepin, Nurse George, Health Services Administrator Brown, Grievance Coordinator King and Nurse Kim have been dismissed. The Clerk shall terminate those parties from the case.Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 09/25/2017. (Jamieson, K)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

KENYA BROWN,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:16-cv-01144 (SRU)

v.
SCOTT SEMPLE, et al.,
Defendants.
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Kenya Brown—currently incarcerated at the Cheshire Correctional Institution
(“Cheshire”) in Cheshire, Connecticut—originally filed a civil rights complaint against
Commissioner Scott Semple, Director of Mental Health Dr. Robert Trestman, Dr. Henry Crabbe,
Dr. Gerald Gagne, Jr., Warden Santiago, Deputy Warden Robert Martin, Deputy Warden Jeffrey
Zegarzewski, Captain James Shabanes, Correctional Officer Aponte, Health Services
Administrator Ron Labonte, and Administrative Remedy Coordinator Kimberly Daly. Brown has
now filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint; two motions to supplement the cover
page of the amended complaint; two motions for order; a motion to file excess interrogatories;
and a motion for extension of time. For the reasons set forth below, I grant Brown’s motion for
leave to amend and his first motion to supplement the cover page of the amended complaint, and
deny his remaining motions.
I.

Motion to Supplement Cover Page – Amended Complaint [Docs. Nos. 34 & 35]
Brown has filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Attached to the motion

to amend is a proposed amended complaint. After filing the motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, Brown realized that he had left defendant Officer Aponte off of the list of defendants

on the first page of the proposed amended complaint. He seeks leave to file a supplemental first
page of the proposed amended complaint that includes Officer Aponte.
The motions to supplement cover page are essentially identical. Accordingly, I grant
Brown’s first motion to supplement the cover page, Doc. No. 34, and deny his second motion,
Doc. No. 35, as moot.
II.

Motion to Amend Complaint [Doc. No. 30]
Brown seeks leave to file an amended complaint to add new claims and defendants.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as
of [right] within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required, [within] 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion” to dismiss, for more definite statement or to strike, “whichever is earlier.”
Because the defendants have not filed a responsive pleading or a Rule 12(b)(6), 12(e) or 12(f)
motion in response to the complaint, Brown may amend once as a matter of right.
Accordingly, I grant Brown’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The Clerk
shall docket the proposed amended complaint attached to Brown’s motion, Doc. No. 30. The
Clerk shall also docket the supplemental first page of the amended complaint attached to
Brown’s motion to supplement cover page, Doc. No. 34, at 5, as a supplemental first page of the
amended complaint.
I now consider the sufficiency of the allegations in the amended complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court “shall dismiss a case at any time if it
determines that” the complaint or amended complaint “is frivolous or malicious . . . fails to state
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a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. Dismissal of a complaint or amended complaint on those grounds
is required “regardless of whether the prisoner has paid the filing fee” or is proceeding in forma
pauperis. See Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Although detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A
complaint that includes only “‘labels and conclusions,’ . . . ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action,’” or “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’”
does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
“Even after Twombly” and Iqbal, courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint
liberally,” but the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of
facial plausibility. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
B. Allegations
Brown’s amended complaint includes essentially the same allegations as his original
complaint but adds new allegations and new defendants. The defendants named in the amended
complaint are as follows: Commissioner Scott Semple, Director of Mental Health Dr. Robert
Trestman, Dr. Henry Crabbe, Warden Antonio Santiago, Deputy Warden Robert Martin, Deputy
Warden Jeffrey Zegarzewski, Captain James Shabanes, Dr. Gerald Gagne, Jr., Dr. Paul Chaplin,
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Dr. Berger, Lieutenant Halloran, Dr. Bruce Lichtenstein, Dental Director Dr. Benoint, Dr. Craig
Burns, Nurse Sandy Pepin, Nurse George, Health Services Administrator Sharon Brown,
Grievance Coordinator Michelle King, Dr. Elizabeth Coursen, Nurse Kim, and Correctional
Officer Luis Aponte.1
Brown claims that, since 1993, various mental health professionals have prescribed
medications to treat his various mental health conditions including, borderline personality
disorder, anxiety, anti-social traits, suicidal ideation, self-mutilation, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder. Commissioner Semple and other Department of Correction officials
have created several “inmate profiles” that restrict interactions between Brown and other inmates
because of past incidents. Brown alleges that the defendants have used those profiles to prevent
him from being housed at Garner Correctional Institution (“Garner”) or Osborn Correctional
Institution (“Osborn”) because the other inmates with whom Brown had prior conflicts are
housed at those facilities and the facilities are not large enough to accommodate both Brown and
the other inmates. Brown contends that Garner and Osborn are the only prison facilities in
Connecticut that are equipped to treat his various mental health conditions.
Brown states, that as of May 2016, he had been confined at Corrigan Correctional
Institution (“Corrigan”) for three years. He asserts that at some point prior to May 19, 2016, a
former warden and a deputy warden of Corrigan as well as a nurse and a psychologist who
worked at Corrigan had approved of and implemented a particular form of behavioral treatment
for him. According to Brown, that treatment was successful in addressing the behaviors that were
caused by his various mental health conditions.

1

The new defendants are Dr. Benoint, Dr. Berger, Health Services Administrator Brown, Dr.
Burns, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Coursen, Nurse George, Lieutenant Halloran, Nurse Kim, Grievance
Coordinator King, Dr. Lichtenstein, and Nurse Pepin.
4

Prior to May 2016, the nurse and the psychologist left Corrigan and the warden and
deputy warden were replaced by Warden Santiago and Deputy Wardens Robert Martin and
Jeffery Zegerzewski. The new administration at Corrigan—which included Warden Santiago,
Deputy Wardens Martin and Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, and Lieutenant Halloran—did not
authorize the treatment methods used by the former nurse and psychologist, and the new
members of the mental health staff at Corrigan abandoned those methods of treating Brown.
Brown claims that Santiago, Martin, Zegerzewski, Shabenas and Halloran were deliberately
indifferent to his mental health needs when they no longer permitted mental health professionals
at Corrigan to treat him using the methods prescribed by the former nurse and psychologist.
Brown also alleges that Dr. Coursen was his psychologist at Corrigan for a period of two
years prior to his transfer to Cheshire on May 31, 2016. During that two-year period, Brown’s
relationship with Dr. Coursen allegedly changed from a doctor-patient relationship to a more
personal, physical, and sexual relationship. At times, Dr. Coursen would force Brown to take
medication to reduce his anxiety during their elicit encounters.
Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens Martin and Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Dr.
Crabbe, and Dr. Chaplin allegedly were aware of Dr. Coursen’s inappropriate conduct toward
Brown. Nurse Kim was the assistant to Dr. Crabbe and her office was close to Dr. Coursen’s
office. Nurse Kim allegedly observed Dr. Coursen’s inappropriate behavior, but failed to take
any action to stop it.
Brown also asserts that at some time during his confinement at Corrigan prior to May
2016, Michelle King was his counselor. She was allegedly in contact with Dr. Coursen and
became aware of the inappropriate relationship between Dr. Coursen and Brown. As of May
2016, Michelle King was a Grievance Coordinator at Corrigan.

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On May 19, 2016, Brown became involved in a heated debate with Officer Aponte.
Brown became agitated and tried to harm himself. Officer Aponte called a code and escorted
Brown to the medical infirmary. Dr. Coursen placed Brown in a cell on observation status.
At the time of his placement in the infirmary, Brown required partial dentures in order to
chew his food. Brown claims that after his transfer to the infirmary at Corrigan, Officer Aponte
and Lieutenant Halloran prepared and packed up the property in his cell in general population
and placed it in temporary storage. They neglected to prepare an inventory of Brown’s property
items. In addition, they failed to give Brown’s dentures to the medical department and instead
discarded them. Brown has been unable to eat on one side of his mouth without the partial
dentures.
At some point, after the plaintiff’s placement in the medical infirmary, Warden Santiago,
Deputy Warden Martin, Deputy Warden Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Health Services
Administrator Labonte, Dr. Gagne, Dr. Crabbe, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Berger, Dr. Burns, and Dr.
Coursen concluded that the only possible course of action was to transfer Brown to Cheshire. Dr.
Crabbe adjusted Brown’s mental health score to facilitate his transfer to Cheshire. On May 31,
2016, Warden Santiago issued an order that Brown be transferred to Cheshire and correctional
officers transported Brown to Cheshire that day.
Brown claims that during his confinement in the infirmary at Corrigan from May 19,
2016 to May 31, 2016, Dr. Coursen searched his personal property for letters from her to him
and photographs of his family friends in an effort to cover-up her inappropriate relationship with
him. Brown contends that Dr. Coursen destroyed some of his personal photographs before prison
officials transferred him to Cheshire on May 31, 2016.

6

Brown claims that the appropriate mental health professionals, resources and services
necessary to treat his mental illnesses are unavailable at Cheshire. Brown contends that Drs.
Gagne, Crabbe, Chaplin, Berger, Burns, and Coursen, Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens Robert
Martin and Jeffery Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Lieutenant Halloran, and Administrator
Labonte were all aware that Cheshire could not provide him with the appropriate mental health
treatment, but transferred him anyway.
Brown claims that during his confinement in the infirmary at Corrigan in May 2016, Dr.
Gagne was a psychiatrist at Osborn and Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”). Dr.
Gagne allegedly refused to permit Brown to be transferred to Osborn and approved the decision
to transfer Brown to Cheshire in retaliation for Brown’s filing of past grievances and complaints
about mental health treatment.
On June 1, 2016, at Cheshire, a psychologist allegedly informed Brown that Cheshire was
not equipped to treat his mental health conditions. The psychologist contacted Drs. Berger and
Chaplin regarding the unsuitability of Cheshire for Brown’s mental health needs, but they took
no action.
On June 3, 2016, Brown informed Nurse George that he could not keep bulk medications
in his cell because of his attempts to harm himself. After Brown returned to his housing unit,
Nurse George allegedly falsely accused him of being suicidal. Although Nurse Pepin was not
present in the medical department when Brown spoke to Nurse George, Nurse Pepin confirmed
the observations of Nurse George with regard to Brown’s suicidal statements. Correctional
officers handcuffed Brown and brought him to the segregation unit. Brown was forced to endure
a humiliating strip search. Nurses George and Pepin caused Brown be placed on behavior

7

observation status. The behavior observation cell was filthy and the sink and toilet could not be
used. Brown remained in the cell on behavior observation status until June 6, 2016.
Brown also asserts that Drs. Benoint and Lichtenstein failed to provide him with dental
treatment during his confinement at Cheshire. In addition, they did not replace his partial
dentures in a timely manner.
Beginning in July 2016, Brown met with Dr. Chaplin on a regular basis at Cheshire.
During his sessions with Dr. Chaplin, Brown related all of the inappropriate behavior exhibited
by Dr. Coursen during her treatment of him at Corrigan and that he had been forced to become
involved in a sexual relationship with Dr. Coursen. Dr. Chaplin failed to report those allegations
pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act.
C. Discussion
As a preliminary matter, Brown’s proposed amended complaint does not comply with
Rule 8’s pleading requirements. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(d)(1) provides that
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise and direct.” The purpose of Rule 8 is “to permit the
defendant to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know
whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Ricciutti v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123
(2d Cir. 1991). In addition, “the rule serves to sharpen the issues to be litigated and to confine
discovery and the presentation of evidence at trial within reasonable bounds.” Powell v. Marine
Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The plaintiff’s statement of his claim
“should be short because ‘[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on
the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant

8

material from a mass of verbiage.’” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)
(quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365 (1969)).
When a litigant does not comply with Rule 8’s requirements, the court may strike any
portion of the complaint that is redundant or immaterial pursuant to Rule 12(f). Alternatively, the
court may dismiss the complaint in its entirety in those cases “in which the complaint is so
confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well
disguised.” Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. For example, in Salahuddin, the Second Circuit had “no
doubt” that a complaint “span[ning] 15 single-spaced pages and contain[ing] explicit
descriptions of 20-odd defendants, their official positions, and their roles in the alleged denials of
[the plaintiff]’s rights” failed to comply with Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and plain
statement.” Id. at 43. Accordingly, the Second Circuit stated that “the district court was within
the bounds of discretion to strike or dismiss the complaint for noncompliance with Rule 8.” Id.
In the present case, Brown’s proposed amended complaint is neither “short and plain” nor
“simple.” As indicated above, Brown originally named eleven defendants.2 The amended
complaint adds twelve new defendants: Lieutenant Halloran, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Berger, Dr.
Lichtenstein, Nurse Pepin, Nurse George, Nurse Kim, Dr. Benoint, Health Services
Administrator Brown, Dr. Coursen, Dr. Burns, and Grievance Coordinator Michelle King. The
amended complaint raises 30 claims for relief over the course of 300 paragraphs and 59 pages;
another 115 pages are attached as exhibits. The incidents to which the amended complaint refers
occurred at two different facilities over a period of several years. Like the complaint in
Salahuddin, Brown’s pleading here clearly “contains a surfeit of detail.” 861 F.2d at 43.

2

I dismissed all claims against one defendant, Grievance Administrator Kimberly Daly. See
Initial Review Order, Doc. No. 15, at 9–10.
9

1. Dental, Deliberate Indifference to Safety/Failure to Protect, and Improper Placement
in Segregation Claims
Many of the claims in Brown’s amended complaint are entirely unrelated to those in the
original complaint. Those claims include (1) the allegations against Drs. Benoint and
Lichtenstein regarding dental treatment; (2) the allegations against defendants Aponte and
Halloran regarding the loss of Brown’s partial dentures; (3) the allegations against Drs. Coursen,
Chaplin, Berger, and Crabbe, Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens Martin and Zegerzewski,
Captain Shabenas, Grievance Coordinator King, and Nurse Kim regarding the inappropriate and
potentially harmful relationship between Dr. Coursen and Brown during his confinement at
Corrigan; and (4) the allegations against defendant King, as Brown’s counselor, regarding his
placement in segregation at Corrigan prior to May 2016.
Those claims are not related to each other and involve different defendants. Thus, the
amended complaint fails to meet the requirements of Rule 20 governing party joinder. Rule
20(a)(2) permits the joinder of multiple defendants in a single action if two criteria are met: (1)
the claims “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and
occurrences”; and (b) “any questions of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). “What will constitute the same transaction or occurrence under
the first prong of Rule 20(a) is approached on a case by case basis.” Kehr ex rel. Kehr v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 596 F. Supp. 2d 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted). As
the Second Circuit has observed in the Rule 13 context,3 whether a counterclaim arises out of the
3

“In construing the term ‘transaction or occurrence’ under Rule 20, many courts have drawn
guidance from the use of the same term in Rule 13(a), applying to compulsory counterclaims.”
Barnhart v. Town of Parma, 252 F.R.D. 156, 160 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 7 Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1653 (3d ed.).
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same transaction as the original claims depends upon the logical relationship between the claims
and whether the “essential facts of the various claims are so logically connected that
considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one
lawsuit.” Harris v. Steinem, 571 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1978).
Brown’s various claims for deliberate indifference to mental health, safety, and dental
needs, as well as his claims related to his improper placement in segregation and the loss of his
partial dentures, occurred at two different facilities over a three-year period. Because those
claims do not “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and
occurrences,” the amended complaint also fails to comply with Rule 20(1)(2). I dismiss Brown’s
dental claims, his deliberate indifference to mental health and safety claims, and his segregation
placement claims against Drs. Benoint, Lichtenstein, Coursen, Chaplin, Berger, and Crabbe,
Officer Aponte, Lieutenant Halloran, Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens Martin and
Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Grievance Coordinator King, and Nurse Kim for failure to
comply with Rules 8 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court notes that in addition to failing to comply with Rules 8 and 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Brown’s claims regarding dental treatment and the loss of his dentures,
as well as his claims regarding Dr. Coursen, are barred as duplicative of claims asserted in two
other actions filed in this court. A district court enjoys substantial discretion to manage its docket
efficiently to avoid duplicate litigation. See Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 197 (2d Cir.
2001) (“In administering its docket, a district court may dismiss a second suit as duplicative of
an earlier suit . . . .”). A plaintiff has “no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the
same court, against the same defendant at the same time.” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133,
139 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit has concluded that “[t]he complex problems that can

11

arise from multiple federal filings do not lend themselves to a rigid test, but require instead that
the district court consider the equities of the situation when exercising its discretion.” Id.
Generally, “the first suit [to be filed] should have priority absent the showing of balance of
convenience . . . or . . . special circumstances . . . giving priority to the second.” Adam v. Jacobs,
950 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1991) (alterations in original).
If it is possible for a plaintiff to amend the complaint in each action to “comprehend all
the issues and all the parties now involved in either,” the continuation of the first action to be
filed is favored. See Hammett v. Warner Brothers Pictures, 176 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 1949);
Gyadu v. Hartford Ins. Co., 133 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal under “prior
pending action doctrine” when plaintiff “still had the opportunity to raise the[] [additional]
causes of action in his amended complaint in his first action”). To determine whether a claim is
barred by the prior pending action doctrine, the court may rely on a comparison of the pleadings
filed in the two actions.
Brown has asserted the same dental treatment and lost denture claims in the complaint
filed in Brown v. Benoit, No. 3:17-cv-00053 (SRU), and has asserted the same claims of
deliberate indifference to safety and mental health needs/failure to protect regarding Dr.
Coursen’s alleged relationship with him in the complaint filed in Brown v. Semple, No. 3:17-cv01328 (SRU). Drs. Benoint and Lichtenstein are named as defendants in Brown v. Benoit, No.
17-cv-00053 (SRU), and the issues of the loss of Brown’s partial dentures and denial of dental
treatment are being litigated in that case. Although Officer Aponte and Lieutenant Halloran are
not named as defendants, I cannot discern why Brown could not amend his complaint in Brown
v. Benoit to add Officer Aponte and Lieutenant Halloran as defendants and to add his claim
against them regarding the loss of Brown’s partial dentures.

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Likewise, all of the defendants named in connection with Dr. Coursen’s alleged
inappropriate relationship and treatment of Brown in this action are also named in Brown v.
Semple, No. 17-cv-01328 (SRU), except for Nurse Kim and Deputy Warden Martin. I cannot
discern why Brown could not amend his complaint in the latter case to add Nurse Kim and
Deputy Warden Martin as defendants.
Although the present case was filed before both Brown v. Benoit, No. 3:17-cv-00053
(SRU), and Brown v. Semple, No. 17-cv-01328 (SRU), the prior pending action doctrine permits
the dismissal of claims in the first-filed case where the “balance of convenience” weighs “in
favor of the second-filed action.” See Adam, 950 F.2d at 93–94. I already have issued an Initial
Review Order permitting Brown’s dental claims to proceed in Brown v. Benoit, see Doc. No. 7,
No. 17-cv-00053 (SRU), and the defendants have appeared in that case. I also already have
issued an Initial Review Order in Brown v. Semple, No. 3:17-cv-01328 (SRU), permitting several
of Brown’s claims to proceed regarding his alleged improper relationship with Dr. Coursen. See
Doc. No. 11, id. Therefore, I conclude that it would be appropriate to have all of Brown’s claims
regarding relationship with Dr. Coursen resolved in the second-filed action. See Holliday v. City
of Newington, 2004 WL 717160, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 19, 2004) (dismissing first-filed action
under prior pending action doctrine and resolving all claims in second-filed action “because the
second-filed case involves the same claims as the claims in the first-filed case as well as the
same defendants, the defendants have appeared in the second-filed case and the court has already
issued a scheduling order in the second-filed case”).
Thus, I also dismiss Brown’s claims regarding dental care and loss of dentures against
Officer Aponte and Lieutenant Halloran, and his claim regarding Dr. Coursen’s treatment against
Drs. Coursen, Chaplin, Berger, Crabbe, Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens Martin and

13

Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Grievance Coordinator King, and Nurse Kim, pursuant to the
prior pending action doctrine. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
2. Claims Related to Mental Health Treatment at Corrigan in May 2016
Brown’s allegations in paragraphs 1 to 9 and 39 to 167 of the amended complaint
essentially mirror the allegations asserted in the original complaint regarding Brown’s treatment
at Corrigan from May 19, 2016 to May 31, 2016 (the date of his transfer to Cheshire). With
regard to those allegations, Brown seeks to add Lieutenant Halloran and Drs. Berger, Burns and
Chaplin as defendants because he claims that they were either involved in creating or applying
the policies that caused him to be transferred to Cheshire from Corrigan, or else were directly
involved in the decision to transfer him.
Brown seeks to add allegations that challenge the Department of Correction’s policies or
directives governing the transfer of an inmate to other facilities when the inmate has a profile due
to conflicts with other inmates or staff members. See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 30, at 8–11, ¶¶ 10–
33. He identifies the policies as those contained in the Department of Correction’s
Administrative Directives 9.9(6)(B) and 8.5(9). See id. at 8, ¶¶ 10–11. Brown claims that those
policies were the basis for the defendants’ decision to transfer him to Cheshire instead of to a
more appropriate facility that could provide him with mental health treatment, such as Osborn or
Garner. He challenges the policies as violating the Eighth Amendment both facially and as
applied to him. He claims that Drs. Berger, Trestmoon, Burns and Chaplin and Commissioner
Semple were responsible for using those policies to deprive him of appropriate mental health
treatment in May 2016.
I conclude that the new allegations are sufficiently related to the claims underlying
Brown’s original complaint. Thus, the Eighth Amendment claims asserted in paragraphs ten to
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thirty-three of the amended complaint will proceed against Commissioner Semple, Warden
Santiago, Deputy Wardens Martin and Zegarzewski, Captain Shabanes, Lieutenant Halloran, and
Drs. Berger, Burns, Chaplin, and Trestman.
3. Retaliation Claims
Brown generally asserts that Commissioner Semple and Drs. Berger, Burns, Chaplin and
Trestman retaliated against him by implementing and applying the policies that have resulted in
the denial of proper mental health treatment for his various conditions. See id. at 12, ¶¶ 34–38.
He claims that the policies have been used against him to restrict mental health treatment, and
that the defendants implemented and applied the policies in retaliation for his filing a prior
lawsuit regarding dangerous or unwanted side effects of a medication prescribed to him. See id.
Brown also generally alleges that the conduct of Officer Aponte and Lieutenant Halloran
in discarding his partial dentures at the time of his transfer to the infirmary at Corrigan on May
19, 2016 was retaliatory. See id. at 34, ¶ 194. In addition, he generally asserts that Grievance
Coordinator King’s conduct in failing to process his grievances properly constituted retaliatory
conduct. See id. at 26, ¶ 130.
Brown claims that, during the period that he was in the infirmary at Corrigan in May
2016, Health Services Administrator Labonte spoke to Dr. Gagne and asked him to accept
Brown at Osborn. See id. at 23, ¶¶ 111–113. Dr. Gagne refused to permit Brown to be transferred
to Osborn and also was involved in approving the decision to transfer Brown to Cheshire. See id.
Brown claims that Dr. Gagne refused to accept him at Osborn and supported the decision of
prison officials at Corrigan to transfer him to Cheshire in retaliation for his filing of past
grievances and complaints about mental health treatment. See id.

15

“In general, a section 1983 claim will lie where the government takes negative action
against an individual because of his exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal
laws.” Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2000). That principle also “applies in
the prison context.” Id. Because claims of retaliation are easily fabricated, courts “approach
prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism” and require that they be supported by specific facts.
Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015). Conclusory allegations of retaliation are
not sufficient; such claims must “be supported by specific and detailed factual allegations.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) his
conduct or speech was protected by the Constitution or federal law; (2) prison officials took
adverse action against him; and (3) the protected conduct or speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory or adverse action by prison officials. See Gill v.
Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004).
Brown’s claims that Drs. Berger, Trestman, Burns, and Chaplin, Commissioner Semple,
Aponte, Halloran, and King engaged in retaliatory conduct are conclusory. Such claims of
retaliation are not cognizable under section 1983, and I dismiss them for failure to state a claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
The facts as alleged against Dr. Gagne are sufficient to state a plausible claim of
retaliation. Thus, the retaliation claim against Dr. Gagne will proceed.
4. New Grievance Procedure Claims
Brown claims that Michelle King was a designated Administrative Remedy/Grievance
Coordinator at Corrigan in May 2016. In his original complaint, Brown named Administrative
Remedy Coordinator Daly as a defendant. I dismissed all claims against Coordinator Daly. See
Initial Review Order, Doc. No. 15, at 7–10.
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Brown now asserts essentially the same claims against Administrative
Remedy/Grievance Coordinator King as he did against Administrative Remedy Coordinator
Daly. He claims that Coordinator King violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by making it
difficult or impossible for him to exhaust his administrative remedies. Specifically, Brown
alleges that Coordinator King failed to replenish the supply of administrative remedy forms in
the officers’ station or replaced the forms with out of date forms; rejected Brown’s grievances
because she claimed that he had not attempted to informally resolve his issues; and did not
respond to his grievances or returned them as deficient in some way. See Am. Compl., Doc. No.
30, at 25, ¶ 122.
It is well-established that “inmate grievance programs created by state law are not
required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those
procedures do[] not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Shell v. Brzesniak, 365 F. Supp. 2d
362, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). In addition, “prisoners do not have a due process right to a thorough
investigation of grievances.” Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 317, 347 (N.D.N.Y.2010)
(citing Torres v. Mazzuca, 246 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The corrections
officers’ failure to properly address [plaintiff’s] grievances by conducting a thorough
investigation to his satisfaction does not create a cause of action for denial of due process
because [plaintiff] was not deprived of a protected liberty interest.”)). I conclude that the claims
against Coordinator King with regard to her alleged non-compliance with the procedures set
forth in the Department of Correction’s administrative remedy directive do not rise to the level of
a violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, if a prison official either deprives an inmate of access to the grievance
system or refuses to process a grievance, the inmate is not precluded from directly petitioning the

17

government for redress of that claim through a lawsuit in court. In fact, Brown availed himself of
his right of access to the courts by filing five lawsuits in this court from May 20, 2016 to August
7, 2017, including this case.4 Accordingly, I dismiss Brown’s claim that Administrative
Remedies/Grievance Coordinator King limited his First Amendment right to access the courts by
failing to properly process his grievances for lack of an arguable legal or factual basis. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
5. Conspiracy Claim Against Coordinator King and Administrator Brown
Brown generally asserts that Administrative Remedies/Grievance Coordinator King
conspired with other defendants, including Warden Santiago, to keep him from exhausting his
remedies by refusing to accept or process his grievances regarding his placement in the infirmary
at Corrigan and the decision to transfer him to Cheshire. See Am. Compl., at 25, ¶¶ 121–22.
Brown contends that Health Services Administrator Brown conspired with Health Services
Administrator Labonte. See id. at 57. He contends that Administrator Brown accepted telephone
calls from Labonte and other defendants about his transfer to Cheshire. See id.
To state a claim for conspiracy under section 1983, Brown must allege facts showing (1)
“an agreement between two or more state actors” (2) “to act in concert to inflict an
unconstitutional injury” on Brown; and (3) “an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing
damages.” Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit has
consistently held that a claim of conspiracy to violate civil rights requires more than general
allegations. “[C]omplaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general allegations that the

4

See Brown v. Simpson, No. 3:16-cv-00781(SRU) (filed May 20, 2016); Brown v. Semple, No.
3:16-cv-01144 (SRU) (filed July 8, 2016); Brown v. Benoit, No 3:17-cv-00053 (SRU) (filed Jan.
12, 2017); Cruz, et al. v. Semple, No 3:17-cv-00348 (JBA) (filed Feb. 28, 2017); Brown v.
Semple, No 3:17-cv-01328 (SRU) (filed Aug. 7, 2017).
18

defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights are
properly dismissed; diffuse and expansive allegations are insufficient, unless amplified by
specific instances of misconduct.” Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir.
2002) (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993)).
Brown has asserted no facts from which I could infer the existence of a conspiracy by
Coordinator King and the other defendants to violate Brown’s constitutional rights with regard to
the exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Nor has he alleged facts suggesting a conspiracy
by Administrator Brown to violate Brown’s constitutional rights by accepting telephone calls
regarding his transfer from Corrigan to Chesire. The claims that Administrator Brown and
Coordinator King conspired to violate Brown’s constitutional rights are conclusory, at best.
Therefore, Brown has not asserted a plausible conspiracy claim against either
Administrator Brown or Coordinator King. I dismiss Brown’s conspiracy claims against
Coordinator King and Administrator Brown. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
6. Mental Health Treatment and Conditions at Cheshire
Brown asserts that, on June 3, 2016, he informed Nurse George that he could not keep
bulk medications in his cell due to his “self injurious nature.” Am. Compl., Doc. No. 30, at 31, ¶
169. After Brown returned to his housing unit, Nurse George accused him of being suicidal and
issued an order that he be placed on behavior observation status. See id. at ¶ 170. Although Nurse
Pepin was not present in the medical department when Brown spoke to Nurse George, Nurse
Pepin confirmed the observations of Nurse George with regard to Brown’s suicidal statement.
See id. at ¶ 171.

19

Correctional officers handcuffed Brown and brought him to the segregation unit to be
placed on behavior observation status. See id. at 31–32, ¶¶ 173–74. The officers performed a
strip search on Brown before placing him in a safety gown in the cell. See id. at 32, ¶ 178.
A mental health worker came to speak to Brown an hour later. See Exs. DD & FF to Am.
Compl., Doc. No. 31, at 46–47, 50–51. The mental health worker made the decision to maintain
Brown on behavior observation status. See Ex. FF, Doc. No. 31, at 50–51. Brown claims that the
behavior observation cell was filthy and the sink and toilet could not be used. See Am. Compl.,
Doc. No. 30, at 33, ¶ 186. Pursuant to the orders of the mental health worker, Brown remained in
the cell on behavior observation status until June 6, 2016. See Ex. EE to Am. Compl., Doc. No.
31, at 48–49.
Brown claims that Nurses Pepin and George were deliberately indifferent to his mental
health needs and safety. The exhibits to the amended complaint reflect, however, that Nurses
Pepin and George reasonably perceived statements made by Brown to be statements suggesting
the possibility of self-harm. See Ex EE, FF, & GG to Am. Compl., Doc. No. 31 at 48–51. They
directed custody officials to place Brown in a cell on observation status to protect his safety. The
mental health worker who interviewed Brown an hour after he was placed on observation status
determined that Brown should remain on behavior status. See Ex. FF to Am. Compl., Doc. No.
31, at 50–51.
Brown’s allegations against Nurses Pepin and George do not constitute claims of
deliberate indifference to mental health needs. To protect Brown from himself, they placed him
on behavior observation status. A mental health worker subsequently affirmed the decision to
place Brown on behavior observation status. Accordingly, I dismiss Brown’s claims against
Nurses Pepin and George. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

20

Brown’s only allegation against Health Services Administrator Brown regarding his
confinement at Cheshire is that the administrator responded to Brown’s grievance regarding his
placement on behavior observation status. On June 23, 2016, Administrator Brown indicated that
she would follow up with all medical and mental health employees who were involved in the
placement of Brown on behavior observation status. See Am. Compl., Doc. No. 30, at 33, ¶ 179;
Ex. DD to Am. Compl., Doc. No. 31, at 46–47. I note that Brown has also attached to the
amended complaint Administrator Brown’s response to an inmate request submitted by Brown in
July 2016. The request and Administrator Brown’s response address Brown’s questions about
how he might challenge mental health policies. Brown’s allegations against Administrator
Brown regarding her responses to one grievance and one inmate remedy request fail to state a
claim of a violation of Brown’s constitutional or federally protected rights. Thus, I dismiss that
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Although Brown complains that the cell in which he was placed on June 3, 2016 was
unsanitary and the sink and toilet could not be used, he does not assert that he made any of the
defendants aware of those conditions. When a mental health worker evaluated him on June 6,
2016, he stated that he had been on a hunger strike for two and one-half days. See Ex. EE to Am.
Compl., Doc. No. 31, at 48–49. Brown was released from the behavior observation status cell
later that day. See id. Brown has not alleged that any defendant was aware of the conditions of
confinement in his observation status cell from June 3, 2016 to June 6, 2016. As such, Brown has
not stated that the defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. I
dismiss without prejudice Brown’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding the conditions in the
behavior observation cell. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

21

Finally, Brown also asserts that he underwent a strip search in front of at least fifteen
unidentified officers prior to being placed in the behavior observation cell. He does not assert,
however, that any of the defendants were present for or involved in the strip search. Thus, he has
not alleged that any of the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights in connection with
the strip search. I dismiss without prejudice Brown’s strip search claim. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
7. Fifth and Sixth Amendment Claims
On the first page of the amended complaint, Brown states that he is asserting violations of
the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, not to the states. See Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (stating that Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
protects citizens against only federal government actors, not State officials); Ambrose v. City of
New York, 623 F. Supp. 2d 454, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that any due process claim against
a city was “properly brought under . . . the Fourteenth Amendment, not . . . the Fifth
Amendment”). Because Brown has not alleged any deprivation of his rights by the federal
government, I dismiss any Fifth Amendment claims against the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
The Sixth Amendment provides:
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defen[s]e.

22

U.S. Const. amend. VI. Brown does not allege facts to state a claim that any of the defendants
violated his rights under any provision of the Sixth Amendment. Thus, I dismiss Brown’s Sixth
Amendment claims as lacking an arguable factual or legal basis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
8. Section 1985 and Section 1986 Claims
In addition to filing this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Brown pursues claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. The first two subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 clearly are not
relevant to this action. Section 1985(1) prohibits conspiracies to prevent federal officials from
performing their duties, and section 1985(2) prohibits conspiracies intending to deter witnesses
from participating in state or federal judicial proceedings. Brown is not a federal official and his
claims are not related to participation of witnesses in judicial proceedings.
In order to state a claim under section 1985(3), the plaintiff must allege: (1) the
defendants were part of a conspiracy; (2) the purpose of the conspiracy was to “depriv[e] . . . any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws”; (3) an overt “act [taken] in furtherance of . . . [the] conspiracy”; and
(4) an injury to the plaintiff’s “ person or property,” or a deprivation of his “right or privilege.”
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971). Furthermore, the plaintiff must show
that the conspiracy was motivated by a “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus.” Id. at 102. Section 1985(3) may not be construed as a “general federal
tort law”; it does not provide a cause of action based on the denial of due process or other
constitutional rights. See id.
Brown has alleged that the defendants acted together to violate his rights. He has not
alleged, however, that the actions of any defendant were taken because of Brown’s race or on the
23

basis of other class-based discriminatory animus. Thus, Brown fails to state a claim cognizable
under section 1985(3), and I dismiss his section 1985 claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Section 1986 provides no substantive rights. Rather, it provides a remedy for the
violation of section 1985. As a result, a prerequisite for an actionable claim under section 1986 is
a viable claim under section 1985. See Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir.
1993) (“Liability under § 1986 . . . is dependent on the validity of a claim under § 1985.”).
Because Brown has not stated a section 1985 claim, his section 1986 is not actionable and is
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
D. Conclusion
With respect to the claims asserted in the amended complaint, I order as follows:
1. The following claims under section 1983 are dismissed for failure to comply with
Rules 8 or 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the dental treatment and
lost dentures claims, the deliberate indifference to mental health and safety
claims, and the segregation placement claims, all raised against Drs. Benoint,
Lichtenstein, Coursen, Chaplin, Berger and Crabbe, Officer Aponte, Lieutenant
Halloran, Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens Martin and Zegerzewski, Captain
Shabenas, Grievance Coordinator King and Nurse Kim. Those claims also are
dismissed as barred by the prior pending action doctrine.
2. The following claims under section 1983 are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii): the claims that Commissioner Semple, Aponte, Halloran, King,
and Drs. Berger, Trestman, Burns and Chaplin, engaged in retaliatory conduct;
the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Grievance Coordinator King
for her failure to properly process Brown’s grievances; the conspiracy claim
24

against Grievance Coordinator King; the Eighth Amendment claims against
Nurses Pepin and George and Health Services Administrator Brown; the
conditions of confinement in the observation status cell claim; the strip search
claim; and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims.
3. The section 1985 and section 1986 claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
4. The following section 1983 claims will proceed: the First Amendment retaliation
claim against Dr. Gagne; the Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate
indifference to safety and mental health needs against Commissioner Semple, Dr.
Trestman, Dr. Gagne, Dr. Crabbe, Dr. Berger, Dr. Burns, Dr. Chaplin, Dr.
Coursen, Warden Santiago, Deputy Warden Martin, Deputy Warden
Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Lieutenant Halloran, Officer Aponte and
Administrator Labonte; the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim
against Commissioner Semple, Dr. Trestman, Dr. Crabbe, Warden Santiago,
Deputy Warden Martin, Deputy Warden Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas,
Administrator Labonte, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Coursen, Dr. Berger, and Lieutenant
Halloran; and the claim of conspiracy to violate Brown’s constitutional rights
against Dr. Gagne, Dr. Crabbe, Warden Santiago, Deputy Warden Martin,
Deputy Warden Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Administrator Labonte, Dr.
Chaplin, Dr. Coursen, Dr. Berger, and Lieutenant Halloran.

25

III.

Motion for Order [Doc. No. 78]
Motion for Order on Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 82]
In his first motion for order, Brown seeks to know the status of his request to amend. In

view of my ruling on Brown’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, I deny as moot
Brown’s first motion for order, Doc. No. 78.
In his motion for an order on amended complaint, Brown states that he does not seek to
proceed in this action with regard to his claims against Dr. Coursen, but instead seeks to file a
separate action regarding his allegations against Dr. Coursen. As indicated above, I dismissed the
claims regarding Brown’s relationship with Dr. Coursen as duplicative of the claims raised in a
new action filed by Brown on August 7, 2017, Brown v. Semple, No. 3:17-cv-01328 (SRU).
Accordingly, I deny as moot Brown’s motion for an order on amended complaint, Doc. No. 82.
IV.

Motion to File Extra Interrogatories [Doc. No. 85]
Motion for Extension of Time [Doc. No. 95]
Brown seeks to serve additional interrogatories on all defendants. He claims that extra

interrogatories are needed to advance the litigation of this case, that all questions are “prudenant
to the claims or claims sought,” and that his intent in serving extra interrogatories is not to be
burdensome. See Doc. No. 85, at 1. Brown does not indicate whether or how many
interrogatories he has already served on the defendants.
Brown also seeks an extension of time to complete discovery. Brown mentions in his
motion that the parties are still in the process of settlement discussions.
Because the parties are still exploring the possibility of settlement, I deny without
prejudice Brown’s motions to serve additional interrogatories and motion for extension of time
to conduct discovery. See Docs. Nos. 85 & 95. I will enter a new scheduling order, if necessary,
at a later time.
26

V.

Motion for Protective Order [Doc. No. 91]
Brown seeks an order directing Dr. Coursen not to contact him with regard to the

relationship that he had with her during his confinement at Corrigan prior to May 2016. Because
I have dismissed the claims against Dr. Coursen with regard to her treatment of Brown prior to
May 2016, and because Brown has filed a separate action against her regarding those claims,
Brown v. Semple, No. 3:17-cv-01328 (SRU), the motion for protective order is more
appropriately addressed in the new action. Therefore, I deny without prejudice Brown’s motion
for protective order, Doc. No. 91. I will direct the Clerk to docket a copy of the motion for
protective order in the new case against Dr. Coursen.
To the extent that Brown claims that he has not received sufficient therapy at Cheshire
regarding his treatment by and relationship with Dr. Coursen, the defendants shall address that
allegation in their response to Brown’s motion for order filed on July 31, 2017, in which Brown
states that he has not been receiving a sufficient number of therapy visits since Dr. Sanesario left
Cheshire. See Mot. Order, Doc. No. 93.
VI.

Conclusion
It is hereby ordered that:
(1)

Brown’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Doc. No. 30] and the first

Motion to Supplement Cover Page of the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 34] are GRANTED.
The Clerk shall docket the proposed amended complaint attached to the motion, pages 2–59 of
Doc. No. 30, as the amended complaint. The Clerk shall docket pages 60–80 of Doc. No. 30 as
exhibits A to J of the amended complaint, and docket Doc. No. 31 as exhibits K to UU to the
amended complaint. The Clerk shall also docket the supplemental first page of the amended

27

complaint attached to the motion to supplement cover page, Doc. No. 34, at 5, as a supplemental
first page of the amended complaint.
The following section 1983 claims asserted in the amended complaint are DISMISSED
for failure to comply with Rules 8 or 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the dental
treatment and lost dentures claims, the deliberate indifference to mental health and safety claims
and the segregation placement claims against Drs. Benoint, Lichtenstein, Coursen, Chaplin,
Berger, and Crabbe, Officer Aponte, Lieutenant Halloran, Warden Santiago, Deputy Wardens
Martin and Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Grievance Coordinator King and Nurse Kim. The
dental treatment and lost dentures claims and the deliberate indifference to mental health and
safety claims are also DISMISSED as barred by the prior pending action doctrine.
The following section 1983 claims asserted in the amended complaint are DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii): the claims that Commissioner Semple, Aponte,
Halloran, and King, and Drs. Berger, Trestman, Burns, and Chaplin, engaged in retaliatory
conduct; the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Grievance Coordinator King for
her failure to properly process Brown’s grievances; the conspiracy claim against Grievance
Coordinator King; the Eighth Amendment claims against Nurses Pepin and George and Health
Services Administrator Brown; the conditions of confinement in the observation status cell
claim; the strip search claim; and the Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims.
The section 1985 and 1986 claims asserted in the amended complaint are DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Thus, all claims against defendants Nurse Pepin, Nurse George, Health Services
Administrator Brown, Grievance Coordinator King and Nurse Kim have been DISMISSED.

28

The following section 1983 claims asserted in the amended complaint will proceed: the
First Amendment retaliation claim against Dr. Gagne; the Eighth Amendment claims for
deliberate indifference to safety and mental health needs against Commissioner Semple, Dr.
Trestman, Dr. Gagne, Dr. Crabbe, Dr. Berger, Dr. Burns, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Coursen, Warden
Santiago, Deputy Warden Martin, Deputy Warden Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Lieutenant
Halloran, Officer Aponte, and Administrator Labonte; the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claim against Commissioner Semple, Dr. Trestman, Dr. Crabbe, Warden Santiago,
Deputy Warden Martin, Deputy Warden Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas, Administrator
Labonte, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Coursen, Dr. Berger, and Lieutenant Halloran; and the claim of
conspiracy to violate Brown’s constitutional rights against Dr. Gagne, Dr. Crabbe, Warden
Santiago, Deputy Warden Martin, Deputy Warden Zegerzewski, Captain Shabenas,
Administrator Labonte, Dr. Chaplin, Dr. Coursen, Dr. Berger, and Lieutenant Halloran.
The second Motion to Supplement Cover Page of the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 35],
the Motion for Order [Doc. No. 78] and the Motion for Order on Amended Complaint [Doc. No.
82] are DENIED as moot.
The Motion to File Extra Interrogatories [Doc. No. 85], the Motion for Extension of Time
[Doc. No. 95] and the Motion for Protective Order [Doc. No. 91] are DENIED without
prejudice. The Clerk shall docket a copy of the Motion for Protective Order [Doc. No. 91] in
Brown v. Semple, No. 3:17-cv-01328 (SRU).
(2)

Because Brown paid the filing fee to commence this action, he is not entitled

to have service of the amended complaint effected by the court. In accordance with the
requirements of Rule 4, Brown shall effect service of the amended complaint and a copy of this
order on Dr. Craig Burns and Dr. Berger in their official and individual capacities, and shall

29

effect service of the amended complaint and a copy of this order on each of the following
defendants in his or her individual capacity: Dr. Paul Chaplin, Lieutenant Halloran, and Dr.
Elizabeth Coursen. Returns of service and Waivers of Service of Summons forms that have been
signed by the defendants should be filed with the court. Failure to comply with this order will
result in the dismissal of all claims against the defendants.
The Clerk shall send Brown instructions for service of the amended complaint, together
with five copies of this order, five blank Notice of Lawsuit forms and four blank Waiver of
Service of Summons forms, to enable Brown to serve a copy of the complaint and a copy of this
order on each defendant in his or her individual capacity. The Clerk also shall mail Brown two
blank summons forms for him to complete and return to the Clerk for issuance to enable Brown
to serve a copy of the summons and amended complaint and a copy of this order on Drs. Craig
Burns and Berger in their official capacities using the address of the Office of the Attorney
General, 55 Elm Street, Hartford, Connecticut 06141.
(3)

Defendants Burns, Berger, Chaplin, Halloran and Coursen shall file their

response to the amended complaint, either an answer or motion to dismiss, within sixty (60)
days from the date the notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of summons forms are mailed to
them. Defendants Semple, Trestman, Gagne, Crabbe, Santiago, Martin, Zegerzewski,
Shabenas, Aponte, and Labonte shall file an answer to the amended complaint within thirty
(30) days of the date of his order. If the defendants choose to file an answer, they shall admit or
deny the allegations and respond to the cognizable claims recited above. They may also include
any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
(4)

Within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, the defendants shall file a

response to Brown’s claim that he has not received sufficient therapy regarding his treatment by

30

and relationship with Dr. Coursen, as included in the Motion for Protective Order, Doc. No. 91,
and shall also respond to the allegations, which are included in the Motion for Order, Doc. No.
93, pertaining to Brown’s claim that he has not been receiving a sufficient number of therapy
visits since Dr. Sanesario left Cheshire. See Mot. Order, Doc. No. 93.

So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 25th day of September 2017.

/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

31