Jackson v. Farinella

Filing 9

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the attached Order, the Court enters the following orders:(1) The claims against defendant for monetary damages in her official capacity are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (2). The Eighth Amendment claim shall proceed against defendant in her individual capacity and in her official capacity to the extent that plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.(2) Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the U.S. Marshals Service shall serve the summons, a copy of the complaint and this order on defendant in her official capacity by delivering the necessary documents in person to the Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, Hartford, CT 06141. (3) Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the Clerk shall ascertain from the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs the current work address for defendant and mail a waiver of service of process request packet to her at her curr ent work address. On the thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing, the Clerk shall report to the court on the status of all the requests. If defendant fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for in-person service by the U.S . Marshals Service and defendant shall be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).(4) Defendant shall file her response to the complaint, either an answer or motion to dismiss, within s ixty (60) days from the date the notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of summons forms are mailed to her. If she chooses to file an answer, she shall admit or deny the allegations and respond to the cognizable claims recited above. She may als o include any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.(5) Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, shall be completed within six months (180 days) from the date of this order. Discovery requests need not be filed with the court.(6) All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this order.It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 11/28/2016. (Gruber, Sarah)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

KEVIN JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:16-cv-01174 (JAM)

MONICA FARINELLA,
Defendant.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff Kevin Jackson is a prisoner of the New Haven Correctional Center, and he has
filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his mental health counselor was
deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint will proceed against
defendant Monica Farinella in her individual and official capacities.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are alleged in the complaint and accepted as true only for purposes of
this initial ruling. When plaintiff arrived at New Haven Correctional Center on February 11,
2014, he suffered from various mental health conditions, including bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and schizophrenia. He informed the mental health department that he
had these disorders and that mental health officials at a prison in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania had
diagnosed him as suffering from these conditions; plaintiff then requested medication to stave off
symptoms of those conditions. After plaintiff was informed that he would need copies of his
prior mental health records before he could be seen by a mental health worker, he signed a
medical records release form and provided the street address of the pharmacy that he had used
prior to his incarceration.

During plaintiff’s first month of confinement, and while waiting for mental health
officials to receive plaintiff’s prior health records, he suffered from hallucinations. He informed
mental health officials about his hallucinations and his need for medication to treat his
symptoms.
On May 27, 2014, defendant Mental Health Counselor Monica Farinella met with
plaintiff. Plaintiff informed defendant about his hallucinations and that he was experiencing
thoughts of suicide. He also gave defendant the names of medications that had been previously
prescribed to treat his mental health conditions.
Instead of evaluating plaintiff, defendant accused him of lying about his symptoms and
indicated that mental health staff had been unable to secure his previous mental health records or
locate the pharmacy that had previously prescribed him medication. Defendant stated that she did
not believe him to suffer from mental disorders because he “looked clean” and, with respect to
his symptoms, he should go back to his “cell and deal with it like a man.” Doc. #1 at 3.
Defendant also stated that plaintiff would not be put on any medications no matter what he did,
and that nobody would let him see a doctor because the request had to go through her. Ibid.
From March 2014 to December 2014, plaintiff’s mental health allegedly deteriorated for
lack of mental health treatment and medication. His symptoms manifested in hallucinations,
depression, and poor behavior, which led to his punitive segregation. In June 2015, mental health
officials placed him on suicide watch for three days. In August 2015, a physician examined
plaintiff, confirmed his mental health diagnoses, and prescribed medication and therapy to treat
him. Despite having received some mental health care, plaintiff asserts that he continues to be
denied adequate medical treatment, causing him further injury.
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DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner civil complaints
against governmental actors and “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has
facial plausibility when plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint that includes only “‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action’ or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement,’” does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Ibid. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). Although courts still have an obligation to interpret “a
pro se complaint liberally,” the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the
standard of facial plausibility. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
For relief, plaintiff requests compensatory damages as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief. To the extent that he seeks monetary damages from defendant in her official capacity, the
claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985);
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). All such claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(2).

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The Court concludes that plaintiff has stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference to mental health needs against defendant. It is well established that “a
prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate
violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). A deliberate
indifference claim has two requirements. “The first requirement is objective: the alleged
deprivation of adequate medical care must be sufficiently serious. The second requirement is
subjective: the charged officials must be subjectively reckless in their denial of medical care.”
Spavone v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). In order to
meet the subjective requirement, “the charged official [must] act or fail to act while actually
aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.” Ibid.
Without prejudice to defendant’s right to seek dismissal as allowed under the federal
rules, I conclude at this initial review stage that the complaint adequately alleges facts that—if
true—would give rise to plausible grounds for relief under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s claim will proceed at this time against defendant Farinella in her individual capacity
and in her official capacity to the extent that plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief.
ORDERS
The Court enters the following orders:
(1)

The claims against defendant for monetary damages in her official capacity are

DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). The Eighth Amendment claim shall proceed
against defendant in her individual capacity and in her official capacity to the extent that plaintiff
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

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(2)

Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the U.S. Marshals Service shall

serve the summons, a copy of the complaint and this order on defendant in her official capacity
by delivering the necessary documents in person to the Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm
Street, Hartford, CT 06141.
(3)

Within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, the Clerk shall ascertain from the

Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs the current work address for defendant and
mail a waiver of service of process request packet to her at her current work address. On the
thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing, the Clerk shall report to the court on the status of all the
requests. If defendant fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for
in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service and defendant shall be required to pay the costs
of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
(4)

Defendant shall file her response to the complaint, either an answer or motion to

dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date the notice of lawsuit and waiver of service of
summons forms are mailed to her. If she chooses to file an answer, she shall admit or deny the
allegations and respond to the cognizable claims recited above. She may also include any and all
additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
(5)

Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, shall be

completed within six months (180 days) from the date of this order. Discovery requests need
not be filed with the court.
(6)

All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within seven months (210

days) from the date of this order.
It is so ordered.
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Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 28th day of November, 2016.

_/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer_______
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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