Verdone v. Greenleaf Biofuels, LLC et al

Filing 92

ORDER finding as moot 48 Motion to Dismiss; granting 85 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 8/24/2017. (Ghosh, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

CHERYL VERDONE,
Plaintiff
vs.
AMERICAN GREENFUELS, LLC, et. al.
Defendant,

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CASE NO. 3:16-cv-01271 (VAB)

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Cheryl Verdone (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint alleging that her former employers,
Greenleaf Biofuels, Kolmar Americas, and American Greenfuels, LLC (collectively
“Defendants”) discriminated against her because of her gender and disability. American
Greenfuels filed a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on October 14, 2016.
Defendant American Greenfuels argued that Counts Three, Five, Eight, Nine, and Ten of Ms.
Verdone’s Plaintiff’s Complaint were factually insufficient and should be dismissed. See Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 48. On June 30, 2017, Ms. Verdone filed a motion to amend her
Complaint, seeking to add claims for retaliation under the state and federal Equal Pay Acts. See
Mot. Amend, ECF No. 85; Proposed Am. Compl., ECF No. 85-1. For the reasons that follow,
Ms. Verdone’s motion is GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Cheryl Verdone filed a Complaint with this Court on July 27, 2016. In the Complaint,

Ms. Verdone alleged that her former employers, Greenleaf Biofuels, Kolmar Americas, and
American Greenfuels, LLC discriminated against her based on her gender and disability.
Defendant Greenleaf Biofuels, LLC (“Greenleaf”) is a Connecticut limited liability company

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with its principal place of business in New Haven, CT. Compl. ¶ 6. Kolmar Americas, Inc.
(“Kolmar”), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business at Bridgeport,
Connecticut, purchased Greenleaf in 2013. Defendant American Greenfuels, LLC (“American
Greenfuels”), also a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, merged with Greenleaf in December 2015. Id. at ¶ 18.
Among the causes of action Ms. Verdone raised in the Complaint were Count Three,
which alleged a violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), et. seq. (“EPA”),
and Count Five, which alleged a violation of the Connecticut Wage & Hour Laws Prohibiting
Discrimination in Compensation of Wages, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-75, et seq. On October 14,
2017, Defendant American Greenfuels (“Greenfuels”) filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). In this motion, Greenfuels argued that Counts Three, Five, Eight, Nine, and Ten of Ms.
Verdone’s Complaint were factually insufficient and should be dismissed. See Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 48.
In her Complaint, Ms. Verdone alleged that, in June 2012, she worked for Defendant
Greenleaf and was managing all of Greenleaf’s human resources matters. Compl. ¶ 39. She also
alleged that she developed Greenleaf’s human resources department. Id. at ¶ 40. She further
alleged that Kolmar, which invested in and subsequently took control of Greenleaf in 2013, hired
Kevin Ovian, a male, as a “Business Director.” Id. at ¶¶ 13, 57. Kolmar allegedly paid Mr.
Ovian $150,000 a year, more than it paid Ms. Verdone. Id. at ¶¶ 57, 61. Mr. Ovian’s
responsibilities included human resources, though he had no experience in human resources. Id.
at ¶¶ 57, 60. After Kolmar hired Mr. Ovian, Ms. Verdone allegedly “continued to manage
human resources for the Defendants, including overseeing all human resources matters handled
by Ovian.” Id. at 61. In August 2014, Mr. Ovian “began to take on human resources projects

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without [Ms. Verdone’s] involvement.” Id. at ¶ 63. Ms. Verdone asked Gus Kellogg, the
company’s Chief Operating Officer, if she was still head of human resources. Id. Mr. Kellogg
told her Ms. Verdone that her role had not changed after Mr. Ovian’s hiring. Id. After this,
Defendants allegedly “began to exclude [Ms. Verdone] from all high-level management
meetings, including meetings related to human resources.” Id. at ¶ 64. Ms. Verdone alleges that
Defendants terminated her on November 13, 2014, and challenges the termination as
discriminatory. Id. at ¶¶ 85-86. After filing a Complaint with the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) and receiving a release of jurisdiction, Ms. Verdone
filed her Complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 93-95.
On October 5, 2016, after a conference with the parties, the Court entered a scheduling
order that provided that Ms. Verdone would amend her pleadings by November 4, 2016 and
created a discovery deadline of September 29, 2017. See ECF No. 44. On June 30, 2017, Ms.
Verdone filed a motion to amend her Complaint, seeking to add claims for retaliation under the
federal and state Equal Pay Acts. See Mot. Amend, 1 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) and Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 31-75). In her proposed Amended Complaint, Ms. Verdone labeled these causes of
action Counts Eleven and Twelve, respectively.
II.

APPLICABLE LAW
A. Rule 15
Rule 15 provides that “[t]he court should freely” grant leave to amend “when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In considering whether to grant a litigant leave to amend, the
Court considers such factors as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice, and
futility of amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Block v. First
Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The rule in this Circuit has been to allow a

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party to amend its pleadings in the absence of a showing by the nonmovant of prejudice or bad
faith.”). “Mere delay, however, absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not
provide a basis for a district court to deny the right to amend.” State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir.1981) (internal citations omitted).
“In gauging prejudice,” a court considers, “among other factors, whether an amendment
would require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and
prepare for trial or significantly delay the resolution of the dispute.” Ruotolo v. City of New
York, 514 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). “Undue prejudice arises,” for
example, “when an amendment comes on the eve of trial and would result in new problems of
proof.” Id. (quoting Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d at 856) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). Nonetheless, “allegations that an amendment will require the expenditure of additional
time, effort, or money do not themselves constitute undue prejudice.” Fresh Del Monte Produce,
Inc. v. Del Monte Foods, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 170, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal citations
omitted). Therefore, “the fact that the opposing party will have to undertake additional
discovery, standing alone, does not suffice to warrant denial of a motion to amend a pleading.”
Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel. Mar. Admin. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 889 F.2d 1248,
1255 (2d Cir.1989)). The decision to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) is within
the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.
321, 330 (1971) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182).
One factor the court must consider is the “futility of amendment.” Foman, 371 U.S. at
182. A proposed amendment is futile if it fails to state a claim that would survive a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lucente v. Int’l. Bus. Machs. Corp., 310
F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002).

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B. Rule 16(b)
Rule 16(b) provides that scheduling orders “must limit the time ... to amend the
pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). Once it is entered, a scheduling order may be modified
only for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The policy behind this rule is to “assure[ ] that
at some point both the parties and the pleadings will be fixed.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory
committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
The “good cause” inquiry turns on the diligence of the party seeking to modify the
scheduling order. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir.2000) (“[A]
finding of ‘good cause’ depends on the diligence of the moving party.”) (citations omitted);
accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment (“[T]he court may
modify the schedule upon a showing of good cause if it cannot be met despite the diligence of
the party seeking the extension.”). “A party is not considered to have acted diligently where the
proposed amendment is based on information that the party knew, or should have known, in
advance of the motion deadline.” Fresh Del Monte, 304 F.R.D. at 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(Internal citation omitted). The burden of showing diligence rests on the moving party. See id.
Recognizing the tension between the standards set by Rules 15 and 16, the Second
Circuit has observed that “[t]he district court, in the exercise of its discretion under Rule 16(b),
also may consider other relevant factors including, in particular, whether allowing the
amendment of the pleading at this stage of the litigation will prejudice defendants.” Kassner v.
2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The primary consideration is
whether the moving party can demonstrate diligence. It is not, however, the only
consideration.”).

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As Kassner explained, a trial court, even when interpreting Rule 16, may consider not
only the diligence of the moving party but also the prejudice to the opposing party. Kassner, 496
F.3d at 244. In other words, “[b]y requiring the district court to consider and balance factors
other than a plaintiff's diligence, the [Second Circuit] left open the possibility that amendments
could be permitted even where a plaintiff has not been diligent in seeking an amendment.”
Fresh Del Monte, 304 F.R.D. at 175 (adding that “many district courts have undertaken a Rule
16(b) good cause analysis that considers prejudice to the opponent in addition to the moving
party's diligence.”); Coale v. Metro-North R.R. Co., No. 08-cv-1307 (CSH), 2009 WL 4881077,
*3 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2009) (observing, when finding good cause for amendment largely
because it would cause no prejudice to the opposing party, that “[s]cheduling orders are not the
Code of Hammurabi.”).
III.

DISCUSSION
Greenfuels opposes Ms. Verdone’s motion to amend for two reasons. First, Greenfuels

argues that Ms. Verdone has not “been denied any right to amend,” but rather “elected not to
exercise this right” in a timely manner. Def.’s Opp. Mem., ECF No. 87, 6. Greenfuels also
argues that Ms. Verdone’s proposed amendments are futile because Ms. Verdone has not stated a
claim for discrimination under the Equal Pay Acts of Connecticut or the United States. Id. at 7.
Ms. Verdone responds that there is good cause to amend the scheduling order, Mot. Amend
Compl., 3, and that her proposed amendments are not futile, because Ms. Verdone could
maintain an action for retaliation under the Equal Pay Acts even if her discrimination claims
under the same acts were dismissed, see Pl.’s Reply Mem., ECF No. 88, 5. For the reasons that
follow, Ms. Verdone’s motion to amend is GRANTED.

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A. Good Cause to Amend
Ms. Verdone argues that there is good cause to permit her to amend her complaint
because an amendment would allow the case to be resolved “on its full merits.” Pl.’s Reply
Mem., 1. Ms. Verdone does not raise additional arguments to support a showing of “good
cause.” Greenfuels assert that Ms. Verdone’s motion to amend is prejudicial because it has
already “expended significant time and resources to conduct discovery.” Def.’s Opp. Mem. 5.
Greenfuels adds that Ms. Verdone has “already informed defense counsel that they will not
produce [Ms. Verdone] to provide any additional deposition testimony even if the Motion to
Amend is granted by the Court. Id. at 6.
The possibility of Greenfuels’ additional discovery would not merit denial of Ms.
Verdone’s motion. As the Second Circuit has observed, the fact that the opposing party will
have to undertake additional discovery, “standing alone, does not suffice to warrant denial of a
motion to amend a pleading.” See United States ex rel Maritime Administration v. Continental
Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 889 F.2d 1248, 1255 (2d Cir.1989). If
Greenfuels is correct that Ms. Verdone’s counsel refuses to produce Ms. Verdone to provide
additional testimony, Greenfuels may seek relief from the Court by requesting a discovery
conference or, if the conference is unsuccessful, filing a motion to compel. While Defendants’
undertaking of additional discovery may be a factor in the Court’s assessment of prejudice,
“allegations that an amendment will require the expenditure of additional time, effort, or money
do not themselves constitute undue prejudice.” Fresh Del Monte, 304 F.R.D. at 174.
Furthermore, Ms. Verdone is correct that the “policy behind [the rule allowing liberal
leave to amend] is that liberal amendment promotes judicial economy by making it possible to
dispose of all contentions between parties in one lawsuit.” See Kreisler v. P.T.Z. Realty, L.L.C.,

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318 F.R.D. 704, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal citations omitted). From a practical standpoint,
Ms. Verdone’s retaliation claims under the state and federal Equal Pay Acts would be most
efficiently litigated alongside her other claims under those statutes. Considering the Court’s
interest in judicial economy, Greenfuels’ allegations of prejudice, as well as “other relevant
factors,” Kassner, 496 F. 3d at 244, the Court determines that Ms. Verdone has good cause to
amend her Complaint.
B. Futility of Amendments
Greenfuels also argues that Ms. Verdone’s proposed amendments—which add Counts
Eleven and Twelve—should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) and are therefore futile. Def.’s
Opp. Mem, 7. Specifically, Defendants argue that Ms. Verdone’s additional counts fail for the
same reasons that her Equal Pay Act claims do, and cites its pending motion to dismiss. The
Court disagrees.
In her original Complaint, Ms. Verdone raised claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1964,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et. seq., and the Connecticut Wage & Hour Laws Prohibiting Discrimination
in Compensation of Wages, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-75 et. seq. Ms. Verdone now seeks to add
retaliation claims under each statute. See Prop. Am. Compl., Ex. A. to Mot. Amend., ECF No.
85-1. Greenfuels argues that Ms. Verdone’s proposed claims fail because Ms. Verdone “has not
alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for discrimination under the state or federal Equal Pay
Act.” Def.’s Opp. Mem., 7 (citing Mot. Dismiss). In its motion to dismiss, Greenfuels sought to
dismiss all of Ms. Verdone’s claims under the state and federal Equal Pay Acts, arguing that Ms.
Verdone did not provide enough facts to show that she performed equal work as male employees
who were paid more. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 49, 8.

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As an initial matter, Ms. Verdone’s failure to state a claim for breach of the Equal Pay
Acts would not necessarily result in the dismissal of her retaliation claims. See Mabry v.
Neighborhood Def. Serv., 769 F. Supp. 2d 381, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (observing, in age
discrimination case, that “the merits of plaintiff's underlying discrimination claim are not
relevant to whether plaintiff's activity is protected.”); Grant v. Hazelett Strip–Casting Corp., 880
F.2d 1564, 1569 (2d Cir.1989) (“[T]o establish participation in a protected activity, a plaintiff is
required to show not an actual violation of the act, but only that he was acting under a good faith,
reasonable belief that such a violation existed.”).1
Furthermore, Greenfuels is incorrect that Ms. Verdone has failed to state a claim for
violation of both statutes. Congress passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963 “to legislate out of
existence a long-held, but outmoded societal view that a man should be paid more than a woman
for the same work.” Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.1999). To prove a violation
of the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must first establish the elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination. A plaintiff must show that: “i) the employer pays different wages to employees
of the opposite sex; ii) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort,
and responsibility; and iii) the jobs are performed under similar working conditions.” Id. at 135
(quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir.1995)); 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d)(1); see
also McCullough v. Xerox Corporation, No. 12-CV-6405L, 2016 WL 7229134, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
2016) (noting that three factors must be proven to establish a prima facie claim under the EPA).
As Greenfuels acknowledges, claims under the Connecticut Equal Pay Act are subject to the
same standard as the Federal Equal Pay Act. Morse v. Pratt & Whitney, No. 3:10-CV-01126
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Title VII, the EPA, and the ADEA, all make it unlawful for employers to retaliate against employees for having
opposed practices prohibited by those acts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
“The standards concerning the burden and order of proof on such claims are essentially the same under all those
acts, and follow the burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglas.” Dinolfo v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 972 F.
Supp. 718, 727 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)

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(JCH), 2013 WL 255788, *11 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2013) (“Claims brought pursuant to the
Connecticut Equal Pay Act are analyzed under the same standard as the Federal Equal Pay
Act.”).
Greenfuels’ objection to Ms. Verdone’s Equal Pay Act claims concerns the second prong
of this three-part test. See Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss, 8. Under this prong, a plaintiff
must prove that she performed “equal work” which required “equal skill, effort, and
responsibility” and was “performed under similar working conditions.” Belfi, 191 F.3d at 135.
The Second Circuit has observed that:
[E]qual skill is defined as including such factors as experience, training,
education, and ability, as measured in terms of the performance requirements of
the job at issue. Equal effort, by turn, looks to the measurement of the physical or
mental exertion needed for the performance of a job. And equal responsibility
turns on the degree of accountability required in the performance of the job, with
emphasis on the importance of the job obligation.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 255
(2d Cir. 2014). Jobs that require “equal work” need not be identical, as long as the jobs are
“substantially equal.” Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 1973)
(internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd sub nom. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S.
188 (1974). Substantial similarity is not based on mere “overlap in titles or classifications.”
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 255. Instead, a female employee’s
“actual job content” must be substantially equal to her male comparators. Id.
A plaintiff may state a claim if she alleges that she was paid less than an employee whose
job was substantially similar, even if the male employee takes on “inconsequential” additional
tasks. See Hodgson, 474 F.2d at 234 (finding that the work done by male night inspection
workers and female night inspection workers was substantially equal, even though some of the
men on the night shift were required to perform some additional “utility work”). The court in

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Hodgson determined that the male employee’s additional duties were “inconsequential” to the
Equal Pay Act analysis because the defendant employer “considered the utility work of so little
consequence that these tasks were not included in the job descriptions of any of the inspectors.”
Id.; see also Rizzo v. Kraus Organization, No. 10–CV-272, 2010 WL 2427434, *3 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (despite “relatively minor” differences in positions, such as evidence that a male attorney
performed legal research and the female attorney “interpreted” the research, female attorney met
her pleading burden by asserting that she and the male attorney both “performed research and
advocacy for the defendants before administrative bodies.”).
Nevertheless, a plaintiff must do more than suggest that “some overlap exists” between
her job duties and those of the men with whom she works. See Abdullajeva v. Club Quarters,
Inc., No. 96CIV.0383 (LMM), 1996 WL 497029, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1996) (“[P]laintiffs
must demonstrate that the overall job they perform is substantially equal to a male employee's
job, and not merely that certain component parts are the same.”); see also Doria v. Cramer
Rosenthal McGlynn, Inc., 942 F.Supp. 937, 942 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (observing, when granting
summary judgment, that “when the additional tasks of one job in comparison to another job are
substantial, then jobs are not congruent and the work is not equal.). The plaintiff must make
specific allegations “about the actual content of the work done” and cannot reset on “broad
generalizations drawn from job titles and divisions.” Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768
F.3d at 256 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)).
The fact that an employer intends to assign different responsibilities to the plaintiff and
her male comparator is “inconsequential if, in fact, their actual responsibilities were the same.”
Corpes v. Walsh Constr. Co., No. 3:14-CV-181 (MPS), 2015 WL 5331725, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept.
14, 2015) (citing Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 255). In Corpes, the

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plaintiff was an Administrative Assistant, Cost Engineer Assistant, and, later, a “Project
Administrator.” Id. She alleged that her job was “substantially equal” to that of Mr. Fagan, a
better paid “Project Accountant.” Id. The Court determined that the two positions “required the
same duties and involved the same content,” so that “any differences in titles [we]re immaterial.”
Id. The Court emphasized that the two employees “assisted one another, worked together, and
communicated with each other multiple times per day.” Id. at *2.
While the question is a close one, Ms. Verdone has stated a claim under the Equal Pay
Act with regard to one employee of Defendants, Mr. Ovian. Ms. Verdone alleges that her
workload overlapped substantially with Mr. Ovian’s, because Mr. Ovian had a “management
position concerning human resources” and she and Mr. Ovian handled human resources projects
jointly. See Compl. at ¶¶ 57-63. She alleges that, until August 2014, she continued to perform
human resources tasks despite Mr. Ovian’s occupation of the Business Director position, and that
Mr. Kellog told her that he role had not change despite Mr. Ovian’s hiring. Id. at ¶¶ 61- 63.
Like the plaintiff in Corpes, Ms. Verdone and Mr. Ovian “assisted one another, worked together,
and communicated,” 2015 WL 5331725 at *2, and “both managed Greenleaf’s human resources
matters after Ovian was hired.” Pl. Opp. Mem., ECF No. 54, 4. While Defendants gave Mr.
Ovian the title of “Business Director” rather than “administrator,” substantial similarity is not
based on “titles or classifications.” Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 255.
Greenfuels argues that Ms. Verdone “merely alleg[es]” that Mr. Ovian’s position as
“Business Director” included human resources, and that such allegations are insufficient to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss, 3-4. As
Greenfuels correctly contends, a plaintiff must provide more than “scant information” to state a
claim under the Equal Pay Act. Adams v. Northstar Location Servs., LLC, No. 09CV1063, 2010

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WL 3911415, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2010). “Even at the motion to dismiss stage, vague,
conclusory, and speculative allegations will not save an Equal Pay Act claim.” Id. (citing Bass v.
World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc., 129 F.Supp.2d 491, 503 (E.D.N.Y.2001)); see also Port
Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 768 F.3d at 256 (“broad generalizations” insufficient to
survive motion for judgment on the pleadings).
Unlike the plaintiff recruiter in Adams, who “did not describe her job responsibilities in
comparison to the job responsibilities of the male recruiter,” see id., or the plaintiff body builder
in Bass, who stated merely that “[u]pon information and belief, [she] was paid lower wages than
males performing comparable work,” Bass, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 503, Ms. Verdone includes
concrete allegations that Defendants paid Mr. Ovian more money than they paid her for doing
work that was “substantially similar.” She has asserted facts, which this Court must accept as
true, that show that she and Mr. Ovian shared many job duties. Ms. Verdone has therefore stated
a claim for violation of the state and federal Equal Pay Acts. Counts Three and Five of Ms.
Verdone’s Complaint therefore should not be dismissed and her motion to amend is not futile on
this basis.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Verdone’s motion to amend is GRANTED.
Accordingly, Greenfuels’ motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT, and may be re-filed to
address the amended Complaint.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 24th day of August.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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