Jackson v. YP Advertising & Publishing LLC
Filing
39
ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the attached, the 38 Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 4/3/2017. (Howard, H.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, COMMISSIONER
OF LABOR, SCOTT D. JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:16-cv-1424 (MPS)
v.
YP ADVERTISING & PUBLISHING LLC,
Defendant.
Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration
The Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s March 1, 2017 Ruling
on Motion to Remand and for Summary Judgment (the “Ruling”).1 The motion is DENIED
because it does not comply with the strict standard applicable to a motion for reconsideration.
Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)(“The standard for granting such a
motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point
to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”).
Instead of pointing to “controlling decisions or data” the Court overlooked, the Plaintiff
seeks to introduce new evidence into the summary judgment record to support what amounts to a
new argument, i.e., that the case does not require the Court to interpret the collective bargaining
agreement (the “CBA”) because it involves solely a narrow dispute over whether a single,
straightforward provision in that agreement violates Connecticut law. This is improper. See,
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Rule 7(c) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes motions for reconsideration.
1
e.g., Chemical Overseas Holdings, Inc. v. Republica Oriental Del Uruguay, 2005 WL 927153, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2005)(“A party may not advance new facts, issues or arguments not
previously presented to the Court. To the extent that counsel seeks to relitigate the underlying
motion to permit his client to make new legal or factual arguments, this will not be a proper basis
for reconsideration.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. New York City
Dep’t. of Educ., 524 Fed. Appx. 730, 734 (2d Cir. 2013)(“Smith also sought to supplement the
record, which is inappropriate on a motion for reconsideration.”).
As set forth in the Ruling, the complaint itself does not suggest that the dispute is as
narrow as the Plaintiff now contends. It simply asserts that the Defendant “owes” commissions
to its former employees “consisting of, inter alia, commissions on sales by them prior to their
terminations but paid for by customers after [their] termination[s].” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) As
detailed in the Ruling, that assertion would require the Court to interpret the complicated
commission provisions of the CBA. Nor do the parties’ briefs in connection with the motion for
summary judgment or the motion to remand make clear that the dispute concerns solely whether
the provision authorizing YP to deduct “deferred” commissions upon an employee’s separation
from YP violates Connecticut law. To the contrary, both sides’ papers pointed to the same
detailed commission provisions of the CBA the Court cited in the Ruling. (ECF No. 8 at 3
(Defendant’s Local Rule Statement discussing commission “milestones”); ECF No. 18-1 at 2, 12
(Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Brief discussing commission “milestones”)) Indeed, Plaintiff at
that time argued that the case could present factual issues involving the application of several of
the CBA’s provisions, not just Article XXV, Section 10(f)(1), which he now contends presents
the sole issue in the case. (Compare ECF No. 29 at 2, 5-6 (Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to
summary judgment/dismissal stating: “The agreement contains a whole sequence of target dates
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triggering payment of deferred commissions as well as separate clauses on forfeiture of deferred
commissions upon termination. Whether there are any issues of interpretation or application of
those provisions, in determining their illegality under the state wage statutes, remains a question
for factual discovery….Other factual issues would include the process of employees’ completing
sales and any conditions of the sales remaining to be satisfied by employees.”) with ECF No. 38
at 1 (Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration asserting, “[t]he only issue presented by this case
involves the CBA provision for an employee’s deferred commissions to be forfeited upon his
termination of employment. Art. XXV, [Sec.] 10(f)(1).”)) Further, as noted in the Ruling, the
Plaintiff had an opportunity to submit the letter he now seeks to bring to the Court’s attention
when he submitted his papers in opposition to the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
He chose not to submit any evidence at that time – declining even to dispute the Defendant’s
Local Rule 56 statement.
Finally, even Plaintiff’s new argument concerning Section 10(f)(1) of the CBA would
require substantial interpretation of the CBA – as illustrated by the Plaintiff’s own exegesis of
that provision (which depends, in part, on new evidence the Plaintiff seeks to submit). (ECF No.
38 at 1-2.) Even assuming the Plaintiff’s analysis of that provision is correct,2 it amounts to
more than “mere referral to [a CBA] for information such as rate of pay and other economic
benefits that might be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker prevailing in a
state-law suit is entitled.” Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2003)(internal
quotation marks omitted).
It is not clear from the CBA that “unearned” commissions are limited to commissions on sales
for which payment has not yet been received from customers at the time of the employee’s
separation from YP. As detailed in the Ruling, the CBA also addresses other circumstances that
might prevent an employee from having “earned” a commission at the time of her departure.
2
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The Plaintiff’s remaining arguments largely repeat points already addressed in the
Ruling, and none of them warrant altering the Ruling. The motion for reconsideration is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
Hartford, Connecticut
April 3, 2017
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