Raffone v. Messina et al

Filing 70

ORDER granting 31 and 26 Motions to Dismiss. Please see attached Ruling and Order for details. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 9/30/2017. (Chenoweth, T.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

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PASQUALE RAFFONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
TATIANA MESSINA and
FREDERICK HINE,
Defendants.

CASE NO. 3:16-cv-1550(RNC)

ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1985 against a prosecutor and witness in a forfeiture proceeding
alleging due process violations and a conspiracy to violate his
right to due process.

Defendants have moved to dismiss arguing

that plaintiff does not allege a claim on which relief may be
granted.

(ECF Nos. 26, 31.).

I agree and therefore grant both

motions.
I.

Allegations
The operative complaint alleges the following.1

Plaintiff

1
Plaintiff’s initial complaint is docketed as “Complaint”
on the Connecticut Superior Court’s docket, under Case Number
FBT-CV-16-5031758-S (“First Complaint”). Plaintiff’s original
complaint has not been included on the docket for this removed
action. His first “revised complaint” (ECF No. 1-2) (“Revised
Complaint”) has been supplemented by another complaint (ECF No.

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was convicted of fifth degree larceny in 2015.

See Raffone v.

Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. FBTCV 145030086, 2015 WL 3974421
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 4, 2015).

As part of this prosecution,

the prosecutor, defendant Messina, sought a hearing to forfeit
plaintiff’s truck to the police department pursuant to
Connecticut General Statutes § 54-33g.

Plaintiff alleges that at

the hearing, Messina “knowingly and willfully elicited [] false
testimony” from a police officer, defendant Hine.

Revised Compl.

(ECF No. 1-2) at 3.
At the hearing, Hine testified that a potential lien holder
with regard to plaintiff’s truck, Industrial Acceptance
Corporation (“IAC”) had been contacted.
77:1-9.2

Tr. (ECF No. 30-3) at

He testified that, although IAC held the paper title to

the vehicle as collateral, there was no lien on the truck.
at 77:22-25.

Id.

Hine’s testimony was false because he said IAC did

16-1) (“Third Complaint”). The Third Complaint incorporates the
Revised Complaint. Plaintiff’s supplemental submission on
January 5, 2017 (ECF No. 42) will not be considered by this Court
because it was not filed in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a)(2).
2
Because plaintiff incorporated his original complaint from
the state docket into his Third Complaint (ECF No. 16-1), the
Court may properly consider page 77 of the transcript and letters
between IAC and Sergeant Hine. See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57,
67 (2d Cir. 2004) (“A complaint is deemed to include any written
instrument attached to it as an exhibit, materials incorporated
in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated
by reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.”).

2

not have an interest in the truck when in fact it did.

Revised

Compl. (ECF No. 1-2) at 3-4.
Plaintiff alleges that three letters between Hine and IAC
were unlawfully withheld preventing him from impeaching Hine’s
testimony.

He also alleges there was a conspiracy between

Messina and Hine.
¶ 2.

First Compl. (Dkt. No. FBT-CV-16-5031758-S)

He alleges that Hine’s false testimony, as well as the

conspiracy between Hine and Messina, violated due process.
seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

He

Revised Compl. (ECF No.

16-1) at 2.
II.

Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court

must assume the truth of the allegations, and interpret them
liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[].”
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007).

“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
at 678 (citation omitted).

Iqbal, 556 U.S.

This standard requires the plaintiff

to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”

Id.

A complaint need not allege “detailed factual

allegations,” but must contain more than an “unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Id. (internal

quotation omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Failure to Produce Letters
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.”

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).

Accordingly, a prosecutor is immune from civil liability for
initiating a prosecution and presenting the case at trial, and
for his or her conduct in preparing for trial.

Id. at 430.

also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993).

See

The

immunity applies to a prosecutor’s conduct at a forfeiture
proceeding arising from a criminal prosecution.

Craig v.

Vanallen, 1:15-cv-00664 (MAD/DJS), 2016 WL 3920240, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016); Nowlin v. 2 Jane Doe Female Rochester
N.Y. Police Officers, No. 11-CV-712Sc, 2012 WL 1415704, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2012).

The immunity is broad, covering

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“virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with
[the prosecutor’s] function as an advocate.”
F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1994).

Dory v. Ryan, 25

The immunity extends to claims

alleging improper withholding of exculpatory evidence.

Storck v.

Suffolk Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 927, 943
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).

Accordingly, Messina is entitled to immunity

for initiating and conducting the forfeiture proceeding,
including her alleged failure to produce the three letters.
B. False Testimony
It is well-established that a witness who testifies at a
hearing has immunity with regard to claims for damages based on
the testimony.

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983).

This immunity bars the claim against Hine arising from his
testimony in the forfeiture proceeding.
C. Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Messina and Hine conspired to elicit
false testimony and “offend [his] due process” in violation of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.

To prevail on his § 1983 claim, he

must show (1) an agreement between two or more state actors; (2)
to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; (3) an
overt act done in furtherance of that goal; and (4) damages.
Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999).

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To state

a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, he must further allege
that the object of the conspiracy was to deprive him of equal
protection of the laws and the conspiracy was motivated by some
class-based animus.

L.K. v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 641

F. App'x 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2016).
“[C]omplaints containing only conclusory, vague, or general
allegations . . . are properly dismissed.”

Ciambriello v. Cty.

of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir. 2002).

That is the

situation with regard to the conspiracy claims here.

Plaintiff

presents no specific allegations regarding the alleged
conspiracy.

He pleads no facts demonstrating a “meeting of the

minds” between the alleged conspirators.
Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 2011).
elements of the section 1985 offense.

See, e.g., Gallop v.
He merely repeats the

Revised Compl. (ECF No. 1-

2) at 1-2; Third Compl. (ECF No. 16-1) at 2.

He also fails to

allege facts showing that he was subject to “racial or
discriminatory animus.”

Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351,

382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the motions to dismiss are granted.

The Clerk

may enter judgment and close the file.
/s/RNC
Robert N. Chatigny, U.S.D.J.

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