Williams v. Corrections et al

Filing 24

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 17 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 22 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 6/30/2017. (Williams, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ALFRED WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:16-CV-01612 (VAB)

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Alfred Williams (“Plaintiff”), brings this action against the Connecticut Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) and four of its employees: Captain James Shabenas, Lieutenant Herman
Corvin, Lieutenant Brian Palmer, and Warden Scott Efie (together “Defendants”). Compl., ECF
No. 1. Mr. Williams alleges that Defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1988, during the course of Mr. Williams’ employment with the
DOC.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) based on
principles of claim preclusion as well as for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Def.
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Williams, who is African-American, allegedly began working for the DOC as a

corrections officer in 1999. Compl. ¶ 36, ECF No. 1. Lieutenant Corvin and Lieutenant Palmer,
Mr. Williams’ supervisors during the time of his employment, are white. Captain James
Shabenas and Warden Scott Efie, who supervised Defendants Corvin and Palmer during the
relevant time period, are also white. During his employment with the DOC, Mr. Williams

alleges that Defendants subjected him to various incidents of discrimination and retaliation. Id.
at ¶¶ 39-40.
Mr. Williams claims that, beginning in September of 2013, Defendants subjected him to
harassment and treated him differently from similarly situated white employees. Id. at ¶ 8. On
one occasion, Mr. Williams claims that he was transferred to work at a separate correctional
institution because of a situation involving a set of missing keys, while Defendants took no such
action against white officers who were similarly involved. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. On another occasion,
Mr. Williams claims that he was improperly questioned about why he had not changed
surveillance tapes, despite Defendants’ knowledge that Mr. Williams was not required to change
the particular tapes at issue. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Mr. Williams further alleges that Defendants
subjected him to additional requirements that were not required of his co-workers, such as
requiring him to sign the DOC log book when he was on duty. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. In addition to
these alleged instances of harassment and disparate treatment, Mr. Williams claims that he was
denied several promotions despite being more qualified than the individuals who were selected
for those promotions, all of whom were white. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
In 2014, Mr. Williams filed an employment discrimination complaint with the
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“CHRO”) and with the Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) in connection with this conduct. See Nov.
2014 EEOC/CHRO Letters, Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1. The CHRO released jurisdiction on
November 18, 2014, and the EEOC issued a “right to sue” letter on January 29, 2015.1

1

Mr. Williams did not attach a copy of this letter to the Complaint in this action; however, Mr. Williams did provide
the Court with a copy of this letter in connection with a previous lawsuit, and the parties do not dispute the date of
the letter.

2

On April 28, 2015, before initiating this current action, Mr. Williams filed a complaint in
Williams v. Department of Corrections, et al., Case No. 3:15-CV-00627 (VAB) (“Williams I”), a
separate lawsuit in this Court consisting of nearly identical allegations against the same
Defendants. On August 24, 2016, the Court dismissed the Williams I complaint without
prejudice under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to make proper
service and allowed Mr. Williams 30 days within which to properly serve Defendants, setting a
deadline of September 24, 2016. Id., Order, ECF No. 40. Mr. Williams did not serve
Defendants within the specified time frame, triggering dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction
under the terms of the Court’s order. Id. at 13. Williams I was formally closed on June 27,
2017. Id., Order, ECF No. 42.
On October 19, 2016, after failing to comply with the September 24, 2016 service
deadline specified in the initial lawsuit, Mr. Williams filed a new Complaint, initiating this
lawsuit.2 The Complaint is based on the same underlying facts as the complaint in the initial
lawsuit, it names the same Defendants, and it makes nearly identical legal claims.3 Defendants
now move to dismiss Mr. Williams’ new Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).4

The Complaint in this action is mislabeled “Amended Complaint,” although it is an initial complaint in a separate
action.
2

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The complaint in Williams I included several additional claims that are not included in this action: a defamation
claim under Connecticut state law; claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986; and a claim under the Connecticut
Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”). The Complaint in this action includes one additional claim that was not
included in Williams I: a claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592, Connecticut’s “Accidental Failure of Suit” statute.
Mr. Williams filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss on November 28, 2016. However, this filing
was untimely – under D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(a), Mr. Williams’ response to Defendants’ motion was due by
November 9, 2016. Mr. Williams failed to file a response by that date, nor did he file any motion requesting an
extension of that deadline. Accordingly, the Court did not consider Mr. Williams’ opposition memorandum in
deciding this motion to dismiss, and Defendants’ pending Motion to Strike Opposition Brief, ECF No. 22, is hereby
denied as moot.
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court may not entertain a case where it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A case
is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district
court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.”). “A plaintiff asserting subject
matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.”
Id. (citing Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir.1996)). When reviewing a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “courts must accept as true all material factual allegations in the
complaint . . . .” Shipping Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). However, the court must refrain “drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to
the party asserting [jurisdiction].” APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 623 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted).
Courts may also dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under this rule, the Court must accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and draw all possible inferences from those allegations in
favor of the plaintiff. See York v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, 286 F.3d 122, 125
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1089 (2002). The proper consideration is not whether the
plaintiff ultimately will prevail, but whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief
may be granted such that he should be entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. See id.
(citation omitted).
In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court applies “a ‘plausibility
standard,’” which is guided by “two working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). First, the requirement that the Court accept as true the allegations in a complaint “is

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inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Second, to survive a motion to
dismiss, the complaint must state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. Determining whether
the complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “‘a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d
66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because

this lawsuit is duplicative of a prior lawsuit, justifying dismissal of the Complaint under Rule
12(b)(1). Defendants also argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for
the following reasons: (1) the claims brought under Title VII are untimely because this suit was
not initiated within ninety (90) days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC; (2) as a
private plaintiff, Mr. Williams may not use the “pattern or practice” method of proving his
discrimination case under Title VII; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not allow a plaintiff to sue
individual Defendants in their individual capacities; (4) Mr. Williams improperly seeks to allege
a separate cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (5) the Complaint fails to adequately
plead prospective injunctive relief and equitable relief under Title VII. Defendants’ arguments
are examined in further detail below.
a.

Duplicative Complaint

Defendants seek dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) on
the basis this lawsuit is duplicative of the earlier lawsuit Mr. Williams filed against them,
Williams I. See Def. Mem. in Supp. at 4, ECF No. 17-1 (arguing that dismissal is appropriate
because “the duplicative complaint filed in Williams II is nothing more than an attempt to avoid

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the consequences of Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s orders in Williams I.”).
Defendants correctly note that both lawsuits arise out of the exact same factual allegations, rely
on nearly identical legal theories, and use much of the same language in advancing Mr.
Williams’ claims.
According to Defendants, this second lawsuit is prohibited because it is duplicative of a
separate lawsuit. The traditional doctrines of claim preclusion and res judicata forbid the filing
of a separate case about the same facts and claims as a prior lawsuit; however, this doctrine only
precludes such filings where the original case was dismissed on the merits. See Nestor v. Pratt
& Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2006) (“under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim
preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a
subsequent action between the same parties or those in privity with them on the same claim ... or
any claim based on the same operative facts that might have been made.’”) (internal quotations
and marks omitted); Medcalf v. Thompson Hine LLP, 84 F. Supp. 3d 313, 321–22 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (“In order to assert an affirmative defense of claim preclusion, a party must show that an
earlier decision was: (1) a final judgment on the merits made by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) in a case involving the same parties or their privies; and (3) involving the same
cause of action.”).
Williams I did not result in a final judgment on the merits, thus res judicata does not
apply here. Nonetheless, Defendants argue that this case is precluded under the broader principle
that duplicative lawsuits should generally be dismissed. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d
133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (“As part of its general power to administer its docket, a district court
may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit.”). “The rule against
duplicative litigation is distinct from but related to the doctrine of claim preclusion or res

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judicata… while the doctrine of claim preclusion serves the interest of society and litigants in
assuring the finality of judgments, it also fosters judicial economy and protects the parties from
vexatious and expensive litigation.” Id.
The Complaint specifically contends that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592, Connecticut’s
“Accidental Failure of Suit” statute, provides the requisite jurisdiction in this matter despite the
substantial similarity between the two cases filed by Mr. Williams. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.
Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592, a plaintiff is permitted to “commence a new action… for the
same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action” provided
that the original action has “failed one or more times to be tried on the merits” due to insufficient
service or dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592(a). “‘Thus, a plaintiff has
a one-year window of opportunity to bring a new action for the same cause as a prior action if
the prior action failed to be tried on its merits due to a matter of form.’” Traylor v. Town of
Waterford, No. 3:13-CV-00507 (AWT), 2014 WL 806391, at *7 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2014)
(quoting Litvack v. Lehrer, No. 3:06-CV-767 (WWE), 2007 WL 322506, *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 31,
2007)). This “savings statute only applies if the original claim was dismissed for procedural
reasons and not on the merits.” Holt v. KMI-Cont'l, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
Legassey v. Shulansky, 28 Conn. App. 653, 659 (1992)).
Mr. Williams’ Complaint does not assert any state law claims. As Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52592 is a state statute, it does not automatically apply to federal claims. See Traylor, 2014 WL
322506 at *7 (concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592 does not apply to plaintiff’s claims,
noting that, while “the Connecticut Accidental Failure of Suit statute would permit Traylor to
bring a new action for the state law claims over which the court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in Traylor I,” there were no remaining state law claims in the case that

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would be governed by this statute). However, federal courts commonly apply Conn. Gen. Stat. §
52-592 to federal claims that borrow the applicable statute of limitations from state law,
including claims brought under § 1983. Williams v. Walsh, 558 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“[O]nce a federal court borrows a state statute of limitations, it generally should also borrow the
related provisions, pertaining to tolling, revival and so forth, as interpreted under state law,
unless such an unmodified borrowing would be inconsistent with a strong federal policy
underlying the federal cause of action.”); LaCroix v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 844 F.2d
88, 89 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592 to § 1983 claim because “[t]he
limitations period for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by the state statute of
limitations applicable to personal injury cases.”).
As noted above, the claims asserted in Mr. Williams’ Complaint are certainly duplicative
of the claims asserted in Williams I. Curtis, 226 F.3d at 140 (“[P]laintiffs may not file
duplicative complaints in order to expand their legal rights.”); Davis v. Norwalk Econ.
Opportunity Now, Inc., 534 F. App'x 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2013) (Summary Order) (affirming district
court’s dismissal of later action against same defendants for same employment actions under
different theory). However, unlike Mr. Williams’ claims under Title VII, which are governed by
a federal statute of limitations, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), Mr. Williams’ claims under
Section 1983 and related statutes borrow the applicable statute of limitations from state law and
thus are covered by the provisions of Connecticut’s Accidental Failure of Suit statute, see
LaCroix, 844 F.2d at 89; Holt, 95 F.3d at 131. Under this statute, even duplicative claims may
proceed where the previous lawsuit was dismissed for procedural reasons and the new lawsuit
was initiated within one year of dismissal. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592(a).

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The protections of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592(a) apply to Mr. Williams’ federal claims
under Section 1983 and Section 1981. The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in
Williams I based on the lack of personal jurisdiction in that case, a procedural question that did
not directly resolve the merits of the case. See Case No. 3:15-CV-00627 (VAB), Order at 13,
ECF No. 40 (“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26, is GRANTED in its entirety,
because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.”). This dismissal was without
prejudice to Mr. Williams completing proper service within thirty (30) days of the Court’s order
of dismissal. Id. However, Mr. Williams failed to make proper service within the requisite time
frame, thus the case was effectively terminated as of September 24, 2016, and this Complaint
was initiated within one year of that termination.5 Compl., ECF No. 1. Accordingly, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 52-592(a) covers Mr. Williams’ claims under Sections 1983 and 1981, and those claims
should not be dismissed on the basis of being duplicative.
The protections of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592(a), however, do not apply to Mr. Williams’
claims under Title VII. Title VII is a federal statute governed by a statute of limitations outlined
in federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (requiring Title VII actions to be brought “within
ninety days after the giving of [a right-to-sue letter]”). Thus, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592 cannot
provide any protection to Mr. Williams’ Title VII claims. Not only are these claims duplicative
of the claims in Williams I, they are also time-barred, as explained in further detail below. Mr.
Williams’ Title VII claims should be dismissed accordingly.

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The Court did not formally close Williams I until June 27, 2017. However, in light of the Court’s August 24, 2016
Order in that case, the case was effectively terminated as of September 24, 2016, Mr. Williams’ deadline for
completing service of Defendants. Thus, while the case remained open on the docket, the case was not “pending” as
of the date of this action, as Mr. Williams could not have continued litigating his claims in the context of that case.

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b.

Timeliness of Title VII Claims

Defendants argue that Mr. Williams’ race discrimination claims under Title VII are
untimely, as the Complaint was not filed within ninety (90) days of the EEOC’s issuance of a
right-to-sue letter in this case. Def. Mem. in Supp. at 11, ECF No. 17-1; see Francis v. Elmsford
Sch. Dist., 442 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of Title VII claim as timebarred on the ground that plaintiff did not commence action within 90 days of receiving a rightto-sue letter); see also Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35, 38 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“the 90–day limitations period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) begins to run on
the date that a right-to-sue letter is first received either by the claimant or by counsel, whichever
is earlier.”).
The EEOC issued Mr. Williams a right-to-sue letter on January 29, 2015. This case was
not initiated until September of 2016, well after the ninety-day deadline following the right-tosue letter. Compl., ECF No. 1. Williams I was initiated on April 28, 2015, 89 days after the
issuance of the right-to-sue letter; however, as discussed above, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592(a)
cannot extend the statute of limitations for federal claims that have federal statutes of limitations.
Accordingly, Mr. Williams’ Title VII claims are untimely, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted with respect to these claims.6
c.

Section 1981

In Count Two, Mr. Williams alleges race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
1981 and 1988. Defendants argue that Mr. Williams’ Section 1981 claim must be dismissed.

Defendants also seek dismissal of individual components of Mr. Williams’ Title VII claims, including (1) the
Complaint’s allegation that Defendants violated Title VII by engaging in “a pattern and practice of disparate
treatment,” Compl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 1; and (2) Mr. Williams’ claims for equitable relief under Title VII. In light of
the Court’s determination that Mr. Williams’ Title VII claims are barred as untimely, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
is appropriately granted on this basis, and Defendants’ arguments with respect to individual components of Mr.
Williams’ Title VII claims are moot.
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According to Defendants, Mr. Williams may not assert a separate claim against individual state
actors in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as such claims can only be brought
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed
by white citizens….” In Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989), the United States
Supreme Court determined that the protections referenced in Section 1981 could only be
enforced through Section 1983: “We hold that the express ‘action at law’ provided by § 1983 for
the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’
provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by §
1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” Id. at 735.
The Second Circuit has reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s holding in Jett and has declined
to take up Section 1981 claims separately from Section 1983 claims when those Section 1981
claims are brought against state actors. See Gladwin v. Pozzi, 403 F. App'x 603, 605 (2d Cir.
2010) (“[Plaintiff]’s § 1981 claims are encompassed by her § 1983 claims, and both are therefore
analyzed under § 1983.”); Burbank v. Office of Atty. Gen. of Connecticut, 240 F.Supp.2d 167,
174 (D. Conn. 2003) (“Some doubt had been cast on Jett's viability by the addition in 1991 of
subsection (c) to § 1981, which states that ‘[t]he rights protected by this section are protected
against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law’
… However, most courts have held that ‘[b]ecause Congress neither expressed its intent to
overrule Jett, nor explicitly created a remedy against state actors in addition to § 1983, we are
not willing to deviate from the Supreme Court's analysis of § 1981 in Jett.’”) (quoting Felton v.
Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 480–81 (5th Cir. 2002)).

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It is not clear from the Complaint that Mr. Williams is asserting an independent cause of
action under Section 1981 that is separate from his claims under Section 1983. See Compl. ¶¶
65(a), 65(r) (referencing “rights secured to the Plaintiff by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and enforced by 42
U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.). To the extent that Mr. Williams does seek to assert an independent claim
under Section 1981, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted with respect to this claim. All
alleged violations of Section 1981 will be addressed exclusively through Mr. Williams’ Section
1983 claim.
d.

Section 1988

The Complaint states that Mr. Williams is seeking “compensatory damages pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988….” Compl. at 17, ECF No. 1. Defendants seek to dismiss
any claims alleged specifically under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, arguing that Section 1988 “provides no
substantive rights” and cannot be used to allege a separate cause of action. Def. Mem. in Supp.
at 16, ECF No. 17-1.
Section 1988 allows the Court, “in its discretion, [to] allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs” of bringing a lawsuit
under Section 1983 or various other civil rights provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Defendants
correctly note that Section 1988 allows for an entitlement to attorney’s fees, see Carter v. Inc.
Vill. Of Ocean Beach, 759 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2014), and in their memorandum they note that
they “do not dispute that if the Plaintiff prevails on his Title VII or Section 1983 claims, he
would be a prevailing party entitled to attorneys’ fees.” Def. Mem. in Supp. at 17 n.1, ECF No.
17-1.
It is not clear from the Complaint whether Mr. Williams intends to assert an independent
cause of action under Section 1988. To the extent that Mr. Williams’ does so intend, any stand-

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alone claims under Section 1988 are dismissed. To the extent that Mr. Williams seeks attorneys’
fees as provided under Section 1988, however, these claims will remain.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) on principles of claim preclusion is denied.
All aspects of Mr. Williams’ Title VII claim are dismissed. Any claims under Section 1981 that
are alleged separately from claims under Section 1983 are dismissed, and any independent
claims alleged under Section 1988 are also dismissed.
Mr. Williams’ remaining claims under Section 1983 may proceed at this time. The stay
of discovery in this matter, see Order, ECF No. 23, is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED this 30th day of June, 2017, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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