Mercado v. Corrections et al
Filing
99
ORDER denying temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction pursuant to the attached Ruling and Order. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 06/12/2017. (Lee, E.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
RAUDELL MERCADO,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL CASE NUMBER:
3:16-cv-01622-VLB
June 12, 2017
RULING AND ORDER
On May 25, 2017, Plaintiff, pro se, filed a Motion for an Emergency Hearing on
Getting Mental Health Treatment. [Dkt. 86]. In this motion, Plaintiff stated he took
12-15 aspirin on May 13, 2017, because he was “feeling depressed and emotional”
in part because he was “in the cell for 24 hours due to it being Saturday and on the
weekends.” Id. As a result of this intentional overdose, he was taken to the
infirmary where medical staff then discontinued his medications. Id. Plaintiff also
notified the Court in this motion that he would be released from Connecticut
Department of Correction (“DOC”) custody on June 16, 2017. Id. He requested a
hearing to receive proper medical treatment before his release because he feared
release without medication. Id. The Court granted the motion and held a hearing
on June 6, 2017. The Court construes Plaintiff’s request to be one for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, the
Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request.
Background
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Northern Correctional Institution
(“Northern”). He claims to have been diagnosed with multiple mental disorders
1
and that he has taken medication to treat the disorders since childhood. According
to Plaintiff, Northern does not have a mental health unit, and he has been placed in
the administrative segregation unit for almost the entirety of his stay there. Plaintiff
believes that the Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference in failing to
provide him with adequate mental health treatment during his custody at Northern
and previously at Cheshire Correctional Institution (“Cheshire”). Plaintiff claims
that the conditions at Northern and Cheshire have “caused him to suffer from
criminal charges; racing thoughts, fear for safety, loss of sleep, extreme anxiety
attacks; to engage in acts of being beaten by custody as a form of self-harm . . .
extreme distrust of authority figures, to isolate himself out of fear of being attacked;
to have depression; [and] to have anger/rages.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 57].
In addition, Plaintiff contends Defendant Dr. Gagne sexually harassed him
when they spoke one-on-one. The Plaintiff reported the incident, but no action was
taken in response to the report. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Dr. Frayne on many
occasions placed the Plaintiff on behavior observation status in retaliation for the
Plaintiff’s complaints to Dr. Frayne’s supervisor regarding improper treatment of
the Plaintiff’s mental health conditions.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court on September 27, 2016, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages for violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, unlawful
disciplinary sanctions, the Eighth Amendment for an alleged sexual harassment,
the First Amendment for retaliation, and 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The Court
2
dismissed certain allegations in its Initial Review Order, [Dkt. 20], and presently the
following claims remain:
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to
mental health needs and safety and unconstitutional conditions of
confinement against Defendants Semple, Rinaldi, Erfe, Cournoyer, Mulligan,
Laffargue, Burns, Gallagher, Liebel, Cruz, Frayne, Gagne and Johnson in
their individual and official capacities;
the Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim against Defendant Gagne
in his individual and official capacity;
the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants Semple,
Rinaldi and Burns in their individual and official capacities in connection
with the Plaintiff’s improper transfer to Northern and Cheshire and
placement in the administrative segregation programs at those facilities;
the First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Frayne in his
individual and official capacity; and
the ADA claim against Defendants Department of Correction, Semple,
Rinaldi, Erfe, Cournoyer, Mulligan, Laffargue, Burns, Gallagher, Liebel, Cruz,
Frayne, Gagne and Johnson in their official capacities.
Id. at 13. Due to Plaintiff’s recently filed Motion for Emergency Hearing, the Court
learned that Plaintiff will be released on June 16, 2017. The Court held a hearing to
address his current medical treatment as well as DOC’s procedure prior to and
subsequent to release.
Legal Standard
A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy, one
that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Reidy, 477 F.
Supp. 2d 472, 474 (D. Conn. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.,
Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005)). “The purpose of a temporary restraining
3
order is to preserve an existing situation in status quo until the court has an
opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a preliminary injunction.”
Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009). The factors considered
in assessing whether to grant a request for a temporary restraining order are
similar to those used to determine the merits of a motion for a preliminary
injunction. See Control Sys., Inc. v. Realized Sols., Inc., No. 3:11CV1423 PCD, 2011
WL 4433750, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2011) (citing Local 1814, Int’l Longshoremen’s
Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass’n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir.
1992)).
Generally, a party seeking a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction “must show (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success
on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them
a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the
party requesting the preliminary relief.” Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401,
405–06 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Waldman Pub. Corp. v.
Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 779–80 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying same standard to motion
for temporary restraining order and motion for order to show cause why a
preliminary injunction should not be granted). However, where a plaintiff seeks a
mandatory injunction, i.e., “one that alter[s] the status quo by commanding some
positive act,” a higher standard applies. Rush v. Fischer, No. 09 Civ. 9918(JGK),
2011 WL 6747392, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Tom
Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995); accord
Cacchillo, 638 F.3d at 405–06. The party seeking the injunction must show a “‘clear’
4
or ‘substantial’ likelihood of success.” Griffin v. Alexander, 466 F. App’x 26, 28 (2d
Cir. 2012) (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir.1996)).
Analysis
Plaintiff requests that the Court compel Defendants to provide medication
that they used to but are no longer prescribing him. Such a request is related to
his allegations for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. To establish
his claim, Plaintiff must show both that his medical need is serious and that the
defendants acted with sufficiently culpable states of mind. See Smith v. Carpenter,
316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1976)). There are both subjective and objective components to the deliberate
indifference standard. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious” in that it is a
condition of “urgency” and may “produce death, degeneration or extreme pain. . .
.” Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005). Subjectively, the defendants
must have “act[ed] or fail[ed] to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that
serious inmate harm will result.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279-80 (2d Cir.
2006).
A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless
that official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a “substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
violated where medical treatment is withheld without justification. See Dolson v.
5
Fischer, 613 F. App’x 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2015). By contrast, negligence that would
support a claim for medical malpractice does not rise to the level of deliberate
indifference and is not cognizable under § 1983. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280.
Nor does a difference of opinion regarding what constitutes an appropriate
response and treatment constitute deliberate indifference. See Ventura v. Sinha,
379 F. App’x 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding insufficient evidence that medical staff
acted with culpable state of mind where plaintiff’s medical limitations were
inconsistent with program requirements); see Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698,
703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Whether a course of treatment was the product of sound
medical judgment, negligence, or deliberate indifference depends on the facts of
the case.”).
At the hearing on June 6, 2017, the Court received evidence enabling it to
make critical findings of fact not present in the motion. Plaintiff stated that he has
been provided medication, albeit medication that is different from that which he
was provided before his aspirin overdose. [Dkt. 94 at 8:07]. He confirmed that the
current medication makes him feel better than he did prior to his overdose. Id.
8:11. It is also now clear that his medication is monitored by the DOC medical staff
and may be adjusted according to his needs. See id. at 8:09, 8:11. Plaintiff’s prior
medications were suboptimal as evidenced by his anxiety resulting in his
intentional overdose of aspirin.
See id.
This overdose was triggered by his
isolation, and he will no longer be isolated after he is discharged on June 16, 2017.
See id. at 8:08-8:12. Furthermore, Defendant Frayne testified that he believes
Plaintiff presently has a mental health score of three, id. at 8:12, which requires the
6
DOC medical staff to evaluate Plaintiff prior to release and develop a discharge
plan, including the coordination of his medication and mental health treatment at a
community organization. See Administrative Directive 9.3 (Inmate Admissions,
Transfers and Discharges) ¶ 12(A).1 Plaintiff confirmed that he has a discharge
counselor with whom he has spoken and who is in the process of developing such
a discharge plan in accordance with Directive 9.3. See [Dkt. 94 at 8:18].
Accordingly, even assuming Plaintiff’s mental health needs are “sufficiently
serious” to satisfy the objective test, the Court finds that none of the DOC
employees have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s mental health needs for
the actions described in the Motion for Emergency Hearing, as medical staff
proceeded to treat him in a reasonable manner and Plaintiff admits to feeling better.
See id. at 8:11 (wherein plaintiff stated he feels “a little bit better” than he did before
and the day he took aspirin), 8:21 (finding prior medication was not as effective as
it should be because plaintiff ingested and overdosed on aspirin). Therefore, no
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is warranted.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s release from custody will moot his
claim for injunctive relief to be transferred to Garner Correctional Institution.
Plaintiff has advised the Court that he intends to continue to pursue all other claims
remaining in this action upon his release with the understanding that because the
Court does not have the authority to require counsel to represent him, he will likely
1
The Court takes judicial notice that the Connecticut Department of Correction
(“DOC”) makes available to the public its Administrative Directives, including those
for discharge of inmates. See Dep’t of Corr. Administrative Directive Chapter 9:
Classification, http://www.ct.gov/doc/cwp/view.asp?a=1494&q=265226.
7
have to continue to represent himself. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may
request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”) (emphasis
added); Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310
(1989) (“We hold only that § 1915(d) does not authorize the federal courts to make
coercive appointments of counsel.”). Indeed, once he is released the need for
counsel will diminish due to his increased access to legal resources in the
community and his continued ability for him to communicate with inmates.
The case will therefore proceed with respect to his claims for damages
against the following Defendants for the following allegations:
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to
mental health needs and safety and unconstitutional conditions of
confinement against Defendants Semple, Rinaldi, Erfe, Cournoyer, Mulligan,
Laffargue, Burns, Gallagher, Liebel, Cruz, Frayne, Gagne and Johnson in
their individual and official capacities;
the Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim against Defendant Gagne
in his individual and official capacity;
the First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Frayne in his
individual and official capacity; and
the ADA claim against Defendants Department of Correction, Semple,
Rinaldi, Erfe, Cournoyer, Mulligan, Laffargue, Burns, Gallagher, Liebel, Cruz,
Frayne, Gagne and Johnson in their official capacities.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s construed request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction are hereby DENIED. This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Robert
A. Richardson for a discovery planning conference and schedule.
8
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____/s/________________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: June 12, 2017
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?