Huang v. Johnson et al

Filing 9

ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 6/6/2018. (Giammatteo, John)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

YOU ZENG HUANG,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:16-cv-1634 (VAB)

KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary, Department
of Homeland Security, and
LEE CISSNA, Director, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Services,
Defendants.
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
You Zeng Huang ( “Plaintiff”) moved for a writ of mandamus to compel a decision on an
I-485 adjustment of status application and an I-730 Refugee Asylee Relative Petition
(collectively “immigration applications”) from Jeh Johnson, Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security, and Leon Rodriguez, Director of the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Services (“Defendants”).1
Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint as moot. See Def. Mot., ECF No. 8.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
You Zeng Huang is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1.

Defendants are government officials with the United States Department of Homeland Security

At the time of the filing of this lawsuit, Jeh Johnson was Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security and Leon Rodriguez was Director of U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Service. The proper defendants are now Kirstjen Nielsen and Lee Cissna, and the caption of this
lawsuit has been amended accordingly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“The officer’s successor is
automatically substituted as a party.”).
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(“DHS”) and are sued in their official capacities. Compl. ¶ 6-7. Both Defendants are responsible
for administering the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id.
A.

Factual Allegations

Mr. Huang came to the United States from the People’s Republic of China seeking
asylum, which was granted on September 16, 2010. Compl. ¶ 9. Subsequently, based on his
asylee status, Mr. Huang filed an I-730 petition for his wife, Xiu Bing Liang, on November 02,
2010, and an I-485 adjustment of status application for himself on September 30, 2011. Id. ¶¶
10–11. At the time of the Complaint, Huang had allegedly not received any updates on his
immigration applications since October 2011, despite allegedly making repeated inquiries. Id. ¶¶
12–13.
B.

Procedural Background

On September 29, 2016, Mr. Huang filed a mandamus action with the Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (“Mandamus Act”). See generally Compl. Mr. Huang sought an order compelling
adjudication of the two applications for immigration relief. Compl. at 4, ¶ IV. On September 30,
2016, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, Defendants were issued summons by the Court. ECF
No. 4.
On March 15, 2017, DHS maintains it interviewed Mr. Huang concerning his asylum
status and Complaint. Def. Mot. at 1. After the interview, Mr. Huang’s immigration applications
were forwarded to the Texas Service Center for U.S. Citizenship & Immigration (“Texas Service
Center”) for adjudication. Id. On July 25, 2017, the Texas Service Center requested additional
evidence from Mr. Huang in order to adjudicate the I-485 application. Id. at 2. Mr. Huang
responded to this request with the additional information and, on July 27, 2017, Mr. Huang’s I730 petition was granted. See Notice of Action on I-730 Refugee Asylee Relative Petition, ECF

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No. 8-1. On August 28, 2017, Mr. Huang’s I-485 application was granted. See Notice of Action
on I485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, ECF No. 8-2.
On August 17, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Huang’s Complaint. Mot. to
Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 8. Defendants argue that the relief request has been granted and the
lawsuit is now moot. Id. In their motion, Defendants included copies of the Notices of Action
providing the relief sought by Mr. Huang. See Notice of Action on I-730 Refugee Asylee
Relative Petition; Notice of Action on I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or
Adjust Status, ECF No. 8-2. Mr. Huang has not opposed this motion.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[.]” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256

(2013). If a federal court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the lawsuit must be
dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional authority to adjudicate
it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal courts are only
permitted to adjudicate actual cases or controversies. See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2. In determining
whether a case or controversy exists, the court will view all uncontroverted facts as true and
“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.” Tandon v. Captain’s
Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014).
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants argue mootness because Mr. Huang’s applications for I-485 Adjustment of

Status and the I-1730 Refugee Asylee Relative Petition have not only been adjudicated, but
approved. Def. Mot. at 2. Defendants thus claim that Mr. Huang has received all of the relief he
seeks. The Court agrees.

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Article III of the United States Constitution, requires that “there be a live case or
controversy at the time that a federal court decides [a] case.” Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363
(1987). As a result, when there is no “live case or controversy,” meaning all of the relief
requested has been granted, the case becomes moot. See In re Kurtzman, 194 F.3d 54, 58 (2d
Cir.1999) (“[A] case becomes moot . . . when it is impossible for the court to grant any effectual
relief whatever to a prevailing party.”); see also Ziauddin v. Enzer, No. 307-cv-993 (AHN), 2008
WL 2078101, at *1 (D. Conn. May 14, 2008) (granting motion to dismiss and finding that
“Ziauddin's petition is moot because the court could not grant him any effective relief, given that
the adjustment application has now been adjudicated.”).
Once the case becomes moot, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the
lawsuit. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 969 F.2d 1430, 1433
(2d Cir.1992) (finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on account of the relief sought
being secured in the interim).
Here, because Mr. Huang’s immigration applications have been adjudicated and
approved, see Notice of Action on I-730 Refugee Asylee Relative Petition; Notice of Action on
I-485 Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (approving Mr. Huang’s
immigration applications),2 the very relief Mr. Huang seeks has already been provided. The
Court therefore cannot grant him any effective relief, making his petition for mandamus moot.
See Ziauddin, 2008 WL 2078101, at *1. As a result, the Court no longer has subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim because no actual case or controversy exists. See, e.g., Dole Food Co.,

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Additionally, Mr. Huang never filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. See D. Conn. L.
Civ. R. 7(a)(2) (“Failure to submit a memorandum in opposition to a motion may be deemed
sufficient cause to grant the motion, except where the pleadings provide sufficient grounds to
deny the motion.”).
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969 F.2d at 1433 (“[T]he Constitution’s case or controversy requirement, U.S. Const. Art. III, §
2, is not satisfied and a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”).
The motion to dismiss this lawsuit therefore must be granted.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 6th day of June, 2018.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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