Harnage v. Brennan et al
Filing
242
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/28/2020. (Clough, M.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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JAMES A. HARNAGE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
JANINE BRENNAN, DR. JOHNNY WU,
:
and LAURA WOODS-STINEY,
:
:
Defendants.
:
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Civil No. 3:16-cv-1659 (AWT)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On August 25, 2020, the court held a bifurcated bench trial
on two of the defendants’ affirmative defenses, release (the Third
Affirmative Defense) and waiver (the Sixth Affirmative Defense).
The court finds for the defendants on both of these affirmative
defenses, and its findings of fact and conclusions of law are set
forth below.
I.
FACTS
The plaintiff brought this lawsuit against defendants Janine
Brennan, Dr. Johnny Wu, and Laura Woods-Stiney making claims about
various
aspects
of
his
medical
care
related
to
prescription
medications during the time he was incarcerated at the Corrigan
Correctional Center (“Corrigan”). The plaintiff entered into a
settlement agreement and release with the State of Connecticut,
which by its terms became effective May 28, 2019 (the “Settlement
Agreement”).
In the Settlement Agreement, the State agreed to pay $3,000
into
the
plaintiff’s
Inmate
Trust
Account,
agreed
that
the
settlement payment was intended to satisfy 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2),
agreed that the plaintiff would be provided with and permitted to
keep a Nintendo 3DS-XL gaming system, and agreed that the State
and its departments, agencies, and other organs would refrain from
collecting or attempting to collect from the settlement payment
any sum owed or claimed to be owed by the plaintiff. See Settlement
Agreement Section 3.A.i., ii., iii. & v. In subsection 3.A.iv.,
the State agreed:
Harnage shall be permitted to purchase and obtain the
following items if he is approved for the items for
medical reasons or justifications by Department of
Correction medical officials. To be clear, this
provision of the [Settlement] Agreement is contingent
upon the medical approval and evaluation of Harnage by
DOC medical officials, and the [Settlement] Agreement
makes no promises or other representations as to what
such medical officials’ decision will be. Both parties
agree instead that the medical officials’ decision will
be based on their medical judgment of Harnage’s medical
needs and that approval will not be unreasonably
withheld:
a. a second pillow; and
b. approved sneakers and/or diabetic footwear.
The plaintiff agreed to execute a Form W-9 and return it to
the State and to execute the Settlement Agreement and return it to
the State. See id. at Section 3.B.i. & ii. The plaintiff also
agreed:
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Effective upon the deposit of the Settlement Payment
into
Harnage’s
Inmate
Trust
Account,
Harnage,
individually and on behalf of his heirs, beneficiaries,
successors and assigns, does herewith release, forever
discharge, and covenant not to sue Releasees from all
actions, causes of action, suits, claims, demands, or
controversies, whether in law or equity, whether
foreseen or unforeseen, whether known or unknown,
whether accrued or not accrued, and of and from all
direct or indirect claims, debts, damages and demands of
every nature and kind, including attorneys’ fees and
costs, monetary and equitable relief, arising out of the
events described in the complaint in the Lawsuit. For
the avoidance of doubt, Harnage is not providing the
Releasees with a general release.
. . .
Within ten business days of Harnage being notified of
the deposit of the Settlement Payment into his Inmate
Trust Account, Harnage shall deliver or cause to be
delivered to the State a signed stipulation of dismissal
of the Lawsuit. Such stipulation of dismissal shall
recite and confirm that the dismissal is with prejudice
and without costs to any party. For purposes of this
Section 3.B.iv, delivery of the stipulation to Attorney
Stephen Finucane shall constitute delivery to the State
Id. at Section 3.B.iii. & iv.
The $3,000 representing the settlement payment was deposited
into the plaintiff’s Inmate Trust Account on June 11, 2019, and on
June 24, 2019 he was notified that the deposit had been made. After
ten business days had passed, the plaintiff refused to deliver to
the State a signed stipulation of dismissal, contending that the
State had not satisfied its obligations under Section 3.A.iv. of
the Settlement Agreement.
On July 1, 2019, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Gerald Valletta
at
Garner
Correctional
Institution,
where
the
plaintiff
is
incarcerated, for an evaluation of his medical needs. The State
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arranged for the visit. When Dr. Valletta conducted his evaluation
of
the
plaintiff’s
medical
needs,
he
did
not
know
that
the
plaintiff had entered into the Settlement Agreement, but rather
simply knew that the Department of Correction wanted the plaintiff
to be evaluated to see if he had a medical need for a second pillow
and sneakers and/or diabetic footwear. Dr. Valletta conducted a
normal clinical evaluation of the plaintiff for his chronic disease
or
illness
concerns,
including
his
diabetes.
Dr.
Valletta
conducted a full physical examination of the plaintiff’s body,
including his feet, legs, hips and back. During the examination,
the plaintiff told Dr. Valletta that he felt great. The doctor
performed tests on the plaintiff’s feet so he could determine
whether the plaintiff needed specialty footwear of any kind. Dr.
Valletta concluded that the plaintiff did not need any specialty
footwear,
and his medical opinion was that the
plaintiff
was
wearing
was
medically
adequate.
footwear
The
the
plaintiff
brought up concerns about chronic pain and the need for a second
pillow. Dr. Valletta informed the plaintiff that he saw no need
for a second pillow but advised the plaintiff that he would order
x-rays of the plaintiff’s spine and hip to be sure. The plaintiff
was x-rayed the next day, July 2, 2019, and Dr. Valletta reviewed
the x-rays that day. The results did not change his initial
assessment that the plaintiff did not have a medical need for a
second pillow. Dr. Valletta found that the x-ray showed that the
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plaintiff had only mild abnormalities, which was excellent for an
adult male the plaintiff’s age.
After the evaluation by Dr. Valletta, the State believed it
was entitled to a signed stipulation of dismissal; the plaintiff
disagreed. The State then arranged for a second evaluation and
medical opinion. It was performed by Dr. Ricardo Ruiz, who worked
at Cheshire Correctional Institution. On November 26, 2019, the
State
transported
the
plaintiff
to
Cheshire
Correctional
Institution for a medical evaluation by Dr. Ruiz. The State and
the plaintiff had agreed that the plaintiff could select whatever
documents and medical records he wished to be provided to Dr. Ruiz
for
his
review
in
advance
of
this
second
evaluation.
Those
documents included a typed summary of the plaintiff’s request and
the reasons he wanted the items in question, which was created by
or on behalf of the plaintiff, and selections from the plaintiff’s
medical chart and medical records. Dr. Ruiz also reviewed, before
examining
electronic
the
plaintiff,
health
record,
the
plaintiff’s
which
at
that
medical
point
chart
and
included
Dr.
Valletta’s notes from the July 1, 2019 evaluation and the July 2,
2009 x-rays.
Dr. Ruiz did not know that the plaintiff had entered into the
Settlement Agreement with the State, but rather simply knew that
the Department of Correction wanted the plaintiff to be evaluated
to see if he had a medical need for a second pillow and sneakers
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and/or diabetic footwear. Dr. Ruiz watched from three separate
angles as the plaintiff walked back and forth in the exam room in
the sneakers he was wearing for the purposes of evaluating the
plaintiff’s gait. The doctor measured the plaintiff’s foot and
confirmed that the size of sneaker he was wearing was appropriate.
Dr. Ruiz examined the sneakers, paying specific attention to the
soles to look for signs of abnormal wear and the tread. He
concluded
that
the
sneakers
the
plaintiff
was
wearing
were
medically adequate.
Dr. Ruiz examined the plaintiff’s feet and conducted several
tests on them to evaluate blood flow and ability to feel pressure.
In
addition,
the
doctor
examined
the
blood
vessels
in
the
plaintiff’s eyes because that was helpful in evaluating whether
there was any progression of diabetes. In addition, the doctor
evaluated the plaintiff’s back and hip in connection with the
question of whether he had a medical need for a second pillow. At
the conclusion of his examination, Dr. Ruiz’s opinion, based on
his medical judgment, was that the plaintiff did not have a medical
need for specialty or medical footwear, that the sneakers the
plaintiff was wearing were medically adequate so he had no medical
need for new, non-specialty sneakers or footwear, and that the
plaintiff did not have a medical need for a second pillow.
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On January 29, 2020, because the plaintiff had not delivered
the signed stipulation of dismissal, the defendants amended their
answer to plead the affirmative defenses of release and waiver.
II.
DISCUSSION
The
parties
disagree
about
the
proper
interpretation
of
Section 3.A.iv. of the Settlement Agreement, and the plaintiff
maintains that the State breached the Settlement Agreement and
cannot rely on release as a defense after doing so. The parties
also
disagree
effective,
about
pursuant
whether
to
the
Section
release
automatically
3.B.iii.
of
the
became
Settlement
Agreement, once the settlement payment was deposited into the
plaintiff’s Inmate Trust Account.
A. The State Did Not Breach the Settlement Agreement
When
testifying
under
cross
examination,
the
plaintiff
testified that he believes that the Settlement Agreement entitles
him to the sneakers or diabetic footwear and the second pillow
even if the DOC medical officials determine there is no medical
need for them. In his post-trial memorandum, the plaintiff argues
that Dr. Valletta and Dr. Ruiz used the wrong standard during their
evaluations. The plaintiff contends that the evaluations were
improper because the doctors evaluated the plaintiff as they would
have
evaluated
any
other
inmate
and
that,
as
the
plaintiff
testified, the Settlement Agreement “guaranteed me a better right
to it than the average inmate would get. I was supposed to be
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guaranteed it unless there was a medical reason that it would hurt
me.” Bifurcated Bench Trial Tr. (“Tr.”) at 107:11-16, ECF No. 239.
Under Connecticut Law,
It is the general rule that a contract is to be
interpreted according to the intent expressed in its
language and not by an intent the court may believe
existed in the minds of the parties. . . . When the
intention conveyed by the terms of an agreement is clear
and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. . .
. [A] court cannot import into [an] agreement a different
provision nor can the construction of the agreement be
changed to vary the express limitations of its terms.
Yellow Book Sales & Distribution Co. v. Valle, 311 Conn. 112,
119 (2014) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Levine v. Massey, 232 Conn. 272, 278 (1995)).
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the
words of the contract must be given “their natural and
ordinary meaning.” Kelly v. Figueiredo, 223 Conn. at 31,
35 (1992). A contract is unambiguous when its language
is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent.
Levine, 232 Conn. at 272. “The court will not torture
words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves
no room for ambiguity.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., at 279. “Moreover, the mere fact that the
parties advance different interpretations of the
language in question does not necessitate a conclusion
that the language is ambiguous.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Stephan v. Pennsylvania General Ins.
Co., 224 Conn. at 758, 764 (1993).
United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn.
665, 670 (2002). “It is axiomatic that a party is entitled to
rely upon its written contract as the final integration of its
rights and duties.” Yellow Book, 311 Conn. at 119 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Levine, 232 Conn. at 279).
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Here,
unambiguous.
the
The
language
first
of
Section
sentence
3.A.iv.
states
is
explicitly
clear
and
that
the
plaintiff would be permitted to purchase and obtain the second
pillow and the approved sneakers and/or diabetic footwear if he is
approved for the items for medical reasons or justifications by
Department of Correction medical officials. The second sentence
emphasizes this point by stating explicitly that this provision is
“contingent upon the medical approval and evaluation of Harnage by
DOC medical officials.” Id. The sentence then goes on to make it
clear that there are no promises or representations being made as
to what the medical officials’ decision will be. The Agreement
further expressly provides that both parties agree that the medical
officials’ decision will be “based on their medical judgment of
Harnage’s medical needs and that approval will not be unreasonably
withheld.” Id.
The plaintiff argues that unless this language is interpreted
to mean that a different standard applies to the plaintiff than
applies to other inmates, “Section 3(a)(iv) of the [Settlement]
Agreement [is turned] into a dead letter -- an empty, illusory
promise[.]” Pl.’s Post-Trial Mem. of Law Re Bifurcated Trial
(“Pl.’s Post-Trial Mem.”) at 8, ECF No. 241. That is not so.
Ordinarily, an inmate cannot obtain sneakers from outside the
prison facility. The plaintiff testified that if an inmate begins
his period of incarceration wearing a particular pair of sneakers,
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he is permitted to keep those sneakers. However, if he wishes to
obtain a new pair of sneakers, they must be purchased at the
commissary using funds in the inmate’s Inmate Trust Account.
Ordinarily, an inmate can purchase, at the commissary using
funds in his Inmate Trust Account, the items the plaintiff wants.
However, the plaintiff was not in a position to do so because the
funds that were in the plaintiff’s Inmate Trust Account were
earmarked to pay other obligations, such as court filing fees.
Even if a friend had sent the plaintiff money to put into his
Inmate Trust Account, that additional money would also have been
applied to pay such obligations. Thus, the plaintiff was not in a
position to purchase a second pillow or a new pair of sneakers or
diabetic footwear. Also, ordinarily an inmate is not permitted to
have items like the second pillow and another pair of sneakers
and/or diabetic footwear mailed to him by family members or friends
from outside the prison. But with respect to the sneakers at least,
the plaintiff was, under the terms of the Settlement Agreement,
going to be allowed to have someone from outside the prison send
him sneakers if the sneakers were approved for medical reasons or
justifications by Department of Correction medical officials.
Thus, the plaintiff did obtain a benefit under the interpretation
of Section 3.B.iv.
of the Settlement Agreement urged by the
defendants.
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In fact, a friend of the plaintiff purchased a new pair of
sneakers for the plaintiff and sent them to the prison, where they
have been held by prison officials because they have not been
approved for medical reasons or justifications. These sneakers
were produced by the plaintiff at trial.
Here, both Dr. Valletta and Dr. Ruiz concluded, after a
thorough examination of the plaintiff and an assessment of his
medical needs, that in their medical judgment he could not be
approved for a second pillow or sneakers and/or diabetic footwear
for medical reasons or justifications. Therefore, the State did
not breach Section 3.A.iv. of the Settlement Agreement.
B. The Release Automatically Took Effect
Section 3.B.iii. of the Settlement Agreement provides that
the
plaintiff
“does
herewith
release,
forever
discharge,
and
covenant not to sue” the defendants “[e]ffective upon the deposit
of the Settlement Payment into Harnage’s Inmate Trust Account[.]”
This language is clear and unambiguous. It is undisputed that the
$3,000 settlement payment was deposited in the plaintiff’s Inmate
Trust Account on June 11, 2019. The effectiveness of the release
set forth in Section 3.B.iii is not conditioned upon any other act
or event. Therefore, the release took effect on June 11, 2019, and
the plaintiff has waived any rights to pursue the defendants for
the alleged conduct at issue in the underlying lawsuit.
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III.
CONCLUSION
The defendants have proven that they are entitled to judgment
in their favor on their Third Affirmative Defense, i.e. release,
and also on their Sixth Affirmative Defense, i.e. waiver. Moreover,
because
the
defendants
are
prevailing
on
these
affirmative
defenses, they are entitled to judgment in their favor on all
claims in the plaintiff’s complaint. The Clerk shall enter judgment
accordingly.
It is so ordered.
Dated
this
28th
day
of
September
2020,
at
Hartford,
Connecticut.
/s/AWT
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge
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