Wong et al v. Education et al

Filing 104

ORDER denying 93 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint for the reasons stated in the attached order. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 4/27/2020. (Conde, Djenab)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JAMES WONG and SUZANNE HOY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

No. 3:16-cv-1873 (VAB)

BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
RULING ON MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT
On October 17, 2016, James Wong and Suzanne Hoy (“Plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit against
the Board of Education of Southington, Connecticut (“Southington”) alleging that Southington
violated their son’s right to an appropriate education under state and federal special education
statutes. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (Nov. 15, 2016).
Now, after obtaining a second set of counsel with numerous extensions of times by the
Court, Plaintiffs have moved to amend their Complaint. Second Mot. to Amend Compl., ECF
No. 93 (Apr. 12, 2020) (“Pl.’s Mot.”).
For the following reasons, and in large part due to the long delays in Plaintiffs’
prosecution of this case, the motion to amend the Complaint is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying factual and procedural background of

this case. See Order, ECF No. 69 (Nov. 20, 2019).
On October 23, 2018, the parties were referred to Magistrate Judge Holly F. Fitzsimmons
for a settlement conference. ECF No. 34-35 (Oct. 23, 2018).
On April 16, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion to withdraw as
attorney. Order, ECF No. 57 (Apr. 16, 2019).

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On November 20, 2019, the Court held a status conference. Minute Entry, ECF No. 68
(Nov. 20, 2019). The parties indicated that settlement was unlikely, and Southington requested
more clarification on deadlines for dispositive motions.
That same day, the Court issued an order allowing Plaintiffs to either have an attorney
enter an appearance on their behalf or enter appearances as pro se self-represented litigants by
December 20, 2019. Order at 2, ECF No. 69 (Nov. 20, 2019). The Court also stated that if
Plaintiffs failed to do either by December 20, 2019, then Southington could file a dispositive
motion by January 17, 2020, and the Court would then consider if the case could be
“successfully prosecuted, or if it must be dismissed.” Id. at 2.
On December 20, 2019, Plaintiffs failed to file anything on the docket, but the Court sua
sponte extended their deadline to January 10, 2020, and kept the January 17, 2020 deadline for
Southington to file a dispositive motion. Order, ECF No. 70 (Dec. 20, 2019).
On December 26, 2019, the Court granted in part Southington’s motion for clarification,
ECF No. 71 (Dec. 23, 2019), and removed the January 17, 2020 deadline. Order, ECF No. 72
(Dec. 26, 2019). The Court stated that if Plaintiffs now failed to meet the extended January 10,
2020 deadline, their case may be “dismiss[ed] . . . for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b).” Id.
On January 10, 2020, Plaintiffs obtained new counsel, who filed an appearance and
moved for an extension of time, a status conference, to amend the Complaint, and to seal the
administrative record. Docket Entries, ECF No. 73–77 (Jan. 10, 2020).
On January 22, 2020, the Court held a status conference. Minute Entry, ECF No. 83 (Jan.
22, 2020). The Court set a new deadline of April 3, 2020 for simultaneous dispositive motions,
and ordered the administrative record to be filed with the Court before dispositive motions are

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filed and before the Court would consider a motion to seal it. Id. The Court also denied without
prejudice the first motion to amend Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as Plaintiffs did not have a proposed
Amended Complaint ready. Id.
On February 28, 2020, Plaintiffs moved to seal the administrative record and attached it
as an exhibit to the motion to seal. Second Mot. to Seal, ECF No. 84 (Feb. 28, 2020).
On March 2, 2020, the Court granted in part the motion to seal and stated it would only
seal the administrative record. Order, ECF No. 85 (Mar. 2, 2020).
On March 4, 2020, The Court also directed Plaintiffs to “separately file a sealed version
of the administrative record.” Order, ECF No. 86 (Mar. 4, 2020).
On March 20, 2020, Plaintiffs moved for an extension of time until June 3, 2020 to file
dispositive motions. Second Mot. for Extension of Time, ECF No. 87 (Mar. 20, 2020).
On March 23, 2020, the Court granted in part the request, and set May 1, 2020 as the new
deadline “[g]iven the age of the case.” Order, ECF No. 88 (Mar. 23, 2020).
On April 6, 2020, Plaintiffs moved to seal the administrative record and filed it as
separate exhibits. Docket Entries, ECF Nos. 89, 90, 92 (Apr. 6 and 7, 2020).
On April 7, 2020, the Court granted the motion to seal the administrative record. Order,
ECF No. 91 (Apr. 7, 2020).
On April 12, 2020, Plaintiffs moved again to amend their Complaint. Pl.’s Mot.; First
Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 94 (Apr. 13, 2020) (“Pl.’s Mem.”); Notice of Suppl. Ex.,
ECF No. 95 (Apr. 14, 2020).
On April 15, 2020, Southington objected to the motion to amend. Obj. to Pl.’s Mot., ECF
No. 97 (Apr. 15, 2020) (“Obj.”).

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On April 17, 2020, Plaintiffs replied. Reply to Obj. to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 101 (Apr. 17,
2020) (“Reply”).
On April 24, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a third motion for extension of time until June 1, 2020
to file dispositive motions. Third Mot. for Extension of Time, ECF No. 102 (Apr. 24, 2020).
On April 26, 2020, the Court granted in part the motion for extension of time, and stated
that dispositive motions will be due by May 15, 2020.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “A party may amend its pleading once as a

matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a
responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Under Rule 15, the decision to grant leave to amend is within the discretion of the court,
but the court must give some “justifying reason” for denying leave. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962). Reasons for denying leave to amend include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]
futility of amendment[.]” Id.; see also Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258
(2d Cir. 2002) (noting leave to amend may be denied when amendment is “unlikely to be
productive,” such as when an amendment is “futile” and “could not withstand a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” (internal citation omitted)); Park B. Smith, Inc. v.

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CHF Indus. Inc., 811 F. Supp. 2d 766, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“While mere delay absent a
showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, is not enough for a district court to deny leave to
amend, the longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less will be required of the nonmoving
party in terms of a showing of prejudice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs seek leave to amend the Complaint in order to ensure it conforms to statutory

and federal requirements. Pl.’s Mem. at 4–5. According to Plaintiffs, this amendment is within
the existing timeline of the Court’s scheduling order, will not result in undue delay, and will not
unduly prejudice Southington “since all of the allegations in the Proposed Amended Complaint
relate back to the Plaintiff’s Superior Court Complaint.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs also seek an
exemption from the “redlining” requirements in Local Rule 7, because they contend there is no
original federal court Complaint that is being amended. Id. at 5–6.
In response, Southington first emphasizes the Plaintiffs have never sought to amend their
Complaint, even when they had counsel. Obj. at 2–4. Southington also notes that Plaintiffs’
Complaint complied with Connecticut’s simple pleading requirements, as it was first filed in
state court. Id. at 2–3. Second, Southington submits that the Court’s first scheduling order set a
deadline of September 7, 2018 for discovery, and Plaintiffs never sought to extend the deadline
for amended pleadings. Id. at 4. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not file the administrative record
until “approximately forty months after the Connecticut State Department of Education’s Bureau
of Special Education shared two copies . . . with them.” Id. at 6.
Southington submits that the Court’s review “should focus on the Plaintiffs’ compliance
with the good cause standard of Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than
the more liberal amendment language in Rule 15.” Id. at 7. Even if the Court uses Rule 15,

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Southington argues that amendment is not required to convert Plaintiffs’ Complaint from an
administrative appeal to a civil action, as the Court has treated the original Complaint as a civil
action in accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §
1400, et seq. Id. at 10. Southington also contends that it is prejudiced by any continued delay in
this case, and Plaintiffs have failed to address the delays in this case. Id. at 11–12.
In reply, Plaintiffs assert there is no evidence that their new counsel has failed to comply
with Rule 16(b). Reply at 4. Plaintiffs submit they were not put on notice that their case risked
being dismissed until the November 20, 2019, status conference, and they contend they were pro
se except for the five-month period that Ms. Baird represented them. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs argue that
only they will be prejudiced if the Court denies their motion to amend, and no manifest injustice
will occur should the Court grant them leave to amend. Id. at 9.
The Court disagrees.
Despite Plaintiffs’ contention that amendment is required “in order to conform to federal
court pleading requirements,” Pl.’s Mem. at 6, as Southington notes, Obj. at 10, the Court has
already decided that Plaintiffs have successfully commenced a civil action under the IDEA and
other statutes. See Ruling and Order on Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss at 2–3, ECF No. 21 (Jan. 22,
2018) (describing Plaintiffs’ claims under the IDEA and relief sought in Complaint).
Moreover, this case has suffered from long delays, and the Court has provided significant
time for the Plaintiffs to obtain new counsel. The Court has also been generous in allowing for
extensions of time, even after new counsel has been brought in. Given the long delays in the
prosecution of this case and its impact on the case’s ultimate resolution, the Court will not grant
Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint at this time. See, e.g., Grochowski v. Phoenix Const.,
318 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint

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when plaintiffs delayed more than one year before seeking leave, discovery was completed, and
a summary judgment motion was pending).
Accordingly, consistent with this Court’s inherent authority to manage its docket with a
“view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases,” Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885,
1892 (2016), the Court denies this motion for leave to amend the October 17, 2016 Complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their

Complaint.
The Court also notes it is not inclined to grant further extensions of time.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 27th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
Victor A. Bolden
United States District Judge

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