Hill v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

ORDER: The Defendant's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc. No. 19 ) is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Reversing the Commissioner's Decision (Doc. Nos. 18 , 20 ) are hereby DENIED for the reasons set forth in the attached document. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 3/26/18. (Mata, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

BRANDON THOMAS HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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: Civil No. 3:16CV2000 (AWT)
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ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
Plaintiff Brandon Thomas Hill has appealed under § 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a
final Decision by the Commissioner denying his application for
disability insurance benefits.

The plaintiff has filed a motion

for reversal or remand, and the Commissioner has filed a motion
for an order affirming the Commissioner’s Decision.

For the

reasons set forth below, the court concludes that the findings
by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) are supported by
substantial evidence, and the Commissioner’s final Decision
should be affirmed.
Legal Standard
“A district court reviewing a final [] decision . . . [of
the Commissioner of Social Security] pursuant to section 205(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.§ 405(g), is performing an
appellate function.”

Zambrana v. Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844

(2d Cir. 1981).

The court may not make a de novo determination

of whether a plaintiff is disabled in reviewing a denial of
disability benefits.

See Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990).

Rather, the court’s

function is to ascertain whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal principles in reaching a conclusion and whether
the Decision is supported by substantial evidence.
v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987).

See Johnson

The Second Circuit

has defined substantial evidence as “‘such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’”

Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.

1988) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
Substantial evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla or
touch of proof here and there in the record.”
F.2d at 258.

Williams, 859

Therefore, absent legal error, this court may not

set aside the Decision of the Commissioner if it is supported by
substantial evidence.

See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467

(2d Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(“The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”).

Further,

if the Commissioner’s Decision is supported by substantial
evidence, that Decision will be sustained, even where there may
also be substantial evidence to support the plaintiff’s contrary

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position.

See Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.

1982).
Discussion
On June 20, 2012, the plaintiff filed an application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging
disability beginning April 9, 2011.

The plaintiff appeared

telephonically and testified at a hearing on May 5, 2014.

On

August 28, 2014, the ALJ issued the Decision concluding that the
claimant was not disabled.
At Step Two the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has
a medically determinable impairment that is “severe” or a
combination of impairments that is “severe”.
404.1520(c).

20 C.F.R. §

An impairment or combination of impairments is

“severe” within the meaning of the regulations if it
significantly limits an individual’s ability to perform basic
work activities.

SSR 96-3p.

At Step Two the ALJ found that the plaintiff had the
following severe impairments:

“persistent somatoform disorder

and schizophrenic, paranoid, and other functional psychotic
disorder-delusional disorder, somatic type rule out.”

R. at 42.

The plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not concluding that
the plaintiff had a severe impairment in the form of a chemical
hypersensitivity or Multiple Chemical Sensitivity (“MCS”).

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As a framework for her analysis on this issue the ALJ
followed the guidance from SSR 96-4p, which includes the
following:
Although the regulations provide that the existence of a
medically determinable physical or mental impairment must
be established by medical evidence consisting of signs,
symptoms, and laboratory findings, the regulations further
provide that under no circumstances may the existence of
impairment be established on the basis of symptoms alone.
Thus, regardless of how many symptoms an individual
alleges, or how genuine the individual’s complaints may
appear to be, the existence of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment cannot be established in the
absence of objective medical abnormalities; i.e., medical
signs and laboratory findings (SSR 96-4p).
No symptoms or combinations of symptoms by itself can
constitute a medically determinable impairment.
In claims
in which there are no medical signs or laboratory findings
to substantiate the existence of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment, the individual must be found
not disabled at step 2 of the sequential evaluation process
(SSR 96-4p).
R. at 43.
The record shows that the plaintiff had a disability
evaluation on April 3, 2012.

The examination was conducted by

Dr. Ronald S. Jolda, who stated:
chemical sensitivity syndrome.
work up.

“He has a self diagnosed

He has never had an evaluation

He is going to see a doctor in two days for a full

workup of this problem.”

R. at 558.

On April 6, 2012 the plaintiff saw Dr. David C. Christiani,
but he did not get a “full workup”.

Dr. Christiani’s notes

reflect that “[t]he patient has not been formally diagnosed by a

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physician to have this syndrome but strongly feels that he does
based on his history and symptom complex.
detailed summary of his history.”

He provided a

R. at 563.

Dr. Christiani’s

assessment was that the plaintiff met the criteria for multiple
chemical sensitivity, but Dr. Christiani’s assessment was based
on the plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms.

Subsequently Dr.

Christiani issued a letter, dated November 14, 2013, in which he
opined that the plaintiff suffered from “environmental
intolerance, also termed multiple chemical sensitivity”.
572.

R. at

However, that letter does not reflect that any medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic tests had been
done to help diagnose this condition.
Then, on March 27, 2014, the plaintiff was examined by Dr.
Dan O. Harper, who had reviewed a healthcare questionnaire
completed by the plaintiff.

Dr. Harper stated that the

plaintiff met all the criteria for chemical hypersensitivity,
but this conclusion was based on Dr. Harper’s review of a fourpage letter setting forth the claimant’s subjective allegations.
See R. at 598.

Dr. Harper also performed genomic testing.

However, as noted by the ALJ, the report of the test contains a
disclaimer stating that genomic testing has not been cleared or
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
575.

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See R. at

The hearing was held on May 5, 2014.

After the hearing,

the plaintiff was examined by Dr. Genie Burns.

The plaintiff

“had no documented treatment for persistent somatoform disorder
and schizophrenic, paranoid, and other functional psychotic
disorder-delusional disorder”.

R. at 50.

However, Dr. Burns

made these diagnoses and her diagnoses were given partial
weight.
On July 16, 2014 the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Nancy
Didriksen.

Dr. Didriksen opined that “Somatic Symptom Disorder

and Delusional Disorder, Somatic Type, are not appropriate
diagnoses for Mr. Hill, but are often considered by healthcare
providers who are unfamiliar with toxic/neurotoxic effects.”
at 613.

R.

Dr. Didriksen evaluated the plaintiff’s

neuropsychological test results.

Her findings indicated that

even where “[h]e is most impaired”, he fell “well within normal
limits, statistically (average to high-average range)”.
612.

R. at

Also, she stated that
Mr. Hill’s present condition appears to be consistent with
the mildest classification of solvent-induced CNS disorders
identified by World Health Organizations/Nordic Council of
Ministers Working Group in June 1985 (organic affective
syndrome), and later by the International Solvent Workshop
in Raleigh North Carolina in October 1985 (Type 1),
characterized by symptoms including fatigue, irritability,
depression, anxiety, and other physical and behavioral
symptoms.

R. at 613 (emphasis added).

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Based on a review of the record, the court concludes that
there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion
that the plaintiff did not have a severe impairment in the form
of MCS.

“[U]nder no circumstances may the existence of

impairment be established on the basis of symptoms alone” (SSR
96-4p), and that is all that the plaintiff provided that tends
to support his claim.

There are no medical records reflecting

treatment for such a condition, and the diagnoses that he
received from doctors were based on the plaintiff’s own report
of his symptoms and self-diagnosis.

As to the genomic testing

performed by Dr. Harper, the test itself disclaimed that it “has
not been cleared or approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration . . . and should not be interpreted as diagnostic
or [a] treatment recommendation . . . . [Its] accuracy . . . is
not 100 %.”

R. at 575.

The plaintiff contends that “the ALJ’s weighing of the
evidence is fatally flawed”.
1) at 7.

Pl.’s Mem. Reversing (Doc. No. 20-

He also contends that the ALJ failed to provide

adequate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Drs. Christiani,
Harper and Didriksen.

However, as to the first point, the ALJ’s

conclusion was supported by evidence that she discussed in the
Decision, and the fact that the plaintiff can also point to
evidence supporting his position does not mean that the ALJ’s
Decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
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In fact, as

long as the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence
it must be upheld even where the plaintiff’s position is also
supported by substantial evidence.

See Schauer, 675 F.2d at 57.

As to the second point, a review of the Decision shows that
the ALJ provided specific reasons for not placing weight on the
opinions of Drs. Cristiani, Harper and Didriksen.

See R. at 44-

45, 563-64, 560, 572 as to Dr. Cristiani (lacks relevant
objective findings and is based on subjective allegations which
are inconsistent with hearing testimony (e.g., showered and
slept at home, used public restrooms and engaged socially); see
R. at 43-45, 582-601 as to Dr. Harper (MCS opinion based on
subjective allegations, genomic testing has not been cleared or
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and opinion is
inconsistent with the hearing testimony (e.g., used public
restrooms, showered and slept at home, admitted that cars have
multiple chemical problems); see R. at 52-53, 612-16 as to Dr.
Didriksen (based on subjective allegations and patient
comparisons rather than objective evaluation and findings,
inconsistent with hearing testimony (e.g., admitted not
following Dr. Harper’s treatment regimen, making selective
medical appointments, using public restrooms and engaging
socially), and referencing non-authoritative, dated (1973-2005)
documents and literature).

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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant’s Motion
for an Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner (Doc.
No. 19) is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Order Reversing the Commissioner’s Decision (Doc.
No. 18, 20) are hereby DENIED.
The Clerk shall enter Judgment accordingly and close this
case.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 26th day of March 2018, at Hartford,
Connecticut.

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/s/AWT
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Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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