Riddick v. Maurer et al

Filing 106

ORDER:- Denying 65 Motion for a Gag Order; - Denying as moot 71 Motion to Take Deposition from Jerome Riddick;- Granting 80 Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint (the Clerk is directed to docket the complaint attached to Riddick' s motion as an amended complaint); - Denying 81 Motion for Order to Show Cause; denying 81 Motion for TRO; denying 81 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; - Denying 82 Motion for TRO; denying 82 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; - Denying 83 Motion to Appoint Counsel; - Granting 89 Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct Discovery. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 8/23/18. (Kaas, E.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JEROME RIDDICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
KATHY MAURER, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:16-cv-2009 (SRU)

RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Jerome Riddick, currently confined in a Connecticut Department of Correction facility,
filed a complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Riddick alleges that the defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. I issued
my Initial Review Order on December 22, 2016, permitting Riddick’s claim to proceed against
all defendants, Doc. No. 9, and the defendants answered the complaint on May 1, 2017, Doc. No.
45. From the defendants’ tardy filing of an answer to the original complaint to the present,
progress in litigating this case has been slow. The delays appear to have been due to factors
including Riddick’s filing of numerous motions that are not suitable for motion practice in this
action, and internal personnel matters at the Connecticut Attorney General’s Office. My earlier
order at doc. no. 95 has provided some guidelines for Riddick regarding motion practice and
future filings. In this ruling, I rule on any currently outstanding motions. The defendants have
also filed a motion to withdraw the attorney formerly responsible for this case, Doc. No. 98,
which I hereby grant. Defendants’ new counsel has timely managed litigation of this case since
her appointment in January of this year, and I expect she will continue to do so moving forward.
In light of prior delays, this ruling sets a new discovery deadline of January 8, 2019, and a

deadline for dispositive motions of February 8, 2019. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
further extensions are unlikely to be granted.
A. Riddick’s Motion for a Gag Order (Doc. No. 65)
In support of his motion for a gag order, Riddick asserts that the defendants are
permitting non-clinical staff to be present during discussions of his medical issues, in violation of
his right to medical privacy. To the extent that Riddick’s grievance is legitimate, a gag order in
this case is not his appropriate remedy.
A gag order is typically issued by a court prior to trial to prevent possible tainting of the
prospective jury pool. See, e.g., Coggins v. County of Nassau, 2014 WL 495646, *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 6, 2014). Because a gag order is essentially a limitation on speech, the party seeking the
order must show that good cause exists to limit the dissemination of covered information. See
Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 2013 WL 4534913, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2013) (“[I]t is the
burden of the party seeking the order to show that good cause exists for issuance of the order.”).
In this case, Riddick has not stated sufficient grounds for the issuance of a gag order. It is
unclear at this stage of the litigation whether Riddick’s case will proceed to trial, and, thus,
Riddick has not shown any danger of potential jury tainting or has he shown that the defendants
are sharing information about his case with members of the public. If he is seeking the gag order
for a purpose other than the preservation of a fair trial in this case—for example, because he
believes that the defendants or other individuals are violating applicable laws by improperly
divulging his medical information—he may pursue such a claim by filing a complaint for such
violations in a separate action. Riddick’s motion for a gag order in this case (Doc. No. 65), is
DENIED.

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B. Riddick’s Requests for Orders to Show Cause, Temporary Restraining Orders and
Preliminary Injunctions (Doc. Nos. 66, 74, 76, 81, 82, 88)
Riddick has filed numerous motions requesting injunctive relief that are not appropriately
the subject of equitable relief at this stage of the proceedings in this action. In my order at doc.
no. 95, I explained that requests for injunctive relief must relate to the underlying claims in this
action. I have also, in an order at doc. no. 53, denied a prior request from Riddick for a TRO
related to the underlying remedies requested in this action, because Riddick has failed to
demonstrate the threshold likelihood of success on the merits. The Second Circuit recently
affirmed my decision on the issue. Doc. No. 99. Finally, to the extent a motion for equitable
relief seeks to obtain discovery on an underlying claim, Riddick must satisfy the standards for
motions to compel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) and Local Rule 37(a).1
At Doc. No. 66, Riddick has sought an “Emergency Order to Show Cause and TRO”
requesting an order for the defendants to produce to him a copy of his medical records. Despite
its title, the motion best appears to be an attempt to compel discovery. On its merits, Riddick’s
request should be denied due to its failure to comply with the standards for motions to compel. I
have previously denied an earlier attempt by Riddick to compel discovery for the same reason.
See Doc. No. 31. Moreover, Riddick’s request appears to be moot because defendants have
indicated that they have provided to Riddick his medical file. To the extent that is not the case,
Riddick should first seek resolution of the issue pursuant to the informal procedures set out for
discovery in the federal and local rules, and may then, if necessary, file a motion to compel that

“[A] party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a certification that
the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or
discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Pursuant to Local Rule 37(a), the
movant must first confer with opposing counsel in person or via telephone and discuss the discovery issues between
them in order to arrive at a “mutually satisfactory resolution.” In the event a resolution is not reached, the movant
must attach an affidavit certifying that, despite a good faith effort, he was unable to resolve the discovery issue with
opposing counsel. Id.
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complies with the applicable rules. Riddick’s request (Doc. No. 66) is DENIED.
At Doc. Nos. 74 and 88, which were both cross-filed in numerous of his cases, Riddick
has sought to be provided with certain electronic filing receipts, and to have returned to him his
legal books and materials. These requests do not relate to the underlying claims in this case and
are thus not the appropriate subject of injunctive relief in this case. Moreover, in filings in other
cases, Riddick has indicated that his legal materials have already been returned to him, and that
at least some filing receipts have likewise been provided to him. To the extent Riddick requires
additional information regarding the administration of this case, he may seek such information in
compliance with my order at doc. no. 95. Riddick’s requests (Doc. Nos. 74, 88) are DENIED.
At doc. no. 76, Riddick seeks an order requiring defendants to repair or replace his
eyeglasses. As a preliminary matter, the defendants’ opposition to Riddick’s request at doc. no.
79 indicates that Riddick’s eyeglasses were repaired, and Riddick has not yet objected to that
fact, so Riddick’s request may be moot. Moreover, to the extent Riddick’s request that I enjoin
the defendants to repair his eyeglasses pertains to the relief sought in his underlying Eighth
Amendment claims, I have already denied Riddick preliminary injunctive relief on such claims.
To the extent Riddick’s request is not related to the underlying relief sought in his complaint, it is
not an appropriate subject for equitable relief in this case. Riddick’s request (Doc. No. 76) is
DENIED as moot.
At doc. nos. 81 and 82, Riddick seeks to prevent defendants from limiting his ability to
communicate with Inmates’ Legal Aid Program personnel. As outlined in my order at doc. no.
95, such requests are not an appropriate topic of a request for injunctive relief, because they do
not relate to the claims raised in the underlying complaint in this case. Accordingly, Doc. Nos.
81 and 82 are DENIED. Because Al-Bukhari’s motion at doc. no. 82 is denied, his motion for

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an extension of time to respond to the defendants’ opposition to such motion (Doc. No. 97) is
DENIED as moot.
C. Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 83)
At doc. no. 83, Riddick has filed a motion to appoint counsel. That motion was crossfiled in multiple of his cases and does not properly explain why counsel would be merited in this
specific case. Civil litigants have no constitutional right to appointment of counsel, Parks v.
Smith, 505 F. App’x 42, 43 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 17274 (2d Cir. 1989)), and the Second Circuit repeatedly has cautioned the district courts against the
routine appointment of counsel, see, e.g., Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Center, 323 F.3d
196, 204 (2d Cir. 2003). I have previously denied a motion by Riddick to have counsel
appointed in this case, Doc. No. 56, because I did not think that Riddick had established that this
case passed the test of likely merit set forth in Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 173-74
(2d Cir. 1989). Riddick’s motion (Doc. No. 83) has not changed my opinion, and his motion is
accordingly DENIED.
D. Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc. No. 80)
At doc. no. 80, Riddick has filed a motion to amend his complaint and has attached the
proposed amended complaint to his motion. Riddick’s changes to his original complaint are not
significant and should not affect the progress of this action. His motion to amend (Doc. No. 80)
is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to docket the complaint attached to Riddick’s motion as an
amended complaint. The docketed amended complaint shall serve as the operative complaint in
this action, moving forward.

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E. Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery (Doc. No. 89)
In light of prior circumstances in this case, the deadlines I previously set have not been
met. I think it appropriate to extend the deadline for discovery until January 8, 2019, consistent
with Riddick’s request at doc. no. 89. The deadline for dispositive motions is reset to February
8, 2019. Riddick’s motion for extension of the time for discovery (Doc. No. 89) is GRANTED.
Further extensions are unlikely.
F. Defendants’ Motion to Take Riddick’s Deposition (Doc. No. 71)
At doc. no. 71, the defendants sought permission to depose Riddick. Riddick opposed to
the defendants’ motion. Doc. No. 93. Although I agree with the defendants that Riddick’s
deposition is warranted in this action, the date for the deposition requested by the defendants has
lapsed. I therefore DENY as moot the defendants’ motion (Doc. No. 71) and urge the
defendants to submit a new request to depose Riddick, at a date that is appropriate in light of the
deadline for discovery set forth above.
CONCLUSION
The following motions and/or requests are DENIED: Doc. No. 65; Doc. No. 66; Doc.
No. 71; Doc. No. 74; Doc. No. 76; Doc. No. 81; Doc. No. 82; Doc. No. 83; Doc. No. 88; Doc.
No. 97. The following motions are GRANTED: Doc. No. 80; Doc. No. 89; Doc. No. 98.
The deadline for discovery is reset to January 8, 2019, and the deadline for dispositive
motions is reset to February 8, 2019.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 23rd day of August 2018.

/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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