Riddick v. Maurer et al

Filing 53

ORDER denying 33 Motion for TRO; denying 33 Motion for Hearing; denying 37 Motion to Strike; denying 41 Motion for Order to Show Cause; denying 41 Motion for TRO; denying 8 Motion for Order to Show Cause; denying 8 Motion for TRO. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 5/17/2017. (Landman, M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JEROME RIDDICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
KATHY MAURER, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:16-cv-2009 (SRU)

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
On December 8, 2016, Jerome Riddick, currently confined at Northern Correction
Institution in Somers, Connecticut, filed a complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Riddick alleges that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The
court granted Riddick’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on December 15, 2016.
On December 22, 2016, I issued an initial review order [Doc. # 9] permitting Riddick’s claims to
proceed against all eight defendants: Director Kathy Maurer, Warden Edward Maldonado,
Warden William Mulligan, Administrator Brien Libel, Dr. Carson Wright, Nurse Vikki Scruggs,
Nurse Barbara Savoie, and Nurse Ellen Durko.
On December 15, 2016, Riddick filed an “emergency” motion for a temporary restraining
order against the defendants [Doc. # 8]. I ordered the defendants to respond to the motion by
February 20, 2017 [Doc. # 10], but the defendants never filed a response. Thereafter, default
was entered against the defendants for failure to plead [Doc. # 25]. Since then, Riddick has filed
two more “emergency” motions for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
[Docs. # 33, 41]. In support of his motions, Riddick seeks an order mandating that the
defendants provide him with an MRI, X-Ray, corrective eye surgery, and an adequate mattress to
alleviate his deteriorating medical conditions.

The defendants responded with a written objection [Doc. # 36] to the second
“emergency” motion [Doc. # 33], arguing that Riddick’s complaints about his medical conditions
are being properly addressed. The defendants attached a declaration from Riddick’s physician,
Dr. Carson Wright, asserting that Riddick’s medical issues are being addressed [Doc. # 36-1].
Thereafter, Riddick filed a “motion to strike” and a written opposition to the defendants’
objection [Doc. # 37, 39], in which he argues that the defendants, who have been defaulted in
this proceeding, cannot object to his motions. Because the order defaulting the defendants has
been vacated [Doc. # 52], I will now address the substance of Riddick’s motions for a temporary
restraining order.
“The Court has discretion whether to issue a temporary restraining order where specific
facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition and
the movant certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not
be required.” Oliphant v. Villano, 2010 WL 537749, at *12 (D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2010) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)). “The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve an existing
situation in statu quo until the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for
a preliminary injunction.” Garcia v. Yonkers School Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Second Circuit applies similar standards for temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions, “and district courts have assumed them to be the same.” See Foley v.
State Elections Enforcement Com’n, 2010 WL 2836722, at *3 (D. Conn. July 16, 2010) (quoting
Allied Office Supplies, Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 107, 108 n.2 (D. Conn. 2005).
Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and is never awarded as a matter of

right. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Johnson v. Newport
Lorillard, 2003 WL 169797, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2003). A movant seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish (1) irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction and (2) either a
likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s
favor. Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51
F.3d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 1995); Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1984). With
respect to the first prong, courts will presume that a movant has established irreparable harm in
the absence of injunctive relief when the movant’s claim involves the alleged deprivation of a
constitutional right. Jolly, 76 F.3d at 482; Mitchell, 748 F.2d at 806. “In deciding a motion for
preliminary injunction, a court may consider the entire record including affidavits and other
hearsay evidence.” Johnson, 2003 WL 169797, at *1.
When the movant seeks a “mandatory injunction,” meaning an injunction that will alter
rather than maintain the status quo by some positive act, or an injunction that will essentially
provide the movant with all the relief sought, which cannot be undone in the event the defendant
prevails at trial, the movant must satisfy an even higher standard of proof. Jolly, 76 F.3d at 473;
Johnson, 2003 WL 169797, *1. He must make a “clear or substantial showing of a likelihood of
success” on the merits. Jolly, 76 F.3d at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Riddick is alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, I will presume that a denial of injunctive relief
will result in irreparable injury, see Jolly, 76 F.3d at 482. He is also seeking an order mandating
specific services to address his medical needs, which subjects him to the heightened standard of
proof that his claim will likely succeed on the merits. At this stage of the proceeding, however,

Riddick has not clearly shown a likelihood of success on the merits to warrant preliminary
injunctive relief. His allegations are devoid of evidence that any of the defendants acted with the
sufficiently culpable state of mind required to establish a claim of deliberate indifference to
medical needs. See Johnson v. Connolly, 378 F. App’x 107, at *1 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff failed
to establish likelihood of success on merits of Eighth Amendment claim); Jones v. Tompkins,
2014 WL 860334, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2014) (to obtain preliminary injunction in form of
medical treatment plaintiff must show that medical condition is “sufficiently serious” and that
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to medical needs); Amaker v. Fischer, 2012 WL
80207777, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (plaintiff’s bare allegations of constitutional
violations insufficient to demonstrate likelihood of success on merits for injunctive relief). He
merely alleges that the defendants “delayed” or “denied” his requests for medical attention,
which is insufficient for a finding of deliberate indifference. See Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d
132, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (delay in treatment based on bad diagnosis, erroneous calculation of risk,
or mistaken view that condition is benign or trivial does not alone amount to Eighth Amendment
violation). Because Riddick has not clearly shown a likelihood of success on the merits, his
motions for preliminary injunctive relief will be denied.
Riddick’s motions for preliminary injunctive relief [Docs. # 8, 33, 41] are DENIED.
Riddick’s motion to strike the defendants’ written opposition to the motion for injunctive relief
[Doc. # 37] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 17th day of May, 2017, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge