Schipke v. Fulcher

Filing 17

RULING: For the reasons set forth herein, the Petition (Doc. No. 1 ) is TERMINATED AS MOOT. The Motions (Doc. Nos. 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 11 , 14 ) seeking various forms of injunctive relief are TERMINATED AS MOOT, to the extent they seek relief rela ted to allegedly unlawful prison conditions, and DISMISSED without prejudice, to the extent they seek injunctive relief that is not cognizable in conjunction with a habeas petition or raise claims over which this court does not have subject matter ju risdiction.The court concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the relief sought in the Petition is moot or that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over at least one of the claims. Thus, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 1/18/2017. (Lewis, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MARY ELIZABETH SCHIPKE,
Petitioner,
v.
STEVE FAUCHER,
Respondent.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:16-cv-2096 (JCH)
JANUARY 18, 2017

RULING RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. NO. 1) AND
PENDING MOTIONS (DOC. NOS. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14)
I.

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Schipke ("Schipke") was confined at York Correctional

Institution ("York") when she filed this habeas petition. She challenges her detention in
state prison pursuant to her arrest by Meriden police officers and seeks numerous other
forms of relief.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is
TERMINATED AS MOOT, and each of the pending Motions (Doc Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11,
14) is DISMISSED and/or TERMINATED AS MOOT.
II.

BACKGROUND
Schipke claims that she inherited the house and piece of property located at 129

Goodwill Avenue in Meriden, Connecticut. See Writ of Habeas Corpus Pet. to
Challenge Illegal Detention (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) at 1.2 On November 25, 2016, she

1 In ruling on the Petition and Motions, the court remains mindful of its obligation to construe pro
se filings “liberally, applying less stringent standards than when a plaintiff is represented by counsel.”
Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). It is also aware that such filings “must
be . . . interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d
Cir. 2006)).
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The facts set forth in this Ruling are drawn from Schipke’s filings, unless otherwise specified.

arrived at the house and unpacked her things. Id. At some point the next day, three
Meriden police officers walked up to the front porch and demanded to know why
Schipke was there. See id. The officers placed Schipke under arrest for trespassing
and burglary, handcuffed her, dragged her to a police car, and threw her in the back
seat. See id. at 1–2. While moving Schipke from the porch to the police car, the police
officers severely injured Schipke’s chest. See id. Despite her injury, the police officers
brought Schipke to the Meriden jail, where she was photographed, fingerprinted, and
placed in a freezing and filthy cell. See id. at 2.
The officers denied Schipke the ability to bail herself out of jail and to make an
uninterrupted telephone call. See id. Schipke remained at the police station for two
days. See id. The officers denied her a medical diet and refused to provide her with a
blanket, a mattress, or a jacket. See id. On November 28, 2016, a Superior Court
judge arraigned Schipke and set bond at $500.00. See id. Because Schipke could not
make bond, police officials transported her to York. See id. at 3.
Prison officials at York denied Schipke a medical diet, purified water, and her
reading glasses. See id. Schipke seeks to be released from prison, the immediate
return of her truck, trailer, and possessions by the police, an order prohibiting the sale or
destruction of her family home in Meriden, an order that she be provided with her
medical diet and purified water, and an order requiring that the prison afford her law
library access. See id. at 4.

The court limits its recitation of any facts to those necessary to adjudicate the pending Petition and
Motions; it expresses no view as to the veracity of the allegations.

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In addition to filing a habeas petition, Schipke has filed six motions seeking
injunctive relief. See generally Mot. for Immediate Ct. Order for Special Medical Diet
Foods & Bottled Water for Def. under ADA/ADAAA & Other Orders (“Food Mot.”) (Doc.
No. 3); Emergency Mot. to Stay All State Ct. Proceedings & Sale of Schipke House
(“Property Mot.”) (Doc. No. 4); Mot. for Emergency Restraining Order Against YCI
Mental Health Dep’t (“Medication Mot.”) (Doc. No. 5); Mot. for Ct. Order for Relief from
Pain of Hunger & Physical Pain (“Private Att’y Gen. Mot.”) (Doc. No. 6); Mot. for
Immediate Ct. Hr’g under Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Hearing Mot.”) (Doc. No. 11); Mot.
for Immediate Ct. Protection from Escalating Civil Rights Violations (“Escalating
Violations Mot.”) (Doc. No. 14). The relief sought in the Motions is substantially identical
to the relief sought in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, with the additional
requests that the court enjoin York employees from forcing her to take certain
medications, see Medication Mot. at 1–2, and provide injunctive relief related to alleged
Eighth Amendment violations at York,3 see Private Att’y Gen. Mot. at 1–2.
III.

DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, the court has become aware that Schipke is no longer

confined at York or any other Connecticut prison facility. Offender Information Search,
Conn. Dep’t of Corr., http://www.ctinmateinfo.state.ct.us/ (last visited January 13, 2017)
(generating no results after entering Schipke’s inmate number—418087—and clicking

3 At various points in her filings, Schipke refers to a “standing recent federal court order directing
the YCI prison ‘to feed 3000 calories per day per inmate.’” See, e.g., Escalating Violations Mot. at 5.
Though this issue is not essential to its ruling, the court is unaware of any such order.

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“Search All Inmates”); Escalating Violations Mot. at 7 (referring to release). Accordingly,
the relief sought by Schipke with regard to her release from York and the conditions of
confinement at that facility is now moot.4
The relief sought by Schipke with regard to the sale of her family home and the
return of her possessions and vehicles that were confiscated by the police are not the
types of relief that are cognizable in a habeas petition. See Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S.
266, 291 (1948) (“The primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to make
certain that a [person] is not unjustly imprisoned.”), abrogation on other grounds
recognized by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 482 (1991). With regard to Schipke’s
seized possessions and vehicles, the appropriate course of action would be to file a
motion for return of seized property in state court. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-36a.5
Schipke mentions that her aunt, who lived in the home located at 129 Goodwill
Avenue in Meriden, Connecticut, passed away on August 31, 2016. See Petition at 1.
Schipke contends that she is the sole heir to the property and believes that someone is
attempting to sell the house and the property to a church that is located next door to the
property. See id. at 3. To the extent that the estate of Schipke’s aunt is in probate, this

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Even if claims related to the conditions of her confinement were cognizable in an action seeking
a writ of habeas corpus, Schipke no longer has standing to seek injunctive relief related to the allegedly
unconstitutional prison conditions at York. See, e.g., Private Att’y Gen. Mot. at 1 (“The Petitioner . . . now
addresses this Court in the legal capacity of Private Attorney General . . . .”). She has not alleged any
likelihood that she will be incarcerated in the future that might give rise to a future injury warranting
prospective, injunctive relief. See Deshawn E. by Charlotte E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“A plaintiff seeking injunctive . . . relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must
show a likelihood that he . . . will be injured in the future.” (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 105–06 (1983)).
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Additionally, if this situation persists after the pending state charges against her are resolved,

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court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action that would interfere with a
probate court’s control over property that is in the probate court’s custody. See
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311–12 (2006). The probate exception bars a
federal court from doing anything to administer a will or to “disturb or affect the
possession of property in the custody of a state court.” Id. at 310 (quoting Markham v.
Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946)).
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is TERMINATED AS

MOOT. The Motions (Doc. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14) seeking various forms of injunctive
relief are TERMINATED AS MOOT, to the extent they seek relief related to allegedly
unlawful prison conditions, and DISMISSED without prejudice, to the extent they seek
injunctive relief that is not cognizable in conjunction with a habeas petition or raise
claims over which this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.
The court concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the
relief sought in the Petition is moot or that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
at least one of the claims. Thus, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and
close this case.

Schipke might consider filing a claim pursuant to section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.

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SO ORDERED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 18th day of January, 2017.

__/s/ Janet C. Hall________
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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