Discuillo v. Allstate Insurance Company

Filing 36

ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the attached, the 25 motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 1/19/2018. (Self, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ELAINE DISCUILLO,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:17-cv-00234 (MPS)

v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Elaine Discuillo, brings suit against the defendant, Allstate Insurance
Company (“Allstate”), based on the latter’s alleged refusal to honor the terms of Ms. Discuillo’s
homeowner’s property insurance policy. Ms. Discuillo sets out two claims against Allstate: (i)
specific performance (count one); and (ii) breach of contract (count two). Allstate moves to
dismiss count one of Ms. Discuillo’s complaint. Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion.
For the reasons set forth below, Allstate’s motion is denied.
I.

Factual Allegations

Plaintiff makes the following factual allegations in her amended complaint, which I
assume to be true.
Ms. Discuillo owns property located in Oakdale, Connecticut. (ECF No. 24, Count One,
at ¶ 1).1 At all times relevant to this case, Ms. Discuillo “was insured under a homeowner’s

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Since Ms. Discuillo includes all of her factual allegations in the counts set out in her
complaint and restarts the numbering of her paragraphs with each count, I cite her factual
allegations using the particular count under which they fall.
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property insurance policy issued by the defendant.” (Id. at ¶ 3). “On or about February 10,
2015, and days and weeks thereafter, while said policy was in full force and effect, a snow and/or
ice storm caused damage to [Ms. Discuillo’s] home and personal property.” (Id. at ¶ 4). Despite
the fact that Ms. Discuillo’s insurance policy with Allstate included “the right to an appraisal of
the loss,” (id. at ¶ 5), Allstate “refused and/or failed” to provide such an appraisal. (Id. at ¶ 6).
Ms. Discuillo “is entitled to a determination through the appraisal process of the amount of the
total loss made by an appraisal panel consisting of competent and independent appraisers and an
independent umpire,” (id. at ¶ 7), and has “no adequate remedy at law” to attain such relief. (Id.
at ¶ 8).
I.

Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)], a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ray v. Watnick, 688 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). While the Court must “draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent
Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2008), it must grant the moving party’s
motion if “a complaint is based solely on wholly conclusory allegations and provides no factual
support for such claims. . . .” Scott v. Town of Monroe, 306 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D. Conn.
2004).
II.

Discussion

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Since Plaintiff declined to file a response to State Farm’s motion to dismiss, I must determine
whether Plaintiff’s “pleadings provide sufficient grounds to deny the motion.” Local Civ. R.
7(a)(1).
Allstate’s sole argument in its motion to dismiss the first count of Ms. Discuillo’s
complaint—which comprises a demand for specific performance—is that specific performance
“is more appropriately considered a remedy, as opposed to a separate, stand-alone cause of
action.” (ECF No. 26 at 4). However, several Connecticut courts have entertained stand-alone
specific performance causes of action. See Kevalis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No.
CV020079667S, 2003 WL 539722, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2003) (denying motion to
strike counts for specific performance on basis that “although plaintiffs were not required to
plead specific performance as a separate equitable cause of action, [the defendant] has not
asserted a sufficient ground to strike the [counts]”); Stevens v. Allstate Ins., No. CV00071957S,
2002 WL 237330, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 24, 2002) (“The plaintiff has alleged the
necessary elements for a claim of specific performance and thus may plead in the alternative
seeking the equitable remedy.”). Also, the Connecticut Supreme Court has entertained standalone causes of action for specific performance. See DeBlasio v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 186
Conn. 398, 398 (1982) (noting that the plaintiff sought “specific performance of an automobile
insurance contract”); Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 702 (2009) (affirming trial judge’s
decision dismissing “plaintiffs’ count seeking damages for breach of contract . . . but rendering
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the count for specific performance”). Thus, although
Allstate is correct that Ms. Discuillo did not have to plead specific performance as a separate
cause of action, her decision to do so does not merit the dismissal of the claim.
I therefore deny Allstate’s motion to dismiss Ms. Discuillo’s first count.

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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

Hartford, Connecticut
January 18, 2018

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