Murphy v. Feliciano et al
ORDER granting Plaintiff's motions for reconsideration [Dkts. 21 and 22] but denying the relief sought therein for the reasons set forth in the Ruling attached. Plaintiff's denial of access to courts and attorney malpractice claims remain dismissed. The Court also denies Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse [Dkt. 24] for the reasons set forth in the attached Ruling. Plaintiff must amend his complaint asserting only a deliberate indifference claim by the extended deadline of October 2, 2017. Failure to meet this deadline will result in dismissal of the case. The Plaintiff must also identify the unnamed defendants in his deliberate indifference claim by October 2, 2017.. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 8/25/2017. (Hudson, C)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FELICIANO, et al.,
PRISONER CASE NO.
AUGUST 25, 2017
RULINGS ON MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
[Doc.#s 21, 22] AND MOTION FOR RECUSAL [Doc.#24]
On February 16, 2017, the plaintiff, Douglas Murphy, filed a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Warden Jose Feliciano, Warden
Allison Black, Deputy Warden Denise Walker, Commissioner of Correction Scott
Semple, Deputy Warden Stacy Marmora, Deputy Warden Richard Laffargue, Dr.
Kathleen Maurer, Dr. Mark Buchanan, Director Constance Weiskoph, Gail
Johnson, Director Michael Nicholson, the Correctional Managed Health Care
(“CMHC”), Attorney Julie Costello, Attorney John Longwell, Attorney Carol
Goldberg, and Mary Ellen Castro for unconstitutional denial of access to courts,
deliberate indifference to medical needs, attorney malpractice and fraud, and
denial of effective assistance of counsel.
On May 31, 2017, this Court issued its Initial Review Order dismissing the
plaintiff’s claims for denial of access to courts, ineffective assistance of counsel,
and attorney malpractice and fraud. The Court permitted the plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim to proceed but only if
the plaintiff could identify the unnamed defendants whom he is suing on that
ground. The Court, thus, granted the plaintiff ninety (90) days to identify those
unnamed defendants so that the Court could direct service of the complaint. On
August 23, 2017, this Court granted the plaintiff an extension until October 2,
2017 to identify those defendants.
On June 26, 2017, the plaintiff filed two motions for the Court to reconsider
its Initial Review Order and/or grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint
[Doc.#s 21, 22]. He claims that the Court erroneously dismissed his denial of
access to courts and attorney malpractice claims. The plaintiff also seeks an
order recusing this Court from deciding the instant case [Doc.#24]. For the
following reasons, the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider the Initial Review Order
[Doc.#s 21, 22] are GRANTED but the relief requested therein is DENIED. His
motion to recuse this Court from deciding the instant case [Doc.#24] is DENIED.
Motions to Reconsider / Amend Complaint [Doc.#s 21, 22]
The plaintiff has filed motions for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) and 60(b). “Rules 59(e) and 60(b) provide for different motions directed to
similar ends.” Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1995).
Rule 59(e) governs motions to “alter or amend” a judgment, and Rule 60(b)
governs relief from a judgment for a compelling reason. See id. However,
pursuant to District of Connecticut Local Rule 7(c), motions for reconsideration
under Rule 59(e) must be filed within seven (7) days of the filing of the Order. See
also Solman v. Corl, 15 Civ. 1610 (JCH), 2016 WL 6652443, *1 n.3 (D. Conn. Nov.
10, 2016). Rule 60(b) motions, on the other hand, could be filed within one year of
the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Because the plaintiff in this case
filed his motions one month after the entry of the Initial Review Order, the Court
will treat them as a single motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b).
A court may grant a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) for any
one of the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) [is]
generally granted only upon the showing of exceptional circumstances.”
Sonberg v. Niagara Cty. Jail., 08 Civ. 364 (JTC), 2013 WL 2468691, *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Jun. 7, 2013) (quoting Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990)). It “will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or
data that the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Id. at *2 (quoting Shrader
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)). “Reconsideration is not
appropriate ‘when the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already
decided.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257). “[T]he strict requirements
of Rule 60(b) apply even to pro se litigants.” Id. at *3.
A. Denial of Access to Courts Claim
In this case, the plaintiff takes issue with the Court’s analysis and
dismissal of his denial of access to courts claim. He does not, however, dispute
the Court’s recitation of the factual allegations in support thereof. Those factual
allegations, as stated in the Court’s Initial Review Order, are as follows:
The plaintiff was arrested on August 16, 2014 and held on a bond of
$50,000 cash or surety. The plaintiff posted bond the next day and
was released from custody. He later appeared for his arraignment on
August 18, 2014, when new charges were added and his bond was
increased to $200,000 cash or surety. The plaintiff could not afford
to post the increased bond and, consequently, was held at the New
Haven Correctional Center (“NHCC”) while awaiting the disposition
of his case.
While at NHCC, the plaintiff attempted to gain access to legal
materials in order to familiarize himself with state statutes and court
rules but was informed that there was no law library or legal
materials available to inmates at NHCC. The plaintiff subsequently
filed a grievance against NHCC staff for the denial of legal materials
to NHCC inmates. In retaliation for his grievance, prison staff
transferred the plaintiff to Bridgeport Correctional Center (“BCC”), a
much less maintained and supervised facility. BCC also does not
provide its inmates with access to legal materials.
On October 15, 2014, the plaintiff posted his $200,000 bail and was
released. Shortly thereafter, however, he was arrested on new
charges and bond was set at $100,000 cash or surety. Prior to his
arraignment on the new charges, the court appointed Attorney Julie
Costello from the Public Defender’s Office to represent the plaintiff
for arraignment purposes. Attorney John Longwell from the Public
Defender’s Office informed the plaintiff that Judge Charles Gill, who
was presiding over his case, was known to arbitrarily convert surety
bonds to cash only bonds, in violation of Connecticut’s bail statutes
(CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a). At the arraignment, Judge Gill converted
the plaintiff’s bond from $100,000 cash or surety to $100,000 cash
only for a single charge of a Class D felony. Attorney Costello later
withdrew from representation, and the plaintiff was again remanded
While housed at NHCC for the second time, the plaintiff again
attempted to gain access to legal materials but was referred to the
inmate handbook, which informed all inmates about the Inmate
Litigation Assistance Program (“ILAP”). However, the plaintiff
subsequently learned that ILAP is limited to civil suits, and does not
assist with criminal proceedings. With respect to criminal matters,
NHCC only permits its inmates to consult with their attorneys.
Without access to adequate legal materials, the plaintiff struggled to
investigate and research the legal issues pertaining to his case.
Often times, he was forced to rely on friends and family to provide
him with information over the telephone regarding his case.
On November 12, 2014, the plaintiff filed a second grievance against
NHCC staff for the facility’s denial of access to adequate legal
materials. Warden Jose Feliciano denied the grievance on December
1, 2014. The plaintiff subsequently appealed the denial of the
grievance, which was also denied. Unlike NHCC and BCC, Osborn
Correctional Institution (“Osborn”) provides its inmates with access
to legal databases for research. Feliciano had the authority, as
warden of NHCC, to transfer the plaintiff to Osborn so that he could
access legal materials.
After five and one-half months, the plaintiff successfully drafted and
submitted a motion to reduce his bail. The court granted his motion,
and his bail was converted back from $100,000 cash only to $100,000
cash or surety. The plaintiff successfully posted bail on May 1, 2015
and was released.
Initial Review Order [Doc.#17] at 2-4. The plaintiff claimed that the absence
of legal materials at NHCC and BCC delayed his ability to successfully
move for a bail reduction by several months. He argued that “[b]ut for the .
. . lack of access to the courts/access to legal material, [he] could have, and
would have, generated the motion . . . that was successful in 7-10 days
instead of 5 ½ months.” Pl.’s Compl. at 10.
The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s denial of access to courts claim
for three reasons. First, the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that
defendants Semple, Jespen, Black, Walker, Marmora, and Laffargue were
personally involved in denying him access to legal material. Second, the
plaintiff failed to allege that any of the defendants acted “deliberately or
maliciously” in hindering his efforts to pursue a legal claim. Third, the
plaintiff failed to allege an “actual injury” as required by Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
With respect to defendants Semple, Jespen, Black, Walker, Marmora,
and Laffargue, the plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts showing how
these defendants prevented him from pursuing his legal claim. Rather, the
plaintiff states conclusory assertions that these defendants “actively
participated in,” “created and/or approved a policy . . . that sanctioned,” or
were “grossly negligent in . . . supervisi[ng] . . . corrections officers who
committed” the constitutional deprivation. Compl. 11-13. In his motion for
reconsideration, the plaintiff acknowledges that he “could have provided
more detail as to [those] defendants’ personal involvement” but,
nevertheless, contends that they were in fact personally involved in
denying him access to courts and/or legal materials and that his
“deficiencies . . . can easily and meritoriously be corrected by amended
pleadings.” Mot. for Recons. [Doc.#22] at 5. The Court is not persuaded
that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of Semple,
Jespen, Black, Walker, Marmora, and Laffargue in his initial complaint.
The Court also dismissed the denial of access to courts claim
against defendant Feliciano because the plaintiff failed to allege that
Feliciano, or any of the defendants, deliberately or maliciously hindered his
efforts to pursue a legal claim. Initial Review Order at 14 (citing Davis v.
Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003). In his motion for reconsideration,
the plaintiff contends that he is not required to make such an allegation
and that the rule in Davis only applies to the interference with an inmate’s
legal mail. Mot. for Recons. [Doc.#22-1] at 7-8. The Court does not agree.
Although Davis involved a claim that correction officials were
interfering with an inmate’s legal mail, the Second Circuit held that
“[i]nterference with legal mail implicates a prison inmate’s rights to access
to the courts and free speech as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 351. Thus,
although Davis may be factually distinguishable, its standard is not limited
to cases involving interference with legal mail. Moreover, the same
standard has also been applied to denial of access claims in this Circuit
based on factual allegations not involving interference with legal mail. See
Ramos v. Culick, 16 Civ. 1312 (FJS/TWD), 2017 WL 835406, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.
9, 2017) (prisoner’s denial of access to courts claim based on allegation
that defendant denied his Freedom of Information Law request fails
because complaint is devoid of facts showing that defendant acted
“deliberately and maliciously in frustrating [his] efforts”); Altayeb v.
Chapdelaine, 16 Civ. 67 (CSH), 2016 WL 7331551, *4-5 (D. Conn. Dec. 16,
2016) (to prevail on claim that defendants unconstitutionally denied him
access to telephone to call his lawyer, prisoner must allege that
defendant’s conduct was “deliberate and malicious”); Green v. Fischer, 11
Civ. 6063, 2015 WL 9460145, *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015) (prisoner’s claim
that defendants denied him access to courts by limiting him to one bag of
legal material in his cell fails because prisoner failed to allege that
defendants acted “deliberately and maliciously”); Martinez v. Healey, 14
Civ. 302 (NSR), 2014 WL 5090056, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014) (prisoner’s
denial of access to courts claim based on allegations that he was denied
access to law library and prohibited from using pen and paper insufficient
without showing that defendant’s conduct was “deliberate and malicious”);
Cancel v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 4670 (RRM) (LB), 2010 WL 8965889, *4-5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2010) (plaintiff’s claim that detective’s failure to identify
individuals who assaulted plaintiff interfered with right of access to courts
must be supported with facts that detective’s conduct was “deliberate and
malicious”). The standard comports with the principle set forth in Lewis,
518 U.S. at 351, that a prisoner seeking to prevail on a denial of access to
courts claim must show more than an allegation “that his prison’s law
library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”
Therefore, the Court does not agree with the plaintiff’s contention that he
sufficiently stated a denial of access to courts claim.
Finally, the Court dismissed the denial of access to courts claim
because the plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered an actual injury as a
result of the inadequacy of the prison law libraries. He claimed that “[b]ut
for the . . . lack of access to the courts/access to legal material, [he] could
have, and would have, generated [a] motion [for bond reduction] . . . that
was successful in 7-10 days instead of 5 ½ months.” Pl.’s Compl. at 10. In
his motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff argues that the denial of access
essentially “delay[ed] his release” because it prevented him from
challenging the criminal sentencing court’s unlawful order in a timelier
manner. Mot. for Recons. at 5. However, “delays in communicating with
the courts or delays in the ability to work on a legal action do not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation.” Cathedral Church of The Intercessor v.
Incoporated Village of Malverne, 353 F. Supp.2d 375, 388 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353); see also Kalican v. Dzurenda, 12 Civ. 1009
(SRU), 2015 WL 1806561, *5-6 (D. Conn. Apr. 21, 2015) (prisoner failed to
show actual injury in support of denial of access to courts claim based on
allegations that defendants delayed his legal calls and did not immediately
grant his requests for envelopes and paper); Tanzi v. Town of Marlborough,
13 Civ. 113 (GTS/RFT), 2014 WL 2815777, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jun. 23, 2014)
(“Conduct that merely delays a plaintiff’s ability to work on a pending
cause of action or communicate with the courts does not amount to a
violation of the right to access”); Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F. Supp. 864,
871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“A delay in being able to work on one’s legal action or
communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation”). Based on the foregoing precedent and the plaintiff’s
allegations, the plaintiff has failed to allege actual injury for purposes of his
denial of access to courts claim.
B. Attorney Malpractice Claim
The plaintiff also requests that his attorney malpractice claim be
reinstated against defendants Costello, Longwell, and Goldberg, but he
does not give any specific reasons why the Court’s initial dismissal of that
claim was incorrect. The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s state law claim of
attorney malpractice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Attorneys
Costello, Longwell, and Goldberg were not acting “under color of state
law” when they were representing the plaintiff and, therefore, are not
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 318-19 (1981) (public defenders do not act “under color of state law”
and therefore are not subject to suit under § 1983); Osuch v. Gregory, 303
F. Supp.2d 189, 196 (D. Conn. 2004) (dismissing § 1983 action against
public defender for ineffective assistance). The Court cannot exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s malpractice claim because his
other claims for denial of access to the courts and deliberate indifference
to medical needs are entirely unrelated to the actions of Costello, Longwell,
Moreover, the claims against the attorneys are misjoined as they do
not arise out of the same facts, to the extent the attorneys are not immune
from suit. Inconsequence, reinstating those claims would be futile because
they would be severed from this action and the Plaintiff would have to
assert them in a separate lawsuit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20; see Benson v. RMJ
Securities Corp., 683 F.Supp. 359, 377 (S.D.N.Y.1988).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to reinstate the
plaintiff’s attorney malpractice claim.
C. Severance of Claims
After reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the Court’s Initial Review
Order, and the motion for reconsideration, the Court will not reinstate the
plaintiff’s denial of access to courts claim or attorney malpractice claim.
Those claims remain dismissed. If the plaintiff chooses to continue
pursuing his denial of access to courts claim or attorney malpractice
claims, he must raise those claims in a separate lawsuit, as they are
completely unrelated to his Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to medical needs.
This Court may “sever any claim against a party” at its discretion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1973). In
determining whether to sever claims, the Court must consider:
(1) whether the claims arise of the same transaction or occurrence;
(2) whether the claims present some common questions of law or
fact; (3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would
be facilitated; (4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance
were granted; and (5) whether different witnesses and documentary
proof are required for the separate claims.
Edwards v. North American Power and Gas, LLC, 14 Civ. 1714 (VAB), 2016 WL
3093356, *3 (D. Conn. Jun. 1, 2016). “Courts within this Circuit have stated that
[s]everance requires the presence of only one of these conditions.” North Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 312 F.R.D. 111, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (quoting Cestone v. General Cigar Holdings, Inc., 00 Civ. 3686 (RCC), 2002
WL 424654, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002)). “However, these same courts have
generally granted severance only after finding more than one of the conditions
was met.” Id. at 115.
If the plaintiff chooses to continue pursuing his denial of access to
courts and attorney malpractice claims, severance is warranted because
those claims do not (1) arise from the same factual transaction, (2) present
common questions of law, or (3) require the same witnesses and/or
documentary proof. The plaintiff brought his denial of access to courts
claim against supervisory Department of Correction officials for providing
inadequate access to legal materials at NHCC and BCC. The plaintiff’s
attorney malpractice claims are against attorneys in the Connecticut Public
Defenders Office for their inadequate representation of the plaintiff during
his bond hearings. His deliberate indifference to medical needs claim
relates to nurses and/or correction officers with whom the plaintiff
interacted regarding his medical injury. Thus, the three claims are against
separate parties based on entirely separate issues. Trying these claims
separately would better serve judicial economy. Moreover, any prejudicial
effect of severance is minimal considering the case consists solely of a
complaint at this juncture, and discovery has not commenced. Thus, any
further litigation of the denial of access to courts claim or attorney
malpractice claim must occur in a separate lawsuit.
D. Conclusion Upon Reconsideration
After reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint and motion for
reconsideration, the Court will not reinstate the plaintiff’s denial of access
to courts claim or attorney malpractice claim. Those claims remain
dismissed. If the plaintiff chooses to continue pursuing his denial of
access to courts claim and/or attorney malpractice claim, he must do so in
a separate lawsuit. The plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration [Doc.#s 21,
22] are GRANTED but the relief requested therein is DENIED.
Motion for Recusal [Doc.#24]
On August 22, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for this Court to
recuse itself from the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. He bases
his motion on his memorandum in support of his motions for
reconsideration of the Court’s order dismissing his denial of access to
courts and attorney malpractice claims [Doc.#22-1], in which he “accused
the court of readily apparent and blatant misconduct.” Mot. for Recusal
[Doc.#24] at ¶ 11. He also asserts that, on July 25, 2017, he “filed an
extremely poignant complaint of misconduct with the [S]econd [C]ircuit
[C]ourt of [A]ppeals misconduct panel,” and, therefore, the Court cannot
remain impartial in the instant case. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15.
“Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455. “In cases where a judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the issue for consideration is
not whether the judge is in fact subjectively impartial, but whether the
objective facts suggest impartiality.” New York ex rel. Boardman v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 04 Civ. 962 (DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 655607, *2
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2007) (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548
(1994)). “The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable person, knowing all
the facts, [would] conclude that the trial judge’s impartiality could
reasonably be questioned.” Id. (internal quotations omitted.). The Second
Circuit has committed broad discretion to the trial court in deciding
motions for recusal. See id. “In deciding whether to recuse [her]self, the
trial judge must carefully weigh the policy of promoting public confidence
in the judiciary against the possibility that those questioning [her]
impartiality might be seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of [her]
presiding over their case.” In re Drexel Brunham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988).
In this case, the plaintiff has not presented the Court with sufficient
grounds for recusal. The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s denial of access to
courts and attorney malpractice claims based on well-established legal
precedent and insufficient factual allegations. See Sec. I, supra.
“[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings,
do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display
a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff has not pointed to any
specific language in the Court’s Initial Review Order [Doc.#17] showing any
such “favoritism or antagonism.” The only language which he claims
warrants recusal is that which he wrote himself in his challenge to the
Court’s ruling. The fact that the plaintiff chose to file a memorandum
accusing the Court of misconduct does not call into question the Court’s
impartiality. See Dipietro v. New Jersey, 14 Civ. 352 (NLH/AMD), 2014 WL
4354027, *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 3, 2014) (plaintiff’s letter to justice department
accusing judge of criminal conduct and expressing displeasure with
judge’s opinion does not cause reasonable person to doubt judge’s
impartiality). “To hold otherwise would allow any disappointed litigant to
switch forums by simply making specious allegations.” Id. Moreover, the
plaintiff cannot “force a judge’s recusal merely by filing suit against him or
her.” Kampfer v. Gokey, 175 F.3d 1008, *1 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Martin-Trigona, 759 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1985)). Virtually
every decision rendered by a judge disappoints at least one person, and
judges are accustomed to having their decisions challenged. In fact, the
entire system of appellate review recognizes that trial judges, like all
humans, are imperfect and make errors. In consequence, disappointed
litigants are afforded under our system of justice an opportunity to raise
objections to trial judges' rulings through the appeal process. Indeed, it is
through the appellate process that our jurisprudence is advanced and
judging is improved. Far from taking umbrage at a disgruntled litigant's
challenge to a trial judge's opinion, a judge relishes the opportunity for
professional growth through the enlightenment or validation yielded by
appellate review. Therefore, a reasonable person would not question this
Court’s impartiality based on the plaintiff’s contentions. The plaintiff’s
motion for recusal is DENIED.
(1) The plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration [Doc.#s 21, 22] are GRANTED
but the relief requested therein is DENIED. The plaintiff’s denial of
access to courts and attorney malpractice claims remain DISMISSED
from the instant case. If the plaintiff wishes to continue pursuing those
claims, he must do so in a separate lawsuit.
(2) The plaintiff’s motion for recusal [Doc.#24] is DENIED.
(3) Plaintiff must amend his complaint asserting only a deliberate
indifference claim by the extended deadline of October 2. Failure to
meet this deadline will result in dismissal of the case.
(4) The Plaintiff must identify the unnamed defendants in his deliberate
indifference claim by October 2, 2017.
SO ORDERED this 25th day of August 2017 at Hartford, Connecticut.
VANESSA L. BRYANT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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