Walker v. Doe et al

Filing 53

RULING denying 50 Motion to Amend/Correct. Walkers Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 50 ) is DENIED. Walkers equal protection claims are DISMISSED pursuant to section 1915A(b)(1) of title 28 of the United States Code and his request for injunctive relief is DENIED as moot. The case will proceed only on the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against Wright and Verville. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 9/17/2018. (Lewis, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

EUGENE LIONEL WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
JANE DOE, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL CASE NO.
3:17-cv-425 (JCH)

SEPTEMBER 17, 2018

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND (DOC. NO. 50)
The plaintiff, Eugene Lionel Walker (“Walker”), currently incarcerated at CorriganRadgowski Correctional Center in Uncasville, Connecticut, seeks leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint in response to the court’s May 21, 2018 Order. For the reasons
that follow, Walker’s Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 50) is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
Walker named six defendants in his Amended Complaint, Dr. Carson Wright and

Nurses Barbara Savoie, Shannon Lawrence, Wanda Verville, Darnella Burke and Debra
Wilson. Walker asserted federal claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs and violation of his right to equal protection of the law. See Amended Complaint
(“Am. Compl.”)(Doc. No. 29) at 10-12. He also re-asserted state law claims for
negligence and medical malpractice which were dismissed in the Initial Review Order.
See id. at 11; Initial Review Order (Doc. No. 9) at 10-11.
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. No. 39) directed to the deliberate indifference claims. The court

granted that Motion as to the claims against Nurses Savoie, Lawrence, Burke, and
Wilson and denied the motion as to the claims against Dr. Wright and Nurse Verville.
See Ruling (Doc. No. 46) at 21. On May 21, 2018, the court issued an Order directing
Walker to file an amended complaint if he intended to pursue his equal protection claim.
Walker was directed to identify the defendants involved in the claim and to allege facts
satisfying the pleading requirements for an equal protection claim. See Order (Doc. No.
47).
II.

ANALYSIS
Walker’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint is a copy of the Amended

Complaint with three changes. First, Walker has revised the paragraph relating to his
equal protection claim. Second, Walker states that he is suing all defendants in their
official capacities as well as their individual capacities and that the omission of official
capacity from the Complaint and Amended Complaint was inadvertent. Third, Walker
has appended the results of a 2014 CT scan to address the deficiency identified in the
Initial Review Order regarding his state law malpractice claim. The defendants object to
the re-assertion of previously dismissed claims.
A.

Equal Protection Claim

Walker includes the following paragraph to clarify his equal protection claim.
Plaintiff’s equal protection rights were violated by doctor Carson Wright
and Nurse Verville. Due to the fact that all sentenced inmates are housed
at facilities that as per state statute C.G.S. 18 have a doctor working every
business day. Dr. Carson Wright was notified about plaintiff’s
deteriorating condition on four separate occasions and still did not
examine plaintiff to identify the problem despite the fact that, the severe
symptoms were clearly presenting themselves. Additionally, Nurse
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Verville acted outside of her authority [and] provence by interjecting her
own personal assessment of plaintiff’s condition, assuming it was just the
eye, and only prescribed putting warm water and soap on it. Under similar
situated circumstances a doctor would have taken the information he or
she received and do a proper examination to identify the root problem.
Furthermore, a nurse under similar situated circumstances would have
called a doctor or immediately put plaintiff on the emergency call list.
Plaintiff being a pretrial detainee at the time was only being held because
plaintiff could not make bond was [ ] entitled to equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“Proposed Second Am. Compl.”)(Doc. No. 501) at 15.
Walker has complied with part of the court’s Order by stating that his equal
protection claim is asserted against Dr. Wright and Nurse Verville, the only remaining
defendants. However, he fails to allege facts to state a plausible equal protection claim.
The Equal Protection Clause protects prisoners from invidious discrimination.
This provision does not mandate identical treatment for each individual; rather it
requires that similarly situated persons be treated the same. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). To state an equal protection claim,
Walker must allege facts showing that he was “treated differently than others similarly
situated as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Phillips v. Girdich, 408
F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). Walker can demonstrate an equal protection violation by
“point[ing] to a law or policy that expressly classifies persons on the basis of race,”
“identify[ing] a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an intentionally
discriminatory manner,” or “alleg[ing] that a facially neutral statute or policy has an
adverse effect and it was motivated by discriminatory animus.” Anderson v. Waterbury
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Police Dep't, 2017 WL 1157843, at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2017) (quoting Brown v. City
of Oneonta, N.Y., 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Walker alleges that sentenced inmates, unlike pretrial detainees, are held in
correctional facilities with a full-time doctor. Although he argues that this arrangement is
pursuant to state statute, he has provided an incomplete citation. The court has
searched the Connecticut General Statutes and not found any statute referring to the
allocation of doctors to correctional facilities. Walker has identified no law or policy that
was applied to him in a discriminatory manner. Nor does he allege that he is a member
of a protected class or that he was treated differently because of a suspect
classification. See Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244, 301 n.18 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)
(merely being a prisoner is insufficient to put plaintiff in a suspect class), aff’d, 449 F.
App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011); Lehal v. United States, No. 13CV3923 (DF), 2015 WL
9592706, at *21 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2015) (“[I]nmates or detainees are not
considered a protected class for equal-protection purposes.”). Thus, Walker does not
allege a plausible traditional equal protection claim.
Walker also could assert an equal violation under a “class of one” theory. To
state a valid “class of one” claim, Walker must allege first, that he was “intentionally
treated differently from others who are similarly situated[.]” Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Second, he must allege facts showing that “there is
no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Id. He must allege an “extremely high”
level of similarity with the person to whom he is comparing himself: their circumstances
must be “prima facie identical.” Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104–05 (2005),
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overruled in part on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir.
2008). Walker identifies no other inmate, sentenced or pretrial detainee, who was
similarly situated but treated differently. Thus, he fails to state a plausible “class of one”
claim.
The court concludes that Walker has alleged no facts to support a plausible
equal protection claim. His allegations merely recast his deliberate indifference claims
as equal protection claims. The equal protection claim is dismissed pursuant to section
1915A(b)(1) of title 28 of the United States Code.
B.

Official Capacity Claims

Walker states that he inadvertently failed to indicate in the Complaint or
Amended Complaint that he was suing the defendants in their official as well as
individual capacity. Walker seeks injunctive relief in the form of orders that he be
provided proper medical care, that the defendants not retaliate against him, and that he
be transferred to Cheshire Correctional Institution. See Proposed Second Am. Compl.
at 16.
The defendants treated Walker when he was confined at Northern Correctional
Institution and Cheshire Correctional Institution. See id. at 7, 10. The Second Circuit
repeatedly has noted that, “[i]n this circuit, an inmate's transfer from a prison facility
generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that
facility.” Wright v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 568 F. App’x 53,
55 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants are nurses and a doctor who
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provide medical services at Northern Correctional Institution. See Proposed Second
Am. Compl. at 6. Walker currently is confined at Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional
Institution. See id. at 18. As no defendant is a high-ranking correctional official,
Walker’s transfer moots his request for injunctive relief. The request is dismissed
pursuant to section 1915A(b)(1) of title 28 of the United States Code. As damages are
not available against correctional officials in their official capacity under the facts of this
case, amendment to assert official capacity claims would be futile. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
C.

Malpractice Claim

The court dismissed Walker’s malpractice claim because he failed to comply with
the requirements of section 52-190a(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes, which
requires that the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action file an opinion letter from a
qualified medical professional certifying that there appeared to have been medical
negligence in the plaintiff’s care or treatment. See Initial Review Order (Doc. No. 9) at
11. Walker has appended to the Proposed Second Amended Complaint the results of a
2014 CT scan. This is not an opinion letter and does not certify any improper medical
treatment. Thus, the exhibit does not correct the deficiency identified in the Initial
Review Order and is insufficient to revive the state law malpractice claim.
D.

Previously Dismissed Claims

Walker includes in his Proposed Second Amended Complaint the deliberate
indifference to medical needs claims against Nurses Savoie, Lawrence, Burke, and
Wilson, even though the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims.
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See Proposed Second Am. Compl. at 13; Ruling (Doc. No. 46) at 21. The defendants
object to the re-assertion of these claims as barred under the law of the case doctrine.
See generally Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 51).
Although not binding, the law of the case doctrine provides that a court should
adhere to its earlier decisions in later stages of litigation unless compelling reasons
counsel otherwise. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 208
(2d Cir. 2013); see Devilla v. Schriver, 245 F.3d 192, 197 (2d Cir. 2001) (purpose of
doctrine is to “maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided
during the course of a single continuing lawsuit” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). The compelling reasons that would support deviation from the law of the
case doctrine include, most notably, an intervening change in the law, availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Ali v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2008). The doctrine is properly applied only when
the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the initial determination. See
Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 219. (2d Cir. 2002).
Walker merely restates his prior allegations. He has not identified any change in
the law or new evidence that would warrant reconsideration of the dismissal of these
claims. Accordingly, the claims against Nurses Savoie, Lawrence, Burke and Wilson
remain dismissed.

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III.

CONCLUSION
Walker’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 50) is DENIED. Walker’s equal

protection claims are DISMISSED pursuant to section 1915A(b)(1) of title 28 of the
United States Code and his request for injunctive relief is DENIED as moot.
The case will proceed only on the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference
claims against Wright and Verville.
SO ORDERED this 17th day of September 2018 at New Haven, Connecticut.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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