Negron et al v. Patriot Auto Sales, LLC et al
RULING denying 14 Motion for Judgment. SO ORDERED by Judge Janet C. Hall on 7/11/2017. (Lewis, D)
Case 3:17-cv-00583-JCH Document 17 Filed 07/12/17 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CORALYS NEGRON and
PATRIOT AUTO SALES, LLC and
CIVIL ACTION No.
JULY 11, 2017
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 14)
The plaintiffs, Coralys Negron and Francisco Negron (“the plaintiffs”), filed their
Complaint on April 10, 2017, against both Patriot Auto Sales (“Patriot”) and Jason Winer
(“Winer”). Compl. (Doc. No. 1). On May 9, the plaintiffs moved for a default entry as
the Patriot Auto Sales for failure to plead. See Mot. for Default For Failure to Plead
(Doc. No. 9). On May 11, the court granted that Motion. See Order Granting Mot. for
Default Entry (Doc. No. 10). Winer timely filed his Answer to the Complaint on May 15.
See Answer (Doc. No. 12). Now before the court is the plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment.
See Mot. for J. (Doc. No. 14).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) governs the entry of default judgment.
However, because this matter involves multiple defendants, only one of whom has
defaulted, the court must also look to Rule 54, which concerns the entry of Judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. §§ 54-55. Rule 54(b) empowers a court to enter judgment as to
fewer than all claims against all parties “only if the court expressly determines that there
is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. § 54(b). “[W]hen one of several defendants
who is alleged to be jointly liable defaults, judgment should not be entered against that
defendant until the matter has been adjudicated with regard to all defendants, or all
Case 3:17-cv-00583-JCH Document 17 Filed 07/12/17 Page 2 of 2
defendants have defaulted.” 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2690 (4th ed.2017) (citing Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that Patriot and Winer have each individually
violated the Truth in Lending Act, and jointly (1) breached the implied warranty of
merchantability; (2) the express warranty allegedly made at sale; (3) the Retail
Installment Sales Finance Act; and (4) the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act. See
Compl. at 5-11. Thus, for the majority of the claims in the Complaint, entering partial
judgment against Patriot would be inappropriate because Patriot is allegedly jointly
liable with Winer, who has appeared and answered the Complaint. See Wright & Miller,
supra, at § 2690. For the Truth in Lending Act Violation, which the plaintiffs allege
Patriot violated individually, the plaintiffs have failed to set forth a basis that there is no
just reason for delay, and so the court cannot enter judgment as to Patriot with regards
to that claim either. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for J. (Doc. No.
14-1) at 7-9. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment is DENIED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 11th day of July, 2017.
/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge
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