Ortiz v. Bennett et al

Filing 7

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER: In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court enters the following orders: (1) All claims against defendant Bennett are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2). (2) The Clerk shall verif y the current work addresses for defendants Williams, Vassell and Duchette with the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs. The Clerk shall then mail waiver of service of process request packets containing the Complaint to defendants at the confirmed addresses within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and report to the court on the status of the waiver request on the thirty-fifth (35) day after mailing. If any defendant fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make a rrangements for in-person service by the U.S. Marshal Service on him or her in individual capacity and the defendant shall be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). (3) The Clerk sha ll send written notice to plaintiff of the status of this action, along with a copy of this Order. (4) The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint and this Order to the Connecticut Attorney General and the Department of Correc tion Office of Legal Affairs.(5) The defendants shall file their response to the complaint, either an answer or motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date the waiver forms are sent. If they choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations and respond to the cognizable claim recited above. They also may include any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.(6) Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, shall be completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this order. Discovery requests need not be filed with the court.(7) All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months (240 days) from the date of this o rder.(8) Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to a dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date the motion was filed. If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can be granted absent objection.(9) If plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local Court Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that plaintiff MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the case. Plaint iff must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. Plaintiff should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If plaintiff has more than one pending case, he should indicate all of the case numbers in the notification of change of address. Plaintiff should also notify the defendant or the attorney for the defendant of his new address. (10) Plaintiff shall utilize the Prisoner Efiling Program when filing documents with the court. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 8/8/2017. (Townsend, D.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LUIS G. ORTIZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
BENNETT, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 3:17-cv-593 (JAM)

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff Luis G. Ortiz is a prisoner at MacDougall Correctional Institution in the custody
of the Connecticut Department of Correction. He has filed a complaint pro se and in forma
pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four defendants in their individual and official
capacities: Remedy Coordinator Bennett, Lieutenant Williams, and Correctional Officers
Duchette and Vassell. Plaintiff alleges defendants used excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment when they forced him into too-tight handcuffs and “bounced” his head against a
wall. After an initial review, the Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed as to
defendant Bennett and be served on the remaining defendants.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations from plaintiff’s complaint are accepted as true for purposes of
this ruling. Plaintiff was a sentenced prisoner confined at MacDougall-Walker Correctional
Institution at the time of the incident underlying the complaint. On February 16, 2016, plaintiff
was speaking with his mother on the unit telephone when a recall was issued. Doc. #1 at 7.
Plaintiff terminated his call and proceeded to walk from the telephone banks at the front of the

housing unit to his cell at the back of the housing unit. Plaintiff entered his cell and waited for
staff to close the cell door.
Shortly after the cell door was closed, plaintiff heard defendant Duchette direct the
control officer to open plaintiff’s cell door. Plaintiff’s cellmate was escorted to the unit’s medical
area, where he was handcuffed and placed face-first against the wall. Doc. #1 at 7 (¶ 36).
Plaintiff was then ordered to exit his cell. Once he did, Duchette grabbed him and pushed his
face against the wall. Defendant Williams pressed a can containing a chemical agent against
plaintiff’s face. When plaintiff questioned these actions, Williams told plaintiff he would explain
when plaintiff got to restrictive housing. Id. at 7–8 (¶¶ 37–39).
Defendants Vassell and Duchette used Vassell’s forearm to “bounce” plaintiff’s face
against the wall. They also twisted his wrists until plaintiff heard something “pop” in his left
wrist. Plaintiff experienced severe pain and began “seeing stars.” Id. at 8 (¶¶ 41–43). The
defendants laughed at his cries of pain. Defendants then placed handcuffs on plaintiff’s wrists,
clamping them tight enough to cause lacerations and dripping blood. Id. at ¶ 44. Defendants then
escorted plaintiff to restrictive housing, and, after plaintiff was strip-searched and placed in a
restrictive housing cell, the handcuffs were removed. An additional, unidentified officer carrying
a hand-held video camera recorded the walk to the restrictive housing unit. Shortly thereafter,
Williams and Vassell photographed plaintiff’s injuries to his wrist, and he was examined by
Nurse Diaz. Id. at 8–9 (¶¶ 45–47).
About ten minutes later, Williams and his supervisor, Captain Baymon, came to
plaintiff’s cell. Williams said that there had been a mistake, plaintiff had done nothing wrong,
and plaintiff would be released from restrictive housing and returned to his unit. No further
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explanation of the incident has been provided to plaintiff. Following the incident, plaintiff began
seeking mental health treatment for anxiety caused by the incident. He also has suffered
permanent nerve damage. Id. at 9 (¶¶ 48–54).
Plaintiff submitted an institutional grievance regarding this incident. When he received
no response he questioned defendant Bennett, the Administrative Remedies Coordinator.
Defendant Bennett denied receiving the grievance. Id. at 5–6.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court must review prisoner civil complaints and
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. The Court must accept as true all factual matters alleged in a complaint, although a
complaint may not survive unless its factual recitations state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770
F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, it is well-established that “pro se complaints ‘must
be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes
v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir.
2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
In recent years, the Supreme Court has set forth a threshold “plausibility” pleading
standard for courts to evaluate the adequacy of federal court complaints. A complaint must allege
enough facts—as distinct from legal conclusions—that give rise to plausible grounds for relief.
See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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Notwithstanding the rule of liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint, a pro se complaint may
not survive dismissal if its factual allegations do not meet the basic plausibility standard. See,
e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff’s allegations support a claim for use of excessive force against defendants
Williams, Vassell, and Duchette. As with all Eighth Amendment claims, excessive force claims
have subjective and objective components. The subjective component focuses on “the
defendant’s motive for his conduct”; the objective component focuses “on the conduct’s effect.”
Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir. 2009). In excessive force cases, the “core judicial
inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per
curiam) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The use of excessive force against a prisoner can constitute cruel and unusual punishment
regardless of whether the inmate suffers serious injuries. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4; accord
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34, 36.
Plaintiff alleges that Vassell and Duchette used excessive force against him by pushing
him against the wall, bouncing his head against the wall, twisting his wrists and applying the
handcuffs so tight that his wrists began bleeding. Williams effectively condoned this conduct
while threatening plaintiff with a chemical agent. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged actions that
indicate a malicious desire to cause harm rather than a good faith effort to maintain discipline.
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 36. First, plaintiff alleges that defendants laughed at him when he cried out
in pain. Second, defendants’ alleged “bouncing” of plaintiff’s head against a wall while plaintiff
was already immobilized served no apparent disciplinary purpose. In the context of such
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malicious actions, plaintiff’s alleged injuries of extreme pain and lacerated wrists are adequate to
state a plausible excessive force claim against Vassell, Duchette, and Williams. See Wright, 554
F.3d at 268–69.
Defendant Bennett does not appear to have been present during the use of excessive
force. Instead, plaintiff’s allegations regarding Bennett focus on his failure to comply with
institutional grievance procedures. Inmates have no constitutionally protected rights to have their
grievances investigated or to have grievance procedures followed. See Cabassa v. Ostheimer,
162 F. Supp. 3d 60, 63 (D. Conn. 2016) (collecting cases). Additionally, inmates have no
constitutional entitlement to receive responses to filed grievances. Ibid. As plaintiff has no
constitutionally protected right to effective grievance procedures or to have state procedures
followed, his claim against Bennett fails and is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court enters the following orders:
(1)

All claims against defendant Bennett are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2).
(2)

The Clerk shall verify the current work addresses for defendants Williams,

Vassell and Duchette with the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs. The Clerk shall
then mail waiver of service of process request packets containing the Complaint to defendants at
the confirmed addresses within twenty-one (21) days of this Order, and report to the court on
the status of the waiver request on the thirty-fifth (35) day after mailing. If any defendant fails to
return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for in-person service by the U.S.

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Marshal Service on him or her in individual capacity and the defendant shall be required to pay
the costs of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
(3)

The Clerk shall send written notice to plaintiff of the status of this action, along

with a copy of this Order.
(4)

The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint and this Order to the

Connecticut Attorney General and the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs.
(5)

The defendants shall file their response to the complaint, either an answer or

motion to dismiss, within sixty (60) days from the date the waiver forms are sent. If they choose
to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations and respond to the cognizable claim
recited above. They also may include any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal
Rules.
(6)

Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37, shall be

completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this order. Discovery requests need
not be filed with the court.
(7)

All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months (240 days)

from the date of this order.
(8)

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a nonmoving party must respond to a

dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date the motion was filed. If no response is
filed, or the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can be granted absent objection.
(9)

If plaintiff changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local

Court Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that plaintiff MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in
the dismissal of the case. Plaintiff must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated.
6

Plaintiff should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is not enough to
just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If plaintiff has
more than one pending case, he should indicate all of the case numbers in the notification of
change of address. Plaintiff should also notify the defendant or the attorney for the defendant of
his new address.
(10)

Plaintiff shall utilize the Prisoner Efiling Program when filing documents with the

court.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 8th day of August, 2017.

/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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