Brown v. Sutton et al

Filing 7

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 5/8/2017. (Chen, C.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
:
DAVEN BROWN,
:
Plaintiff,
:
CASE NO. 3:17-cv-673 (VAB)
:
v.
:
:
SUZANNE SUTTON, et al.,
:
Defendants.
:
:
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Daven Brown (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Cheshire Correctional Institution
(“Cheshire”), filed this Complaint pro se, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”). Mr. Brown’s Complaint was filed on April 24, 2017, ECF No. 1, and his motion to
proceed in forma pauperis was granted on April 27, 2017, ECF No. 6. He brings claims against
First Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Suzanne Sutton, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Beth L.
Baldwin, Investigator James Bender, Chief Disciplinary Counsel Patricia A. King, Reviewing
Committee Attorney Joseph D. Fotti, Grievance Attorney Gail S. Kotowski, Bar Counsel
Member Christopher L. Slack, Reviewing Committee Member John Doe, State Trooper
Fratellenico, and Sergeant Supervisor Gunsalus1 (collectively, “Defendants”). Mr. Brown
challenges the way Defendants handled his grievance for attorney misconduct relating to a
charge of violation of probation.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss

any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which

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Trooper Fratellenico’s and Sergeant Supervisor Gunsalus’s full names are not provided in the Complaint.

relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must “liberally construe [the] pleadings,” and
interpret the complaint to “raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d
636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101-03 (2d Cir. 2010)
(discussing special solicitude that courts ought to show to pro se litigants). Although detailed
allegations are not required, the complaint must still include sufficient facts to afford the
defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to
demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
II.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Mr. Brown alleges that he was charged with violation of probation, which he alleges

“never happen[ed].” Compl. at 8, ECF No. 1. He alleges that he hired an attorney to represent
him on the violation charge and that the attorney charged him $5,000 as well as additional
money to hire a private investigator. Id. Mr. Brown alleges that the attorney that he hired never
actually retained a private investigator despite charging Mr. Brown for the expense. Id. Mr.
Brown further alleges that “[t]he investigation officer never got proper documentation of [the
violation of probation],” despite the attorney charging him the expense. Id.
In 2014, Mr. Brown alleges that he filed a grievance against that attorney with the Bar
Association, alleging misconduct and a violation of ethics codes. Compl. at 8. He alleges that
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the Disciplinary Counsel refused “[t]o properly investigate” his allegations and improperly
“dismiss[ed] [his] complaint” against the attorney. Id.
Mr. Brown further alleges that the “state trooper[s] also closed the case without proper
paperwork.” Compl at 8. He further alleges that “[a]ll the people mention[ed] in my case
intentionally conspired to cover up a crime.” Id.
III.

DISCUSSION
A review of Mr. Brown’s Complaint and his allegations shows that Mr. Brown’s claims

are a challenge to a state disciplinary proceeding that he initiated against his attorney and a
challenge to the actions of state police troopers in closing an underlying criminal case. See
Compl. at 8. For the reasons described below, even when the Court construes Mr. Brown’s
Complaint “liberally”, Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639, Mr. Brown cannot state a claim on either of these
grounds, and the Court therefore dismisses his Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
A.

Grievance Complaint

Defendants Sutton, Baldwin, Bender, King, Fotti, Kotowski, Slack, and Doe
(collectively, the “Disciplinary Counsel Defendants”) appear to have been involved in the
grievance complaint Mr. Brown filed against his attorney. Mr. Brown’s claim against them
stems from his belief that his grievance complaint was not handled properly. As explained
below, the Court concludes that Mr. Brown’s claim against the Disciplinary Counsel Defendants
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the
doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries causes by
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state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Second Circuit has “specifically determined
that federal courts are precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from reviewing a claim
attacking a state court's decision regarding the discipline of an attorney.” McKeown v. New York
State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 377 F. App’x 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Zimmerman v.
Grievance Comm. Of the Fifth Judicial Dist., 726 F.2d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 1984)).
The Connecticut attorney grievance committee acts as an arm of the state courts of
Connecticut. Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Zelotes, 152 Conn. App. 380, 402-03 (2014)
(explaining in case arising from attorney disciplinary proceeding in Connecticut that “[a]n
attorney as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, is continually accountable to it
for the manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been accorded him”). “[T]he
United States Constitution does not permit [district courts] to supervise the departmental
disciplinary committees or review the decisions” of state courts. McKeown v. N.Y., No. 08-CIV2391 (SAS), 2010 WL 4140421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010), aff'd, 444 F. App'x 508 (2d Cir.
2012). Any complaints alleging “an underlying wrongdoing by an attorney, followed by a
complaint to a disciplinary committee, followed by the disciplinary committee’s failure to take
action,” must therefore be brought through “the state court system,” as this Court “lacks
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the” state’s disciplinary committee for attorneys. Id.
As to the Disciplinary Counsel Defendants, Mr. Brown’s Complaint alleges only that
they improperly failed to take action on his grievance against the attorney he hired to represent
him on his alleged violation of probation. Compl. at 8. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this
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Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. McKeown, 377 F. App’x at 123. Thus, his
claims against the Disciplinary Counsel Defendants are properly dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.
B.

Alleged Failure to Investigate

Mr. Brown also alleges that Connecticut “state trooper[s] also closed [his] case without
proper paperwork.” Compl at 8. His Complaint names Trooper Fratellenico, and his supervisor,
Sergeant Gunsalus, from the Connecticut State Police. Mr. Brown includes no other facts
relating to these two defendants. The Court construes Mr. Brown’s Complaint to allege a claim
for insufficient investigation.
A claim against a police department or police officers for failure to investigate a crime
does not state a constitutional violation unless another constitutional right also is implicated. See
McCullough v. Syracuse Police Dep’t, No. 7:15-CV-0638 (DNH) (TWD), 2015 WL 5057472, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015), report and recommendation adopted by, 2015 WL 5062370
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2015) (finding that where plaintiff alleged that police officers failed to
investigate a theft that he reported and failed to enforce the law “[s]uch an allegation fails to state
a federal civil rights claim as a matter of law”) (citing Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir.
1985)); see also Newton v. City of New York, 566 F. Supp. 2d 256, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(dismissing civil rights case arising out of an alleged failure to investigate in a criminal case
because “there is no constitutional right to an adequate investigation”). Mr. Brown’s allegations
against Defendants Fratellenico and Gunsalus are therefore dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
ORDERS
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Court enters the following orders:
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(1)

The complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)(1).
(2)

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 8th day of May, 2017.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
Victor A. Bolden
United States District Judge

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