Sellars v. Semple et al

Filing 9

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REFILING OF PROPER COMPLAINT(S). For the reasons stated in the attached ruling, the Court enters the following orders: (1) The following claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
67; 1915(e)(2)(B): all claims against defendants Semple, Giles, Chance, Camp, May, Hagan, Ruth, Desmarais, Pigeon, and DeMatteis-Lepore, and all claims against defendant Williams arising from events prior to April 27, 2014. (2) The remainder of t he complaint that involves allegations that are not time-barred is dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8 and its requirement of a short and plain statement of the facts and grounds for relief. (3) On or before November 30, 2017, plaintiff may file an amended complaint (or more than one complaint) that complies with Rules 8 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint (or amended complaints) by that date, the Co urt intends to dismiss this case. (4) Any amended complaint should identify by name all "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" defendants whom plaintiff seeks to hold liable, or, if plaintiff has been unable to discover the identities of th ese defendants, he shall file a motion for extension of time that describes in detail the efforts he has made to learn the names of these defendants along with his amended complaint. (5) Plaintiff is advised that any amended complaint will compl etely replace his original complaint, and therefore he must include all factual allegations he wishes to pursue in any amended complaints that he may file, even if these facts were already set forth in his original complaint. Failure to do so may res ult in the dismissal of any claims not included in the amended complaint. If plaintiff has any questions about how to file his amended complaint, he may contact chambers at [phone] and to request to speak with the law clerk for this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 10/20/2017. (Black, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SEAN DUNCAN SELLARS,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:17-cv-00706 (JAM)

SCOTT SEMPLE, et al.
Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RE-FILING OF PROPER COMPLAINT(S)
Plaintiff Sean Duncan Sellars is a former prisoner of the Connecticut Department of
Correction. He has filed a 59-page civil rights complaint against some 24 defendants who he
believes wronged him during the course of several years while he was incarcerated, residing at
several halfway houses, or on parole. For several reasons, I will dismiss the complaint with leave
to file an amended complaint (or more than one amended complaint to the extent that plaintiff
wishes to file a complaint against defendants who cannot be properly joined in one action).
First, insofar as the complaint alleges wrongful acts that occurred more than three years
prior to his filing of the complaint, I conclude that these allegations are barred by the statute of
limitations. Second, insofar as the complaint alleges claims against parole board members for
actions taken in their official capacity, I will dismiss these claims with prejudice on the ground
of absolute immunity. Third, insofar as the complaint alleges claims against supervisory prison
or program officials who were not personally involved in any wrongful acts against plaintiff,
these claims are dismissed without prejudice to re-filing claims against these supervisory
defendants in the event that such facts showing their personal involvement can be alleged.

As to those claims that are not time-barred by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of
absolute immunity, the complaint contains an extraordinary level of factual detail that defies
even the most generous interpretation of the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that a complaint contain no more than a short and simple statement of the facts that
give rise to plausible grounds for relief. Moreover, because the complaint joins many different
claims against many different defendants and despite the fact that many of the claims are not
factually related to one another, plaintiff must proceed in compliance with Rule 20 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by filing one or more separate lawsuits against each defendant or group
of defendants for whom plaintiff’s claims are factually related. Because of these concerns under
Rule 8 and Rule 20, if plaintiff wishes to proceed, he must first file an amended complaint or
amended complaints that set forth a reasonably concise statement of the facts that give rise to any
claims for relief and that join as defendants to each lawsuit only those defendants as to whom
plaintiff’s claims are factually related to another defendant.
Accordingly, I will dismiss the complaint with prejudice as to those claims that are timebarred by the statute of limitations and as to those claims that are barred by absolute immunity. I
will otherwise dismiss the complaint without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing by November 30,
2017, of any amended complaint (or complaints) in compliance with Rule 8 and Rule 20 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis and has named 24 defendants. Although several
of the defendants are identified as John Doe or Jane Doe, the complaint identifies the following
defendants by name:
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Scott Semple, Commissioner of the Department of Correction
Carleton Giles, Chairperson of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
Joy Chance, Board Member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
Patricia Camp, Board Member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
David May, Board Member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
Joseph Haggan, Director, Parole and Community Services
P.O. Williams, Parole Officer of Parole and Community Services
P.O. Pawlich, Parole Officer of Parole and Community Services
P.O. Howlett, Parole Officer of Parole and Community Services
P.O. Gibbons, Parole Officer of Parole and Community Services
Jason Bedard, Parole Manager, Resident Services Unit, Parole and Community Services
David Ruth, Owner, Sober Solutions, LLC
Eric Desmarais, Manager, Sober Solutions, LLC
Robert D. Pigeon, CEO, Community Solutions, Inc.
Lisa DeMatteis-Lepore, CEO, The Connection, Inc.
Gail Eureka, Director, The Connection, Inc.
Tamara Jackson, Assistant Director, The Connection, Inc.
Patrick Fallon, Director of Community Justice Services
The complaint spans nearly five years of plaintiff’s journey through many facilities and

programs of the state criminal justice system. The facts begin with the sentencing of plaintiff by
a state court judge in October 2012 to a three-year term of imprisonment followed by three years
of special parole. On September 13, 2013, Department of Correction officials released plaintiff to
the custody of Parole and Community Services prior to the completion of his term of
imprisonment. Parole and Community Services placed plaintiff in a community halfway house
called Sober Solutions, Inc. in East Hartford, Connecticut.
Sober Solutions
Plaintiff repeatedly complained about unsanitary conditions and rampant usage of
narcotics at Sober Solutions, even by some of their own staff. Plaintiff’s complaints about the
living situation to defendant David Ruth, the owner of Sober Solutions, engendered some
hostility between them. On November 11, 2013, an organization called Access to Recovery
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denied plaintiff’s request for a rent subsidy. Subsequently, Ruth discussed plaintiff’s rent
situation with plaintiff’s parole officer, defendant (John Doe) P.O. Williams (listed as Defendant
#7).
After this conversation, Ruth posted a new contract on plaintiff’s door on November 18,
2013, demanding an increase in rent. Plaintiff refused to pay the extra money. On December 10,
defendant Ruth apparently tried to intimidate plaintiff into voluntarily evicting himself: Ruth
appeared at plaintiff’s door, armed with a pistol and accompanied by an allegedly gang-affiliated
body guard, and demanded plaintiff leave.
Meanwhile, conditions continued to deteriorate at Sober Solutions: plaintiff’s bed had
collapsed and his shower broke. Despite notifying staff and his parole officer, P.O. Williams,
about these worsening conditions, they went unaddressed. P.O. Williams warned plaintiff to
“watch his step,” because Ruth “had pull in upper management.”
On the evening of January 24, 2014, an incident occurred involving Ruth, his
“bodyguard,” and plaintiff. Ruth confronted plaintiff while making dinner, demanding that
plaintiff give a specific date when he would leave. Plaintiff refused, and Ruth called the police.
When the police arrived, they took no action, informing Ruth that this was a matter for the
housing courts. On January 26, P.O. Williams met with plaintiff. In their conversation, Williams
relayed to plaintiff that Ruth had called him and asked him to get “rid of [plaintiff].” Williams
allegedly reiterated to Ruth that this was not the parole board’s place to get involved.
The next day, January 27, 2014, P.O. Williams called plaintiff back into his office,
whereupon he informed plaintiff that Ruth had evicted him from the facility. According to P.O.
Williams, Ruth spoke with P.O. Williams’s supervisor, defendant John Doe, after speaking with
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P.O. Williams. It is implied that this conversation between Ruth and the supervisor somehow
sanctioned or effected plaintiff’s eviction. Sober Solutions refused plaintiff reentry upon
returning from this visit and disposed of plaintiff’s belongings, including his birth certificate,
clothing, a Social Security card, electronics, and pictures of his wife and photos of their wedding.
Hartford Correctional Center and Carl Robinson CI
On January 28, 2014, plaintiff went to Danbury to live on the streets or get a bed in a
homeless shelter. Plaintiff kept his parole office informed about his living situation in Danbury.
Plaintiff’s parole officer issued a warrant for plaintiff’s arrest because he could not permit
plaintiff to live on the streets. A Danbury police officer arrested plaintiff on February 10, 2014,
and plaintiff’s parole officer transported him to Hartford Correctional Center.
On February 20, 2014, prison officials at Hartford Correctional Center transferred
plaintiff to Carl Robinson Correctional Institution to complete a drug and alcohol program.
Plaintiff was confused by this, insisting he had been sober since 2012 and that every urinalysis
was clean. Defendant Jane Doe, the clinician who had read his report, allegedly said plaintiff
must have “really pissed someone off.” Plaintiff later learned this transfer was on the basis of
fabricated documents that falsely reported him using alcohol and cocaine.
On April 4, 2014, prison officials at Carl Robinson transferred plaintiff to another 30-day
residential alcohol program in Brooklyn, Connecticut. When plaintiff asked why he was
subjected to another alcohol treatment program, the director replied that it was likely a stop-gap
measure until a spot in a half-way house opened up.

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Watkinson House
On May 9, 2014, prison officials released plaintiff to a halfway house called Community
Solutions, Inc. – Watkinson House (CSI) in Hartford, Connecticut. Plaintiff describes a
despicable living arrangement, where plaintiff and six other men were stuffed into a small room
infested with bed bugs and rodents. He threatened to call the Department of Public Health
numerous times and complained to the Director of CSI at Watkinson, defendant John Doe (listed
as Defendant #17), who allegedly reacted with malign indifference. The director allegedly
further decided to restrict plaintiff’s freedom of movement to leave the facility to find work,
while threatening him with jail time if plaintiff did not have a job. Five days later, on May 14,
2014, a liaison from the parole office, Jane Doe (potentially referring to Defendant #13), met
with plaintiff and hinted that he should stop threatening to complain to the Department of Public
Health or he might incur further retaliation.
Around this time, CSI began sending plaintiff offsite to Community Renewal Team
(CRT) for additional urine testing. On June 19, 2014, an incident occurred where plaintiff was
asked to submit a urine sample just after returning from completing a urine sample at CRT. He
attempted to comply, but was physically unable. CSI staff refused to give him water or allow him
to leave the room. They threatened to call his parole officer and re-incarcerate plaintiff if he did
not urinate within an hour. Eventually, plaintiff left the room and prepared his things to return to
jail.
The next day, parole officers P.O. Williams and defendant Jane Doe (possibly referring to
Defendant #12, #13, or #14) met with plaintiff in the director’s office at CSI. An argument
ensued over plaintiff’s cooperativeness regarding the urine samples, although some of the
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director’s and parole officers’ alleged statements suggest plaintiff’s whistle-blowing about the
deleterious living conditions constituted the underlying motivations of the dispute. Ultimately,
the defendant parole officers arrested him on the grounds of violating a condition of his parole
and transferred him back to Hartford Correctional Center.
From June 20, 2014, through July 9, 2014, plaintiff was housed at Hartford Correctional
Center. He claims that, on July 9, 2014, he discharged his definite three-year sentence to his
three-year term of special parole.
Cheyney House
The parole office next sent him to Community Solutions Inc. – Cheyney House in
Hartford, Connecticut (Cheyney House). On July 14, 2014, defendant P.O. Pawlich visited
plaintiff and explained that plaintiff was sent to Cheyney House—rather than being released—
due to his reputation, beginning with his complaints at Sober Solutions, so his Special Parole
sentence would be conducted in a more secure environment. According to plaintiff’s allegations,
Cheyney House severely restricted his freedom of movement and denied him visits from family
or friends for the ensuing months. It appears plaintiff would routinely dispute CSI’s curtailments
of his liberties with P.O. Pawlich as stretching beyond the conditions of his parole.
During his stay at Cheyney House, employees at the facility as well as his parole officer
and his parole officer’s supervisor denied him the opportunity to receive medical treatment for a
serious liver condition that was originally diagnosed in 2011. They conditioned his freedom to
see a private doctor on some sort of release, which plaintiff refused to sign.
Plaintiff also notes that the living conditions were equally abysmal at Cheyney as they
were at Watkinson: the building sweltered in August with a lack of air conditioning and was
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infested with bed bugs, roaches, and rodents. Plaintiff left an anonymous tip with the Department
of Public Health, which subsequently investigated. Defendant Director of CSI at Cheyney, John
Doe (Defendant #18), and defendant Assistant Director of CSI at Cheyney, Jane Doe (Defendant
#19), subsequently threatened plaintiff that there would be consequences for his tip-off.
Around this time, plaintiff also began filing complaints about CSI to the Social Security
fraud departments. In response, P.O. Pawlich threatened him that continuing to complain would
result in more jail time.
Revocation of Parole and the Community Partners in Action Program
Shortly thereafter, on September 29, 2014, parole officials transferred plaintiff to the
Reach Alternative Program. On December 7, 2014, officers arrested plaintiff for breach of peace.
On April 15, 2015, the charges were dismissed. On May 12, 2015, plaintiff participated in a
parole revocation hearing before defendants Joy Chance, David May, and Patricia Camp.
Though his charges were dismissed, the Board of Pardons and Paroles found plaintiff guilty of
violating the conditions of parole and sentenced him to a nine-month term of imprisonment, a
three-month term in a work release program, and completion of an anger management program.
On September 8, 2015, Department of Correction officials released plaintiff to the
custody of the Board of Pardons and Paroles. The Board placed plaintiff in a work release
facility, Community Partners in Action, in Hartford, Connecticut. Plaintiff was not able to seek
treatment for his medical needs and could not be in contact with friends or family who were not
on his visiting list. Parole and Community Services and plaintiff’s parole officer required him to
attend an anger management program. Plaintiff’s participation in the program required him to
miss one day a week of work. His parole officer refused to permit him to stop attending the
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program even after a licensed clinician at CRT indicated that the program would not be
beneficial to plaintiff.
Hospitalization and Another Revocation of Parole
On December 1, 2015, a car side-swiped plaintiff as he walked down the street in
Hartford, Connecticut. Plaintiff suffered injuries requiring that he be treated in a hospital. During
the examination of plaintiff, hospital personnel became aware that plaintiff had started drinking
alcohol again and this relapse had caused his pre-existing liver condition to deteriorate. Thus, on
December 5, 2015, hospital personnel transferred plaintiff to another hospital in Connecticut to
begin a detoxification program.
On December 9, 2015, plaintiff’s parole officers including P.O. Howlett, P.O. Pawlich,
and Supervisor P.O. Jason Bedard interrupted his treatment and picked him up from the hospital
and transferred him back to Hartford Correctional Center. The following day, plaintiff’s parole
officers served him with paperwork charging him with violating the terms of his parole for
allegedly “snitching on [parole officers].” A parole revocation hearing was held on February 2,
2016. The Board of Pardons and Paroles found that plaintiff had violated his parole conditions
and sentenced him to a nine-month term of imprisonment.
On September 9, 2016, correctional officials re-paroled plaintiff to a term of special
parole. Plaintiff’s parole officer committed him to a residential treatment program as a condition
of special parole. Plaintiff completed the program on October 10, 2016.
Roger Sherman House
On October 10, 2016, plaintiff’s parole officer transferred him to a Department of
Correction work release facility, Roger Sherman House, in New Haven, Connecticut. Plaintiff
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had multiple disputes with the staff at Roger Sherman House regarding the nutritional content of
the food served at the facility and his transportation to court for various hearings. He sought to be
transferred to another facility in Hartford, which would have been closer to his family and a
potential job. His parole officer denied the request for a transfer.
When plaintiff complained about being denied access to the courts, staff at Roger
Sherman House moved him to another room at the facility. When he complained about the food
and his nutritional requirements, he was transferred to another room in the facility and told he
would be sent back to jail if he did not comply and move to another room.
In February 2017, plaintiff sought to attend a number of events held at Yale University
pertaining to a campaign against torture. His parole officer and counselor permitted him to attend
two events, but then denied his request to attend additional events. Staff at Sherman House
continued to throw away food he claimed his doctor had instructed him to eat. In March 2017, a
staff member at Roger Sherman House searched his room.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any case brought in forma
pauperis at any time if it determines that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. The allegations of a pro se plaintiff's complaint must be read
liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d
90, 101–02 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants).
In recent years, the Supreme Court has set forth a threshold “plausibility” pleading
standard for courts to evaluate the adequacy of federal court complaints. A complaint must allege
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enough facts—as distinct from legal conclusions—that give rise to plausible grounds for relief.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). Notwithstanding the rule of liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint, a pro se
complaint may not survive dismissal if its factual allegations do not meet the basic plausibility
standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015).
Statute of Limitations
A civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994). Although the statute of
limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, a court may “dismiss an action sua sponte on
limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitation
defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.” Walters v. Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff filed his complaint on April 27, 2017. It follows that all of plaintiff’s allegations
concerning discrete, wrongful acts by one or more defendants that occurred prior to April 27,
2014, are barred by the statute of limitations. This includes plaintiff’s allegations regarding his
release to Sober Solutions, Inc. on September 13, 2013, his subsequent eviction from that facility
by owner David Ruth and manager Eric Desmarais on January 27, 2014, his arrest by Parole
Officer Williams on February 10, 2014, his confinement at Carl Robinson Correctional
Institution from February to April 4, 2014, and his confinement at the program in Brooklyn from
April 4, 2014 to April 27, 2014, all as detailed in the first 28 paragraphs of the complaint.
Accordingly, the following defendants are dismissed from this action: David Ruth and Eric
Desmarais. Additionally, all claims against defendant P.O. Williams for events prior to April 27,
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2014, are dismissed as well.
Claims Against Parole Board Members
The complaint names as defendants three members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
who conducted plaintiff’s violation hearing on February 2, 2016. Parole board members have
absolute immunity when performing the quasi-judicial role of presiding over violation hearings.
See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760–61 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the following
defendants are dismissed from this action: Joy Chance, Patricia Camp, and David May.
Claims Against Supervisory Officials
The complaint names several defendants who are senior supervisory personnel but
without alleging facts to show that these supervisory personnel were personally involved in any
of the alleged wrongdoing by lower-level employees.1 “It is well settled that, in order to establish
a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia,
the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City
of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97,
116 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that “liability for supervisory government officials cannot be
premised on a theory of respondeat superior because § 1983 requires individual, personalized
liability on the part of each government defendant”). Moreover, conclusory, non-specific
allegations of misconduct or gross negligence are insufficient to establish liability of supervisory
prison officials under § 1983. See Parris v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Servs., 947 F.

1
The only mention of some of these supervisory defendants by name in the complaint occurs on page 48,
where plaintiff states that he “called and notified” numerous senior officials in the Connecticut criminal justice
system about his grievance against Roger Sherman House. Plaintiff does not allege that any of these officials took or
failed to take any particular actions in response to his calls, and therefore has failed to state any viable claim against
these defendants.

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Supp. 2d 354, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s claims
against defendant Scott Semple, Joseph Hagan, Lisa DeMatteis-Lepore, Carlton J. Giles, and
Robert D. Pigeon without prejudice to re-pleading if plaintiff is able to allege facts to show that
any of these supervisory personnel were personally involved with any deprivation of his rights.
Filing of Amended Complaint to Comply with Rule 8 and Rule 20
The complaint runs 59-single-space pages and is inordinately long and detailed. The
allegations are essentially a blow-by-blow recounting by plaintiff of his many interactions over
many years with many defendants and others. The level of detail far exceeds what is necessary to
show that plaintiff is entitled to relief against any particular defendant. Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that that a complaint “must contain ... a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
The point of Rule 8 is to relieve the Court and defendants alike of the “unjustified
burden” of having “to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Salahuddin v.
Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). In Salahuddin, the Second Circuit concluded that a
prisoner’s 15-page single-spaced complaint against 20-odd defendants did not comply with Rule
8 and that the district court had discretion to dismiss the complaint to require plaintiff to file an
amended complaint. Ibid. Just as in Salahuddin, plaintiff’s complaint here does not comply with
the requirements of Rule 8.
In addition, it is readily apparent that the complaint also fails to comply with the limits on
permissive joinder of claims against multiple defendants under Rule 20(a)(2). Joinder of claims
against multiple defendants is permitted by this Rule if two criteria are met: (1) the claims
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“aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences,” and
(2) “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 20(a)(2).
Here, the complaint amounts to a running monologue of all the wrongs that plaintiff
believes have occurred during his several-years’ journey through many different facilities and
programs. At each stop along the way there are different officials who plaintiff believes
mistreated him, and there is little indication that any one defendant’s misconduct was ongoing. It
is clear that there are no common questions of law or fact that tie all these alleged wrongs against
all of the defendants together.
In such circumstances, a plaintiff is required to file separate lawsuits against each
defendant or against each group of defendants who acted in concert with one another or as to
whom plaintiff’s claims are logically connected to one another. See, e.g., Melvin v. Connecticut,
2016 WL 3264155, at *2 (D. Conn. 2016); see also Webb v. Maldonaldo, 2013 WL 3243135, at
*2-3 (D. Conn. 2013) (prisoner plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force against
some defendants not properly joined with plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against other
defendants relating to possession of sexually explicit materials).
In order for plaintiff’s claims to proceed as to those defendants who engaged in
misconduct against plaintiff after April 27, 2014, I will require plaintiff to file separate
complaints that comply with the joinder requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Any of these complaints may include more than one defendant but for each separate complaint
plaintiff should limit the complaint to naming only those defendants as to whom there is a link
between plaintiff’s claims against another defendant.
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For example, if plaintiff was subject to similar mistreatment at one particular facility
involving defendants who worked together to engage in mistreatment, then it would be
appropriate for plaintiff to join those defendants in a single complaint. By contrast, if plaintiff
seeks to sue multiple defendants from different facilities who did not work with one another and
who engaged in separate acts of misconduct against plaintiff, then plaintiff should file separate
complaints against these defendants rather than joining them together in a single complaint. In
short, each complaint that names more than one defendant should be limited to naming only
those defendants for whom there is a factual or logical connection between these defendants and
plaintiff’s claims against them.
Claims Against “John Doe” Defendants
Plaintiff's claims against unnamed “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants are
permissible at this time as placeholders for purposes of notice of the scope of plaintiff's claim
and for conducting discovery in this action. See, e.g., Abreu v. City of New York, 657 F. Supp. 2d
357, 362–63 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that he cannot ultimately obtain
monetary relief against unnamed “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants, and he must diligently
take steps to learn the real names and identities of the “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants
and to amend his pleadings to identify by name any person whom he seeks to hold liable for
money damages. See, e.g., Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517–20 (2d Cir. 2013).
Because the Court cannot serve process on any of the defendants so long as they have not
been identified by name, plaintiff’s amended complaint shall identify by name any of the
“John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants whom he seeks to hold liable. If plaintiff is unable to
identify all or any of the “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants by name within the allotted time
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period, then he shall file a motion for extension of time that describes in detail the efforts he has
made to learn the names of these defendants. Failure to file a timely amended complaint or
motion for additional extension of time may result in the dismissal of this action against any of
the “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” defendants.
CONCLUSION
The Court enters the following orders:
(1)

The following claims are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B): all

claims against defendants Semple, Giles, Chance, Camp, May, Hagan, Ruth, Desmarais, Pigeon,
and DeMatteis-Lepore, and all claims against defendant Williams arising from events prior to
April 27, 2014.
(2)

The remainder of the complaint that involves allegations that are not time-barred

is dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8 and its requirement of a short
and plain statement of the facts and grounds for relief.
(3)

On or before November 30, 2017, plaintiff may file an amended complaint (or

more than one complaint) that complies with Rules 8 and 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint (or amended complaints) by that date,
the Court intends to dismiss this case.
(4)

Any amended complaint should identify by name all “John Doe” or “Jane Doe”

defendants whom plaintiff seeks to hold liable, or, if plaintiff has been unable to discover the
identities of these defendants, he shall file a motion for extension of time that describes in detail
the efforts he has made to learn the names of these defendants along with his amended
complaint.
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(5)

Plaintiff is advised that any amended complaint will completely replace his

original complaint, and therefore he must include all factual allegations he wishes to pursue in
any amended complaints that he may file, even if these facts were already set forth in his original
complaint. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of any claims not included in the amended
complaint. If plaintiff has any questions about how to file his amended complaint, he may
contact chambers at [phone] and to request to speak with the law clerk for this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 20th day of October, 2017.

/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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