Tyson v. Alvarez

Filing 174

OMNIBUS DISCOVERY RULING. For the reasons set forth in the attached Ruling, the Court: (1) GRANTS, in limited part, and DENIES, in large part, 153 plaintiff's motion to compel interrogatory responses; (2) DENIES, without prejudice to re-filin g, 156 plaintiff's motion to compel discovery; (3) DENIES, as moot, plaintiff's 157 motion for default judgment; (4) DENIES plaintiff's 159 motion for sanctions; (5) DENIES plaintiff's 160 second motion to compel the production of defendant Jane Doe's address; and (6) DENIES, as moot, plaintiff's 161 motion to compel interrogatory responses from defendant Healy. Signed by Judge Sarah A. L. Merriam on 11/12/2019. (Katz, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
------------------------------x
:
DESHAWN TYSON
:
:
v.
:
:
JANE DOE, et al.
:
:
------------------------------x

Civ. No. 3:17CV00731(JCH)

November 12, 2019

OMNIBUS DISCOVERY RULING
Pending before the Court are six motions filed by selfrepresented plaintiff Deshawn Tyson (“plaintiff”): (1) “Motion
to Compell defendants to answer Plaintiff first set of
Interrogatories” [Doc. #153] (sic); (2) “Plaintiff Motion to
Compel Defendant’s to Produce Production/discovery” [Doc. #156]
(sic); (3) “PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO COMPELL”
[Doc. #157] (sic); (4) “MOTION FOR SANCTION(S)” [Doc. #159]
(sic); (5) “SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL Defendants to produce
address of Defendant Jane Doe AND OBJECTIONS” [Doc. #160] (sic);
and (6) “Motion to Compel Interrogatories from John F. Healy”
[Doc. #161] (sic). On August 13, 2019, Judge Janet C. Hall
referred plaintiff’s motions to the undersigned. [Doc. #164]. On
the same date, the undersigned entered an Order requiring that
on or before September 3, 2019, defendants file an omnibus
response to plaintiff’s motions, along with a copy of any

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discovery requests at issue in plaintiff’s motions. [Doc. #165].
Defendants have timely complied with that Order. [Doc. #171].
For the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) GRANTS, in
limited part, and DENIES, in large part, plaintiff’s motion to
compel interrogatory responses [Doc. #153]; (2) DENIES, without
prejudice to re-filing, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery
[Doc. #156]; (3) DENIES, as moot, plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment [Doc. #157]; (4) DENIES plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions [Doc. #159]; (5) DENIES plaintiff’s second motion to
compel the production of defendant Jane Doe’s address [Doc.
#160]; and (6) DENIES, as moot, plaintiff’s motion to compel
interrogatory responses from defendant Healy [Doc. #161].
I.

Background
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background

of this matter, which is set forth at length in Judge Hall’s
Initial Review Order [Doc. #12], Initial Review Order re:
Amended Complaint [Doc. #21], Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. #73], Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Amend and Amended Initial Review Order [Doc. #99], and Ruling on
Motion to Intervene and to Stay Discovery [Doc. #133].
Nevertheless, the Court highlights two important details, which
are relevant to the Court’s rulings below.
First, on July 18, 2019, in connection with the criminal
charges underlying this civil case, plaintiff entered an Alford
~2~

plea to a substitute information charging plaintiff with
unlawful restraint in the first degree. See Doc. #171 at 65-78;
see also Doc. #146 at 2-3.
Second, Judge Hall has dismissed, without prejudice,
plaintiff’s false arrest claim against defendant Lucille Roach
(hereinafter “Roach”). See Doc. #99 at 7. Judge Hall has
instructed: “If the criminal prosecution terminates in Tyson’s
favor, Tyson may file a motion to add this claim.” Id. (footnote
omitted). To date, plaintiff has not requested to add the false
arrest claim against defendant Roach to this case.
Accordingly, at present, the following claims remain in
this case: (1) a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim against
defendants Garofalo, Przybylski, Przya, and Healy in their
individual capacities, see Docs. #21, #29, #35, #73; (2) a state
law defamation claim against Jane Doe, see Docs. #12, #21, #35;
and (3) claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
against Jane Doe and defendant Roach, see Docs. #21, #35, #73,
#99.
II.

Legal Standard
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets

forth the scope and limitations of permissible discovery:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
and proportional to the needs of the case, considering
the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to
~3~

relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this
scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to
be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “[T]he burden of demonstrating
relevance remains on the party seeking discovery.” Bagley v.
Yale Univ., 315 F.R.D. 131, 144 (D. Conn. 2016) (quotation marks
and citation omitted), as amended (June 15, 2016); Republic of
Turkey v. Christie’s, Inc., 326 F.R.D. 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(same). Once the party seeking discovery has demonstrated
relevance, the burden then shifts to “[t]he party resisting
discovery ... [to] show[] why discovery should be denied.” Cole
v. Towers Perrin Forster & Crosby, 256 F.R.D. 79, 80 (D. Conn.
2009) (alterations added).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff has filed six motions relating to discovery
and/or requesting the imposition of sanctions. The Court
addresses each in turn.
A. “Motion to Compell defendants to answer Plaintiff first
set of Interrogatories” [Doc. #153] (sic)
Plaintiff seeks to compel additional responses to his first
set of interrogatories directed to defendant Roach. See Doc.
#153. Plaintiff specifically takes issue with defendant Roach’s
responses to interrogatories 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19,
21, and 24. See generally id. Defendant Roach has filed an
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opposition to plaintiff’s motion. See Doc. #171 at 1-9. The
Court addresses each interrogatory in turn.
Interrogatory 2 asks: “Could evidence from a crime scene
identify ten difference people that may participated in a
alleged crime you are investigating?” Doc. #153 at 1 (sic); see
also Doc. #171 at 19. Defendant Roach objected to interrogatory
2 on several grounds, and notwithstanding those objections,
provided a response. See Doc. #171 at 19-20. Plaintiff
challenges defendant Roach’s objections that interrogatory 2 is
vague and overbroad. See Doc. #153 at 2. Plaintiff does not,
however, acknowledge defendant Roach’s response, nor does he
present any grounds for the Court to find that defendant Roach’s
response is insufficient or non-responsive. The Court has
reviewed defendant Roach’s response to this interrogatory and
finds it sufficient. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s
motion to compel with respect to interrogatory 2.
Interrogatory 5 asks: “Do you have any evidence that Jane
Doe was even at the Marriott Hotel between the days and/or night
of 5/6/2014, 5/5/2014 and 5/4/2014.” Doc. #153 at 2 (sic); see
also Doc. #171 at 20. Defendant Roach objected to interrogatory
5 on several grounds, and notwithstanding those objections,
provided a response. See Doc. #171 at 20. Plaintiff challenges
defendant Roach’s objection that interrogatory 5 seeks
information subject to the law enforcement privilege. See Doc.
~5~

#153 at 2-3. Plaintiff does not acknowledge defendant Roach’s
response, nor does he present any grounds for the Court to find
that said response is insufficient or non-responsive. The Court
has reviewed defendant Roach’s response to this interrogatory
and finds it sufficient. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to interrogatory 5.
Interrogatory 7 asks: “Is everything in your warran/sworn
Affidavit for my Arrest True?” Doc. #153 at 3 (sic); see also
Doc. #171 at 20. Defendant Roach objected: “The affidavit is a
sworn affidavit signed by the Affiant, Lucille Roach, a police
detective at the time. With this in mind, no response is
necessary or appropriate.” Doc. #171 at 20. Plaintiff asserts
that defendant Roach’s response is vague and that interrogatory
7 warrants a “yes” or “no” answer. Doc. #153 at 4. Defendant
Roach responds that interrogatory 7 “is harassing, though it is
answered in the objection.” Doc. #171 at 3. Interrogatory 7
calls for a yes or no answer, which was not provided. Defendant
Roach shall provide plaintiff with such a response. See Connors
v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., No. 3:98CV699(GLG), 1999 WL 66107, at *1
(D. Conn. Feb. 4, 1999) (“While defendant asserts that it
responded to these requests, plaintiff takes issue with the
substance of defendant’s answers. ... [the
interrogatory] calls for a yes or no answer. Defendant is
directed to answer, yes or no[.]”). Accordingly, the Court
~6~

GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to
interrogatory 7.
Interrogatory 8 asks: “Within your warrant/sworn Affidavit
for my arrest it stated that I Deshawn Tyson the plaintiff have
two convictions of sexual assault is that true?” Doc. #153 at 4
(sic); see also Doc. #171 at 20. Defendant Roach objected: “The
affidavit is a sworn affidavit signed by the Affiant, Lucille
Roach, a police detective at the time. With this in mind, no
response is necessary or appropriate.” Doc. #171 at 20.
Plaintiff asserts that interrogatory 8 warrants a “yes” or “no”
answer. Doc. #153 at 4. Defendant Roach responds that
interrogatory 8 “is harassing, though it is answered in the
objection.” Doc. #171 at 3. Interrogatory 8 calls for a yes or
no answer, which was not provided. Defendant Roach shall provide
plaintiff with such a response. See Connors, 1999 WL 66107, at
*1. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to compel
with respect to interrogatory 8.
Interrogatory 9 asks: “In your warrant/sworn Affidavit for
my Arrest. All the DNA evidence within your warrant for my
arrest is listed as Mixtures and that my DNA profile contributes
to that DNA mixture. Does that mean more than two people DNA
profile could exist within all the DNA listed in your
warrant/sworn Affidavit?” Doc. #153 at 5 (sic); see also Doc.

~7~

#171 at 20. Defendant Roach responded and objected to
interrogatory 9 as follows:
This Interrogatory requests information that would
require the testimony of an expert. Further, the
language referred to in this Interrogatory appeared in
the Supplemental DNA report provided by the State of
Connecticut Emergency Services and Public Protection
Division of Scientific Services, which has been provided
to the plaintiff; the paragraph (and the document from
which it was gathered) speaks for itself.
Doc. #171 at 21. Plaintiff asserts that he seeks a response of
“yes,” “no,” or “not sure” to interrogatory 9. Doc. #153 at 5.
Defendant Roach, relying on the above-quoted response, states:
“Plaintiff seeks an interpretation that requires an expert. ...
It should not be incumbent upon the defendant(s) to provide a
further interpretation.” Doc. #171 at 4. The Court agrees that
interrogatory 9 essentially seeks an expert interpretation of
the Supplemental DNA report –- an opinion which defendant Roach
is not qualified to give. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes,
729 F.3d 178, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (“If the opinion of a witness
rests in any way upon scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge,” then it would be considered an expert
opinion, “because lay opinion must be the product of reasoning
processes familiar to the average person in everyday life.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). The Court will require
no further response to interrogatory 9. Accordingly, the Court

~8~

DENIES plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to
interrogatory 9.
Interrogatory 12 asks: “Did you comply with the Court
informer to have Jane Doe Identify a Second Suspect on photo
Board Before my arrest?” Doc. #153 at 5 (sic); see also Doc.
#171 at 21. Defendant Roach responded and objected to
interrogatory 9 as follows:
There is an ongoing criminal prosecution of the
plaintiff related to the events described in plaintiff’s
complaint; defendant objects on the basis of the law
enforcement privilege and to the extent that the
information
sought
would
prejudice
the
criminal
prosecution. Plaintiff is entitled to receive documents
and information in the criminal action and should not be
permitted to collect additional information to which he
is not entitled therein by way of his civil action if it
may prejudice the criminal prosecution. Plaintiff has
been provided the information to which he is legally
entitled at the juncture from the State’s Attorney,
including information that would be responsive to this
Interrogatory. In addition, the request is harassing and
argumentative and not proportional to the needs of the
case.
Doc. #171 at 21. Plaintiff contends that because the criminal
action is “resolved and closed[,]” that the Court should compel
defendant Roach to provide a yes or no answer to interrogatory
12. Doc. #153 at 6-7. Defendant Roach responds that “[t]he
resolution of the plaintiff’s criminal prosecution does not
alter the stated basis for objection. ... [C]onsidering
plaintiff’s guilty plea and criminal conviction on the charges
arising from the incident that is the subject of the complaint,

~9~

the information sought is not proportional to the needs of the
case.” Doc. #171 at 4-5.
More importantly, plaintiff has failed to establish how the
information sought by interrogatory 12 is relevant to the claims
remaining in this case. See Section I, supra. As previously
stated, Judge Hall has dismissed, without prejudice, plaintiff’s
claim for false arrest against defendant Roach. See id.
Plaintiff has not filed a motion seeking to re-plead that claim.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to compel with
respect to interrogatory 12.
Interrogatory 16 asks: “Did you check Any toxicology,
report done on Jane Doe: to see if maybe Jane Doe was on any
hallucination drugs that would make her delusional? On the night
of 5-6-2014?” Doc. #153 at 7 (sic); see also Doc. #171 at 21.
Defendant Roach responded and objected to interrogatory 16 as
follows:
There is an ongoing criminal prosecution of the
plaintiff related to the events described in plaintiff’s
complaint; defendant objects on the basis of the law
enforcement privilege and to the extent that the
information
sought
would
prejudice
the
criminal
prosecution. Plaintiff is entitled to receive documents
and information in the criminal action and should not be
permitted to collect additional information to which he
is not entitled therein by way of his civil action if it
may prejudice the criminal prosecution. Plaintiff has
been provided the information to which he is legally
entitled at the juncture from the State’s Attorney,
including information that would be responsive to this
Interrogatory. In addition, defendants object to the

~ 10 ~

degree that this Interrogatory
medical information or records.

calls

for

protected

Doc. #171 at 21. Plaintiff challenges the assertion of the law
enforcement privilege because there is no longer an ongoing
criminal investigation. See Doc. #153 at 7. However, plaintiff
fails to explain how the information sought by interrogatory 16
is relevant to the claims remaining in this matter. He has
failed to sustain his burden in that regard. Accordingly, the
Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to
interrogatory 16.
Interrogatory 17 asks: “Did you have any evidence/proof
that any of the items collected from the Alleged crime scene
belong to Jane Doe in case 14022071? If yes what?” Doc. #153 at
9 (sic); see also Doc. #171 at 21. Defendant Roach has responded
and objected to interrogatory 17 as follows:
There is an ongoing criminal prosecution of the
plaintiff related to the events described in plaintiff’s
complaint; defendant objects on the basis of the law
enforcement privilege and to the extent that the
information
sought
would
prejudice
the
criminal
prosecution. Plaintiff is entitled to receive documents
and information in the criminal action and should not be
permitted to collect additional information to which he
is not entitled therein by way of his civil action if it
may prejudice the criminal prosecution. Plaintiff has
been provided the information to which he is legally
entitled at the juncture from the State’s Attorney,
including information that would be responsive to this
Interrogatory.
Doc. #171 at 22. Plaintiff again challenges the assertion of the
law enforcement privilege given that there is no longer an
~ 11 ~

ongoing criminal investigation. See Doc. #153 at 9. However,
plaintiff fails to explain how the information sought by
interrogatory 17 is relevant to the claims remaining in this
matter. He has failed to sustain his burden in that regard.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to compel with
respect to interrogatory 17.
Interrogatory 18 asks: “Have Jane Doe ever been accused of
prostitution, escort and/or selling herself for money?” Doc.
#153 at 10 (sic); see also Doc. #171 at 22. Defendant Roach
objected and responded to interrogatory 18, in pertinent part,
as follows:
The information being sought by this interrogatory is
not relevant to the plaintiff’s remaining claims against
the defendants and it is of little to no importance in
resolving the issues related to those claims. In
addition,
information
regarding
accusations,
uncorroborated allegations, prior arrests not resulting
in convictions, and the information plaintiff requests,
if responsive information exists, would be subject to
erasure and/or destruction statutes (if reflected in
documents) and is private and not otherwise disclosable.
Conviction records are publicly available and equally
available to the plaintiff.
Doc. #171 at 22. Plaintiff asserts that the information sought
by interrogatory 18 “is very relevant it goes to the questions
ask from Lucille Roach to Jane Doe during Jane Doe interview. It
goes to the understanding of Lucille Roach and credibility of
Jane Doe and Lucille Roach.” Doc. #153 at 10 (sic). Defendant
Roach stands on her objection and further asserts that “the

~ 12 ~

information sought ... is not proportional to the needs of the
case[.]” Doc. #171 at 7.
The Court sustains defendant Roach’s objection that the
information sought is not relevant to the claims remaining in
this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to
compel with respect to interrogatory 18.
Interrogatory 19 asks: “Is Jane Doe a confidantal informant
for the New Haven Police Department or any other State Agency?”
Doc. #153 at 10 (sic); see also Doc. #171 at 7. Defendant Roach
responded and objected to interrogatory 19, in pertinent part,
as follows:
The information being sought by this interrogatory is
not relevant to the plaintiff’s remaining claims against
the defendants and it is of little to no importance in
resolving the issues related to those claims, and it
likely amounts to an impermissible “fishing expedition”
by the plaintiff. In addition, the request is vague and
overly broad and not limited by time or in scope, and
the compliance with the request would pose a significant
burden upon the New Haven Department of Police Service,
Jane Doe, and the general public. Further, confidential
informant information is among the most sensitive in an
entire police department, and it is typically never
released, divulged, confirmed, or denied. The chilling
effect of the exposure of confidential informant
information of any sort (this includes a confirmation or
denial that any individual is a confidential informant)
upon the general public’s willingness to assist law
enforcement officials with their daily work would
greatly outweigh any benefit the plaintiff could hope to
gain with the requested information.
Doc. #171 at 22-23. Plaintiff asserts that the information
sought “is relevant and necessary ... to the plaintiff claims[.]

~ 13 ~

... The information sought is necessary and goes to credibility
of Jane Doe and Lucille Roach[.]” Doc. #153 at 11 (sic).
Defendant Roach responds that “information regarding
confidential informants is one of the most sensitive and highly
protected areas of police work. Such information can potentially
affect numerous other law enforcement matters.” Doc. #171 at 7.
Defendant Roach further stands by her objections, including that
the information sought is not relevant to plaintiff’s remaining
claims. See id.
The Court sustains defendant Roach’s objection that the
information sought is not relevant to the claims remaining in
this civil case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s
motion to compel with respect to interrogatory 19.
Interrogatory 21 asks: “From 5/6/2014 through the date and
year 3/10/2016 could you obtain the sureillance footage from all
Marriott Hotel Sureillance location(s) to identify any and all
true suspect(s) of the Alleged crime at Marriott Hotel on
5/6/2014.” Doc. #153 at 11 (sic); see also Doc. #171 at 23.
Defendant Roach responded and objected to interrogatory 21, in
pertinent part, as follows:
In addition, defendant objects that the information
sought in this interrogatory is irrelevant to the
remaining claim in this matter against Lucille Roach
(intentional infliction of emotional distress) to the
extent that it suggests that surveillance footage, if,
in fact it was not reviewed by the defendant, would
“identify” true suspects or otherwise override other
~ 14 ~

evidence in the investigation such as the results of the
DNA results positively identifying the plaintiff.
Without waiving said objection, surveillance footage is
available for a limited time before it is overwritten.
Doc. #171 at 23. Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, that the
“[i]nformation sought is relevant and necessary and goes to the
Credibility of Lucille Roach.” Doc. #153 at 12 (sic). Defendant
Roach responds that she stands by her objections. See Doc. #171
at 8.
The Court sustains defendant Roach’s objection that the
information sought is not relevant to the claims remaining in
this case. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion to
compel with respect to interrogatory 21.
Interrogatory 24 asks: “How may sexual assault cases have
you investigated in your last 20 years of being a officer of the
law?” Doc. #153 at 12 (sic); see also Doc. #171 at 24. In
addition to objecting on several grounds, including that the
information sought is not relevant, defendant Roach responded:
“Without waiving said objection, more than ten.” Doc. #171 at
24. Plaintiff does not acknowledge defendant Roach’s response,
nor does he present any grounds for the Court to find that
defendant Roach’s response is insufficient or non-responsive.
The Court has reviewed defendant Roach’s response to this
interrogatory and finds it sufficient. Accordingly, the Court

~ 15 ~

DENIES plaintiff’s motion to compel with respect to
interrogatory 24.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS, in limited part, and DENIES,
in large part, plaintiff’s motion to compel [Doc. #153].
B. “Plaintiff Motion to Compel Defendant’s to Produce
Production/discovery” [Doc. #156] (sic)
The Court construes plaintiff’s next motion as seeking to
renew the motion to compel reflected at document 102, which was
originally filed on September 19, 2018 (hereinafter the
“original motion to compel”). See generally Doc. #156. Judge
Hall denied the original motion to compel on November 14, 2018,
when she stayed this case pending the resolution of plaintiff’s
related state criminal matter. See Doc. #133 at 6.
Plaintiff appears to assert that because defendants did not
timely respond to the original motion to compel [Doc. #102],
defendants have waived their objections to the requests which
are the subject of the original motion, and the Court should now
order defendants to produce the requested documents. See Doc.
#156 at 2.1 Defendants respond: “It is not contested that

Attached to defendants’ omnibus response is a copy of defendant
Roach’s objections to plaintiff’s written discovery requests,
along with a Notice to the Court stating that such responses
were mailed to plaintiff on August 14, 2018. See Doc. #171 at
42-62. The Notice states that “[e]ach and every request for
production was objected to, and many because of, inter alia, the
pending criminal prosecution against the plaintiff for the
sexual assault that is referenced in plaintiff’s complaint.” Id.
at 61. It appears that the original motion to compel takes issue
1

~ 16 ~

responses [to the original motion to compel] were due by October
10, 2018 and that Defendants filed a response on October 11,
2018; however, defendants filed a Motion for Leave to file their
Objection along with the Objection (both within Document 110),
which Motion for Leave explained the extenuating circumstances
that resulted in the Objection being filed one day past the
October 10 deadline.” Doc. #171 at 10.
Defendants’ objection to plaintiff’s original motion to
compel states, inter alia:
Some of the categories that plaintiff identifies in his
Motion to Compel seem to align with the original Requests
for Production (e.g., 1-4) and others appear to either
change or add to what was originally requested (e.g., 6,
7, 8). To the extent that the plaintiff is requesting
different categories of documents than those he
originally requested, these requests are untimely as the
time to file requests has closed. To the extent that
plaintiff seeks to compel on his prior request for
production, the defendants filed objections to these
requests and these defendants maintain these objections.
The previously filed objections should carry even more
force presently than when they were originally filed
because of the dismissal of the false arrest claim
against Lucille Roach (leaving just a claim of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress).
To the extent that plaintiff attempts to compel
disclosure of documents that were not requested before
the Motion (21-25), the Motion is improper.
Doc. #110 at 4-5.

with defendant Roach’s objections which are attached to
defendants’ omnibus response.
~ 17 ~

It is not apparent that the parties have attempted to
confer in a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute
raised in the original motion to compel, which implicates over
twenty requests for production, many of which seek information
that is no longer relevant to the claims remaining in this case.
See generally, Doc. #171 at 38-41 (Plaintiff’s Request for
Production of Documents directed to defendant Roach). The Court
will not consider the issues raised by the original motion to
compel [Doc. #102], or defendants’ objections thereto [Doc.
#110], until plaintiff and counsel for defendants have conferred
in an attempt to resolve the disputes raised in the original
motion to compel. See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 37(a).
Accordingly, on or before December 12, 2019, plaintiff and
counsel for defendants shall engage in a meet-and-confer
conference, by telephone or in person, in an attempt to resolve
the issues raised by plaintiff’s original motion to compel [Doc.
#102]. During this meeting, plaintiff should carefully consider
the propriety of his requests in light of the claims remaining
in this case.
If after that meeting, the disputed requests have not been
entirely resolved, and plaintiff has a legal basis to seek an
order compelling the production of the documents requested, then
on or before December 27, 2019, plaintiff may re-file a motion
to compel directed to those requests which remain at issue.
~ 18 ~

Plaintiff’s re-filed motion must contain a “verbatim listing of
each of the items of discovery sought or opposed, and
immediately following each specification shall set forth the
reason why the item should be allowed[.]” D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
37(b). Plaintiff must also attach as an exhibit to any re-filed
motion to compel a copy of the discovery requests in dispute.
See id.
Accordingly, “Plaintiff Motion to Compel Defendant’s to
Produce Production/discovery” [Doc. #156] (sic) is DENIED,
without prejudice to re-filing.
C. “PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT TO COMPELL”
[Doc. #157] (sic)
Plaintiff “moves the court for an order compelling all
defendants to produce discovery as requested by Plaintiff.” Doc.
#157 at 1. Plaintiff asserts that on May 15, 2018, he requested
discovery from all defendants, and that on September 19, 2018,
he filed a motion to compel with respect to those discovery
requests. See id. (citing Doc. #102). Plaintiff contends that
the Court ordered defendants to file a response to his motion to
compel on or before October 10, 2018, but that defendants failed
to do so. See id. at 2. Plaintiff therefore “prays that the
Court will now hold the Defendants in default, regarding the
above mentuned, and compell the defendants to provide plaintiff
with all the materials that plaintiff requested.” Id. (sic).

~ 19 ~

The Court does not construe this particular motion as
seeking the entry of a default judgment against defendants.2
Rather, the Court liberally construes this motion as seeking an
order compelling defendants to provide the discovery sought in
the motion reflected at document 102, i.e., the “original motion
to compel” previously discussed. See Section III.B., supra.
Plaintiff’s current motion, reflected at document 157, is
duplicative of the motion docketed as document 156, which the
Court has now addressed. See id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES,
as moot, plaintiff’s motion for default judgment to compel
discovery [Doc. #157].
D. “MOTION FOR SANCTION(S)” [Doc. #159] (sic)
Plaintiff has moved for an order sanctioning defendants
pursuant to Rules 37 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. [Doc. #159]. Plaintiff “moves to have defendants and
their Attorney Sanctioned” because they have “not once complied
with plaintiff request for [Productions/Discovery][.]” Id. at 1

2 Even

if the Court construed plaintiff’s motion as seeking the
entry of a default judgment, the Court would not grant such an
extreme sanction given the “preference that litigation disputes
be resolved on the merits, and not by default[.]” S.E.C. v.
Setteducate, 419 F. App’x 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Aliki
Foods, LLC v. Otter Valley Foods, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 159, 178
(D. Conn. 2010) (listing the factors courts should consider when
determining whether the entry of a default judgment under Rule
37 is appropriate).
~ 20 ~

(sic). Defendants generally assert that “there is no basis” for
the motion. Doc. #171 at 13.
“The party requesting sanctions under Rule 37 bears the
burden of showing that the opposing party failed to timely
disclose information” sought. Lodge v. United Homes, LLC, 787 F.
Supp. 2d 247, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). “To meet this burden the
party must establish (1) that the party having control over the
evidence had an obligation to timely produce it; (2) that the
party that failed to timely produce the evidence had a culpable
state of mind; and (3) that the missing evidence is relevant to
the party’s claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find it would support that claim or defense.” In re
Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge
Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing the
propriety of imposing Rule 37 sanctions on defendants and/or
their counsel. As to Rule 11, that rule explicitly does not
apply to discovery disputes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d) (“This
rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery requests,
responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.”).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for sanctions [Doc. #159]
is DENIED.

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E. “SECOND MOTION TO COMPEL Defendants to produce address of
Defendant Jane Doe AND OBJECTIONS” [Doc. #160] (sic)
Plaintiff seeks an order compelling defendants to produce
the address of defendant Jane Doe. See Doc. #160. Plaintiff asks
that “the Court receive the current address of Jane Doe for Jane
Doe to be serve Complaint and Summons finally.” Id. at 1 (sic).
Defendants contend that they are “not aware of Jane Doe’s
address. Upon information and belief, she moved, at least in
part, out of fear for her own safety stemming from the events
that gave rise to plaintiff’s lawsuit.” Doc. #171 at 13.
Defendants further assert that even if they did have knowledge
of Jane Doe’s address, the Court should not compel the
production of the address because “plaintiff pled guilty to a
charge for which he was arrested – unlawful restraint of Jane
Doe for a sexual purpose.” Doc. #171 at 13. Defendants further
assert that “plaintiff’s guilty plea should be read as a waiver
of any right to pursue a civil action against the victim of the
act to which he pled guilty.” Id. at 14.
Attached to defendants’ omnibus response is the transcript
of plaintiff’s plea colloquy and sentencing before Judge Patrick
J. Clifford in the state court criminal matter giving rise to
this lawsuit. See id. at 64-79. As part of plaintiff’s sentence,
Judge Clifford imposed a standing criminal protective order,
ordering that plaintiff

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not assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere
with or stalk [Jane Doe]. Stay away from their home,
wherever they may reside. Don’t contact them in any
manner including written, electronic or phone. ... This
doesn’t expire until June 18th of 2034. ... If you violate
this you could be arrested for violating a standing
criminal protective order[.]
Id. at 77-78 (sic) (emphasis added). There is nothing in the
record before the Court to suggest that the criminal protective
order has been vacated or otherwise modified such to allow
plaintiff to have any contact with Jane Doe.
Essentially, by seeking an order compelling the disclosure
of Jane Doe’s address, plaintiff requests that this Court modify
the criminal protective order to allow written contact between
himself and Jane Doe. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court
likely does not have jurisdiction to entertain such a request,
see Slater v. Thomas, 100 F.3d 944 (2d Cir. 1996), the Court
denies plaintiff’s request on grounds of comity and federalism,
see Wiacek Farms LLC v. City of Shelton, No.
3:04CV1635(JBA)(JGM), 2005 WL 8167623, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 26,
2005). See also Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D.
495, 499 (D. Md. 2000) (“There seems to be little doubt that a
protective order issued by a court, either state or federal,
which on its face survives the underlying litigation, continues
to have full force and effect on the parties subject to it even
after final resolution of the underlying case, and the issuing
court retains jurisdiction and authority to modify or revoke
~ 23 ~

it.”); Dushkin Pub. Grp., Inc. v. Kinko’s Serv. Corp., 136
F.R.D. 334, 335 (D.D.C. 1991) (“As for those documents shielded
by the ... protective order, this court as a matter of comity
respects the order issued by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York.”). Further, as Judge Hall observed in her
ruling on the State’s motion to intervene, “[i]f the court were
to order disclosure, it would be facilitating Tyson’s violation
of the state court Protective Order.” Doc. #133 at 3; see also
Doc. #134 at 1 (“Pursuing discovery in this case, as plaintiff
proposes, would be violative of that protective order.”).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s second motion to
compel defendants [Doc. #160] to produce the address of Jane
Doe.
F. “Motion to Compel Interrogatories from John F. Healy”
[Doc. #161]
Last, plaintiff seeks an order compelling defendant John F.
Healy to provide responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories. See
Doc. #161 at 1-3. Plaintiff asserts that he has not received
defendant Healy’s “interrogatories oR productions/discovery,”
and requests “that the Court order defendant John F. Healy to
produce interrogatories to the plaintiff immediately.” Doc. #161
at 2-3 (sic).
Defendant Healy responds that after having received an
extension of time from the Court, he served responses to

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plaintiff’s interrogatories on October 29, 2018. See Doc. #171
at 14; see also Doc. #105 (motion seeking extension of time
until October 29, 2018, for defendant Healy to respond to
plaintiff’s interrogatories dated August 10, 2018); Doc. #108
(Order granting motion for extension of time). Defendants
additionally attach to their omnibus response a copy of
defendant Healy’s responses to plaintiff’s interrogatories. See
Doc. #171 at 87-97.
Defendant Healy has responded to plaintiff’s
interrogatories, and a second copy of those responses has now
been provided to plaintiff as an attachment to defendants’
omnibus response. Accordingly, the Court DENIES, as moot,
plaintiff’s motion to compel interrogatory responses from
defendant Healy [Doc. #161].
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court: (1) GRANTS, in limited

part, and DENIES, in large part, plaintiff’s motion to compel
interrogatory responses [Doc. #153]; (2) DENIES, without
prejudice to re-filing, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery
[Doc. #156]; (3) DENIES, as moot, plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment [Doc. #157]; (4) DENIES plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions [Doc. #159]; (5) DENIES plaintiff’s second motion to
compel the production of defendant Jane Doe’s address [Doc.

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#160]; and (6) DENIES, as moot, plaintiff’s motion to compel
interrogatory responses from defendant Healy [Doc. #161].
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 12th day of November,
2019.
/s/
HON. SARAH A. L. MERRIAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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