Manon v. Brantly et al
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER: Manons Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to safety may proceed against defendants Brantly and James in their individual capacities for monetary damages only. All other claims are dismissed. Chapdelaine, Guadarra ma, Hynes, Moore, and Perry are dismissed as defendants to this action. Manon is given leave to replead his Complaint within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order if he can allege facts to support that his disciplinary segregation imposed a substantial and atypical hardship as required by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). If he does so, he may further amend his Complaint to join one or more additional defendants, assuming that he can allege facts showing personal involvementby any individuals in the absence of due process afforded to him for the disciplinary charges at issue in this case. Discovery due by 4/13/2018 Dispositive Motions due by 5/13/2018 Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 9/12/2017.(Lewis, D)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BRANTLY, et al.,
PRISONER CASE NO.
SEPTEMBER 12, 2017
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
On May 1, 2017, the plaintiff, Kelvin Manon (“Manon”), an inmate currently
housed at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield, CT (“MacDougallWalker”), filed a Complaint pro se pursuant to title 42, section 1983 of the United States
Code (“section 1983”) against Correction Officer Brantly, Correction Officer James,
Warden Chapdelaine, Deputy Warden Guadarrama, Deputy Warden Hynes, Counselor
Moore, and “C.T.O.” Perry for monetary and injunctive relief. Manon is suing the
defendants for acting with deliberate indifference to his safety and for violating his due
This court denied Manon’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis because his
application showed that he had more than sufficient funds to pay the $400.00 filing fee
to commence this action. See Order #6. On June 16, 2017, Manon paid the filing fee to
proceed with his case.
For the reasons articulated below, his Complaint is dismissed in part.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to title 28, section 1915A of the United States Code, this court must
review prisoner civil complaints and dismiss any portion of a complaint that is frivolous
or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 18 U.S.C. §
1915A(b). Although detailed allegations are not required, a complaint must include
sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon
which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Nevertheless, it is wellestablished that “[p]ro se complaints ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise
the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403
(2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.
On July 31, 2016, Correction Officer Brantly propped open Manon’s cell door,
which permitted another inmate to enter Manon’s cell and assault him. Correction
Officer James also witnessed the incident. Afterward, Brantly wrote a disciplinary report
in which he falsely stated that the physical altercation occurred in the dayroom outside
For the purposes of an Initial Review Order, the court accepts all factual allegations in the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Williams v. Correction
of Manon’s cell, despite the fact that James had told him that the altercation occurred
inside the cell. The incident was not investigated.
The next day, Manon submitted a written request to Captain Paine to preserve
the video surveillance footage of the incident, but Captain Paine refused to produce the
footage, stating that he could not review it without a court order. Manon then wrote to
Counselor Moore who refused to provide the video footage because Manon’s request
“was not received in the [required] time frame.”
On August 11, 2016, Lieutenant Diaz told Manon that he had reviewed the video
and had seen the other inmate enter Manon’s cell. Diaz said that she knew Manon was
not at fault and “wrote that on her report.”
On August 16, 2016, Manon requested assistance from “C.T.O.” Perry.
Specifically, Manon requested that Perry “take notes of the things [he] needed . . . to
defend [him]self” at the disciplinary hearing, review the video from the incident, and
determine how much time elapsed after the other inmate entered his cell before any
prison official noticed. He also asked her to take a statement from his cell mate,
Paredes. Perry did not honor any of Manon’s requests.
Unsatisfied, Manon wrote to Warden Chapdelaine and Deputy Wardens
Guadarrama and Hynes on August 19, 2016, requesting all written reports of the July 31
incident, but he never received a response from any of them. That same day, Manon
was moved to Q-Pod, a unit that houses inmates who have been sanctioned for
disciplinary reports. The Q-Pod unit also has inadequate plumbing, which created “a
Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2016).
serious threat to [Manon’s] physical and mental well being . . . .” A few weeks later, he
was moved to N-Pod, a similar unit. There, Manon learned that the inmate who had
assaulted him had not been issued a disciplinary report.
On September 22, 2016, Manon submitted a grievance for prison officials’ failure
to respond to his requests for information about the incident, which was later rejected.
That same week, he was moved to another disciplinary housing unit.
On September 29, 2016, Manon was transferred to general population and
placed in a cell adjacent to where the inmate who had assaulted him was staying.
Manon feared for his safety because the other inmate had “access to the same things
as [him].” Manon believes that the decision not to discipline the other inmate is part of a
conspiracy to cover up the July 31 incident.
On November 8, he requested from Counselor Moore copies of reports on the
July 31 incident and information regarding his disciplinary ticket. Three months later,
Manon received the requested information, but he “felt like [he] was given what
[officials] wanted [him] to see only and not all of it.” Lieutenant Diaz’s report, which
allegedly stated that he had seen the other inmate enter Manon’s cell on July 31, was
not included in the information provided to Manon. None of the reports given to Manon
state that he had a physical altercation with another inmate. Three prison officials
reported that the video footage taken of the incident do not capture the physical
altercation because there was a pillar blocking the view of the camera lens.
Manon is suing defendants Brantly, James, Chapdelaine, Guadarrama, and
Hynes for acting with deliberate indifference to his safety, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. He is suing defendants
Moore and Perry for violating his procedural due process rights based on their failure to
assist him in procuring evidence in his defense against the disciplinary sanctions
imposed by prison officials. To remedy these alleged violations, Manon seeks monetary
damages and an order that Brantly, James, Moore, and Perry be suspended for six
months without pay.
Claims for Relief
Manon does not specify in his Complaint whether he is suing the defendants in
their individual or official capacities. To the extent he seeks monetary damages against
the defendants in their official capacities, those claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 342 (1979). All such claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Furthermore, this court cannot order disciplinary action against the defendants.
See Osuch v. Gregory, 303 F. Supp.2d 189, 194 (D. Conn. 2004) (prisoner has no
constitutional right to have defendants prosecuted or disciplined). Therefore, his
request that defendants Brantly, James, Moore, and Perry be suspended for six months
without pay is also DISMISSED.
Claims Against Chapdelaine, Guadarrama, and Hynes
Manon’s allegations against Chapdelaine, Guadarrama, and Hynes include
allegations that each of these defendants “allow[ed] . . . unethical conduct and . . . cruel
and unusual punishment,” Compl. at 15, and that each defendant failed to provide
Manon with the written documents related to the July 31, 2016 incident, Compl. at 11.
With respect to Manon’s allegations that the Chapdelaine, Guadarrama, and
Hynes permitted unethical and cruel and unusual conduct to occur under their
supervision, which the court construes as a deliberate indifference claim, Manon has
failed to state a claim of personal involvement by these three defendants. “It is well
settled . . . that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations
is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496,
501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1973) (doctrine of respondeat superior does not suffice for
claim of monetary damages under § 1983). Personal involvement cannot be
established simply by showing that a defendant was in a supervisory role over one or
more persons who violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ayers v. Coughlin, 780
F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985) (claim for monetary damages against Commissioner of
Correction requires showing more than linkage in prison chain of command); McKinnon
v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977) (fact that Commissioner was in high
position of authority insufficient basis for personal liability).
A plaintiff who sues a supervisory official for monetary damages must allege that
the official was “personally involved” in the constitutional deprivation in one of four ways:
(1) the official directly participated in the deprivation; (2) the official learned about the
deprivation through a report or appeal and failed to remedy the wrong; (3) the official
created or perpetuated a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices
occurred; or (4) the official was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused
the unlawful condition or event. Wright, 21 F.3d at 501; Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d
137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003). “In addition, supervisory liability may be imposed where an
official demonstrates gross negligence or deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional practices
are taking place.” Wright, 21 F.3d at 501. The plaintiff must allege a causal link
between the conduct of the supervisory official, or lack thereof, and the injury. See Poe
v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002). Manon’s factual allegation against
Warden Chapdelaine, Deputy Warden Guadarrama, and Deputy Warden Hynes that he
sent them a request for all written reports of the July 31 incident is insufficient to show
the necessary gross negligence or deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights.
See Smith v. Conn. Dept. of Corr., No. 3:05CV960 (HBF), 2007 WL 678549, at *4 (D.
Conn. Mar. 1, 2007) (holding that “[f]or the purposes of Section 1983 . . . personal
involvement cannot be established based on the receipt of a letter or grievance” and
In addition, Manon does not allege that he alerted Chapdelaine, Guadarrama, or
Hynes to any unlawful or unconstitutional behavior, but only that he sent them a request
for written documents. Therefore, even if the court accepted Manon’s argument that
notifying supervisory actors by letter would be enough to make them personally
involved, his claim would still fail because he has not pled facts indicating that his letter
put these defendants on notice of the alleged constitutional and statutory violations.
See Bodie v. Morgenthau, 342 F. Supp. 2d 193, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Because [the
plaintiff] fails to allege that he alerted these two defendants of actions barred by the
Constitution or federal law, he fails to state a claim that they were involved in conduct
barred by section 1983.”).
Similarly, Manon’s allegation that Chapdelaine, Guadarrama, and Hynes ignored
his request for written reports, which the court broadly construes as an allegation of a
procedural due process violation, is not sufficient to allege personal involvement on the
part of these defendants. See Atkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1233
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[A]llegations that an official ignored a prisoner’s letter is not enough to
establish personal involvement.”). There is no indication in the Complaint that any of
these three defendants had a duty to supply Manon with the relevant documents; to the
contrary, Manon’s Complaint states that he was informed that Officer Moore was
responsible for the relevant documents, and in fact did provide him with documents
eventually (although Manon asserts that Moore refused to provide him with the relevant
surveillance footage and withheld exculpatory documents). Compl. at 13.
Therefore, Manon’s claims against Warden Chapdelaine, Deputy Warden
Guadarrama, and Deputy Warden Hynes are DISMISSED for failure to plead sufficient
Deliberate Indifference to Safety
Manon claims that defendants Brantly and James violated his Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment by acting with deliberate indifference
to safety when they permitted another inmate to enter his cell and assault him.
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).
“[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal quotations omitted);
see also Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997). To state a claim for
deliberate indifference to safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Manon must
show that the alleged conduct was sufficiently serious and that Brantly and James acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, that is, that they were “deliberate[ly]
indifferen[t]” to Manon’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In other words, Brantly and
James must have been aware that Manon faced an excessive risk to his health and
safety and ignored that risk. See id. at 837. To determine whether Manon faced an
excessive risk of serious harm, the courts “look at the facts and circumstances of which
the official was aware at the time he acted or failed to act.” Hartry v. County of Suffolk,
755 F. Supp. 2d 422, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Moreover, to obtain an award for damages against either defendant, Manon
must show that he was personally liable for the alleged constitutional violation. Farid v.
Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).
In this case, Manon alleges that Brantly propped open the door to his cell, which
allowed another inmate to enter his cell and assault him. Compl. at 9. He further states
that the other inmate had no reason to be on his tier, let alone in his cell. Id. James
allegedly witnessed the incident and did nothing to prevent the assault. Id. at 9, 13.
Brantly then allegedly lied in a disciplinary report by stating that Manon and the other
inmate physically fought in the dayroom when, in fact, the incident occurred inside
Manon’s cell. Id. at 13. Construed liberally, these allegations state a plausible Eighth
Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to safety.
Procedural Due Process
Manon claims that defendants Moore and Perry violated his right to due process
by refusing to provide him with the video surveillance footage and other evidence which
were necessary to prepare his defense against disciplinary sanctions for the July 31
incident. Based on these allegations, the court construes Manon’s claim as a violation
of procedural due process.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that due
process requires procedural protections before a prisoner could be deprived of a
protected liberty interest. In finding a protected liberty interest in Wolff, the Court noted
that the right at issue, good time credit, was statutorily provided by the State of
Nebraska. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–85 (1995), the Court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that prison discipline “encroaches upon a liberty interest under the
Due Process Clause even in the absence of any state regulation [creating a liberty
interest].” In so doing, the Court explicitly noted that the disciplinary segregation which
was the plaintiff’s basis for his section 1983 claim “did not present the type of atypical,
significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest”
because “disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those
conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody”
and therefore “did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement either in
duration or degree of restriction.” Id. at 486. Thus, a plaintiff “has a protected liberty
interest only (1) if the state has created a liberty interest in a statute or regulation and
(2) deprivation of that interest caused plaintiff to suffer an ‘atypical and significant
hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Cruz v. Prior, No. 3:16-cv1303 (VAB), 2016 WL 5348571, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2016).
Manon’s Complaint suggests, though he does not explicitly state, that after the
July 31 incident, he was placed in segregated housing until August 19, 2016, without a
disciplinary hearing. Compl. at 9, 11. He implies that during this time he had access to
a water fountain with low pressure out of which he did not feel safe drink, resulting in
dehydration. Id. at 11. It is not clear from the Complaint whether Manon had access to
other sources of water, nor is it clear whether anything was wrong with the water
fountain water aside from touching the fountain itself. Manon further asserts that on
August 19, 2016, he was transferred to a unit for inmates with disciplinary sentences,
and on September 9, 2016, was transferred again to another unit “not different from
ticket block,” and states that he was “still getting punished even after charges were
dropped.” Id. at 11, 13. He does not specify in what way or to what extent the
conditions in these units differed from that of the conditions in the general population.
Finally, Manon states that he was transferred to the general population on September
29, 2016. Id. at 13. He therefore alleges that he was in segregated housing for
nineteen days, and in some form of disciplinary housing for an additional forty-one day,
for a total of sixty days of disciplinary housing.
In Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652, 656 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit held that,
because prison discipline involving restrictive housing implicates a due process liberty
interest, the Wolff requirements of due process applied to disciplinary hearings resulting
in restrictive housing sanctions. However, the Second Circuit has since specified that
“[a] prisoner’s liberty interest is implicated by prison discipline . . . only if the discipline
imposes [an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.” Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004)). As the Court of Appeals explained
Factors relevant to determining whether the plaintiff endured
an atypical and significant hardship include the extent to
which the conditions of the disciplinary segregation differ
from other routine prison conditions and the duration of the
disciplinary segregation imposed compared to discretionary
confinement. . . . [R]estrictive confinements of less than 101
days do not generally raise a liberty interest warranting due
process protection, and thus require proof of conditions more
onerous than usual.
We have also stated that SHU
confinements of fewer than 101 days could constitute
atypical and significant hardships if the conditions were more
severe than the normal SHU conditions or a more fully
developed record showed that even relatively brief
confinements under normal SHU conditions were, in fact,
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Davis is not directly on point because Manon is incarcerated in a Connecticut
facility, and the plaintiff in Davis was in the custody of the State of New York.
Therefore, the first question for this court is whether the State of Connecticut has
created a right to be free from disciplinary segregation such as would satisfy the first of
the two Sandin requirements.
State of Connecticut Department of Corrections Administrative Directive 9.5
(“Directive 9.5”) states that “punitive segregation shall be for a definite period of time,”
based on the classification of the offense. Directive 9.5 at ¶ 10(B). Directive 9.5 further
provides that, if an inmate does not plead guilty to the disciplinary offense charged, the
inmate will be provided with an “advocate” who “shall meet with the inmate at least 24
hours prior to the hearing, review all submitted documentation and evidence . . . , assist
the inmate in preparing a defense, and document his/her conclusions and
recommendations.” 9.5(25). Directive 9.5 further details the procedures to be followed
during the hearing itself, including that “[t]he inmate shall be given an opportunity to
present the inmate’s version of the offense” and “to present witness testimony.”
Directive 9.5 at ¶ 31(I).
In light of the procedural protections that the governing Directive provides, the
court finds that Connecticut has created a protected liberty interest in being free from
disciplinary segregation. Although other courts do not appear to have reached this
precise question, both the Connecticut Supreme Court and other courts in this District
have reached a similar conclusion with respect to administrative segregation. See
Vandever v. Comm’r of Corr., 315 Conn. 231 (2014); Ellerbe v. Jasion, No. 3:12-cv00580 (MPS), 2015 WL 1064739, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2015) (collecting cases).
However, Manon’s claim fails on the second prong of the Sandin standard,
namely the requirement that the disciplinary segregation in question must impose a
“substantial and atypical hardship” resulting from disciplinary segregation. As described
above, Manon has alleged only 19 days in segregated housing, and an additional 41
days in some kind of special housing unit for people with disciplinary records. With
respect to both the first 19 days and the subsequent 41 days, it is unclear what the
housing conditions were like or how they differed from the general population at
MacDougall-Walker. The only fact asserted with respect to the conditions of
confinement in disciplinary segregation is that the water fountain to which Manon had
access “had no preasure [sic] and the little water that trickled traveled through rusty,
mold-like and different color metal.” Compl. at 11. Although Manon asserts that he
“[felt] dehydrated” because of this problem with the water fountain, it is unclear whether
he had access to other sources of water. In any event, it is clear that this water fountain
was only a problem for Manon for the 19 days he spent in segregated housing. On
these facts alone, the court cannot conclude that Manon has adequately plead
“substantial and atypical hardship,” particularly given the presumption that fewer than
101 days in disciplinary housing ordinarily does not rise to the level of “substantial and
atypical hardship.” See Ellerbe v. Jasion, 2015 WL 1064739, at *3 (“Where the plaintiff
was confined for an intermediate duration––between 101 and 305 days––development
of a detailed record of the conditions of confinement relative to ordinary prison
conditions is required.”) (quoting Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64–65 (2d Cir.
2004)). Manon’s due process claims are therefore dismissed for failure to plead a
protected liberty interest such that due process rights attach. However, Manon is given
leave to replead this claim if he can state facts to support a substantial and atypical
hardship despite the relatively brief duration of his disciplinary segregation.
In light of the court’s conclusion that Manon has not alleged sufficient facts with
respect to the liberty interest at stake, it is not necessary for the court to determine
whether Manon received due process. However, given that Manon may replead his
Complaint if sufficient facts exist to support a protected liberty interest, in the interests of
efficiency the court notes that, if such a liberty interest exists, Manon has pled facts
which state a due process violation. Where a protected liberty interest is at stake, the
Supreme Court has held that prisoners must receive “(1) advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense;
and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S.
445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). Manon has alleged that he did not
receive documentation explaining the charges against him, that when he eventually
received documentation it was incomplete, and that he never received a hearing
concerning the charges against him. Therefore, it is the view of the court that Manon
has alleged facts showing a lack of due process.
Furthermore, the court notes that Manon has sufficiently alleged facts showing
that, if Manon’s due process rights were violated, Moore was personally involved in that
violation. Manon alleges that Moore violated his due process rights by withholding
certain documents related to the July 31, 2016 incident, namely Lieutenant Diaz’s
report, and either withheld or destroyed evidence in the form of video surveillance
evidence, both of which Manon asserts would corroborate his claim that the inmate who
attacked him did so in his cell. Compl. at 13. These allegations are sufficient to state a
due process claim against Moore.
However, the court is not persuaded that Manon has a due process claim against
Perry, even assuming that he states a claim of substantial and atypical hardship with
respect to the disciplinary segregation. Manon asserts that Perry violated his due
process rights by failing to adequately assist him with his disciplinary hearing.
Specifically, he alleges that he asked Perry to take a statement from his cell mate,
Paredes, review the surveillance video from July 31, 2016, and pick up a statement he
had written from his cell. Id. Manon alleges that, despite this request, Perry did not
assist him in the ways that he requested. Id. As described above, Directive 9.5 gives
Manon the right to an advocate to assist him with his hearing. On the other hand, the
minimum due process rights that the Supreme Court has recognized with respect to
disciplinary proceedings in prisons––including the right to a written notification of the
charges, an opportunity to present defense evidence, and a written explanation of the
outcome––do not include a right to an advocate.
Furthermore, even assuming that Directive 9.5 is sufficient to create such a right
in Connecticut, it is not clear that Perry’s performance fell short of the requirements of
Directive 9.5. Directive 9.5 only requires that advocates “meet with the inmate at least
24 hours prior to the hearing, review all submitted documentation and evidence . . . ,
assist the inmate in preparing a defense, and document his/her conclusions and
recommendations . . . .” Directive 9.5 at ¶ 25. Directive 9.5 does not create an
obligation on the part of the advocate to follow the inmate’s instructions with respect to
investigating a disciplinary action, and none of Manon’s allegations with respect to
Perry’s performance suggest that she failed to satisfy the obligations that are stated in
Directive 9.5. Indeed, given that Manon did not receive a hearing, it is not clear that
Perry had any obligation to Manon under Directive 9.5, which explicitly associates the
advocate’s responsibilities with preparation for a hearing. For these reasons, even if
Manon successfully repleads a substantial and atypical hardship, the court is skeptical
that facts exist that would support liability on the part of Perry.
On the other hand, if Manon is able to replead substantial and atypical hardship,
it may be that additional entities at MacDougall-Walker are responsible for the absence
of due process, in particular the fact that Manon did not receive a hearing or other
opportunity to present evidence in his defense. Manon is therefore given leave to join
additional defendants in an amended complaint if he can allege facts which state
personal involvement on the part of other individuals.
Manon’s Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to safety
may proceed against defendants Brantly and James in their individual capacities for
monetary damages only. All other claims are dismissed. Chapdelaine, Guadarrama,
Hynes, Moore, and Perry are dismissed as defendants to this action.
Manon is given leave to replead his Complaint within twenty-one (21) days from
the date of this Order if he can allege facts to support that his disciplinary segregation
imposed a “substantial and atypical hardship” as required by Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995). If he does so, he may further amend his Complaint to join one or more
additional defendants, assuming that he can allege facts showing personal involvement
by any individuals in the absence of due process afforded to him for the disciplinary
charges at issue in this case.
The Clerk shall verify the current work addresses of defendants Brantly
and James with the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs and mail a waiver
of service of process request packet to each defendant at the confirmed address within
twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order. The Clerk shall report to the court on
the status of the waiver request on the thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing. If any
defendant fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make arrangements for inperson service by the U.S. Marshals Service on that defendant in his or her individual
capacity and the defendant shall be required to pay the costs of such service in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
Brantly and James shall file their response to the complaint, either an
answer or motion to dismiss, within seven months (120 days) from the date of this
Order. If they choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations and
respond to the cognizable claim recited above. They may include any and all additional
defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 27,
shall be completed within seven months (210 days) from the date of this Order.
Discovery requests need not be filed with the court.
All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within eight months (240
days) from the date of this Order.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of September, 2017 at New Haven, Connecticut.
/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge
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