Viola v. Bryant
Filing
2
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER (see attached). For the reasons stated in the attached Order, Plaintiff's [Doc. 1] Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. Signed by Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on June 21, 2017. (Kahl, A)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
GREGORY VIOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
3:17-cv-00853 (CSH)
VANESSA BRYANT,
JUNE 21, 2017
Defendant.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
Haight, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff, Gregory Viola, currently incarcerated at the Devens Federal Medical Center in
Ayer, Massachusetts, filed this complaint pro se pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which permits suits against federal employees
for violations of federal constitutional rights. Viola is challenging his sentence on certain federal
criminal charges from 2012. He also complains about the denial of his subsequent habeas petition
by the Honorable Vanessa Bryant, United States District Judge, who had also imposed Viola's
sentence. Judge Bryant is the only Defendant in Viola's complaint.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under section 1915A of title 28 of the United States Code, the Court must review all prisoner
civil complaints against governmental actors, and dismiss any portion of the complaint that “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations, and interpret
them liberally to "raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[]." Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636,
639 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002)).
Although detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford
the defendant fair notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they are based. Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). A plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nevertheless, it is well-established and worth repeating that
"[p]ro se complaints 'must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that
they suggest.'" Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)).
II.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The factual allegations contained in Viola's complaint are recounted herein, recited in the
light most favorable to Viola.
Viola entered a guilty plea to federal charges of wire fraud. Doc. 1 ¶ 1. On October 4, 2012,
Judge Bryant sentenced him without taking into consideration his acceptance of responsibility for
the crimes as proscribed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.1 While preparing
a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Viola discovered evidence allegedly showing
that Judge Bryant was biased against him. Id. ¶ 3. The evidence is attached to his complaint as
Exhibit A. Id. ¶ 4.
Exhibit A is a copy of an affidavit from an inmate who had been incarcerated with Plaintiff's
1
The Second Circuit affirmed this sentence in United States v. Viola, 555 F. App'x 57 (2d
Cir. 2014) (summary order). The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. Viola v. United
States, No. 13-10574 (2014).
2
criminal attorney, James Pickerstein. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The affidavit recounts conversations between the
inmate and Pickerstein. See Ex. A. In those conversations, Pickerstein claims to have been upset
with his former client, Viola, for a variety of reasons, deliberately set out to "screw[] him," and to
have had a relationship with "Vanessa"(referring to Judge Bryant by her first name) whereby she
would protect him and Viola would never be able to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim or win his appeal. Id. at 2-3; Doc. 1 ¶ 4.
Viola alleges that the affidavit also "makes clear" that Pickerstein promised Viola that Judge
Bryant would sentence him to 24 months just to get rid of Viola because he was a "nightmare
client." Doc. 1 ¶ 5. Viola alleges that the affidavit shows Pickerstein intended Viola to receive a
long criminal sentence in an effort to reduce his own potential criminal sentence. Id. Viola alleges
that Judge Bryant has been in a conspiracy with Pickerstein to "frustrate every procedural attempt
of the Plaintiff to prove this illegal conduct of [Judge Bryant] and James Pickerstein." Id. ¶ 6.
As evidence of this "conspiracy," Viola alleges that Judge Bryant denied a "Motion of
Discovery" that Viola filed in order to "prove these allegations" on April 26, 2016. Id. ¶ 7.2
According to Viola, Judge Bryant "showed her biasness [sic]" in the ruling by claiming that he had
not held a job since the late 1990s and that he was a habitual gambler with huge losses. Id. Viola
asserts that her actions show "plain biasness [sic] and slander." Id. Viola then filed a "Motion for
Recusal," which Viola alleges Judge Bryant improperly denied because Judge Bryant is a fact
witness to his case, and thus, her recusal was required. Id. ¶ 8.3 On March 15, 2017, Viola's § 2255
2
See Viola v. United States, No. 3:15-CV-01398, 2016 WL 1664756 (D. Conn. April 26,
2016).
3
See Viola v. United States, No. 3:15-CV-01398 (D. Conn. March 15, 2017) (Doc. No. 39
filed Sept. 1, 2016).
3
habeas corpus petition was dismissed by Judge Bryant, "without any legal precedent" according to
Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 9.4
Viola alleges that Judge Bryant's conduct shows "a clear pattern and abuse of conduct" in
order to harm Viola because of her "outside relationship with James Pickerstein." Doc. 1 ¶ 10. He
believes that Judge Bryant tried to frustrate and prevent his exoneration in a court of law. Id. Viola
claims that Judge Bryant's behavior violated his constitutionally protected civil rights. Id. Viola
seeks the costs of this lawsuit, attorney's fees and all other relief that the Court feels is just and
proper. Id. at 3.
III.
DISCUSSION
Viola brings claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens is analogous to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 except that
§ 1983 applies to state actors, rather than federal actors. See Mahoney v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 681
F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Conn. 1987). Analysis of Bivens claims therefore parallel the analysis used
to evaluate state prisoners' § 1983 claims. See Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Because the two actions share the same 'practicalities of litigation', federal courts have typically
incorporated § 1983 law into Bivens actions." (collecting cases) (citation omitted)). To state a claim
under Bivens, a claimant must show (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by an official acting under
color of federal law. See Mahoney, 681 F. Supp. at 132 (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 155–56 (1978)).
4
See Viola v. United States, No. 3:15-CV-01398 (D. Conn. March 15, 2017) (Doc. No. 49
filed March 15, 2017). Viola reports the date incorrectly in his complaint as March 14, 2017.
4
As required by § 1915A, the Court must dismiss any portion of Viola's Complaint that “is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
Viola clearly seeks relief from someone who is immune from such relief and fails to state any claims
to which he is entitled to relief. Thus, Viola's complaint is "frivolous" as a matter of law, and must
be dismissed in full.
A.
Immunity
It is well established that judges are immune from suits that assert individual capacity claims
and seek damages for acts taken in exercise of the judges' judicial authority.5 Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 347 (1872) ("The principle … which exempts judges of courts of superior or
general authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial
functions, obtains in all countries where there is any wellordered system of jurisprudence. It has
been the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that
5
It is unclear what relief Viola seeks and he has not specifically pled a claim for money
damages. The Court will assume that is the only relief that he seeks. Viola's criminal case is no
longer pending in front of Judge Bryant, and he only pleads claims against her related to that
specific case. In any event, were injunctive relief what Viola seeks, such claims are precluded by
the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 ("FCIA"), which extends judicial immunity to most
actions seeking prospective injunctive relief. See Rodriguez v. Trager, No. 10-CV-0781, 2010 WL
889545, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. March 8, 2010). District courts in the Second Circuit have held that the
limitations in § 309(c) of the FCIA apply to Bivens actions. Id. (collecting cases). Pursuant to the
FCIA in actions brought against a judicial officer for acts taken in their judicial capacity, "'injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.'" Id. (quoting Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), Pub.L. No. 104–317,
110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and citing Huminski v. Corsones, 396
F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir. 2005)). There are no conceivable allegations that a declaratory decree was
violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable in Viola's pleadings. Thus, were injunctive relief
what Viola seeks (and the Court does not believe he does so), he would not be entitled to it.
5
we are aware of, in the courts of this country."); see also McCulley v. Chatigny, 390 F. Supp. 2d 126,
130 (D. Conn. 2005) ("Federal judges are also absolutely immune from individual capacity claims
for damages when those claims arise out of the conduct of their official judicial duties." (citing
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) ); Patterson v. Rodgers, 708 F. Supp. 2d 225, 234 (D. Conn.
2010) ("Judges are immune from suit for exercising their judicial authority." (citing Bradley, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall) at 347)).
This judicial immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of bad faith, malice or conspiracy.
Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 347 ("Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be
affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed."); Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11
("[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice."); Dorman v. Higgins,
821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[A]n allegation that an act was done pursuant to a conspiracy has
no greater effect than an allegation that it was done in bad faith or with malice, neither of which
defeats a claim of absolute immunity." (collecting cases)). The Supreme Court has made clear that
judges "are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 351)).6
The only circumstances under which a judge is not immune from such suits is when the judge
takes a non-judicial action, i.e., an action not within her judicial capacity, Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 227-29 (1988); or when the action is taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,
6
In the analogous context of § 1983 actions, the Supreme Court has consistently applied the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)
("[J]udges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts
performed in their judicial capacities." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
6
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57.7 The determination of whether a judge's actions are judicial or
nonjudicial in nature, and thus, whether the judge is immune from suit, is a question of law for the
Court. Leslie v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 3:05-cv-1725, 2006 WL 1980305, at *4
(D. Conn. July 12, 2006) (citing Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990)). That
determination is made by consideration of the nature and function of the act; for example, whether
the act is one ordinarily performed by a judge. See id.; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13.
Viola's allegations clearly refer only to judicial actions taken by Judge Bryant. He alleges
that Judge Bryant denied a discovery motion and a recusal motion and then dismissed his § 2255
petition. In each of these actions, Judge Bryant performed inherently judicial functions. See Leslie,
2006 WL 1980305, at *5 (finding the act of issuing a memorandum denying the plaintiff's motion
to be judicial and protected from suit). Thus, Judge Bryant is immune from this suit. Viola's general
allegations of bias and conspiracy do not alter her immunity or this Court's analysis. See Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11; Dorman, 821 F.2d at 139.
In addition, it is not absolutely clear from the complaint as to whether Viola has sued Judge
Bryant in her official capacity. Such a suit against a federal governmental official would be a suit
against the United States. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). To the extent that Viola
has asserted any official capacity claims under Bivens, the United States is immune from such a suit
as a sovereign. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). The United States has not
waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410; see also
McQuay v. Pelkey, No. 3:16-cv-436, 2017 WL 2174403, at *2 (D. Conn. May 17, 2017) (citing
7
None of Viola's allegations support that there could be any finding of an absence of
jurisdiction applicable to his criminal proceedings. Thus, such an exception is inapplicable to this
action.
7
Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) and Wright v. Condit,
No. 13-CV-2849, 2015 WL 708607, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2015)). Thus, to the extent such
claims are alleged, they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In conclusion, any Bivens claims asserted by Viola are barred by judicial immunity or
sovereign immunity. If Viola believed that Judge Bryant had acted in error, maliciously, or
improperly, his remedies were to appeal the allegedly erroneous rulings or to file a complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 351. Although Viola may feel wronged by this decision, "absolute judicial immunity
from damages suits is essential in order that judges may perform their judicial work impartially and
without any fear of retribution from disappointed litigants." See McCulley, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 130
(citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10). Viola's complaint must be dismissed because it fails to state any
claims against defendants not immune from suit, and asserts only claims which must be
characterized as "frivolous" under governing law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
B.
Heck Barred Claims
Even if the plaintiff's claim were cognizable, Viola's claims are entirely barred by the
Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that, if a determination favorable to the plaintiff in a § 1983 action "would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence," then the plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal or declared invalid before he can recover any damages.
512 U.S. at 486-87.
It is well established that Heck also applies to Bivens actions. Tavarez, 54 F.3d at 110
("Given the similarity between suits under § 1983 and Bivens, we conclude that Heck should apply
to Bivens actions as well." (citing Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam))).
8
Courts have repeatedly held that claims of judicial misconduct can be barred by Heck. See, e.g.,
Collin v. Conn. Judicial Branch, No. 16-cv-1390, 2016 WL 6304434, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2016)
(holding that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for judicial misconduct claims); Abraham v. N.Y.C.
Police Dep't, No. 15-CV-5208, 2016 WL 3181125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2016) (holding that
claims of judicial and prosecutorial bias and misconduct were barred by Heck); Godwin v. Reeves,
No. 1:14-cv-00572, 2014 WL 1757209, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2014) ("It appears success on
Plaintiff's judicial misconduct claim would impact the fact or duration of his confinement and be
Heck barred.").
Viola contends that Judge Bryant denied his motions, refused to recuse herself and dismissed
his petition. Viola argues that Judge Bryant was biased against him and would do nothing that might
discredit his attorney's performance. However, Viola was convicted, sentenced and is currently
incarcerated. His direct appeals were denied and his habeas petition was dismissed by Judge Bryant.
He has not put forth any allegations that demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has been
invalidated in any of the ways set forth in Heck. See Abraham, 2016 WL 3181125, at *4. If the
Court were to rule in Viola's favor, the validity of his sentence would most certainly be called into
question. See Godwin, 2014 WL 1757209 at *2-3 (holding that Heck barred claims in similar
circumstances). Accordingly, Viola's claims are also barred by the Supreme Court's decision in
Heck.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the court finds Viola's complaint is frivolous, fails to state any claim to which he is
entitled to relief, and seeks monetary relief against a defendant is who immune from such liability.
Consequently, Viola's complaint [Doc. 1] is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and
9
(2). Because Viola cannot amend his pro se complaint to overcome the infirmities in his complaint,
the Court also finds that the dismissal of Viola's action must be with prejudice.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this
case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: New Haven, Connecticut
June 21, 2017
/s/ Charles S. Haight, Jr.
CHARLES S. HAIGHT, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?