Ely v. Marino

Filing 31

ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss; denying 23 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 1/23/18. (Gould, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
AMANDA ELY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

17-cv-860-WWE

BRIAN MARINO and
STEPHEN ANDERSON,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS
In this consolidated civil rights action, plaintiff asserts that defendants
Connecticut State Trooper Brian Marino and Shelton Police Officer Stephen Anderson
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Defendant Anderson has moved to dismiss this action and defendant Marino has
moved for judgment on the pleadings.1 For the following reasons, defendant
Anderson’s motion to dismiss will be granted, and defendant Marino’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings will be denied.
BACKGROUND
The following background is taken from the allegations of plaintiffs’ complaint,
which are accepted as true for purposes of this decision.
On June 11, 2014, Officer Anderson contacted defendant Marino and “falsely
and maliciously” reported that plaintiff was illegally growing marijuana in an apartment,
which he claimed plaintiff occupied in Derby. Defendant Marino sought and obtained a
warrant to search plaintiff’s apartment in Derby based on this allegedly false

The Court considers the arguments that plaintiff asserted in her opposition brief [doc.
20] to the motion to dismiss [doc. 19] on docket 17cv967.
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information, and police officers then searched plaintiff’s apartment.
The Court takes judicial notice that plaintiff was arrested, prosecuted and
convicted for felony conspiracy to commit possession of hallucinogenic substances or
greater than four ounces of marijuana in violation of state law.
DISCUSSION
The function of a motion to dismiss is “merely to assess the legal feasibility of the
complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support
thereof.” Ryder Energy Distrib. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779
(2d Cir. 1984). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where material facts are
undisputed and where a judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the
contents of the pleadings.” Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d
Cir. 1988). In deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, a court employs the same standard
applicable to dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC,
647 F.3d 419, 429 (2d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, the Court must accept all well-pleaded
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Hishon v.
King, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The complaint must contain the grounds upon which the
claim rests through factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

A plaintiff is

obliged to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such
amplification is needed to render the claim plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
Plaintiff has alleged that the search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment
because it was not supported by probable cause.

Defendant Anderson
Anderson asserts that plaintiff’s claim against him is not cognizable because he
was not personally involved in obtaining the warrant or conducting the alleged
unreasonable search. Personal involvement of a defendant in the alleged
constitutional deprivation is a prerequisite to a claim for damages under Section 1983.
Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff argues that her allegations against Anderson are similar to a Fourth
Amendment violation based on malicious prosecution, which requires that (1) the
defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against plaintiff;
(2) the criminal proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant acted
without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose
other than that of bringing an offender to justice. Moreno v. City of New Haven Dep. Of
Police Serv., 604 F. Supp. 2d 364, 374 (D. Conn. 2009). However, plaintiff has not
pleaded the elements of a malicious prosecution case. Further, plaintiff cannot plead
such a malicious prosecution claim under Section 1983 unless the criminal proceedings
terminated in her favor. The Court has taken judicial notice of plaintiff’s conviction
stemming from the search that resulted from Anderson’s conduct.
The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant Anderson
participated in the alleged unreasonable search. The complaint contains no allegation
that Anderson acted to obtain the warrant or to search the apartment. Accordingly, the
Court will grant the motion to dismiss on the Fourth Amendment claim against
Anderson.
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Heck v. Humphrey
Under Heck v. Humphrey, a Section 1983 claim for damages that “would
necessarily imply the invalidity of [plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence” is not cognizable,
unless the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence was “reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). However, due to doctrines such as
independent source and inevitable discovery, a claim for damages due to an allegedly
unreasonable search “may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that
was introduced in a state criminal trial” resulting in plaintiff’s conviction. Id. at 487 n.7.
At the same time, if a conviction depended upon evidence that resulted from the
challenged search, a Fourth Amendment claim would be barred by Heck.
In ruling on defendants’ motions, the Court does not have a factual record
sufficient to determine whether plaintiff’s conviction was dependent upon the allegedly
unreasonable search. Fifield v. Barrancotta, 353 Fed. Appx. 479, 481 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court will leave plaintiff to her proof that she suffered an “actual, compensable
injury” based on defendant Marino’s alleged unreasonable search. Heck, 512 U.S. at
487 n.7 (stating that “injury” does not “encompass” the “injury” of conviction and
imprisonment). The motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings will be
denied on this basis.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Anderson’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED
[doc. 30]; defendant Marino’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [doc. 23] is
DENIED.
Dated this 23rd day of January, 2018 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

/s/Warren W. Eginton
WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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