McFarland et al v. Inland Wetlands Commission

Filing 37

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. For the reasons stated in the attached ruling, defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. # 29 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. # 23 ) is DENIED in light of my grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. The Clerk of Court shall close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 2/2/2018. (Black, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SCOTT MCFARLAND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

No. 3:17-cv-00936 (JAM)

INLAND WETLANDS COMMISSION, et
al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs have sued their town because the town won’t let them cut down trees on their
property without obtaining a permit. Because plaintiffs have not alleged plausible grounds for
relief under federal law, I will dismiss this action without prejudice to plaintiffs’ right to seek
any relief that may be available in state court.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations from plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. #22) are
accepted as true solely for the purpose of this motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs Scott and Beth
McFarland own a home and property in the Town of Wilton, Connecticut. On February 14, 2017,
plaintiffs were in their backyard cutting logs when a town official named Michael Conklin
entered the backyard to tell plaintiffs that he had received complaints about them “clearing” trees
on their property. The following day, plaintiffs received letters from Conklin and from the
chairman of the Town’s wetlands commission to the effect that they would need to take
corrective action and seek a permit before cutting down any more trees on their property.
Plaintiffs have now filed a pro se complaint against the Town of Wilton and its Inland
Wetlands Commission seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The amended complaint alleges
1

that defendants have violated plaintiffs’ right to substantive due process under the U.S.
Constitution. The complaint also cites the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(“APA”), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2202, as well as the Connecticut Inland
Wetlands and Watercourses Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-36 et seq. Defendants now move to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)6), and plaintiffs have crossmoved for partial summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
For purposes of either a Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept as true all factual matters alleged in a complaint, although a complaint may not survive
unless its factual recitations state a basis for federal jurisdiction and a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mastafa v. Chevron
Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2014); Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp.
3d 153, 155–56 (D. Conn. 2016).
Plaintiffs claim a violation of their rights to substantive due process. The substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against governmental
conduct that is so noxious and abusive that it can be said to shock the conscience. See, e.g.,
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998); Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170
F.3d 258, 262–63 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs here complain that local officials will not let them cut
trees or clear their land without a permit as they would like. This is hardly conduct so egregious
in nature that it shocks the conscience and rises to the level of a violation of substantive due
process. Even if defendants have violated state or local law or regulations, this without more falls
short of establishing a substantive due process claim. See, e.g., Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159,
167 (2d Cir. 2010); Interport Pilots Agency v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir.1994). Nor have

2

plaintiffs alleged that they are members of a suspect class or seek to exercise a fundamental right
that would warrant a higher level of scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Dittmer v.
Cty. of Suffolk, New York, 59 F. App’x 375, 378 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting property owner’s
substantive due process challenge to land use restrictions imposed by New York Pine Barrens
Protection Act). In short, plaintiffs have not alleged a plausible claim for relief under the Due
Process Clause.
The complaint next cites the federal Administrative Procedures Act (APA). But the APA
does not apply to local government actors or entities like the Town of Wilton or its Inland
Wetlands Commission. The APA allows for judicial review of “agency action,” see 5 U.S.C. §
702, and an “agency” is defined to include “each authority of the Government of the United
States,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1), without any reference to state or local government actors or
entities. “While it is true that there is a strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review
of administrative action, that presumption is only available with regard to the administrative acts
of federal agencies as defined in the APA.” New York v. Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n,
609 F.3d 524, 533 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (interstate
commission created by congressionally approved compact not a federal “agency” within
meaning of APA). Accordingly, plaintiffs have not alleged plausible grounds for relief under the
APA.
The complaint next cites the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. That statute
provides in relevant part that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, … any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought.” Ibid. But the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only; it does not

3

create an independent federal cause of action and does not expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2012); Cable Television
Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1992). Accordingly, for lack of an
independent federal cause of action upon which to predicate a claim for declaratory relief,
plaintiffs have not alleged plausible grounds for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
What remains is plaintiffs’ state law claim under the Connecticut Inland Wetlands and
Watercourses Act (IWWA). I decline to consider this claim. “When district courts dismiss all
claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss as
well all related state claims.” Artis v. D.C., ___ S. Ct. ___, 2018 WL 491524, at *3 (U.S. Jan. 22,
2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711
F.3d 106, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2013).1
Nor is there any basis to conclude that plaintiffs’ state law claim under IWWA somehow
presents a federal question that would allow for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court has ruled that “the presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Obviously, if a complaint alleges a state law claim for
relief, there is good reason to conclude that the claim does not on its face present a federal
question.
To be sure, there are narrow exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule if a state law
claim necessarily incorporates federal law, see Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Bridgeport, 368

1

Of course, if there were an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as federal diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, then the Court would exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claim. Here, however,
plaintiffs are citizens of Connecticut and have sued their own town in Connecticut, such that there is no basis for
federal diversity jurisdiction.

4

F.3d 108, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2004), or if a state law claim is altogether and completely displaced or
preempted by federal law, see McCulloch Orthopaedic Surgical Servs., PLLC v. Aetna Inc., 857
F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2017). But “[a] complaint that merely anticipates that the defense will
raise a federal issue does not create federal jurisdiction,” and “if the underlying coercive lawsuit
that the declaratory judgment action seeks to block … would not present a federal issue, then the
declaratory judgment procedure cannot furnish the federal courts with jurisdiction.” Finneran,
954 F.2d at 94.
Here, plaintiffs’ claim of a violation of IWWA does not present a federal question.
Although plaintiffs argue that the federal Coastal Zone Management Act may generally limit the
scope and application of state wetlands law, see Doc. #35 at 2-4, the complaint does not allege
how defendants here have violated the Coastal Zone Management Act. Nor does the complaint
plausibly allege facts to suggest that the federal Coastal Zone Management Act preempts state
law as applied here or prevents the town in general from regulating the chopping down of trees.
Cf. Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d
206 (2d Cir. 2011) (federal aviation law did not preempt IWWA regulations governing tree
removal on airport wetlands).
Accordingly, there is no conceivable basis to conclude that plaintiffs’ IWWA claim
presents a federal question, and I will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law
claims. Of course, to the extent that plaintiffs contend—as they do in their motion for partial
summary judgment—that defendants lacked jurisdiction to exercise their authority under IWWA
and local regulations, they may pursue any available remedies for state or local law violations in
the state courts of Connecticut rather than in federal court.

5

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. #29) is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. #23) is DENIED in light of my grant of
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 2nd day of February 2018.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

6